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FOREWORD
With the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China
celebrating their 75th anniversary on August 1, 2002, it only seemed
appropriate and timely to take stock of the world’s largest military.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has officially been in existence
for three-quarters of a century, and its history is one filled with
turmoil and warfare. One weekend in September 2002, a group of
PLA specialists gathered at Carlisle Barracks, the home of the U.S.
Army War College, to assess what lessons China’s soldiers had
drawn from the history of their own armed forces.
This volume constitutes the final product of months of extensive
research by the individual authors and hours of intense discussion
at the 3-day conference by approximately 50 participants. The
conference was sponsored jointly by the American Enterprise
Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the U.S. Army War College.
It is with great pleasure that I commend this book to anyone with a
serious interest in the Chinese military.

Ambassador James R. Lilley
Senior Fellow
American Enterprise Institute
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PART I:
OVERVIEW

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION:
THE LESSON LEARNED BY CHINA’S SOLDIERS
Laurie Burkitt
Andrew Scobell
Larry M. Wortzel
The title of this volume, “The Lessons of History: The Chinese
People’s Liberation Army at 75,” captures well the overall theme
of the twelve chapters that follow. The primary focus is not on
summarizing the lessons that analysts or scholars from outside
China have learned when they look back at the past three-quarters
of a century of Chinese military history. Rather, the emphasis of
this volume is to assess key lessons that the top ranks of the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) have drawn from their own military’s 75year history. The reader should be clear at the outset: this volume
is not a comprehensive up-to-date overview of the state of the PLA;
nor is it a comprehensive 75-year history of the Chinese communist
military. Anyone seeking these will have to look elsewhere.1 The
primary value of this volume, we believe, is that it provides insights
into what Chinese military leaders themselves take from their past.
Learning Chinese Lessons and Avoiding Pitfalls of Analysis.
The PLA is certainly not monolithic and to attribute a single,
collective point of view is foolish, if not futile. Nevertheless, the
contributors to this volume attempt to distill lessons learned by the
Chinese military as an institution. However, in many cases, it is
impossible to assert with 100 percent reliability what precise lessons
have been gleaned by the PLA. Wherever possible, the contributors
have used Chinese published source material originating from
within what Paul Godwin calls “China’s Defense Establishment.”
Moreover, it should be noted that the analyses in this volume are
based entirely on open source materials.
There are challenges for any outsider researching a military
organization, and there are particular challenges in studying an
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opaque institution like the PLA.2 Since analysts are not always privy
to the classified studies conducted for the internal use of the Chinese
military, there is the ever-present danger of dutifully parroting the
propaganda published in official works produced for public and/or
foreign consumption. Often the researcher is left to read between the
lines, discerning what is left unsaid or taking the logic of the official
printed lesson a step further. These challenges can be partially
overcome by supplementing open sources with internally circulated
materials wherever possible and through interviews and firsthand
observation. For the non-Chinese researcher, another challenge
to be overcome in studying China’s armed forces is that of mirror
imaging. Many PLA analysts today have served or are serving in the
militaries of their own countries and still others work in the defense
intellectual communities.3 There can be a tendency to presume that
all militaries think and operate more or less like one’s own does.
Yet, the kinds of lessons the U.S. Army may draw from a particular
experience may be very different from those that might be drawn by
the PLA’s ground forces. Fortunately, mirror imaging is kept under
control because most specialists have had to immerse themselves in
Chinese language, history, and culture often for a decade or more.
Many have spent months--if not years--of their professional lives in
China with day-to-day interaction with the PLA.
Lessons or Reactions? Individual or Institutional? Learned or
Lost?
What is a lesson? As conference participant Wendy Frieman
cautioned, lesson should not be conflated with reaction. Soldiers and
strategists often have gut reactions. But these are not the same as an
individual or an institution learning a lesson. Even if an individual
battlefield commander has learned a lesson, that does not mean an
army as a whole has absorbed a lesson. Dennis Vetock, in his history
of U.S. Army Lesson Learning, observes:
An army learns lessons after it incorporates the conclusions
derived from experience into institutional form. Out of the
commander’s experience may come a lesson, and from that lesson
may come new or adapted doctrine or perhaps dissemination of
potentially useful information. Only after its institutionalization
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can the lesson be correctly described in the past tense as a lesson
learned. Until then it remains just a lesson or usable experience, a
semantic distinction that few fully appreciate.4

Moreover, just as lessons can be learned, they can also be “lost.”5
In short, for a military lesson to be truly “learned,” it must result
in a real change or transformation and this kind of thoroughgoing
institutional change can take years, if not longer.
Indeed,
fundamental change does not come quickly or easily to a large
bureaucratic organization such as a military institution.6
Military Modernization: Lessons and Frustrations.
The history of the PLA in the eyes of its 2.5 million service
members is a glorious one of heroic struggle and triumph over
insurmountable obstacles. A fundamental lesson learned by the
PLA is that the weak can triumph over the strong. No matter how
daunting the difficulties and how superior the foe appears to be,
ultimate victory is possible if selfless Chinese soldiers and civilians
doggedly pursue their tasks. After all, China built an atomic bomb, a
daunting undertaking,7 and the PLA Navy and Air Force developed
from extremely humble beginnings, each officially established as a
separate service in 1949. While the PLA remains an overwhelmingly
“muddy boots” military, its air and naval arms have made significant
progress in recent decades in terms of quality of equipment, caliber
of personnel, and operational capabilities. Here it is worth quoting
General Liu Zhen, who recalled thoughts he had running through
his mind when he was appointed commander of the air force of
the Chinese People’s Volunteers on the eve of China’s military
intervention in the Korean War. General Liu wrote in his memoirs
that upon his appointment, he had to admit to himself that the whole
subject of airpower was a “mystery.” In fact, he had absolutely no
experience in commanding aircraft formations. Liu went on to state
the obvious: “. . . in our level of tactics and technology we were way,
way below those of our enemy [i.e., the U.S. Air Force].” In facing
his apparently hopeless task, Liu could only draw inspiration from
the fact that the PLA had long struggled against unbelievable odds
on the battlefield, always learning through a painful process of trial
and error. He was comforted when recalling: “I . . . had a resolute
5

thought running through my mind over and over again: the cause
of the revolution had all along developed out of nothing, gone
from small to big, developed as a brutal, difficult, death-defying
struggle.”8
More recently, the PLA has undertaken a massive, wholesale
transformation from a mass peasant infantry to smaller, highlytrained, and well-educated integrated army that stresses high
technology and is capable of waging modern 21st century warfare.
The PLA’s failings were well-understood by some senior leaders back
in the mid-1970s: Deng Xiaoping, for example, bluntly criticized the
military for being “bloated, lax, conceited, extravagant, and inert.”9
Such failings became glaringly evident during the 1979 war with
Vietnam (see Chapter 10 by John Corbett and Edward O’Dowd).
But the process of defense transformation was not started in earnest
until the mid-1980s and, today, some two decades later, still remains
incomplete. There is continued frustration at the slow pace of
change and at some of the glaring failings that remain, perhaps none
more so than the inability of China’s military industrial complex to
produce, with a few notable exceptions such as ballistic missiles,
complete indigenous modern weapons systems that the PLA can
promptly deploy.
If We Hadn’t Acted the Situation Would Have Gotten Much
Worse . . . .
Chinese analysts and military historians tend to look at conflicts
in which the PLA was involved and claim success each and every
time. In part, this likely represents propaganda and human nature:
to pronounce any military operation a failure risks incurring the
wrath of one’s superiors, not to mention a natural tendency to reject
the idea that soldiers died for naught. But this publicly claimed
100 percent success rate also seems to represent a widespread and
sincere belief among Chinese civilian and military leaders that
China did the right thing in every instance. The logic of this belief
can be explained with reference to what Thomas Christensen calls
“trend analysis.”10 According to this concept, the PLA used force in
a particular instance with the goal of countering negative trends that
are extremely harmful to China’s national interests. In the logic of

6

Chinese strategists, even if these trends were not halted or reversed
by military action, they were at least mitigated. That is, if China had
not used military force in a particular instance, then things would
have gotten even worse. For example, Beijing judges the 1995-96
Taiwan Strait Crisis to have been a success because negative trends in
Taiwan and the world were checked. If China had not made a show
of force, the situation would have further deteriorated. Indeed, as
Ronald Christman notes, China’s leaders do not tend to evaluate the
success of a military operation in terms of the operational outcome
(as measured by any quantitative metric of casualties inflicted or
received) but rather in terms of the impact of the conflict on the
“overall situation.”
At the risk of sounding trite, we suggest a primary implication to
be drawn from trend analysis might be that, after the fact, China’s
leaders never seem to have seen a war they didn’t like. What we
mean is that the overall lesson these individuals seem to draw from
instances since 1949 where China used military force is that these
were justified, measured, and correct. We are certainly not trying
to argue that China’s soldiers or civilians are warmongers. On
the contrary, like dedicated soldiers the world over, the men and
women of the Chinese military seem to view war as a necessary evil
and desire to fight only as a last resort. However, neither do we
claim that Chinese soldiers are dovish; on the contrary, uniformed
members of the PLA tend to be quite hawkish, especially on issues
such as Taiwan. But “hawkishness” should not be confused with
“belligerency” or “bellicosity.”11 In the final analysis, decisions
to go to war usually are not made by soldiers. In China, as in
most countries, it is civilian superiors who make these decisions,
albeit often with military advice. While political leaders are not
necessarily trigger-happy, they do tend to be more willing than their
counterparts in uniform use military force.12
If, indeed, when China’s leaders review the last 75 years of
military history, they have never met a war they didn’t like, then
this may make Beijing far more predisposed to use force in the
future than foreign analysts might think. And when China leaders
assess the strategic environment and determine that macro trends
are going against China’s national interests, they may decide that, at
some level, use of military force may be required (likely in tandem
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with other nonmilitary measures) to achieve specific political goals.
Indeed, this appears to be essentially articulated in China’s 2002
Defense White Paper.13 It is not implausible to imagine top Chinese
leaders concluding that use of military force in a particular instance
is urgently needed and there is an excellent likelihood of success.
Moreover, Chinese leaders would reason that, not only is military
action necessary to protect national interests, it is also purely
defensive in nature, strictly limited in scope, with minimal danger
of escalation.14
The conventional wisdom is that China has fundamentally
changed since the era of Mao Zedong. The country has been
transformed by economic reforms that have seen the country become
far more prosperous and more integrated into the global economy.
In Mao’s day, China was poor, autarkic, and saw little to lose from
military adventures. After 2 decades of sustained economic growth,
China has far more to lose from a military conflict, no matter how
limited in scope or duration. This is certainly true. But the above
analysis, together with recent analyses of China’s use of force since
1949, presents a more sobering prognosis. What is evident from
this record of military activity is that Beijing has a proclivity for
taking calculated risks.15 Furthermore, the PLA’s current doctrine
of limited war under high technology conditions also makes it likely
that Beijing will see conflict as an acceptable risk. In Mao’s China, the
assumption was that war, when it came, would be total and global
in scope, and the resulting devastation would also be total. Despite
Maoist bravado, this tended to make China think rather carefully
before it used force because of the real dangers of escalation. Today,
from Beijing’s perspective, the dominant trends in the world are
supposed to be “peace and development.”16 While wars will
continue to break out, they will be limited and local, with much less
danger of escalation. For China’s leaders, the macro environment
and current PLA warfighting doctrine (not to mention improving
power projection capability) make military conflict more thinkable
than it was in Mao’s day. This is not to say that China’s leaders
do not recognize that the costs of a conflict may be considerable,
particularly to China’s economy,17 but these costs may be deemed
acceptable if action prevents a critical situation from getting worse.
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Lessons in Modernizing China’s Defense Establishment.
In analyzing the lessons learned, scholars have feared an
impending projection of pessimism. Whereas many of their papers
focus on China’s strategic failures and thus hint at an underlying
negativity of the PLA, scholars remind us that — in this case —
pessimism emerges merely by virtue of the analytical theme. Changes
resulting from positive historical instances do not compare to those
of their counterparts. China’s military failures have been catalysts
for change, the reason for reaction, and are thus predominant in
analysis of the lessons learned.
Limitations on ground operations have opened doors for the
development of China’s naval and air services in China. In the
struggle of the Korean War, Chinese military leadership realized
that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) had the capacity to
become the military’s essential component for amphibious defense,
for protecting naval traffic, and for establishing order on coastal and
inland waters. Bernard Cole writes that, despite PLAN success, such
as the victory in 1974 over a South Vietnamese task force, Beijing did
not fully stress naval development until the late 1990s. After the 1996
Chinese defensive operations--in the face of U.S. naval deployments
around Taiwan--China carried out a series of modernizations to
ensure that the navy will be capable of executing defensive and
offensive national strategic missions.
Since its establishment in 1949, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has
undergone more than a handful of changes. With a retrospective
view on PLAAF utility during the Korean War, the 1958 Taiwan
Strait Crisis, and the 1979 Vietnam border conflict, Kenneth Allen
examines PLAAF modernizations and concludes that there were
“lessons learned.” Allen’s chapter reveals that PLAAF leadership,
organization, theory, operations, weapon systems, and training
have all proven to be responsive in terms of deployment, defense,
and modernization. Historically, the PLAAF has faced political,
budgetary, and structural limitations that have forced officials to
focus on the necessity of continuous administrative and operational
updates.
Though failure has been the impetus for military modernization,
successful historical performances have also been catalysts for
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lessons learned. Larry Wortzel’s chapter on the Sino-Indian War
focuses on the ability of the Chinese leadership to learn from their
successful operations. During their war on the borders of China and
India, the Chinese suffered few casualties and were able to destroy
key targets within the Indian Army. Their success reinforced
PLA principles of war: surprise, mass, maneuver, and strategic
employment of terrain.
Notwithstanding the claim of success or failure, the Chinese
military is anything but stagnant. Self-strengthening, self-criticism,
and self-assessment are familiar terms within Chinese history, and
the PLA has utilized them in their path to modernization. Paul
Godwin notes that, in its attempt to develop a new program of
defense modernization, post-1978 Beijing reviewed the causes and
consequences of its failure to sustain past programs and began
revisions based on this assessment. The chaos created by campaigns
and “misdirected policies” left the PLA in strategic shambles-shambles that forced the PLA to abandon Mao’s strong desire for
self-reliance and to reacquaint itself with more reliance on foreign
assistance. Though the post-Mao era has seen increased use of foreign
arms in the modernization process, the Chinese long-term objective
of self-reliance has not been erased. The PLA merely understands
that it must join the leading international forces in modern warfare
and that it must be a competent competitor on the international
front.
Lessons of Campaigns and Civil-Military Relations.
Beijing apparently lives by the motto that it’s not whether you
win or lose, but how you play the game. While Western leaders
concentrate on winning statistics, using quantitative figures
to weigh military success, CCP leaders assess success through
subjective, qualitative indicators. According to Ron Christman,
effective military campaigns in China are measured by the impact
on the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to maintain control.
Beijing assesses success through strong central authority, solidarity,
national unity, and the ability to furnish self-defense. The last item
on that list provides possible explanations for China’s desire to
develop and maintain a nuclear retaliatory capability. To secure a
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robust international status, the Chinese government pushes missile
and space development and has launched China into its longest
period of sustained modernization.
Though the PLA has recently experienced its most expansive
historical modernization period, PLA warfare strategy has not
overwhelmingly been transformed in the process. The focus of the
warfare strategy, however, has shifted. The strategic shifts, discussed
in John Tkacik’s chapter, illustrate lessons learned from a time when
obvious weaknesses existed in the ground strength of the PLA--the
Korean War. Chinese troops in the Korean War were deprived of
adequate food, ammunition, and sleep. They suffered relentless
American attacks, and death in the trenches revealed their lack
of static combat experience. The Chinese quickly saw the value of
persistence and adequate preparation. They learned, moreover, that
positional warfare was not their forte. Trained to fight and retreat,
the army was not skilled in immobile defense. They were, however,
skilled in the element of surprise and certainly had strength in
numbers. By fusing the successful elements of their campaigns,
the PLA demonstrated qualitative evaluation. Their tactical lesson
learned: in order to take advantage of numerical strength, the army
must use the element of surprise.
Operational limitations and complications in the 1979 Chinese
campaign in Vietnam shaped a massive post-Mao military
modernization program. In their chapter, Edward O’Dowd and John
Corbett suggest that ineffective artillery, crude combat engineering,
and faulty land navigation weakened the 1979 campaign. The extent
of the failures was so great that infantry schools began to study the
complications that arose from the disastrous logistics of Vietnam.
The PLA Academy of Military Sciences even published an analysis
of the 1979 campaign and identified its weaknesses. Due in part
to the 1979 failures and subsequent criticism, the PLA has been
upgrading its training programs and standardizing its equipment
and procedures.
The PLA’s role in reunification campaigns has been updated
more than a few times in the post-Mao era. Arthur Ding notes that
China’s military intervention in Taiwan’s 1996 presidential elections
resulted in heightened security in the region, and it forced China
to realize the necessity of military modernization. Chinese officials
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began to understand that reunification battles would not be fought
in the absence of a militarily superior United States. If military
reunification is to be successful, China must deter U.S. intervention,
which would necessitate greater modernization and perhaps a more
willing Taiwan. The capability gap between the mainland and the
United States, Ding notes, has affected Beijing’s relationship with
Taiwan officials and was perhaps a factor in the comparatively
prudent reaction to Chen Shui-bian’s “one country on each side of
the Taiwan Strait” remark in August of 2002.
Subsequent to the challenges of the Cultural Revolution and the
Tiananmen Square Incident, the Chinese regime has reassessed PLA
deployment and national security. As highlighted by June Teufel
Dreyer, the Chinese leadership’s handling of these tumultuous
periods illustrates the regime’s propensity to resort to military means
for the sake of regaining control of the population. In order to prevent
the kind of unbridled military chaos and dominance experienced
during the Cultural Revolution, Chinese leaders have learned to
pull in the reigns on military intervention. Post-Tiananmen use of
the military indicates that the leadership has learned that the PLA
should not be utilized in situations where it must directly challenge
popular will.
The CCP’s past inclination for PLA support has created an
intertwined relationship in which the party has become almost
indistinguishable from the gun. In combination with blurred partyarmy relations, military intervention in the 1989 student protests
sent a message to the Chinese population that the “P” in PLA no
longer stood for “People’s.” The 1989 suppression signaled an
alternate meaning for PLA — Party’s Liberation Army. Andrew
Scobell notes that this alternate meaning had roots long before 1989,
dating back to the Long March in 1935. The relationship between
Chinese society and the military has been a delicate one and is often
under appreciated. Often ignored, however, is the relationship
between armed forces and the state. As illustrated in the Lin Biao
incident, ignoring the relationship can be dangerous if loyalty to the
state is not ensured within the military. Scobell’s chapter reveals that
the past 75 years have taught the Chinese state that the party-gun
relationship is mutually beneficial but potentially fragile. The PLA
may be the one defining feature in upholding a communist China.
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There is no doubt among the PLA conference scholars that the
extended modernization of the Chinese military indicates a series of
lessons over the past 75 years. Through failure and through success,
Beijing continues to review its own history and recognizes the value
of qualified personnel, standardized equipment, and advanced
training. The evidence indicating the utility of these lessons is
whether the PLA continues to improve its personnel, upgrade its
weapon systems, and step up its training schedule. The true test,
however, will only come when China’s military is forced to prove
itself in future conflict.
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CHAPTER 2
CHINA’S DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT:
THE HARD LESSONS OF INCOMPLETE MODERNIZATION
Paul H. B. Godwin
PROLOGUE
In the mid-19th century, the Qing dynasty’s antiquated armed
forces were incapable of successfully defending China against
the military incursions of the Western powers. Since those first
humiliating defeats, no Chinese government has developed armed
forces capable of meeting its most dangerous foreign adversaries
on equal terms. In part, this is due to China’s modern history. Selfimposed isolation meant that neither the industrial revolution nor
the scientific knowledge that transformed the West and created
its military strength penetrated China. Continuous rebellions,
revolution, internal and international wars so disrupted China from
the mid-19th century into the mid-20th century that no government
had the opportunity to industrialize and acquire the science and
technology that was at the root of modern warfare. The best any
government could do to enhance its military capabilities was to
follow the path initially set by the mid-19th century Qing “SelfStrengtheners.”1 Western weapons and naval combatants were
purchased and Western military advisers recruited. Arsenals and
naval shipyards were constructed with foreign assistance. Chinese
students were sent abroad for military training, and military
academies based on Western models were established in China.
This pattern of acquisition and borrowing did not grant any Chinese
government the military capabilities held by the industrialized
powers, including Japan, which had been far more successful in
adopting Western technologies and military methods.
With its defeat of the Kuomintang (KMT) armies on the mainland
in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) inherited a country
disrupted by a century of internal and international wars. China was
in political chaos and its economy in a shambles, with no industrial,
scientific, and technological infrastructure of any consequence. Like
preceding governments, if the new People’s Republic of China (PRC)
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was to build a modern national defense establishment, it could do so
only with foreign assistance.
The defense modernization objective set by Beijing sought to
break the pattern of dependence Chinese governments had to
accept over the previous century. Although it could do so only
with extensive Soviet help, Beijing’s long-term objective for the
modernization programs launched after the Korean War was to
build a self-sustaining defense establishment as free as possible
from foreign sources of technology. Chinese industries were to
equip the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as the services and
branches of China’s armed forces are collectively named, with the
most modern armaments. Nonetheless, in succeeding years Mao
Zedong’s domestic and foreign policy initiatives prevented China
from achieving this objective. Today, after 23 years of pursuing
the defense modernization programs initiated by Deng Xiaoping in
1978, China remains significantly dependent on foreign technologies
and foreign technicians. Furthermore, Mao’s policies had denied
China access to the advances in military technologies that have
so dramatically changed the weaponry and supporting systems
of modern warfare. With no opportunity to employ the military
capabilities these new technologies created as they emerged, China’s
armed forces have to draw extensively on foreign military doctrine
and operational concepts as they prepare for war in the 21st century.
In short, 150 years after the Qing dynasty’s self-strengthening
movement was launched, China’s defense modernization goals yet
remain significantly dependent on foreign military technology and
foreign doctrinal experience and innovation.
It is ironic that, as successor to the country that first assisted the
PRC in building a modern defense establishment, Russia should
return as China’s principal source of imported advanced arms,
equipment and military technology. Moreover, the United States is
again the potential adversary of greatest concern to China and the
primary focus of Beijing’s Russian-assisted defense modernization
programs. Nonetheless, China today is far different from the
underdeveloped, poverty stricken, politically dislocated society
the CCP inherited, and China’s security environment has radically
changed from the threatening bipolar Cold War structure the PRC
entered in 1949.

16

This chapter will be devoted to assessing the lessons learned by
Beijing from the difficult passage its defense modernization programs
have followed. To accomplish this, the assessment is divided into
two parts. First, it will review the objectives and multiple causes and
consequences of the failure to sustain the defense modernization
programs launched in the mid and late 1950s. Second, the defense
modernization programs initiated since 1978 will be examined.
Here the focus will be on the difficulties created by the aborted
programs of the 1950s and China’s changing threat environment.
The chapter’s conclusions will concentrate on the lessons China’s
defense modernizers have learned as they sought to overcome the
obstacles they confronted and the implications of these experiences
for China’s future defense establishment.
Defense establishment is a central construct of this chapter. This
concept is broad and designed to encompass the reality that military
hardware must be joined with appropriate doctrine, strategy,
operational principles and training to create an effective defense force.
Consequently, the concept of a defense establishment includes more
than just the armed forces. It also embraces the defense industrial
base, the research and development (R&D) infrastructure, and the
professional military education (PME) system, research centers, and
training that prepare the armed forces for near-term security threats
and potential long-term requirements.
SETTING THE OBJECTIVES
Beijing’s defense modernization requirements were initially set
by the experiences and consequences of contesting the Republic
of China’s (ROC) presence on Taiwan and China’s participation
in the Korean War. Although KMT forces on the mainland had
been decisively defeated, the ROC’s continued existence on
Taiwan presented quite specific military requirements. ROC forces
continued to garrison offshore islands and provide the basis for
a revived military capability on Taiwan. Since their 1949 retreat
to Taiwan, ROC forces had constantly harassed China’s coastal
shipping and conducted frequent small-scale raids and air attacks
on the mainland. China’s preparations to evict ROC forces from the
islands they controlled and to invade Taiwan were suspended by
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the outbreak of the Korean War2 but were reinstated with the war’s
end. The post-Korean War contest to control the Taiwan Strait led
to major clashes between ROC and PRC forces3 and ultimately a
1954 mutual defense pact between the United States and the ROC.
Although Chinese and American forces did not engage one another,
the ROC received American military assistance in the Taiwan Strait
confrontations of 1954-55 and 1958, including a U.S. threat to employ
nuclear weapons.4 With this alliance and the arms and training the
United States provided the ROC, Beijing’s ambition to conclude the
civil war and restore China’s territorial integrity by seizing Taiwan
had to be put off indefinitely.
Beijing’s poorly equipped expeditionary forces entered Korea
in October 1950, and for almost 3 years they engaged a United
Nations (U.N.) coalition led by the world’s leading military power.
No war China has fought since that time has been as long, costly, or
bloody. Until the Korean War, commanders of the Chinese People’s
Volunteers (as Beijing named its expeditionary forces) had not
experienced the firepower-intensive joint operations conducted by
the ground, air, and naval forces of advanced industrial states. Since
the founding of the PLA in 1927 as the Red Army of Workers and
Peasants, the experience of most commanders had been in irregular
warfare fought with inadequately armed light infantry units. As it
rotated forces in and out of Korea’s battlefields, the PLA learned
much about its own extensive deficiencies in firepower, combined
arms warfare, logistics, and command and control. By the latter part
of 1951, when Soviet-supplied tanks and artillery began arriving
on the battlefield in some numbers, the conflict had ground to
stalemate where static lines of defense did not allow maneuver
warfare. Offensive operations were local and tactical. Similarly,
the PLA had no experience in air warfare until the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) provided combat aircraft and training
for the newly established People’s Liberation Army Air Force
(PLAAF) during the Korean War. Although many Chinese pilots
gained experience in aerial combat, their missions did not include
close air support (CAS) and battlefield interdiction (BAI), which
were standard operational requirements for established air forces.5
Because naval operations were an insignificant component of
Chinese operations, the recently created People’s Liberation Army
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Navy (PLAN) gained no experience in maritime warfare.
What was to prove extremely influential in China’s defense
modernization programs was the U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons
in the closing year of the war.6 This nuclear threat was reinforced
after the war when the United States adopted a national military
strategy of “massive retaliation” to be built around a mix of strategic
and battlefield tactical nuclear weapons.7
Beijing’s experience in the Taiwan Strait confrontations and the
Korean War created two essential defense requirements. First, to
acquire ground, air, and naval capabilities that would enable the
PLA to recover the offshore islands and provide an effective defense
of China’s territory, coastal waters, and air space. Second, that
China’s future defense industrial base and R&D infrastructure must
be capable of supporting the PLA’s requirements for the changing
technological demands of war in the nuclear age. This was an
immense task for a developing country lacking the industrial,
technological, and scientific capabilities required to support such a
goal. Only the USSR’s willingness to engage in the largest industrial
and technology transfer program ever to occur between a developed
and developing country made such a national objective even
plausible, yet alone possible.
DEFENSE MODERNIZATION FOR THE NEW ERA
China’s primary security concern was to counter the threat
posed by U.S. overwhelmingly superior military capabilities both to
the mainland and to the recovery of Taiwan. This, in turn, required
the PLA to be transformed and a major investment in the defense
industrial sector of China’s economy. But, if the CCP was to bring
China out of its poverty and build the PRC into a great power,
Beijing also needed to undertake development of the civil sector
of the economy. The industrial dilemma Beijing confronted was
to integrate defense requirements with the overall development of
China’s economy.
In 1953, Beijing and Moscow signed the first of a series of
agreements in which the USSR agreed to assist China in the
construction of an entire defense industrial base and R&D
infrastructure. Beijing sought to produce a complete range of
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modern armaments for ground, air, and naval warfare. Soviet
technicians assisted in the modernization of China’s shipyards,
brought Russian-supplied factories on-line, and provided blueprints
for the weapons these plants were to produce. China’s pursuit of
advanced conventional weaponry was quickly joined by its quest for
nuclear arms. In January 1955, Beijing made the decision to develop
nuclear weapons, and in 1956 to build their ballistic missile delivery
systems. Both programs were to receive Soviet assistance. In 1958,
when Moscow refused to support the development of nuclearpowered attack (SSN) and ballistic missile submarines (SSBN),
Beijing undertook indigenous programs for the submarines and
solid-fueled ballistic missiles to arm the SSBN.8
Balancing defense production and R&D with civil sector
requirements was to prove difficult. Beijing had ambitious goals but
its resources were extremely limited. In particular, the decision to
develop strategic nuclear weapons received most opposition. There
were two sources of resistance to overcome.9 Civilians concerned
with building China’s basic industrial base and technological
infrastructure saw nuclear weapons programs jeopardizing civil
sector development. Within the military, a group viewed them
as diverting too many resources from conventional weapons
programs. Marshal Nie Rongzhen, the senior officer responsible
for military R&D, proposed that the strategic weapons programs
actually served China’s overall national technological progress. He
and his supporters argued that the sophisticated technologies these
weapons and their delivery systems required would stimulate the
development of an advanced technology base for China that at the
time was essentially nonexistent. The same was true of advanced
conventional weaponry such as combat aircraft. Ultimately, and
until the 1980s, the military came to control the most technologically
sophisticated sectors of China’s industry and dominated the R&D
programs. Military precedence occurred despite Mao Zedong’s
pronouncement in his April 1956 report to the Politburo that the
defense sector had to serve the overall interests of the national
economy.10
Transforming the PLA into a modern combined arms force
capable of joint warfare was undertaken as the defense industrial
base and R&D infrastructure were created. Soviet military advisers
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helped establish the new military schools and training centers
that were to provide officers for a modernizing tri-service PLA.
Continuing a practice going back to the 1920s, PLA officers were sent
to the USSR for professional military education (PME) and training
in Soviet service and branch schools.11 Given China’s extensive
needs, such a comprehensive level of assistance and the extent to
which Soviet military advisers were involved in building the new
PLA, Soviet doctrinal and operational principles were undoubtedly
introduced.
Beginning in 1958, these ambitious programs were severely
disrupted by Sino-Soviet dissension and the domestic economic
and political crises brought about by Mao Zedong’s “Great Leap
Forward” campaign and the poor harvests of 1959-60. Mao’s Great
Leap Forward emphasized quantity over quality just as the defense
industries were beginning production of weapons from Soviet
supplied kits. Trapped by Mao’s demand for quantity, defense
plants began to produce armaments of very poor quality. According
to Chinese sources, for example, in the years 1959-60 the aviation
industry did not produce a single acceptable aircraft.12 The SinoSoviet split added yet another blow to China’s defense modernization
programs. A series of disagreements were creating tensions between
Moscow and Beijing.13 Attempting to pressure China into accepting
its positions, in the summer of 1959 Moscow withdrew its support
of Beijing’s nuclear weapons R&D, and in 1960 ended its assistance
for both civil and military programs. China then entered an era of
unwanted self-reliance that left its ambitious defense modernization
plans in limbo and with a very uncertain future.
Disruption of the post-Korean War defense modernization goals
was accompanied by Mao’s dispute with the PLA officer corps.14
Mao’s criticisms were not directed at modernizing the armed
forces’ arms and the development of air and naval power. There
was agreement that to be an effective fighting force the PLA had to
be armed with advanced weaponry and that modern arms would
require changes in doctrine and operational principles. What Mao
perceived was that in accepting the technology-driven doctrine of
the Soviet armed forces, the PLA officer corps was also rejecting the
egalitarian military ethic that so characterized the earlier years of the
PLA. In its place, the PLA was implementing the strict hierarchical
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model of the USSR’s armed forces. Mao’s egalitarian model stressed
unity between commanders and common soldiers and between the
army and the “people.” This unity was an integral component of
the People’s War political-military doctrine that had served the PLA
and its predecessors so well in the 1930s and 1940s when fighting
against the materially superior forces of Japan and the KMT. As they
modernized the PLA under Soviet influence, and, drawing on their
Korean War experience, senior PLA commanders placed far greater
importance on advanced weaponry and the capabilities of soldiers,
sailors, and airman to use these weapons effectively. Mao Zedong’s
People’s War doctrine was viewed as largely irrelevant to demands
of modern firepower-intensive combined arms operations. In 1959,
this clash brought down Marshal Peng Dehuai, defense minister and
commander of China’s expeditionary forces during the Korean War.
Peng’s replacement was Marshal Lin Biao, who sought to provide
a better balance between the demands of modernization and Mao’s
insistence that the PLA restore his People’s War military ethic.
The Era of Unwanted Self-Reliance: Mao’s Disruptive
Interventions Continue.
Severance of Russian technical support threw China’s defense
industrial base and R&D infrastructure into chaos, and the Great
Leap Forward’s economic dislocation created a budget crisis.
Facing serious budgetary shortfalls and with no technical assistance
forthcoming from the USSR, defense modernization priorities had to
be carefully examined. The summer of 1961 saw the conventional
weapons lobby inside the PLA try to reduce funding for the strategic
weapons programs and return to the priority initially granted
aviation, artillery and armor in the mid-1950s. They failed. The
argument that programs associated with nuclear weapons did more
than serve the defense industries but also benefited the national
economy and China’s overall technological advancement won
Mao’s support.15 With this decision, R&D for conventional arms
became minimal.
Renewing the priority granted strategic weapons set back an
earlier agreement on the development of conventional arms. In
December 1960, priorities had been set for each of the industries and
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research centers responsible for ground force arms, aviation, naval
vessels, air defense weapons, cruise missiles and electronics.16 Their
task was to transition from copying to modifying Soviet systems
and then to developing and producing indigenous armaments. The
budget priorities set in 1961 did not grant conventional weaponry
the resources required to make this transition. The fate of the
conventional arms industries and R&D received a further setback in
1964 when Mao Zedong launched yet another damaging initiative-his “Third Line” strategy.
As the United States expanded its role in the Vietnam War, Mao
feared the conflict could spread to China and result in a nuclear
attack. Drawing on the USSR’s shift of its defense industrial base
east of the Ural Mountains in World War II, Mao’s Third Line
strategy was to move industrial and R&D facilities from the coastal
areas to China’s northwest and southwest interior.17 This massive
relocation and construction process began in 1965. Over the next
decade, 1.6 million workers built research facilities, factories, roads
and railroads in remote parts of central and northwest China.
Ultimately, 483 factories and 92 research institutes were constructed,
and thousands of technical and scientific personnel were assigned to
work in them.18
The Third Line strategy was yet another in a series of Maoist
missteps. As Chinese sources have stated, the lives of workers and
research staffs were disrupted, and widely separated institutes
and factories led to uncoordinated projects and severe production
difficulties.19 Yet, even as this massive project was underway, Mao
Zedong launched what was to be his last and most disruptive mass
political campaign. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
launched in 1966 tore China apart until Mao’s death in 1976.
The Cultural Revolution’s decade brought the final blow of
Mao’s wrecking ball to the PLA, the defense industries and defense
R&D. The PLA itself was drawn into the internecine warfare that
marked the highest levels of China’s leadership. Furthermore, for
10 years China’s armed forces went without any systematic training.
The navy and air force were torn apart by Maoist radicals. The
aviation industry, already severely disrupted by the Third Line
transition, was reduced to a shambles. Indeed, no part of the defense
industries or R&D infrastructure escaped disruption, including the
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strategic weapons programs.20 When the defense industries began
to put themselves together, the best they could do was produce poor
quality copies of Soviet armaments from the 1950s.21 The core of a
nuclear deterrent was emerging, but the delivery systems were of
questionable reliability and accuracy and, being liquid-fueled, could
not be kept at high levels of readiness. Nonetheless, China’s first
SSN had entered service in 1974, and the SSBN was to join the fleet
a decade later. The priority granted China’s strategic weapons was
paying off.
Reconstructing the Defense Establishment.
When Deng Xiaoping set out to reconstruct the defense
establishment in 1978, it had suffered not only from the Cultural
Revolution’s “ten lost years,” but from the 20 lost years that
commenced with Mao’s Great Leap Forward in 1958. The most apt
description of its condition would be one of anarchic obsolescence.
The strategic weapons programs were the single bright spot to emerge
from Mao’s years. In all other aspects, the defense establishment was
a shambles and the task of reconstruction enormous.
The PLA itself was excessively manned and would require
large manpower reductions. Its basic military doctrine, concepts
of operations, organization, logistics, and command and control
required revision to meet the demands of modern warfare. The
officer corps had to be rebuilt in order to provide a leadership at
all levels that could conceptualize, plan and conduct contemporary
warfare. This required renovating the PLA’s long neglected PME
and research centers. Systematic training had to be restored in order
that the PLA be prepared for combat operations. The shadow cast
over these requirements was the basic obsolescence of the PLA’s
armaments, which were at least 2 decades behind those of the major
powers. Overcoming this deficiency would be extremely difficult,
for China’s defense plants were incapable of producing weaponry
more sophisticated than copies or modifications of Soviet systems
based on 1950s technologies. The defense industries and R&D
infrastructure needed resuscitation before they could be a source of
advanced arms, and, even if Beijing had access to the international
arms market, China had insufficient funds to purchase modern
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weaponry. Nor would the PLA be capable of absorbing advanced
weaponry and supporting systems. Operations, tactics, logistics,
and maintenance were based on 1950s weapons. Leaping ahead to
arms and equipment based on 1970s technologies without extensive
preparation was simply not plausible. There was in fact no “quick
fix” for the 20 years of neglect the PLA, especially the conventional
general-purpose forces, had suffered under Mao Zedong’s
dominating influence.22
Beyond the sheer complexity of the task and scarce resources,
two additional factors contributed to the slow, incremental
approach to defense modernization mandated by Deng Xiaoping.
First was the absence of any significant external assistance. In the
1950s, Soviet support had been central to the rapid construction
of a modern defense establishment. In 1978, there was no source
of foreign assistance that could come even close to the extent of
support the USSR had provided. China’s 1972 rapprochement
with the United States would quickly become formal diplomatic
recognition, but could not conceivably lead to any major defense
assistance programs. Deng, however, would use the access to the
West provided by rapprochement and U.S. diplomatic recognition
to implement his “open door” (kaifang) strategy. Although obviously
not immediately beneficial, this strategy would provide access to
Western defense establishments. Such access would allow both
the PLA and the defense industries and R&D sectors to understand
what had passed them by in the 20 years of isolation and turmoil
Mao had inflicted on China. Knowledge and understanding would
be gained, but it would be slow.
The assessment of China’s security environment was the second
factor. Since Mao’s death, there had been a debate over the degree
of military threat presented by the USSR. A central argument was
that the Soviet threat along China’s long border was so menacing
and close that defense modernization had to be granted the highest
priority. At the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee
held in December 1978, Deng Xiaoping ended the dispute. He
asserted that although the Soviet Union was China’s principal
security concern, Moscow’s military threat was insufficiently
menacing and imminent to require the highest priority in China’s
resource allocation.23 His position was strengthened by the Reagan
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administration’s early 1980s defense buildup and resolve to oppose
any further expansion of Soviet influence.
By the mid-1980s, Deng’s guidance to the PLA could state that
it was no longer necessary to prepare for a major and possibly
nuclear war. Any future military conflicts would be localized and
limited in political objectives and geographic scope.24 Furthermore,
Beijing actively sought to ensure that China’s regional security
environment was as benign as possible. After Gorbachev’s
readjustment of the USSR’s foreign and defense policies in the mid
and late 1980s, relations with the Soviet Union improved to the
point of rapprochement and its successor, Russia, became a quasially of China.25 The troublesome Sino-Indian border was the focus
of careful diplomatic management as both New Delhi and Beijing
sought to avoid remilitarizing their longstanding border dispute.26
Working closely with Russia and the newly independent Central
Asian states, China developed confidence-building measures such
that the historically threatening inner Asian frontiers of China were
no longer a major security concern.27 Tensions remained, especially
in the South China Sea and over Taiwan, but these were territorial
and sovereignty issues that did not of themselves threaten mainland
China. Consequently, as Beijing pursued the reconstruction of
its defense establishment, the military security of China became
more assured and less threatening than at any time since the early
19th century. These same years were accompanied by impressive
economic growth and development.
Nonetheless, as China’s overall military security improved,
two developments emerged almost simultaneously that would
significantly influence Beijing’s perception of its defense
modernization requirements. First, PLA assessments of U.S. military
operations in the 1991 Persian Gulf War demonstrated the extent
to which its forces remained woefully obsolescent in both their
armaments and operational doctrine. Second, these unsettling
assessments occurred as Sino-American relations were in the midst
of their post-Tiananmen degeneration and the bipolar Cold War
global security environment had become part of history.28 With the
Cold War’s end and the disintegration of the USSR, the United States
emerged as the world’s most powerful state. With this transformation,
China’s strategic value to the United States evaporated. The sale of
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150 F-16s to Taiwan in 1992 signaled just this to Beijing. By the early
1990s, Beijing’s security assessments had concluded that the United
States was using its overwhelming military, political, and economic
power to contain and encircle China with reinvigorated military
alliances. The dispatch of two aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBG)
to the Taiwan area in response to Beijing’s use of coercive diplomacy
to intimidate Taipei in 1996 served to confirm China’s convictions.
Despite the Sino-America summit meetings of 1997 and 1998, the
United States remained China’s primary security concern.
China’s 2000 defense white paper made Beijing’s position
eminently clear. While declaring China’s policy to be one of
peacefully settling disputes, the white paper cast the United
States in a distinctly different light: “However, in view of the fact
that hegemonism and power politics still exists and are further
developing, and in particular, the basis for the country’s peaceful
reunification is seriously imperiled, China will have to enhance its
capability to defend its sovereignty and security by military means.”29
The threatening posture taken by the Bush administration’s 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review confirmed Beijing’s perception of
American intentions.30 Indeed, it may well have convinced Beijing
that it now faces a long-term strategic competition with the United
States in East Asia that goes beyond the immediate issue of Taiwan.
Changing Threat Environments and Defense Modernization.
Changing threat perceptions over the years since 1978 had
critical consequences for Beijing’s understanding of its defense
modernization requirements. Deng Xiaoping’s 1985 assessment
that it was no longer necessary to prepare for major and possibly
nuclear war with the Soviet Union resulted in a fundamental change
in China’s national military strategy that continues to reverberate
throughout PLA doctrine and concepts of operations. The PLA’s
new strategic guidance was to prepare for local, limited wars
(jubu zhanzheng) on China’s periphery. These wars were expected
to be short, probably high intensity, conflicts fought in confined
geographical areas for limited political objectives potentially under
conditions of nuclear deterrence. Although a Soviet attack for
limited political objectives was seen as possible, the 1985 guidance
broadened the scope of PLA planning from a single-minded focus on
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preparation for war with a known enemy to contingency planning
that included China’s maritime periphery. Strategies based on
protraction and attrition were seen as ineffective responses to these
kinds of military contingencies. The most probable future wars were
expected to break out with little warning. Because they would be
fought for limited political objectives, the PLA had to be prepared
for swift, lethal responses to crises involving the threat or application
of military force with little time for mobilization.31
Seen in this context, the 1991 Persian Gulf War was precisely the
kind of contingency the PLA had been preparing for since the mid1980s. It was a short, high-intensity war fought for limited political
objectives within a confined theater of operations. What sent a shock
wave throughout the PLA was the overwhelming effectiveness of
U.S. joint service operations fought with high technology arms and
equipment. The conduct of the Gulf War, especially the synergy
created by the linkage between military technology and joint
operations, generated a turning point in Beijing’s comprehension of
the PLA’s defense modernization requirements for both defensive
and offensive capabilities. This was reflected in Beijing’s refinement
of the PLA’s strategic guidance from preparing for local, limited war
to preparing for local, limited war “under high-tech conditions”
(jubu zhanzheng zai gaoji jishu tiaojian xia).
Looked at more broadly, over the years since defense reforms
began in 1979, China’s high priority defense requirements
transitioned from continental defense with a primary emphasis on
land warfare where the PLA was most experienced and comfortable
to defending China’s maritime approaches. This transition shifted
primary operational responsibility from land to air and naval
warfare where the PLA had the least experience and was least
comfortable. Not only was this a demanding transition for the PLA’s
deeply entrenched ground force culture where the air force and
navy are subordinate services, but it was joined with the escalating
importance of military technology. The accelerating importance
of technology was found in five principal areas. Combat aircraft,
naval combatants, and ground force weaponry were all benefiting
from technological advances. Standoff weapons launched from
aircraft, ships, and submarines were increasing in range, accuracy,
and lethality. Space systems for intelligence, surveillance, and
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reconnaissance (ISR) and communications had vastly increased
battlespace awareness capabilities. Information warfare (IW) was
coming of age as an additional realm of defensive and offensive
military operations. Finally, renewed U.S. R&D in missile defenses
threatened the continued viability of China’s aging nuclear
deterrent.
These developments would not have been so important had
China’s defense modernization requirements been driven primarily
by potential regional adversaries. Even here, however, regional
concerns presented difficulties, especially territorial issues in
the South China Sea. China could establish and sustain a naval
“presence” in those waters, but until aerial refueling became an
operational capability, neither the air force nor naval aviation could
sustain air cover for a naval presence. Without air cover, China’s navy
was susceptible to air attack; a danger exacerbated by the weak air
defense systems of its combatants. Despite the low threat environment
Beijing nurtured across inner Asia, ground forces modernization
was needed and would have application along China’s extensive
interior frontiers. Beijing’s primary dilemma, however, was created
by its perception of the potential threat presented by the United
States in a military confrontation over Taiwan. Nonetheless, Beijing
would recognize that military capabilities specifically developed for
a Taiwan scenario had application elsewhere in the region.
Lessons Learned.
As reforms were implemented over the past 20 years, the PLA
senior leadership learned what is required to conduct contemporary
warfare. They fully understand that advances in military technology
have transformed the battlefield. For current and future warfare,
space and cyberspace have joined the traditional land, air, and sea
battlefield dimensions to create an integrated battlespace. This
battlespace is being made increasingly transparent by wide area
strategic surveillance and tactical reconnaissance made possible by
advanced military technologies. Mobility, speed, and long-range
precision guided munitions, together with offensive joint operations
and information warfare, are recognized as the keys to military
success in this battlespace. Revisions to PLA concepts of operations
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and training concentrate on developing the skills required for joint
operations,32 and China’s military research centers are focused
on preparing for the demands of future wars, with a particular
concentration on information warfare.33
China’s defense industries and R&D infrastructure have similarly
become aware of their deficiencies and the changes required if they
are to achieve the level of self-sufficiency Beijing hopes to achieve.
In response, Beijing has adopted essentially the same strategy it
applied in the 1950s, but with a critical difference. In the same
manner that the PLA learned from observing and assessing U.S.
military operations in the Gulf War and after, Chinese scientists have
gleaned much from their contact with the United States. In the 1950s
and 1960s, advanced military technology was viewed as stimulating
the civil sector of China’s industries. This perspective has now
changed. When Deng Xiaoping initiated his open door strategy in
the late 1970s, Chinese began participating in international science
and technology exchanges and hosting their counterparts in China.34
From these exchanges, China’s weapons developers learned that
in modern armaments and other military related areas such as
space systems, many of the components and system integration
processes are innately “dual use.” Beginning in the 1980s, China’s
R&D programs reflected the interdependence of civil and military
technologies.
This understanding led to the “863” programs for long-term S&T
development. They were named after the year (1986) and month
(March) the first program was initiated, with the follow-on “Super863” program commencing a decade later. The first 863 program
focused on information technologies, biotechnology, astronautics,
energy, lasers, and new materials. The second concentrated
on areas that included microelectronics, telecommunications,
bioengineering, machine tools, computerized manufacturing,
exotic materials, nuclear, aviation, marine, and space technologies.
China’s intent to move into the most advanced areas of defense
research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) and build
the capability to manufacture weapons and supporting military
systems based on the most advanced technologies is not in doubt.
The integration of civilian and military R&D was part of the defense
conversion process where China’s extensive military industrial
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complex was directed to produce products for the civilian market.
The policy’s intent was not only to assist in developing the civilian
economy but also to improve China’s military manufacturing
capabilities, which were abysmal.35 Because of the paucity of
adequate reliable information, the degree of success being achieved
cannot be determined. All observers agree, however, that although
China remains far behind the major industrial powers in technology
and precision manufacturing, progress in military “niche” areas is
quite possible.36 It is perhaps more important that China is making
a concentrated effort to achieve indigenous capabilities in the most
advanced realms of military technologies--the same objective set by
Mao Zedong in the 1950s.
Just as Beijing was encountering the problems created by the
escalating role of technology in modern warfare, China’s improved
relations with Russia provided a source of modern arms and
military technology that existed nowhere else. As China’s economy
boomed, Russia was experiencing the economic downturn that came
with the USSR’s disintegration. An expanding economy gave China
the funds to purchase weapons and military technology, and Russia
needed sales to keep its defense industries alive. This coincidence
could not have come at a more fortuitous time for Beijing.
Again reflecting the modernization strategy adopted in the 1950s,
China’s efforts in defense RDT&E are accompanied by attempts
to advance its manufacturing capabilities through the licensed
production of imported weapons and components. China has
obtained, for example, licensed production rights to the Su-27, now
being assembled from kits provided by the Russian manufacturer.
Unlike the 1950s, China is also building its own advanced weaponry
and platforms, albeit often with imported components, technologies,
and foreign assistance. These projects include solid-fueled, tactically
mobile conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles, long-range cruise
missiles, combat aircraft, naval surface combatants, conventional
and nuclear-powered submarines, tanks and armored fighting
vehicles, and air defense systems.
That China’s defense industrial complex deficiencies continue
to hamper domestic design and production of modern military
systems is evident from the range of weapons Beijing continues to
import. Acquisitions from Russia are equipping both the PLA Air
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Force and the PLA Navy. These imports include advanced combat
aircraft together with their ordnance, long-range heavy-lift transport
aircraft, diesel-electric submarines with their torpedoes and cruise
missiles, guided missile-armed destroyers, and long-range air
defense systems. Aerial refueling technologies have also been
acquired from abroad, and because the U.S. blocked Israel’s sale of
airborne warning and command system (AWACS) aircraft,37 China
is actively seeking to acquire this capability elsewhere--most likely
from Russia.38
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
Despite Beijing’s considerable efforts to modernize its defense
establishment over the past 2 decades, it is evident that severe
problems remain. In large part, these problems continue to reflect
the 20 years when Mao Zedong’s domestic and foreign policies
resulted in a defense establishment isolated from advances in
military technology and the changes in military operations these
technologies made possible. China therefore remains dependent
on foreign sources for much of its advanced weaponry, ordnance,
supporting systems, and technology.39
Nonetheless, China is far from the poverty stricken undeveloped
society and economy that undertook major defense modernization
programs in the mid-1950s. After more than 20 years of rapid
economic growth, China is far richer than it was in the 1950s
and manufacturing capabilities have been upgraded by foreign
imports. They have not yet reached the standards that exist in
North America, Europe, or Japan, but manufacturing capabilities
have been enhanced. China’s scientific and technological personnel
base has also improved in both size and sophistication. The cadre of
S&T personnel that was developed and expanded by the weapons
programs of the 1950s and 1960s have been joined by a younger
echelon whose training began in the 1980s. Even with all the
recognized deficiencies, it would be prudent to assume that China
is far more capable of developing a modern indigenous defense
industrial base and RDT&E infrastructure than it was in the 1950s.
Extensive reform of the PLA since the late 1970s has provided
the basic building blocks required for sustained improvements in
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operational capabilities. A series of force reductions brought the
total number of personnel from around 4 million in the early 1980s to
some 2.5 million in early 2002.40 Officer recruitment has been changed
to an emphasis on college graduates rather than selecting from the
ranks of serving enlisted men and women, and advancement in rank
now requires attendance at the appropriate PME schools.41 The PLA
National Defense University (PLA-NDU) was established in 1985
as the armed forces’ first joint service school and their capstone
PME center. The PLA Academy of Science (AMS) was revitalized.
Together with the PLA-NDU Institute for Strategic Studies, the
AMS has generated research in the conduct of war to assist in
preparing the PLA’s combat arms for contemporary warfare and
military planners for thinking about potential future requirements.
Improving the enlisted personnel is being sought through a program
to build a noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. First initiated in
1986,42 the NCO program has accelerated for the past several years.
The force structure has been extensively changed from what it was
in the 1970s.43 These force structure changes have been accompanied
by doctrinal revisions, improved command and control, and more
realistic training to prepare the PLA for joint service operations.44
There is no sense within the PLA’s leadership that these reforms are
sufficient, but there is the distinct impression that their armed forces
are being transformed into a more flexible, quicker responding
combat force.
It is plausible to conclude that reforms undertaken since the late
1970s in the economy, the manufacturing base, the S&T infrastructure,
and the PLA have reached the point where the modernization of
China’s defense establishment can now progress quicker than it has
over the past 2 decades. The task Beijing confronts, however, has
two critical components: a potential confrontation with the United
States over Taiwan and the continuing quest for self-reliance. In
the recent past, both the former Soviet Union and the United States
abruptly severed military relations with China to demonstrate their
dissatisfaction with Beijing’s policies or actions. Self-reliance today
is undoubtedly influenced by these very hard lessons. Despite the
progress China has made, however, self-reliance must remain a very
long-term strategic objective. In the shorter term, preparing for a
possible Taiwan scenario will provide the overriding priority for
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defense modernization.
Whether in the short or long-term perspective, China’s defense
modernization is focused on obtaining the most advanced weapons,
ordnance, and technology available. As General Fu Quanyou,
chief of the PLA General Staff, stated the objective in analyzing the
challenges facing the PLA in 2002:
. . . we must earnestly implement the strategy of strengthening the
armed forces with science and technology, vigorously cultivate
new-type military talents, increase the science and technology
content of our weaponry, deepen science and technology-based
military skills, work hard to effect our armed forces’ fundamental
transition from one characterized by its large personnel to one
oriented toward quality performance and from a labor-intensive
model to a technology-intensive model, and take additional steps
to raise our armed forces’ overall combat capability under hightech conditions.45

An important aspect of this speech before a PLA-NDU class
of senior officers is recognition that China’s armed forces are yet
in transition to a modern defense force and that in the military
environment faced by the PLA, quantity cannot substitute for
quality. It is just this approach the PLA has applied to future
warfare against potential adversaries armed with high technology
armaments. Winning battles against these forces requires weapons,
ordnance, and supporting systems employing the most advanced
military technologies.
China’s defense modernization goals are importantly not based
on matching the capabilities of adversaries as well-equipped and
trained as U.S. armed forces, but on countering them. In assessing
these requirements, PLA analysts returned to their core military
doctrine from the late 1930s and its focus on how to defeat materially
superior enemies. In part, PLA assessments have sought to determine
what advanced military technologies are required to defend against
U.S. advantages and exploit perceived American vulnerabilities. In
analyzing U.S. military doctrine and observing American operations
over the past decade, these analyses have come to quite specific
conclusions.
• A military confrontation with the United States will involve nuclear
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deterrence.
• U.S. operations place highest emphasis on degrading enemy defenses in
the opening phase of a war, therefore PLA bases, command and control
facilities, air defenses, and other high priority military targets will come
under immediate attack.
• U.S. weapons of choice for degrading China’s defenses will be long-range
precision guided munitions launched from ships and aircraft.
• The “hard” attack of munitions will be coordinated with the “soft” attack
of information warfare.
Major U.S. vulnerabilities are:
• Dependence on foreign-hosted bases and extended lines of logistical
support for sustained combat operations in the West Pacific.
• Dependence on space systems for the command, control, communications,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that make U.S. offensive
joint operations so effective.
• Dependence on aircraft carrier battle groups for the opening offensive air
operations, including cruise missile attacks.

Although the PLA anticipates it will have to confront the
United States with a mix of old and new weapons, acquisitions and
indigenous development programs focus on developing advanced
technology capabilities to offset specific U.S. advantages and exploit
American vulnerabilities. To evaluate PLA problems and prospects
in these tasks, it is useful to break them down into three broad
missions areas: strategic deterrence, mainland defense and offshore
defense.
Strategic Deterrence.
Beijing’s strategy is based on “minimal deterrence” logic. This
logic assumes that even states with overwhelming nuclear power
can be deterred from the threat or use of nuclear weapons if credibly
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threatened with a second strike. The adversary’s uncertainty that its
first strike has failed to eliminate all of China’s strategic weapons
provides the second strike threat.46 As Beijing states China’s nuclear
posture:
China maintains a small but effective nuclear counterattacking
force in order to deter possible nuclear attacks by other countries.
Any such attack will inevitably result in a retaliatory nuclear
counterstrike by China. China has always kept the number of
its nuclear weapons at a low level. The scale, composition and
development of China’s nuclear force are in line with China’s
military strategy of active defense.47

The force structure48 supporting this logic is currently composed
of around 20 liquid-fueled Dong Feng-5/5A (East Wind–DF) fullrange intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). The DF-5 achieved
initial operating capability (IOC) in 1981, with its numbers gradually
increasing over the past 2 decades. Because these weapons are liquidfueled, they cannot be maintained at high levels of readiness, but
are normally deployed unfueled in their silos with their warheads
stored separately. Fueling the launchers and mounting the warheads
can take 2-4 hours. The second long-range weapon in China’s
inventory is the 3,400-mile range liquid-fueled DF-4 deployed since
1980. There are now perhaps 20 of these weapons, which have the
same limitations as the DF-5/5A. China’s single SSBN armed with
12 solid-fueled 1,000-mile range Ju Lang-1 (Big Wave — JL-1) ballistic
missiles entered service in the late 1980s. This ship has been so
troublesome over the years that it likely never became operational
and is a doubtful component of China’s strategic forces.
These strategic forces are complemented by a regional deterrent
force of perhaps 90 warheads deployed on intermediate-range
ballistic missiles (IRBM). There are some 40 DF-3A liquid-fueled
mobile missiles with ranges of 1,700 miles. With an IOC of 1971,
these are Beijing’s oldest weapons. China’s newest IRBMs are the 48
solid-fueled mobile DF-21As with a range of more than 1,000 miles
that achieved IOC in the mid-1980s. American bases in the West
Pacific are within the effective range of both weapons.
Modernization programs to replace the inaccurate, unreliable,
slow-responding liquid-fueled systems with more reliable, accurate,
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quicker responding solid-fueled tactically mobile weapons were
initiated in the early 1980s. Tactical mobility was sought to reduce
the vulnerability of China’s forces to a disarming first strike, thereby
sustaining the uncertainty principle at the root of Beijing’s deterrent
strategy. Four new weapons form the heart of China’s modernization
programs. The 7,500-mile range DF-41 was to replace the DF-5, but
may have been cancelled or delayed by development problems. The
DF-4 is to be replaced by the 5,000-mile range DF-31. The DF-31 also
serves as the basis for the 5,000-mile range JL-2 submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM) for the new SSBN class (the 09-4 program),
should this project come to fruition. The fourth weapon is the 1,000mile range DF-25, which will replace the aging DF-3. This system
employs the first two stages of the DF-31 three-stage launcher.
As it anticipates deploying more capable nuclear forces, Beijing
faces an increasingly complex strategic environment. In part, this
stems from the weaponization of India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear
programs. Of greatest concern to China, however, are U.S. ballistic
missile defense programs (BMD), especially given the higher
priority they have received from the Bush administration. The
danger Beijing perceives is quite straightforward. Even a “thin”
deployment of 100 terminal defense interceptors could threaten
the viability of a Chinese deterrent based on as few as 20 weapons.
Some Chinese strategists may well be apprehensive about a
particular scenario where the United States becomes confident that
its BMD will capture whatever retaliatory forces are launched after a
disarming first strike. Such confidence undermines the uncertainty
principle upon which China’s deterrent depends. Under these
conditions, China could be exposed to the threat of nuclear coercion
— something Beijing refers to as “nuclear blackmail.” Should the
United States be successful in theater missile defense, which is now
part of what the Bush administration conceives as a single integrated
missile defense strategy,49 China’s regional deterrent would also
become threatened.
China’s potential response to American BMD programs involves
a number of feasible options.50 With so much invested in developing
a new family of nuclear weapons, including the 09-4 SSBN class and
a submarine-launched ballistic missile, cost will not necessarily
constrain China’s choice. Additionally, with an operational ballistic
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missile defense some distance in the future, Beijing is under no
immediate pressure to make a firm commitment to a radically
changed strategy and force structure. These conditions suggest that
the most probable Chinese response will be to increase the number
of weapons and warheads to reinforce the uncertainty principle
at the root of its minimal deterrence strategy. This can be done
most effectively by keeping the DF-5 family on line and adding the
tactically mobile DF-31 armed with multiple reentry vehicles (MRV),
including penetration aids. Because China has the capability,51
arming its missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry
vehicles (MIRV) warheads is a probable option. Whether or not
China will go ahead with the 09-4 class SSBN is unclear. Given
that the JL-2’s range is believed to be around 5,000 miles, an 09-4
SSBN could strike the United States from waters close to China.
This capability would assist the uncertainty principle embedded in
China’s deterrence doctrine. SSBNs could also be seen as a reserve
force to be fired should a retaliatory strike of land-based weapons be
defeated by missile defenses.
A particular political constraint may limit the size of the force as
Beijing’s planners think through their potential responses to BMD.
China has a longstanding commitment to “no first use” (NFU). That
is, China’s nuclear forces are retaliatory and will not be used first
or against a non-nuclear state. A major buildup of nuclear forces
would cast doubt on China’s NFU commitment and alarm China’s
Asian neighbors as well as the United States. Such a buildup would
suggest a more aggressive strategy and make it difficult for Beijing
to argue as it has done for many years that its nuclear forces are
strictly defensive. Thus, Beijing will consider what increase in force
size it can defend as a response to U.S. BMD as it seeks to preserve
its uncertainty principle.
Going beyond sustaining its minimal deterrence strategy brings
China into realms of technology that it has yet to master. Launch
on warning requires space-based sensors to identify the source
and dimensions of an attack in near real-time to provide sufficient
warning for a retaliatory strike. China’s R&D in space-based sensors
is known,52 but when these programs will produce operational
capabilities is not known.
Given that a U.S.-layered BMD capable of providing multiple
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engagement opportunities along the entire path of ballistic missiles
at all ranges is only plausible in the far distant future, it is most
probable that Beijing will delay any major strategy and force
structure change. Ensuring the uncertainty principle by increasing
the number of launchers, especially tactically mobile systems,
and mounting MRV/MIRV warheads is well within China’s
technological capabilities. Whatever constraint Beijing places on
the size of the force structure will depend on the intersection of two
factors. First, how many launchers and warheads China’s strategists
believe are required to penetrate an initial U.S. BMD, which will
almost certainly be a terminal defense system. This requirement will
be balanced by whatever Beijing believes is the maximum number
of launchers it can deploy before its nuclear strategy is seen as more
offensive than defensive in its intent.
Defense of the Mainland.
Chinese military analysts anticipate that in the opening phase of a
war the United States will seek to crush China’s defenses and cripple
the PLA’s ability to conduct sustained offensive operations. PLA
authors had identified offensive operations as central to American
military doctrine from their Gulf War assessments,53 but defense
of China’s mainland did not become a central issue until NATO’s
mid-1999 Allied Force operations against Serbia. The turning point
appears to have been the analysts’ estimate that 95 percent of the
weapons used against Serbia were PGMs, whereas only 8 percent of
the weapons employed against Iraq were precision-guided.54 The
escalating employment of precision munitions becomes important
when PLA planners assume that in a military confrontation over
Taiwan U.S. forces will follow their doctrine and will initiate their
campaign by launching intensive PGM attacks on China’s air
defenses, air and naval bases and missile launch sites. These “hard
attack” weapons are expected to be joined with the “soft attack”
of electronic and information warfare designed to disrupt PLA
communications, air defense, and intelligence networks. From
observing the U.S.-led campaign against Serbia, some PLA analysts
assume that transportation hubs, fuel reserves, oil refineries, and
other economic targets will also come under attack.55
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China’s deficiencies in defense are exposed as the PLA devises
ways to offset U.S. offensive capabilities. China lacks an integrated
air defense system (IADS), therefore its antiaircraft artillery (AAA)
and surface-to-air missiles (SAM) are limited to point defense. This
does not provide an effective defense when aircraft and cruise
missiles will be attacking their targets from multiple directions.
Nor is it likely that the PLAAF will be able to gain and sustain air
superiority. Consequently, the PLA has concentrated its near-term
defenses on low-tech responses to a high technology attack. These
include camouflage, deception, dispersal and hardening of military
facilities to limit the effectiveness of U.S. reconnaissance and the
damage inflicted by weapons. Defense of military communications
is critical and will depend in part on redundancy. China has long
placed priority on constructing a national C4I (command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence) infrastructure that is
secure, mobile, and less susceptible to hard and soft attack. Defense
against offensive information operations is a priority, but it is
difficult to determine what progress has been made.
In reporting China’s defense measures, the military press has
placed great emphasis on the “three attacks and three defenses”
training program. This rubric covers attacking stealth aircraft, cruise
missiles, and helicopter gun-ships and defense against precision
attacks, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and surveillance.56 Great
successes are claimed for this training, but a far less optimistic note
was sounded by an unidentified Group Army deputy commander
writing in the Beijing Military Region newspaper.57 He charged
that training for the three attacks and three defenses was far too
“idealistic.” Training exercises were criticized for underestimating
the generation gap between the weapons employed by the attacking
and defending forces, and that imagination was given precedence
over reality. As examples, he cited the use of rifles to down
Apache helicopters and artillery to attack Tomahawk cruise missiles.
Misconceptions such as these, he declared, were not only wishful
thinking, but also using such misconceptions in training would
produce bad results. It is necessary to defeat the enemy using
existing equipment, the critique concluded, but that to be effective
training must be realistic and “seek truth from facts.”
It is no surprise that the application of People’s War methods to
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mainland defense has received considerable attention. In addition
to the expected mobilization of militia, reserve, and People’s Air
Defense (PAD) units, the Chongqing military garrison introduced
the “militia network warfare fendui.” This unit, reportedly the
first of its kind in the PLA, was formed out of graduate students,
professors, and other computer specialists to conduct network
warfare.58 Additional People’s War tactics suggested are the use of
civil-defense installations to store military supplies and the use of
local telecommunications, media and network systems, and civilian
technological services to assist the military.59 Major General Yao
Youzhi of the AMS credited Serbia with using People’s War methods
to preserve its military strength when under attack and declared that
Mao’s doctrine will remain a “magic weapon for prevailing over
enemy forces in the future.”60
All of these efforts to offset U.S. technological and operational
superiority will have some measure of effectiveness, but they do not
solve China’s basic problems in conducting an effective defense. Its
weapons are mostly obsolete and the PLA’s current C3 (command,
control, and communications) network is inefficient.61 Point defense
of essential military facilities may be reasonably effective, but a
truly capable air defense will require China to integrate advanced
Russian SAMs into an IADS. Here, the PLA has long recognized
the requirement for an effective intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capability to provide warning of an attack.
Following the pattern set by almost all of China’s advanced
technology military programs, ISR capabilities are being sought
through a combination of indigenous efforts, importing foreign
technologies, international cooperation in space programs, and the
acquisition of complete systems.62 R&D and acquisitions are being
applied to space, airborne, ground, and sea-based platforms. For
its space programs, China can build on its cooperative endeavors
with Russia, Ukraine, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. With
the possible exception of Russian and Ukrainian assistance, it is
doubtful this cooperation contains specifically military applications.
Nonetheless, the foreign technology and advice China receives
for civil projects can be transferred to military programs. Space
systems will be complemented by ground-based over-the–horizon
radars (OTHR), and tactical reconnaissance will be conducted by
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manned aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). When these
programs and acquisitions mature, China will have the capability
to continuously monitor and track air and naval activity in the West
Pacific, thereby greatly improving defense against air and missile
attack.
Offshore Defense.
China’s pursuit of ISR capabilities serves offshore defense as
much as it does defense of the mainland. As in all other areas
of advanced technology warfare with the exception of nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles, the sharp point of the PLA’s spear is
currently formed by foreign acquisitions and imported technologies.
In particular, Russia is supplying China’s most advanced combat
aircraft and naval combatants. These acquisitions are complemented
by indigenously developed aircraft, ships, and submarines built in
China but using some imported technologies and sometimes with
foreign assistance. The follow-on SSN to the current five Han-class
ships will probably incorporate Russian technology. Although far
from the cutting edge of modern armaments, these indigenous
weapons are more capable than those derived from Soviet models
of the 1950s and early 1960s that yet equip much of the PLA.63 These
acquisitions appear to support an “area denial” strategy. Reviewing
Chinese assessments of U.S. vulnerabilities, this strategy appears to
have three central components.
• Keeping U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBG) as distant as possible
from China’s maritime periphery by threatening them with cruise missile
attack from aircraft, surface combatants, and submarines together with
torpedo attack.
• Threatening foreign-hosted American bases with cruise and ballistic
missile attack to hamper U.S. capabilities to conduct sustained combat
operations, especially air operations, from these facilities.
• Developing the capabilities to attack U.S. space systems, thereby degrading
the ISR and communications capabilities that make American military
operations so effective.

Because they entail both defensive and offensive operations
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and tactics, these objectives require substantial improvements in
China’s air and naval capabilities. By shifting China’s maritime
defense several hundred miles seaward the navy would lose the
protection provided by land-based air defenses. PLAN ships do
not have an area defense capability and few have a competent point
defense against air and cruise missile attack. Moreover, except
possibly for the newly acquired Russian Sovremenny guided missile
destroyers (DDG), China’s surface combatants have only limited
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Consequently, a PLAN
surface fleet cannot successfully defend itself against a sophisticated
and competent adversary. Certainly, the PLAN is aware of these
deficiencies and is seeking to overcome them — again primarily
with imported weapons and technologies.
Air and naval operations against a U.S. CVBG are equally, if not
more, demanding. First, one has to assume that China develops the ISR
capabilities to locate and track a moving battle group. Depending on
the battle group commander’s interpretation of his tactical situation,
the CVBG’s defense “bubble” will range out 200 to 400 miles. 64 This
means that an air-launched cruise missile will have to be very long
range to be effective. Inside the bubble, attacking aircraft have to
penetrate the CVBG’s defending aircraft and missiles. Even so, when
the attacking aircraft launch a cruise missile, it must be able to select
its target from the defensive decoys and ships forming the battle
group and survive the area and point defenses directed against
it. This is a very demanding mission against a navy that prepared
such defenses against a foe as formidable as the former USSR. Shiplaunched cruise missiles face the same problems, assuming the
launching ship could get close enough to fire its weapons.
Yet another alternative mooted in China’s military press is the
employment of ballistic missiles to attack a battle group.65 Even
assuming China develops the ISR capability to locate and track
a moving battle group, a ballistic missile with terminal guidance
would still have to distinguish the aircraft carrier from among the
decoys and other ships forming the battle group. This is not an easy
task.
The most effective offensive capability being acquired by the
PLAN is the Kilo diesel-electric submarine acquired from Russia,
especially the type 636. This is an exceptionally quiet submarine that
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can be armed with sub-surface launched cruise missiles and both
wire-guided and wake-homing torpedoes.66 Even considering the
ASW capabilities found in a U.S. CVBG, this submarine presents a
very real threat. Assuming the next generation Chinese SSN (the 093 program) benefits from Russian technology, weaponry, and design
assistance, the submarine threat to U.S. naval operations over the
coming decade is going to increase significantly.
Degrading American ISR and C2 is yet another tactic mooted in
Chinese journals as a way of degrading U.S. offensive operations.
With so much of American effectiveness dependent upon real-time
intelligence and communications, crippling the systems that support
long-range precision attack and joint operations would substantially
reduce U.S. superiority.67 With so much available from public
sources, China probably has a quite complete understanding of
U.S. space systems and operations. It is likely that China is applying
imported technologies to develop laser radars to track U.S. imaging
satellites and conducting R&D on jamming the Global Positioning
System (GPS). Satellite optical sensors are susceptible to damage by
lasers, so it may be assumed that China is conducting research on
these capabilities. Jamming communication satellites, airborne early
warning systems, and the Joint Tactical Information Distributing
System (JTIDS) is also probably high on China’s R&D agenda. Thus
far, these capabilities are only in the research stage of development
and are years from operational application. Here again, however,
China has made its intent clear.
The final vulnerability seen in U.S. military operations is their
dependence of foreign-hosted bases for sustained combat operations
in the West Pacific.68 Long-range land attack cruise missiles (LACM),
which China is trying to develop, and conventionally armed ballistic
missiles would be the weapons of choice. Threatening to attack
these targets would be politically charged and designed to minimize
primarily Japan’s support for U.S. operations. Whether China
would undertake to attack bases such as Kadena Air Force Base on
Okinawa is questionable. Among the issues such attacks would raise
is whether the United States would see them as widening the war.
It is very unlikely striking these bases would result in the United
States backing away from aiding in the defense of Taiwan. It is far
more likely that whatever restraints the United States had placed on
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its operations, other than crossing the nuclear threshold, would be
lifted in anticipation of a potentially wider war.
China’s Taiwan Dilemma.
The PLA views preparations to counter U.S. military superiority
in the West Pacific as an essential component of planning for the
use of force against Taiwan. Beijing assumes that the use of military
coercion against Taiwan will result in U.S. military intervention.
This assumption almost certainly contributed to the judgement
of some PLA analysts that the most effective use of military force
would be to crush Taiwan’s defenses and compel acceptance of
Beijing’s reunification terms before the United States had sufficient
time to intervene. A joint missile and air attack to quickly subdue
Taiwan’s defenses seems to be at the heart of such a campaign.69
Other military options are available, including variations on an
intimidating display of military power, blockading the island, and
an escalation strategy that begins with intimidation and gradually
increases the level of military coercion before implementing a direct
attack. These options, however, provide strategic warning to the
United States and Taiwan, allowing them to coordinate a diplomatic
and military response to China’s coercion.
A short, decisive military campaign to compel Taiwan’s
submission fits into the pattern of operational doctrine the PLA has
been developing since the mid-1980s, especially the “high-tech”
variant adopted in 1993. This high-tech variant has been the focus
of the advanced weaponry and military technology China has been
importing, and to some extent indigenously developing, for the past
decade. Nonetheless, for near-term planning the PLA faces a serious
dilemma when it contemplates a short, decisive high-tech military
campaign designed to compel Taipei’s compliance with Beijing’s
demands. First, PLA planners anticipate American intervention. If
these planners accept that U.S. forces will implement the offensive
operational doctrine they observed in the 1991 Persian Gulf War
and after, they are confronted with a difficult task. The advanced
weaponry in the PLA’s inventory remains limited, therefore the
units equipped and fully trained with these armaments is limited.
In planning for a short, decisive campaign against Taiwan, these
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forces must be divided among three tasks. Some, perhaps the
majority, will be assigned to the sudden air and missile assault on
Taiwan. A second element must be assigned the task of deterring or
defeating U.S. forces coming to Taiwan’s aid. A third element must
be assigned to defending critical facilities on the mainland against
intense U.S. precision attack. Allocating the PLA’s technologically
advanced air, naval, and missile assets among these three tasks will
be extremely demanding. Whereas the PLA expects to confront the
United States and Taiwan with a mix of old and new weapons, the
new weapons are clearly seen as the sharp point of the PLA’s spear.
For some years, the PLA will be short of just the weapons it believes
are required to implement its preferred operational doctrine.
A final dilemma the PLA has to confront is that it has not fought a
major military conflict since the 1979 border incursion into Vietnam.
That now distant experience is hardly useful because it was a
ground war where the PLA had the most experience and against an
adversary where quantity could play an important role in the combat.
A military confrontation over Taiwan brings the PLA into a realm of
military operations it has never experienced: joint warfare fought in
the air and at sea. Certainly, PLA exercises are increasingly joint and
realistic, including amphibious warfare, but the Taiwan scenario
involves confronting the world’s best-equipped, best-trained, most
operationally experienced armed forces. Furthermore, the PLA will
be contesting United States forces in realms of warfare where they
are most experienced--maritime and air power force projection. The
PLA will recognize what an exacting task this is.
Ground Forces Modernization: Straddling Inner Asia and the
Taiwan Scenario.
Although highest priority is now granted preparation for the
demanding Taiwan scenario, China’s defense modernization
programs are not myopically focused on this potential conflict. In the
same manner that air, naval, ISR, and IW programs concentrating on
a Taiwan confrontation are applicable to other maritime theaters,
such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea and protection
of China’s sea lines of communication (SLOC), ground forces
modernization has benefits that extend beyond a Taiwan scenario.
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Undoubtedly, the large joint service amphibious warfare and other
exercises extensively reported in the Chinese and Hong Kong
press70 do reflect preparation for a Taiwan conflict. Nonetheless,
and despite the low threat conditions that currently exist, ground
forces modernization programs have implications for the defense of
China’s extensive inner Asian frontiers. The operational doctrine
driving ground forces modernization parallels that of the air, naval,
and missile forces. Since the mid-1980s, PLA ground forces have
concentrated on developing the capability to respond quickly and
lethally to limited, localized military conflicts along China’s borders.
The overall objective has been to transform the ground forces from
the large, lumbering field armies that existed in the 1970s into more
flexible, quicker reacting forces capable of responding effectively to
a wide range of potential threats. Since the late 1990s, their training
has focused on preparing to fight as the ground component of a joint
operation.
In striving to achieve their modernization objectives, the
ground forces have undergone a series of force reductions and
reorganization.71 In the most recent PLA force reduction of 500,000
completed in 2000, the ground forces experienced an 18.6 percent cut.
The air force was reduced by 12.6 percent, the navy by 11.4 percent,
and the 2nd Artillery Corps manning China’s strategic forces was
reduced some 2.9 percent.72 Reductions in force (RIF) have been
undertaken for more than simply slimming down PLA organization
and reducing manpower costs. They are part of the objective to
make the ground forces more mobile and quicker reacting. Thus,
in the recent RIF some 30 combat divisions were reduced to
brigades. Brigades are a central component of creating what the
PLA refers to as “rapid reaction” units. Rapid reaction units have
been complemented by the creation of “fist” and “special operating
forces.” These types of units, which have been under development
since the late 1980s,73 include ground, airborne, aviation, and marine
forces. It appears they received greater emphasis following PLA
assessments of the Gulf War, and the high visibility given U.S.
Special Forces operations in Afghanistan will probably spur even
more attention to these kinds of units.
Modernizing ground forces weapons and equipment has not
benefited from foreign acquisitions as much as the air and naval

47

forces. In part this may be because China’s R&D and manufacturing
plants are more capable of developing and producing modern
tanks, armored personnel carriers (APC) and artillery than they are
advanced technology ships and aircraft. It may also reflect that the
ground forces have a lower priority than air and naval forces. This
lower priority is perhaps indicated by the fact that although ground
force aviation units were first formed in the 1980s, there are still only
around 300 helicopters assigned to them and they continue to lack a
dedicated attack helicopter. If funds were made available, dedicated
attack helicopters could be purchased in numbers from Russia along
with any other rotary-wing aircraft.
It seems probable that the most modern arms and equipment
available to the ground forces have been assigned to units that fall
into three categories. First, those assigned to be part of, and exercise
for, a Taiwan scenario, especially the amphibious, rapid reaction,
and “fist” units. Second, forces deployed along particularly
sensitive border areas, such as the Sino-Indian border. Third, units
tasked with developing the tactics and learning the maintenance
requirements for the new weapons and equipment. The knowledge
and experience gained by these training units is to be passed on to
other units to prepare them for the new weaponry.
This suggests that the majority of PLA ground forces remain
equipped with older weapons, but that selected units with high
priority missions are far better equipped and trained than the
majority. In this sense, the ground forces reflect the same pattern of
modernization as the air, naval, and missile forces. What percentage
of PLA ground forces are capable of quick, decisive, and lethal
responses to threats on China’s borders cannot be determined
without access to far more detailed information. It is nonetheless
evident that some ground force units, and probably an increasing
number, are now far more capable of conducting rapid response
joint operations than was true only a decade ago. Again, as with the
other services, the intent of ground force modernization is clear even
if the progress made is not.
LESSONS LEARNED
The first and perhaps most important lesson learned by China’s
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defense establishment occurred long before systematic defense
modernization was reinstated as a national goal in 1978. Twenty
years of Mao Zedong’s mass campaigns and too often misdirected
policies had left China’s military industrial complex in obsolescent
chaos, and the PLA corroded into a hulking obsolescent giant.
Overcoming and correcting these conditions was understood to be
a long-term process. As Beijing struggled to reconstruct its defense
establishment over the following 24 years, other critical lessons
emerged.
When in the 1980s Chinese scientists and technicians began
participating in international science and technology exchanges,
weapons developers learned that technologies found in modern
armaments and the complex supporting systems of contemporary
and future warfare are often closely tied to civilian products. They
learned that the components and systems integration processes
that form much of advanced weaponry are intrinsically “dual
use.” The same was obviously true for space systems, electronic
warfare, information technologies, and just about any other area
of advanced military technology. This allowed China to institute
R&D on advanced technologies with military applications by
employing a broad array of civilian scientists and technicians. This
did not imply that the defense industrial complex could quickly
and easily be reconstructed. It did mean that high priority research
programs would have greater resources to work with without
unduly burdening civil sector research and development as they
did in the 1950s. In the current era, military and civil R&D are often
complementary.
Placing advanced weapons in serial production is far different
from undertaking R&D on arms and components. The fact that the
PLA’s most advanced armaments are imported or, as in the case of
the Su-27, assembled from kits, indicates the severe and continuing
deficiencies in China’s defense manufacturing plants. Whether this
has diminished China’s quest for a self-sufficient defense industrial
complex is unclear. Producing indigenous systems with imported
components and foreign assistance is a step forward, but it is
most likely that China’s longstanding pursuit of self-sufficiency is
understood to be achievable only in the far distant future.
The principal lesson the PLA has learned over the past 24 years is
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that, in both defensive and offensive operations, advanced military
technologies have made the conduct of contemporary and future
warfare incredibly complex. China’s planners survey a military
environment where ballistic missile defenses, space-based ISR,
long-range precision strike munitions, information operations, and
all the other advances in military technology present the PLA’s
current operational capabilities with daunting demands. Even the
PLA’s much discussed “asymmetric” approaches to a war with the
United States concentrate on advanced technologies such as laser
weapons to attack U.S. space systems. More importantly, as the
PLA assessed U.S. military operations in the Gulf War and against
Serbia, Mao Zedong’s insistence that man is more important than
weapons struck home with a vengeance. Whether it is the officer
corps planning and preparing for war, the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and marines fighting the war, or the logisticians supporting the war,
professional knowledge and training are now recognized as essential
for military success. Since 1999, a constant theme in speeches by
senior PLA officers and Jiang Zemin as Chairman of the Party’s
Central Military Commission is that China’s armed forces must be
capable of applying advanced weaponry and supporting systems in
combat. Assessments of U.S. military operations taught the PLA that
conceptual operational doctrine has to be applied by well-trained
forces. These demands would not be so high in border disputes
with many of China’s neighbors, but Beijing’s concerns focus on a
potential military conflict with the United States over Taiwan.
China’s search for arms and supporting systems capable of
contesting U.S. military superiority introduced the PLA to the
complexity of current military operations. Beyond the already
difficult demands of conducting joint operations involving ground,
air, naval, and missile forces are the yet untested tasks of integrating
wide area and tactical ISR into an ongoing campaign against an
aggressive and competent adversary. As it has in developing joint
operations, the PLA is undoubtedly scouring U.S. doctrine and actual
operations to determine how to do just this. Realistic training in the
task of integrating ISR into joint operations will be as important
and in many ways as demanding as the RDT&E and production
of the systems themselves. What the PLA has learned as it probes
the demands of contemporary and future warfare is that the more it
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understands, the more complex military operations become.
To remain dependent on foreign arms, military technology and
assistance for now some 150 years must be a source of profound
frustration for a civilization that produced one of the world’s
foremost philosophers of war. There is certainly pride in the
knowledge that Sun Tzu is seriously studied in the war colleges of
the world’s most powerful armed forces. However, for what remains
of the military cadre that fought the Korean War and then saw
their defense modernization ambitions aborted by Mao Zedong’s
obsessions, this frustration must be intense. Nonetheless, today’s
China has dramatically progressed in science, technology, and
manufacturing skills, and its defense establishment is experiencing
the longest period of sustained modernization since the PRC was
founded. This progress and the promises it suggests for the future
must produce a degree of confidence inside the PLA even as it
generates apprehension in Asia and the United States.
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PART II:
THE SERVICES

CHAPTER 3
PLA GROUND FORCES LESSONS LEARNED:
EXPERIENCE AND THEORY
Dennis J. Blasko1
The lessons learned by PLA ground forces since their founding
can be divided into two distinct periods: first, lessons learned
through their own combat experience from 1927 to 1979 and second,
lessons from studying the experience of other armies in modern wars
from 1979 to the present. This division roughly parallels China’s
revolutionary experience, led primarily by Mao Zedong, followed
by the period of economic development, characterized by “reform
and opening,” initiated by Deng Xiaoping. Many of the lessons of
the revolutionary period are now considered “assumptions” about
army building in the period of reform. Underlying both periods are
lessons derived from the pre-modern Chinese military, primarily the
tenets of Sun Tzu Art of War, and the influence of the Soviet military,
especially in force structure, doctrine, and equipment.
The lessons learned in the first 52 years of the PLA were derived
from combat experience in both guerrilla and conventional action
against the Nationalists (KMT), Japanese, and Americans and their
allies. The 1979 campaign against the Vietnamese was a major
influence for the period of reform to follow. Prior to the “selfdefense counterattack,” Deng had already identified many elements
of future reform, but the bloody combat in northern Vietnam
provided impetus for their implementation (along with Deng’s
accession to the country’s primary leadership role). To reinforce the
value of combat experience, the PLA rotated a series of units to the
Vietnamese border in the 1980s to expose the troops to battlefield
conditions.
This chapter will examine each of those two periods in turn.
Major lessons are categorized into civil-military relations; China’s
technological level, including the “Red versus Expert” debate; and
military doctrine, tactics, and force structure.

61

LESSONS FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD
Though there are certainly other sources from the revolutionary
period, this chapter will rely on the fountainhead of Chinese
Communist wisdom, the thoughts of Mao Zedong, for its outline
of lessons learned. While these quotations from the Chairman are
certainly “party line,” they were selected because of their enduring
impact on the PLA’s current ideology, force structure, and doctrine.
There have been numerous modifications to Mao’s lessons over
the years, but many of his observations have become “traditions”
in the PLA and are now assumptions used to structure the force
and formulate its doctrine in the modern period. The examples
cited illustrate how these lessons remain a major factor in PLA
modernization.
Civil-Military Relations.
Every Communist must grasp the truth, “Political power grows
out of the barrel of a gun.” Our principle is that the Party
commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to
command the Party.2

Though the primary mission of the PLA is defense of the country
from external threats, it retains a secondary mission of domestic
security, including protection of senior Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) leaders.3 Party control of the gun is emphasized foremost here
because it is likely the army would be called on to perform internal
security operations if the Public Security police and People’s Armed
Police (PAP) failed to maintain order.
Party control over the armed forces was not much of an issue
during the revolutionary period when most Party leaders were or
had been Army leaders. Of course, internal disputes flared over
which Party-Army leaders were in control, but except for confusion
during the decade of the Cultural Revolution that culminated in Lin
Biao’s alleged coup attempt, the military as a whole stood behind
the Party. The issue was put to the test in the spring of 1989 when a
significant number of officers and men failed to follow the orders of
their chain of command. Nevertheless, the Party prevailed and units
of the PLA from across the nation applied deadly force against an
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unknown number of demonstrators and citizens.
In the following decade, Party and PLA leaders stressed
“absolute loyalty” to the Party in numerous political slogans and
campaigns. Ideological training was consistently listed as first
priority — demonstrated by three of Jiang Zemin’s “Five Sentences
on Army Building” (“politically qualified, militarily competent,
good work style, strict discipline, and adequate logistical support”),
referring to political loyalty and party discipline. In recent years,
political training has focused on Jiang’s “Three Represents.”
Party control is supervised by the political commissar/instructor
and Party committee systems that extend from the highest levels to
basic grass roots units.4 Periods of tension between commanders
and commissars have occurred, but that tension appears to have
lessened today even as fewer officers move from one track to
another.5 Traditionally, the PLA has also been a school to train
young communists for their eventual return to society as loyal
servants of the Party.
Though there has been talk of transforming the PLA into a “state
army,” these efforts were set aside after Tiananmen and, in reality,
Party control trumps any mention of “state control.” Jiang Zemin
and Hu Jintao, two Party and state leaders with no formal uniformed
military experience, head the Central Military Commission (CMC);
currently no uniformed military officers are found on the Party’s
highest policy making organ, the Standing Committee of the Political
Bureau.
The sole purpose of this army is to stand firmly with the Chinese
people and to serve them whole-heartedly.6

The Red Army was different from warlord and Nationalist
armies in its relationship to the Chinese peasants and workers. For
example, the “Three Main Rules of Discipline” and “Eight Points of
Attention”7 were a code of behavior intended to enlist support from
the Chinese masses in the Red Army’s fight against stronger KMT
forces. As a guerrilla force, the Red Army was the fish in the sea of
the Chinese people.
The concept “serve the people” continues into the modern period
in the PLA’s provision of labor to economic projects, such as the
laying of optical fiber lines throughout the country, and especially in
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its efforts in disaster relief throughout the country. The manpowerheavy, mobile, and disciplined ground force with logistics and
helicopter support has regularly been used as a “shock force,” along
with PAP, reserves, and militia, during floods, earthquakes, and
other natural disasters. These undertakings have multiple benefits:
1) they improve the image of the PLA in the eye of the average
Chinese and 2) they allow the units to exercise their command and
control and logistics functions while providing valuable leadership
experience for officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in
small units.
For the first time in 2002, the PLA included rescue and disaster
relief operations in its unit training programs.8 Additionally, a total
of 19 special units to fight floods have been formed in designated
engineering regiments and brigades.9
We have an army for fighting as well as an army for labor. For
fighting we have the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies; but
even they do a dual job, warfare and production.10

In its early years of fighting against both the KMT and Japanese,
the Red Army had to fend for itself in remote, rural areas. The
communists reduced the burden on the peasants by raising their
own crops and livestock. This tradition continued into the PLA era,
helping to reduce government expenditures for defense. However,
the practice got out of hand in the mid-1980s and 1990s during the
period of rapid economic growth, but of limited official allocations
to the military. Training time was lost, graft and corruption
were rampant, and profits were problematic as the PLA moved
from subsistence farming and light industry into a vast array of
commercial enterprises.
In 1998, President and Chairman of the CMC Jiang ordered the
PLA and PAP to divest themselves of most of their commercial
enterprises. However, as noted by the U.S.-China Commission:
[T]he Chinese government decided to allow the PLA to retain a
number of production units and enterprises, proving the “notion
that the PLA is out of business is not true.” Observers estimate
the PLA has held onto 8,000 to 10,000 such enterprises and units
of which “a vast majority were subsistence” units like farms and
food-processing units. Militarily useful enterprises were retained
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for national security reasons, most notably telecommunications,
space and satellite-launch services, radar technologies and optoelectronics, lasers, civil aviation and railways. Some enterprises
that provided cover for intelligence gathering, national security,
foreign affairs, and front operations were only partially
divested.11

China’s Technological Level.
Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive
factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive.12

Mao’s view of the importance of “man over technology,”
sometimes criticized as an attempt “to make a virtue out of necessity,”
was logical at the time for a guerrilla force operating in a country
with a large population and of limited industrial modernization. In
1959 Lin Biao modified the precept with the formulation that “men
and material form a unity with man as the leading factor.” Lin’s
“balanced policy” was important in providing justification for the
development of the PLA’s more technical arms, i.e., missile, air, and
naval forces, at the expense of the ground forces.13
The balance of man and weapons is directly related to the tension
between “Red” and “Expert” that began almost immediately after
the founding of the Red Army. In oversimplified terms, Mao’s
“Red” vision emphasized the ideal “Party soldier” operating with
the support of the masses in a “People’s War,” utilizing hit and
run guerrilla tactics. Modern weapons were less important to
this kind of force, which often was under-equipped and relied on
what it could acquire from the enemy, than they were to a more
technologically advanced foe. This vision contrasts with the “Expert”
professional military concept that stressed regularized organization
and conventional tactics as advocated by Zhu De and nearly all
early Red Army leaders.14 In fact, the Chinese army has used both
styles of fighting depending on the circumstances and today the
PLA requires that soldiers be both “Red” (politically reliable) and
“Expert” (capable of employing modern weapons and equipment in
a highly structured organization).
. . . a force which is inferior but prepared can often defeat a
superior enemy by surprise attack.15
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Chinese military planners constantly are looking for tactics and
techniques by which “the weak can overcome the strong.” Rapid
movements, surprise, deception, and camouflage and concealment
characterize the PLA’s preferred operating style and can be traced
back to Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. The 1999 air campaign in Kosovo
reinforced the importance of these techniques for ground forces by
highlighting the success of stealthy movements at night and the
employment of camouflage and concealment to elude and degrade
the effectiveness of NATO’s precision-guided munitions.
As the U.S.-China Commission report points out, PLA writers
and researchers have a fascination with “trump cards” or “assassin’s
mace weapons”:
In fact, assassin’s mace weapons have been given the highest
level of attention since August 1999 when Jiang Zemin called
for their priority development in a speech. Such weapons fall in
line with a host of other asymmetrical strategies–such as cyber
warfare–that the Chinese believe would help to counter U.S.
military superiority.16

It is arguable, however, whether “trump cards,” information or
cyber warfare, and other asymmetric forms of warfare, especially
if untested and available in limited numbers, will prove decisive in
conflict. Outside the technical journals, Chinese writings seldom
address the difficulties in taking these weapons from concept to
reliable, deployable form. Successful use of such weapons and
techniques might temporarily wound or stun a more technologically
advanced enemy, but would they be effective enough for China to
achieve its political objectives in a rapid and conclusive manner?
What if the enemy does not respond in the way China expects
— either before or after the use of the “trump card”? And what
happens if their initial use spurs the enemy into a protracted, more
destructive war against China? A skeptic might say that over-selling
the effects of the “assassin’s mace” is actually a distraction from the
more difficult task of properly training a professional force to fight
a modern high-technology war. These weapons could be included
among the “force multipliers” the PLA is pursuing, but should not
be considered ultimate weapons, which will single-handedly bring
an enemy to his knees.17
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We stand for self-reliance. We hope for foreign aid but cannot be
dependent on it . . .18

Self-reliance has been stressed for decades, even more so after
the Soviets pulled their industrial and technological support in the
late 1950s and after the Tiananmen massacre when the United States
cancelled its Foreign Military Sales programs and imposed a set of
sanctions that continue to this day. In a book entitled The ThirdGeneration Leadership Group of the Party and the Building of the Quality
of Armed Forces published in 1997, Commander of the Chengdu
Military Region Liao Xilong is quoted:
Jiang Zemin has emphasized time and time again that self-reliance
should be the key word in strengthening our Army’s modernization.
Judging by this, in developing its arsenal for cross-century
purposes, the PLA will continue to adhere to the principle of
mainly relying on self-reliance and drawing on foreign experience
to a limited extent. As far as some leading-edge weapons are
concerned, in particular, domestic production will be the top priority.19
(emphasis added)

Through the decade of the 1990s, as China turned primarily to
Russia for approximately $10 billion in arms imports, the ground
forces received only limited numbers of Mi-17 helicopters and
SA-15 mobile air defense systems20 and perhaps some precision
guided artillery munitions and anti-tank weapons. By the turn of
the century, however, Chinese factories were once again producing
significant numbers of new model, Chinese design main battle tanks
(MBT), amphibious tanks, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled
artillery, and helicopters. This new equipment is being deployed
to units throughout the country, though still in relatively limited
numbers. The 2002 DOD report quotes open sources predicting
that 1,800 new MBTs will be deployed by 2005.21 The 2000 Chinese
Defense White Chapter states, “In the field of conventional equipment,
China has made a fundamental shift from copying to independent
production . . .”22
Military Doctrine, Tactics, and Force Structure.
. . . our strategy and tactics are based on a people’s war . . .23
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“People’s War” initially was a concept of continental defense for
a low-tech, manpower intensive force, supported by loyal citizens.24
Though air and naval dimensions were added in the late 1940s, it
is an army-oriented doctrine. The doctrinal shifts of the 1980s and
1990s to “Local War” put greater emphasis on air, naval, and missile
forces, and these services received priority in modernization efforts.
Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 21st century, the PLA remains
led primarily by ground force officers. The shift in operational
mindset from continental defense to operations in the air and at sea
is as great a task as modernization of equipment.
“People’s War” is still considered an effective deterrent to a land
invasion of the mainland. A major dimension of the continuing
viability of People’s War is renewed attention to reserve and militia
forces, with particular attention to defense of Chinese cities from
air attack. Active army units are smaller in number and size, more
mobile combined arms formations than their predecessors. Still a
large number of ground force units remain equipped, trained, and
deployed principally for continental defense of the mainland.
The object of war is specifically “to preserve oneself and destroy
the enemy” . . . Attack is the chief means of destroying the enemy,
but defense cannot be dispensed with. . . . If war is taken as a
whole, attack remains primary.25

Despite the confusion generated by the sound of the term “active
defense” and the tasks of the armed forces of the PRC “to consolidate
national defense, resist aggression, defend the motherland, safeguard
the people’s peaceful labor, participate in national construction
and serve the people wholeheartedly,”26 Chinese military doctrine
has never relied solely on the defense at any level of war--tactical,
operational, or strategic. Fighting shifts between the offense and
defense as circumstances change. For example, the Third Stage of
Protracted War is “the counter-offensive.” Mao’s understanding that
attack is the decisive form of combat is consistent with Clausewitz
and Soviet and U.S. doctrine.
Our principles of operation are: (1) Attack dispersed, isolated
enemy forces first; attack concentrated, strong enemy forces
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later. . . . (3) Make wiping out the enemy’s effective strength our
main objective . . . (4) In every battle, concentrate an absolute
superior force . . . (5) Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle
you are not sure of winning . . . (6) Give full play to our style of
fighting . . . 27

A common perception of the PLA is that it is “the largest military
in the world,” with the implication that Chinese leaders rely simply
on mass to overpower their enemies. As can be seen in the quote
above, the goal is to apply “absolute superior force” (which consists
of both mass and firepower) at key points, not necessarily along the
entire front. Even in Korea by early 1951, the Chinese volunteers
adhered to this concept despite the “conventional wisdom”:
The press still reported human seas and overwhelming hordes,
but except where they were massing for a breakthrough, the
Chinese remained apart and in moderate numbers on the line.
Front-line soldiers began to joke: “Say, Joe, how many hordes
are there in a [Chinese] platoon?” Or, “We were attacked by two
hordes last night. We killed both of them.”28

The Chinese also learned “in open battle no amount of savage
cunning could substitute for firepower.”29 Subsequently following
Soviet doctrine and with Soviet assistance, the PLA incorporated large
formations of artillery into the ground force. Today, conventional
surface-to-surface multiple rocket and missile units extend the range
of tube artillery. New self-propelled artillery and multiple rocket
launchers are entering the inventory. The Chinese press recently
has noted these developments, albeit somewhat simplistically:
“Artillery has evolved into the biggest arm of the army. It is learned
that the number of artillery guns in China is the second largest in the
world. The biggest change to the Chinese artillery is that the groundto-air missile and ground-to-ground missile units have joined this
family.”30
Jiefangjun Bao offered a more sophisticated analysis of the role of
firepower and its relationship to information warfare in an article of
July 2000:
Although firepower warfare is the basic means in modern wars,
it is never isolated. It will need the guarantee and support of
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mobility, capability in information warfare, engineering work,
logistics, equipment, and technology. However, . . . if we
exaggerate the position of mobility, information warfare, and
various types of logistical support to an inappropriate extent, it
will mislead and bring harm to the state’s preparations against
war and army building . . . . The correct practice should be
studying in an all-round way to employ the firepower of various
arms of services in a joint operation and fully raise the firepower
capability of various arms of services.31

This perspective of modern war is consistent with the use of force
multipliers (e.g., information warfare, engineers, etc.) to enhance the
effects of firepower and maneuver. In order to retain firepower, the
PLA’s most advanced, mechanized group armies, i.e., the 38th and
39th, apparently have not downsized any of their maneuver divisions
to brigades and have been assigned organic helicopter groups.32 At
the same time, the PLA is increasing battlefield mobility with the
introduction of several types of new, wheeled armored vehicles,
trucks and transports, and all-terrain vehicles.
The operational and tactical lessons learned by the PLA through
several decades of actual combat operations are not that different
from other armies’ 20th century experience. A prime example is
the PLA’s understanding of the logistics lesson from the 1973 ArabIsraeli conflict: mid-intensity modern combat results in higher than
expected expenditure of munitions requiring a logistics tail that
can efficiently support extended operations. In recent years, each
Military Region headquarters has established a “Joint Logistics
Department” that seeks to maximize sources of supply and reduce
duplication of effort among the services.
The PLA’s problem generally has been, however, that it was the
technologically weaker force with inferior weaponry, forcing it to
rely more on the principles of speed, surprise, and deception than its
foes. This is what Mao meant by “our style of fighting.” While that
style may have served its political purposes in early 1979 in northern
Vietnam, it may not be suitable for the more likely wars of the future
— limited, local wars on the periphery of China. The PLA began a
multifaceted program of modernization at about the same time the
country shifted its focus to “national economic development.” This
period of reform brought new challenges to the Chinese ground
forces.
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LESSON FROM THE PERIOD OF REFORM
Three major factors have defined the parameters of ground force
lessons learned in the era of reform. First, in contrast to the 1950s
and 1960s, when Mao’s revolutionary zeal put a national emphasis
on developing atom bombs, missiles, and conventional forces, since
1978 military modernization has been subordinated to national
economic development. This translated directly into smaller resource
allocations than the military brass may have preferred. At the end
of the 1990s, China began to reap the benefits for its patience as the
announced defense budget received real double-digit percentage
increases,33 while at the same time planning and preparation for
possible Taiwan scenarios were pushed to the forefront.
Next, Deng’s pronouncement that the threat of major world
war was low and the most likely form of warfare that China would
face was local, limited war allowed for military modernization to
be conducted in a phased, long-term manner. Deng’s guidance
resulted in a shift in emphasis in the PLA from the ground forces
to development of the air, naval, and missile services. At the turn
of the 21st century, as a result of force reductions and defense
budget increases, priority for the ground forces appears to have
been reinvigorated with an infusion of new, indigenously-produced
weapons and an increase in realistic training opportunities.34
Finally, the PLA’s lack of ground combat experience since its
experiences with Vietnam has required it to learn lessons vicariously
based on studying the contemporary experience of other armies. The
PLA has developed doctrine, refined its force structure, upgraded
command and control, improved its logistics system, instituted
training reform, and introduced new equipment into the force, but
has yet to prove these changes meet the requirements of the modern
battlefield. No measure is as effective as the crucible of battle to
test the efficacy of reforms and to spur the innovation necessary to
overcome deficiencies unforeseen in theory.
Civil-Military Relations.
One of the greatest examples of the PLA’s loyalty to the Party
in the period of reform has been acceptance by the senior military
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leadership of the relatively low priority afforded to military
modernization in relation to other elements of national economic
development. While there has been a significant adjustment to
the resources dedicated to the PLA since 1999, the U.S.-China
Commission report is half right and half wrong when it says: “In
1997, the Chinese Communist Party defined the country’s economic
strategy. It called for close coordination between the military and
civilian sectors, and put the civilian sector at the service of the military.”35
(emphasis added)
The Commission bases this conclusion on the 16-character slogan:
Junmin jiehe–Combine military and civilian; Pingzhan jiehe–Combine
peace and war; Junpin youxian–Give priority to military products; Yi
min yang jun–Let civilian production support military production.
According to China’s Defense Conversion, published in 1994 by the
China Economic Press, Deng proposed the 16-character slogan in
January 1982 and it was adopted by the Party Central Committee to
guide “both the military industrial construction policy of China and
the policy for the development of the national economy.”36 The book
specifically states: “The national defense economy is not a “purely
consumer” economy. It is built on the national economy, and it follows
and serves the national economy.”37 (emphasis added)
The fourth 4-character phrase (Yi min yang jun), “Let civilian
production support military production,” often causes confusion
and may lead to the interpretation that “the civilian sector is at
the service of the military.” Indeed, China’s Defense Conversion
acknowledges “money earned developing civilian products was
used to develop military products,” but then explains “the basic
meaning” of the phrase to be:
From the overall view of the nation, national defense expenditures
cannot directly create wealth, but they are a necessary condition
for civilian production to generate wealth. National defense
expenditures are taxes generated by civilian manufacturing
turned into national financial income and spent as such. Basically,
military expenses come from the conversion of civilian-product
profits.38 (emphasis added)

This interpretation of the phrase in question explains how taxes
from the civilian sector support the military sector — a situation
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similar to that found in most countries.39 With this background
in mind, the actual relationship between the military and civilian
sectors of the economy is more accurately stated in China’s Defense
White Paper of 2000:
Developing the economy and strengthening national defense are
two strategic tasks in China’s modernization efforts. The Chinese
government insists that economic development be taken as the center,
while defense work be subordinate to and in the service of the nation’s
overall economic construction. Meanwhile, along with economic
development, the state strives to enhance its national defense
strength, to effectively support the armed forces in their efforts
to improve their quality and to form a mechanism which enables
national defense and economic development to promote each
other and develop in harmony.40 (emphasis added)

President Jiang is quoted in the Yangcheng Wanbao in February
2001 making direct reference to the 16-character slogan and saying,
“We must persistently ensure unreserved coordination by building
a system of coordination in the whole society to facilitate scientific or
technological development for national defense. We must combine
military efforts with non-military efforts and build a structure
full of vitality for developing science and technology for national
defense.”41 (emphasis added) Close coordination between the
civilian and military sectors is different than placing “the civilian
sector at the service of the military.” Uniformed military leaders
consistently reflect the thoughts expressed in the Defense White Paper
and by President Jiang in their numerous public pronouncements
and writings. For example, in April 2002, Chief of the General Staff
Fu Quanyou stated:
First, we must uphold the central task of economic development,
subordinate ourselves to and serve the overall interest, carry
forward the spirit of plain living and hard struggle, bring into
full play our armed forces’ special characteristics and strong
points, contribute more to socialist modernization, and lay a solid
material foundation for us to meet the challenges brought about
by the new changes in the world military arena.42

At the 2002 National People’s Congress, the Jiefangjun Bao quoted
several PLA deputies about the coordination of the defense and
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civilian sectors:
Deputy Chief of the General Staff Kui Fulin: It is necessary to

persistently include national defense in the overall planning
for the development of the national economy, give overall
consideration to it and make all-round arrangements for it,
and promote the coordinated development of national defense
construction and economic construction.
General Logistics Department (GLD) Political Commissar Zhou
Kunren: [G]overnments at all levels should give great support
to national defense and army building, and regard preparation
for military struggle as their duty. For example, they should
give full consideration to military needs in the construction of
highways, railways, and other projects, and should make efforts
to link national defense construction with national economic
construction to form a complete set of the two.
GLD Deputy Director Zhou Youliang: It is necessary to give
full consideration to the needs of national defense in economic
construction, implement the principles of “integration of
peacetime and wartime needs; and military and civilian
compatibility,” strive to link national defense construction with
national economic construction to form a complete set of the
two.43

The ideas of thrift and more efficient use of funds allotted to
the PLA are now common themes even as resources available to
the PLA grow. Nevertheless, in the Chinese military mind, there is
no confusion about where the modernization of the PLA stands in
relationship to national economic development — a reflection of the
military’s absolute loyalty to the Party.
China’s Technological Level.
CMC Chairman Jiang is committed to “building a strong army
with science and technology and pressing ahead with the army’s
quality building” by “transforming our army from a force known
for quantity and scale into a force known for quality and efficiency
and from a personnel-intensive force into a science- and technologyintensive force as well.”44 He and the senior military leadership
recognize the PLA’s limitations:
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[W]e should know that our armed forces still have difficulties
or even defects in fighting or winning a local war under hi-tech
conditions at the moment, including such outstanding problems
as relatively backward weapons, equipment, personnel quality,
structure, establishment, and so on in terms of overall scientific
and technological contents, lack of experiences in or a capability of
fighting a war under hi-tech conditions, and so on. . . . At present,
our army’s modernization standard is still incompatible with the
needs of fighting a modern war, this being a major contradiction
faced by our army building. . . . At present, our army still lags
far behind armed forces of developed countries in the West in
terms of weapons or equipment, intelligence or reconnaissance,
telecommunications or liaison, command or control, joint
operations, logistic support, and in other basic fields as well.45

With limited resources available for military modernization the
PLA has had to prioritize the distribution of funds. As a general rule,
ground forces have been the losers in this competition, though recent
evidence suggests that situation may be changing to some degree.
Instead of an across-the-board upgrading of forces, only a portion
of the force has been selected to receive the newest equipment and
training priority. The result of these decisions has been the creation
of “pockets of excellence” and rapid reaction or fist units.
The army has accepted the fact that for the foreseeable future
its forces will be a mix of high, medium, and low-technology units
equipped with an assortment of high, medium, and low-technology
equipment. President Jiang has stressed the importance of man in
relationship to modern weapons, “Though we’re unable to develop
all hi-tech weapons and equipment within a short period of time, we
must train qualified personnel first, for we would rather let our qualified
personnel wait for equipment than the other way round.”46 Thus, it is
more important to train officers and men in how to maintain and
operate new equipment according to the PLA’s newly promulgated
doctrine than it is to flood the troops with weapons that could not be
absorbed by the units. This is a rational, if long-term, solution to the
problem of an army with a low education and technological base.
In order to prepare the force to properly employ new weapons
and equipment in the 1990s the General Staff Department issued
guidance for experimental test beds to be established in the different
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Military Regions for various technologies and tactics. Lessons
learned through actual troop trial would then be applied throughout
the force and in the military school system. In this manner, the
ground forces could learn how to best operate small numbers of
modern equipment, such as night vision devices, under the current
conditions in the PLA.47 Despite the preparation undertaken prior to
the issuing of new equipment, it is still common to read accounts of
soldiers and units that are afraid of using or breaking the new gear.48
Reticence of this sort is not unique to the PLA, however.
While the army has received fewer imported weapons from
Russia than the other services, especially in the last few years, new
models of Chinese-produced tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and
logistics equipment have been introduced into units throughout the
country, and particularly to units in the Military Regions opposite
Taiwan. These new prestige weapons undoubtedly will help build
morale in what otherwise can be an unenviable situation.
The role of the NCO is being expanded, in part to assist in the
training and operation of new equipment, but also to assist the
officers in small unit leadership. This is a lesson learned from the
study of foreign armies and personal observation of the NCOs
during overseas travel by PLA leaders. The ongoing maturation of
the NCO corps also is related to the reduction in terms of conscription
for ground force soldiers from 3-2 years that occurred in the late
1990s. With conscripts staying in the army for a shorter amount of
time, NCOs have increased in number and had their responsibilities
expanded to provide stability in units and properly train younger
soldiers to maintain and operate new equipment. Some units now
are able to attain higher levels of unit proficiency in shorter periods
of time than in the 1990s, allowing for major training exercises to
begin in April and continue for several months.49
Military Doctrine, Tactics, and Force Structure.
In order for the ground force to fight potential Local Wars, it has
had to 1) create or reorganize units capable of getting to a battle on
China’s periphery, and 2) focus on combined arms and joint training.
The transformation of army corps to group armies and the formation
of the first helicopter units in the 1980s were initial steps. The

76

growth of the army helicopter force has been slow, with only about
300 aircraft distributed among 12 aviation groups or regiments.50
Numerous Chinese sources have photographs of growing numbers
of Zhi-9 and Mi-17 helicopters; some are gunships armed with guns
and rockets.51 The PLA still lacks an “attack helicopter,” designed
specifically for that single role. In the 1990s, Special Operations
Forces (SOF) units were established in each of the Military Regions
and received considerable attention in the Chinese media. These
units routinely train with army helicopter units and elements from
the PLA Air Force and Navy — they are among the few PLA army
units who can carry the battle beyond the borders of China.
The number of group armies has been reduced and their
composition changed through transfer of units; many divisions were
restructured into smaller brigades with the intention of making these
units lighter and more rapidly deployable. Other divisions have had
their structure modified. In the late 1990s, divisions or brigades that
had been designated as “tank” were redesignated as “armored”
units to emphasize their “combined arms” capabilities. Also in the
late 1990s, the 1st Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division of
the 1st Group Army in the Nanjing Military Region was fashioned
from the former 1st Motorized Infantry Division. By 2001, the 124th
Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division was created from the
former 124th Motorized Infantry Division in the 42nd Group Army
of the Guangzhou Military Region.52 PLA ground forces now have a
larger number of designated amphibious troops than does the PLA Navy
with its two marine brigades.53 Because of the elevation of planning for
Taiwan scenarios, amphibious operations are receiving emphasis in
ground force units throughout China and new amphibious armored
vehicles are being introduced into the force.
An assortment of “high-technology units,” such as the
“Guangzhou Military Region Informationized Unit,” “Jinan Military
Region Tech Rapid Reaction Unit,” and other “Hi-Tech Units,” have
been added to the various electronic warfare units previously in the
order-of-battle.54 For the first time, a surface-to-surface missile unit
has been assigned to the ground forces, as opposed to the Second
Artillery, in the Nanjing Military Region. This unit in Shangrao,
Jiangxi province was converted from an artillery brigade in 1997.55
Nanjing is also the first Military Region headquarters in which a
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“Conventional Guided Missile Department” has been identified.56
Training. The Military Training Plan for 2002 carries forward
lessons learned in past years and focuses “on improving the
quality of training, instead of focusing on how much time is used in
training.”57 Standardized training criteria and evaluation guidance
have been issued to units from the General Staff Department to
ensure quality. The use of simulators to enhance field training
appears to be expanding.
Joint and combined arms training has become more common
and more realistic, to include forces crossing Military Region
boundaries to exercise in increasingly complex tasks.58 Force-onforce maneuvers (“confrontational” exercises) are widespread, as
are dedicated “Blue Force” (“enemy”) units. Training is more “hightechnology” oriented with a focus on the “three attacks and three
defenses” (strike at stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and gunship
helicopters; defend against precision strikes, electronic jamming,
and reconnaissance and surveillance). The Persian Gulf War and
the NATO Kosovo operations are generally cited as the influences
that led to the adoption of the “three attacks and three defenses”
scheme.
In addition to joint amphibious training areas in the Nanjing and
Guangzhou Military Regions at Dongshan, Pingtan, and Zhoushan
islands, and near Shantou,59 combined arms training bases have been
identified in the Beijing, Guangzhou, Jinan, Lanzhou, and Shenyang
Military Regions, along with five additional “Tankmen” (armored
forces) training areas.60 According to the 2002 DOD report:
PLA ground forces training and exercises since the mid-1990s
have focused on various themes, although without a predictable
pattern or sequence from year to year. Training activity in 2001
reportedly emphasized maritime and amphibious training and
integration of conventional ground units with Airborne, Marines,
and SOF. It built on previous years and included more combat
units, which incrementally improved the PLA’s abilities to deploy
and sustain the force, and to conduct amphibious operations in
a multi-service environment . . . . Over the past year, Beijing’s
military training exercises have taken on an increasingly realworld focus emphasizing rigorous practice and operational
capabilities, and improving the military’s actual ability to use
force.61
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Deterrence. The Chinese leadership relies on its numerically
large force as the basis for conventional deterrence. An article in the
journal of the Academy of Military Science observed in 2001:
In conventional deterrence, demonstrations of power can take
various forms, but they are generally expressed as tests and
exhibitions of high-performance weapons, focused concentrations
of armed forces, large-scale military exercises, threats and strikes
that serve as warning examples, and limited combat operations,
etc.62

In order for a deterrent force to be credible it must be structured
for and capable of carrying out its military missions. In the Chinese
strategic mindset, significant ground forces stationed throughout
the country are key to deter against both external aggression and
domestic disturbances. Because of the difficulty in rapidly moving
large formations of troops along with their supplies and equipment,
ground forces are found in all corners of the country. Many group
armies remain deployed along traditional avenues of attack into
China.
PLA ground forces are also the ultimate guarantor of China’s
domestic stability. Although the National Defense Law of 1997
assigns to the PLA the primary mission of “defensive fighting”
against external attack, “the standing army, when necessary, may
assist in maintaining the public order in accordance with the law.”63
The PLA leadership would prefer for the PAP and Public Security
forces to handle domestic disturbances and approved transferring
14 PLA divisions to strengthen the PAP in the late 1990s. Currently,
PAP internal security forces are estimated at about 800,000 in
approximately 45 division-like units.64
At the same time that the PLA is changing its doctrine and
training regimen, the PAP is receiving more specialized equipment
and training to perform its main task. As the PLA becomes more
mechanized and modernized, additional training for domestic
security operations will be a distraction from preparation for its
primary mission. My experience with PLA officers has caused me to
conclude that most Chinese military leaders have learned the same
lesson as many American officers that “soldiers don’t make good
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policemen.”65
With regard to “terrorism, separatism, and extremism”66 especially
in China’s western regions, the PLA may likely be used in addition
to, or in lieu of, PAP and local police forces. The PLA considers
dealing with armed insurgents who challenge the authority of the
Chinese government an integral part of its mission. In October 2002,
the PLA held its first “cross-border,” bilateral, antiterrorist exercise
with a Shanghai Cooperation Organization member, Kyrgyzstan.
The 2-day maneuver involved over 100 soldiers from each side, as
well as armored vehicles and helicopters. The Xinjiang Military
District provided the PLA contingent for this exercise.67
CONCLUSION
If anything, the PLA has proved itself to be a good learner from
the lessons of its own experience and that of others. It is not afraid
of making modifications to its thinking, practices, and structure if
circumstances warrant. However, most often, course corrections are
still framed in an ideological tradition that dates back to Mao. The
effectiveness of recent attempts at modernization is yet to be proven
in battle, and it is certain that if it is involved in future combat the
PLA will make further adjustments based on its successes and
failures in practice.
Perhaps for the army, the most significant lesson of the period of
reform is that the ground forces will not be the predominant factor
in most likely future scenarios. Therefore, the army leadership has
given greatest priority to that portion of ground forces that can get
to the fight. Only a relatively small percentage of the large ground
force is likely to be applied at key points in the battle, while the
rest of the force provides a distraction to the enemy and cover for
smaller movements. The units that fight the first battle probably will
be quite different from those called on later to participate in a longer
struggle.
In the years ahead, a true commitment to a doctrine of joint
warfare may be demonstrated by the elevation of air, naval, or
Second Artillery officers to the most senior national leadership
positions or as Military Region commanders. With the exception of
Liu Huaqing, who was both an army and naval officer, nonground
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force officers have not been included in the highest decisionmaking
circles of the Chinese military in recent years. This is likely to be
a gradual process, but at the grass roots levels there is evidence of
exchanges of officers in schools to become more familiar with the
inner workings of other services.
Currently, there is little indication that the PLA will be anything
but a Party-controlled army in the near to mid-term. If it were to
become truly a state-controlled army, political conditions would
have to be vastly different than they are today. In the meantime, it is
a good assumption that the fundamental tenet of the Chinese armed
forces for 75 years — “the Party commands the gun, and the gun
must never be allowed to command the Party” — will endure.
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CHAPTER 4
THE PLA AIR FORCE: 1949-2002
OVERVIEW AND LESSONS LEARNED
Kenneth W. Allen
In a future high technology local war, the PLAAF will be the first
to impact the enemy, and will be utilized throughout the war. We
will develop elite troops armed with precise weaponry, quality
training, rapid reaction, and the ability to attack and defend. The
PLAAF will accelerate development of weapons and equipment
to form a killing machine on a fixed scale. In recent years, troops
have put education and training in a strategic position. We have
already set the stage for war strategy research to defeat enemies
with high technology weapons and equipment, but we must still
form a military theory system with special PLAAF characteristics.
One group of experimental troops has already begun to take
new operational theories and concepts and has developed them
into live fire exercises. Initial results have been scored in mobile
operations, air attack, seizing air superiority, nighttime attack,
defense, and the increased use of simulators. Future training will
further highlight tactical training, including air blockades, air
attack, and participation in combined operations by all three PLA
services.
General Liu Shunyao, May 20001

INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an overview of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF)
and examines lessons learned since it was established in 1949.
Whereas most Western articles focus primarily on weapon systems
and order of battle, this article examines the PLAAF as a whole
by looking at the seven areas of leadership, organization, theory,
operations, weapon systems, education and training, and logistics
and maintenance. Each of the seven sections begins with a short
summary of the key topics, followed by supporting background
material. The conclusion section ties these lessons learned into
challenges for the future.2
In terms of operational experience, the chapter looks at three
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external campaigns the PLAAF has participated in — the Korean
War, the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the 1979 Vietnam border
conflict.3 During those campaigns, several hundred combat aircraft,
antiaircraft artillery (AAA) units, surface-to-air missile (SAM) units,
and thousands of support personnel deployed to a few airfields
near the border, but the per-pilot sortie rate was minimal. More
importantly, none of these campaigns involved enemy attacks
against targets inside China’s borders, so the aircraft, airfields, and
troops were safe in their sanctuaries.
Since the Gulf War and Kosovo conflict, the PLAAF has
acknowledged its next war will most likely be completely different
from any previous wars it has fought. It readily admits its aviation
and air defense assets, not only near the front but also in rear areas,
will not be safe from attack by stealth aircraft and long-range cruise
missiles in an intense electromagnetic environment. As a result,
the PLAAF is concentrating on shifting from positional, defensive
operations to mobile, offensive operations that involve camouflage,
concealment, and deception (CC&D) and dispersal measures.
As noted in former commander Liu Shunyao’s comments above,
the PLAAF has made improvements across the board so it will be
prepared to fight and win future local wars under modern hightechnology conditions. His comments also provide elements of the
PLAAF’s aspirational doctrine, laying out its goals for the future.
The question remains, however, whether the PLAAF is applying
satisfactorily what it has learned in order for it to be prepared to
fight these kinds of wars in the future, especially against a modern
military like the United States.
During the 1950s, the PLAAF “learned from the Soviet Union
and its own experience in the Korean War and standoff with the
Nationalist forces on Taiwan.”4 As a result of the devastation
to military professionalism during the Cultural Revolution, the
PLAAF was unprepared to fight a major war as it entered the Deng
Xiaoping era of the 1980s. Although the PLAAF has begun acquiring
some high-tech weaponry from Russia, the bulk of the force and
its tactics are still based on weapons and concepts designed in the
1960s and 1970s. The PLAAF is trying to adapt itself to the future
goal of simultaneous offensive and defensive operations, but it is
still hampered by institutional impediments. Because the PLAAF’s
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last major battle was fought in 1958, it is trying to “learn” from
foreign air forces and adapt those lessons to itself. It is making some
progress, but the process is slow. This chapter will examine these
ideas in greater detail.
LEADERSHIP
Summary.
Over the past 53 years, leadership has resided in the hands of only
nine commanders and 11 political commissars.5 When examining
their backgrounds, several generalizations can be made. First, until
the mid 1980s, almost all of the leaders served initially in the ground
forces. The PLAAF did not have a deputy commander with aviation
experience until 1973 and a commander with pilot experience until
1985. Since then, all commanders have been pilots. Second, three of
the nine commanders served first as the political commissar, but
there is no discernible trend for political commissars becoming the
commander in the future. Third, it has sought to promote younger
leaders at all levels throughout the force, but the trend does not
appear to apply to the commander’s position. Fourth, the PLAAF
has only limited general officer representation outside the Air Force
structure. Fifth, the leadership has increased its interaction with
foreign militaries.
It is difficult to make any predictions about the PLAAF’s future
leadership. Given that Qiao Qingchen is currently 63 years old,
he will have to retire in 2004. Will his successor be in his late 50s,
so he can lead for 7 to 8 years before retirement, or will he be a
placeholder like Qiao for 2 to 3 years? Will he be one of the current
deputy commanders, or come from a Military Region Air Force
(MRAF) with no headquarters experience like Cao Shuangming did
in 1992? Either path will tell something about the political dynamics
at Headquarters Air Force (HqAF) at the time. Most importantly,
will he be a strong leader with a broad vision, or will he merely fill
the position and carry out the will of others?
Background.
All members of the PLA are assigned one of 15 grades.6 Their
91

grade also designates the level of their service or organization within
the PLA hierarchy as shown below:
• Grade 1: Chairman and vice chairmen, Central Military Commission
(CMC).
• Grade 2: Members of the CMC. This includes the four General Department
directors.
• Grade 3: Leaders (commander and political commissar) of the seven
military regions (MR), Navy (PLAN), PLAAF, Academy of Military
Science (AMS), and National Defense University (NDU).7

In spite of the PLA’s focus on jointness, the PLAAF is not yet
fully integrated into senior-level joint positions. It was not until the
late 1980s that MRAF commanders were integrated into the MR
command staff as deputy MR commanders. Prior to the late 1990s, all
PLAAF officers working in the four general departments — General
Staff (GSD), General Political (GPD), General Logistics (GLD), and
General Equipment (GED) — were required to wear an Army
uniform regardless of their job. It does not appear there is a single
PLAAF general officer assigned as a deputy commander or secondlevel department director in any of the four general departments. Nor
does it appear there are any PLAAF general officers in the prestigious
AMS, where the PLA’s strategy and doctrine are formulated. A
major general is the director of the Training Department at NDU.8
In spite of the lack of general officers in these organizations, the Air
Force does have senior colonels (U.S. military O-7 equivalents) and
colonels serving in each of these organizations.
Commanders. Of the nine commanders, the first four, covering
1949 to 1985, were all ground force officers who moved into various
command positions when the PLAAF was formed in 1949.9 In 1985,
Wang Hai became the first aviator to be selected as the commander.
Since then, all of the commanders have been career aviators.
Chart 1 shows each commander’s date of birth, dates he served as
commander, age when he became commander, and the age he left
office. With the exception of Liu Yalou, the age for assuming the
commander’s position has ranged from 50 to 63 years old. Although
Wang Hai and Liu Shunyao assumed the commander’s position
at age 59 and 57, respectively, Cao Shuangming, Yu Zhenwu, and
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Qiao Qingchen took office at age 63 and could serve for only 2 years
before reaching the mandatory retirement age of 65. The political
clout of the commanders has apparently decreased over the years.
Some, but not all, of the commanders, political commissars, deputy
commanders, deputy political commissars, and directors of the
four administrative departments have been representatives at the
National People’s Congress (NPC). All of the commanders and
political commissars have been members of the Party Congresses,
and some of them have been members or alternate members of the
Party Congress Central Committee. Liu Yalou was a member of
the CMC, Wu Faxian was a member of the Politburo and deputy
director of the CMC General Department, and Zhang Tingfa was a
member of the Politburo and CMC. Zhang was the last commander
to hold these positions.
One reason for the lack of political clout stems from the Cultural
Person

DOB

Held office

Age assumed
office

Age left office

Liu Yalou

1910

Oct 1949–May 1965

39

55 (died)

Wu Faxian

1915

May 1965–Sept 1971

50

56 (arrested)

Ma Ning

1922

May 1973–Apr 1977

51

55 (replaced)

Zhang Tingfa

1918

Apr 1977–Jul 1985

59

67 (retired)

Wang Hai

1925

Jul 1985–Nov 1992

60

65 (retired)

Cao Shuangming

1929

Nov 1992–Nov 1994

63

65 (retired)

Yu Zhenwu

1931

Nov 1994–Dec 1996

63

65 (retired)

Liu Shunyao

1939

Dec 1996–May 2002

57

63 (retired due to
health)

Qiao Qingchen

1939

May 2002–Present

63

Currently in
position

Chart 1. PLAAF Commanders.
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Revolution. For example, the PLAAF went without a commander
for 18 months after Wu Faxian was arrested following Defense
Minister Lin Biao’s plane crash over Mongolia in September 1971.
When Deng Xiaoping gained control of the CCP in 1978, he sought
to upgrade China’s airpower capabilities, but one of his unstated
purposes was to assert his authority over what he and other senior
officials regarded as a “potentially dangerous service.”10 Deng’s
leadership group attached special political weight to the PLAAF,
because Defense Minister Lin Biao had wrested control of the Air
Force through Wu Faxian during the Cultural Revolution. As a
result of these and other power struggles in the Cultural Revolution
that involved the Air Force, Party leaders thereafter sought to keep a
much tighter rein over the PLAAF than the other service arms.
Political Commissars. The PLAAF has had 11 political commissars
since 1949 (see Chart 2). There is no set template or discernible trends
for these leaders. While seven of them spent their entire career in
the political commissar system, two served in command positions
before becoming the political commissar, and two of them had a mix
of command and political commissar positions. Qiao Qingchen has
been the only pilot. The first four political commissars spent their
entire career in the political commissar system (Wu Faxian became
commander under Lin Biao after being the political commissar for
almost 15 years).11 In an apparent attempt to weed out the political
commissar influence in the PLAAF following Lin Biao’s death, Ma
Ning became the commander and Fu Chuanzuo became the political
commissar in 1973 — both officers had spent their entire career in
command positions, none of which were in the headquarters.
Zhang Tingfa, who was the political commissar from 1975
to 1977 and the commander from 1977 to 1985, had previously
spent his entire ground force and Air Force career in command
positions. When Zhang was commander, the political commissar,
Gao Houliang, had a mixed command and political commissar
background. Zhu Guang, who was the political commissar with
commander Wang Hai from 1985 to 1992, had served in only
political commissar system positions, moving back and forth
between Army and Air Force billets. Zhu’s replacement, Ding
Wenchang, had also spent his entire career in political positions,
but they had all been in the PLAAF. The current commander,
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Person

DOB

Held office

Age
assumed
office

Age left office

Xiao Hua

1916

Oct 1949–Feb 1957

33

34 (to GPD)

Wu Faxian

1915

Feb 1957–May 1965

32

39 (to commander)

Yu Lijin

1913

May 1965–Sep 1968

50

53 (to CAAC)

Wang Huiqiu

1911

Sep 1968–May 1973

57

59 (to Shenyang MR PC)

Fu Chuanzuo

1914

May 1973–Nov 1975

59

61 (retired)

Zhang Tingfa

1918

Nov 1975–Apr 1977

57

59 (to commander)

Gao Houliang

1915

Apr 1977–Jul 1985

62

68 (retired)

Zhu Guang

1922

Jul 1985–Nov 1992

63

70 (retired)

Ding Wenchang

1933

Nov 1992–Feb 1999

59

65 (retired)

Qiao Qingchen

1939

Feb 1999–May 2002

60

63 (to commander)

Deng Changyou

1947

May 2002–Present

55

Currently in position

Chart 2. PLAAF Political Commissars.
Qiao Qingchen, has a mixed command and political commissar
background, having served as the deputy political commissar in
the Jinan MRAF before moving up to become the commander of the
Beijing MRAF. From there he became a PLAAF deputy commander,
then the political commissar, and replaced Liu Shunyao as
commander in May 2002, when Liu had to retire for health reasons.
Little background information is available on the new political
commissar Deng Changyou, except that he served in political
department and commissar positions in the Lanzhou MRAF before
moving to Headquarters Air Force in 1995 as the deputy director
and then director of the Political Department.
Deputy Commanders. Since 1949, the PLAAF has had 32 deputy
commanders, who collectively have been responsible for the
following general areas: schools, training, maintenance, logistics,
equipment, research and development, operations, air defense, and
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discipline.12 The first 14 deputy commanders were ground force
officers who had served in the Army until the PLAAF was formed
in 1949. Immediately after the PLAAF and Air Defense Force (ADF)
merged in 1957, the PLAAF had seven deputy commanders, two of
whom came from the ADF. These were the last two deputies with
an air defense background, even though the air defense component
(SAM/AAA) has been instrumental in defending China’s airspace,
including AAA troop involvement in the Vietnam War. Although one
of the deputy commanders is always responsible for the air defense
role, at least one of the deputy chiefs of staff (deputy directors in the
Headquarters Department) generally has an air defense background.
For example, Major General Chen Huiting, who was a deputy chief
of staff in the late 1980s, had served as a SAM battalion and division
commander, and as the deputy commandant of the SAM academy.
It was not until 1973 that the PLA assigned a pilot (Zhang Jihui)
as a deputy commander. Between 1973 and 1982, all of the other
deputy commanders had their roots in the ground forces as political
commissars or commanders. In 1982, Wang Hai became only the
second pilot to be assigned as a deputy commander. Since then,
most of the deputy commanders have been pilots.
The most notable exceptions to assigning pilots as deputy
commanders are two former commanders of the PLAAF’s 15th
Airborne Army. Jing Xueqin was the airborne commander from
1990 until he moved up to became a PLAAF deputy commander
in 1993, where he remains today. His successor, Ma Diansheng,
became a PLAAF deputy commander in September 1999, then
moved to the Nanjing MR as a deputy MR commander in July 2000.
Jing’s appointment came at the same time airborne forces upgraded
its brigades to divisions and the Air Force began receiving its first
Il-76s to support the airborne forces.13 Adding them as deputy
commanders clearly indicates the elevation of the airborne forces in
the PLA’s force planning.
Seeking Younger Leaders. Overall, the PLAAF has made a
concerted effort at reducing the age of its leaders. When ranks were
reinstituted in 1988, almost two-thirds of the 32 lieutenant generals
promoted were over 60 and about two-thirds of the major generals
were over 54.14 Today, the PLAAF has approximately 150 general
officer positions, including one general, 25 lieutenant generals, and
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125 major generals. The average age of officers assuming the same
positions as those in 1988 has been reduced by about 3 to 5 years
(lieutenant generals are about 57 and major generals about 52),
thus indicating a move toward a younger force. By comparison,
an analysis of current senior USAF leaders shows that they entered
the Air Force between 1966 and 1970, and were promoted to major
general at age 47 to 49, lieutenant general at 48 to 51, and general at
52 to 53.15
Although the Air Force has succeeded in reducing the overall age
of its leaders, it has lost all of its leaders with any operational wartime
experience.16 When Wang Hai was commander (1985 to 1992), three
of the four HqAF deputy commanders, three of the seven MRAF
commanders and two deputy MRAF commanders were Korean War
veterans.17 By the mid 1990s, all of these officers had retired. Today,
there are no Korean War veterans still on active duty, and probably
no one left from the 1958 conflict over the Taiwan Strait. This means
that the historical experience today’s leaders bring with them comes
primarily from the Vietnam War of the 1960s, where the PLAAF’s
main involvement was its AAA troops stationed inside Vietnam and
Laos, plus a handful of air engagements along the border.18
Foreign Relations. The PLAAF began sending delegations abroad
in August 1949, when Liu Yalou led a delegation to Russia to purchase
aircraft and equipment. As with the rest of the PLA, however, this
program lagged until Deng Xiaoping opened the door in the late
1970s. Since 1979, commanders have emphasized direct contact with
foreign air forces by leading an average of one delegation abroad
per year and hosting visits to China by two to four foreign air force
commanders annually. In addition, political commissars since 1988
have also paid visits to several countries, including the United States,
Russia, Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Portugal, and Turkey.
Most importantly, the record shows each of the delegations led
by the commander or political commissar have included directors
from key headquarters departments, regional commanders, and/or
personnel from research institutes and academies. In addition, most
of the deputy commanders and deputy political commissars have
visited abroad as part of delegations led by senior PLAAF or PLA
officers. These types of visits also help indicate who the PLAAF is
grooming for future leadership positions. For example, as a deputy
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commander, Liu Shunyao accompanied Defense Minister Chi
Haotian to the United States in November 1996 and became the
commander the next month. In September 1998, Deputy Political
Commissar Qiao Qingchen accompanied Zhang Wannian to the
United States and became the political commissar 3 months later.
There are several limitations to the future growth of the PLAAF’s
foreign relations program. The first limitation is the small size of the
Foreign Affairs Division, which has only about five full-time officers
and has not grown appreciably over the past 15 years. These officers
must plan the itinerary for and escort all delegations to and from
China. Second, each commander is authorized only one visit abroad
per year under ordinary circumstances, and the number of foreign
air force leaders accepted for visits to China is guided by the overall
PLA visitors plan. Besides meeting with foreign commanders, the
PLAAF also hosts or sends out an average of five to ten functional
exchange delegations per year. Third, the PLAAF must pay for all incountry expenses for visiting delegations and all international travel
expenses for PLAAF delegations. Fourth, the PLAAF has military
attachés posted in only two locations — Washington and London
— and only about ten countries have air force attachés assigned to
Beijing. This limits the day-to-day interaction between the PLAAF
and foreign air forces.
The trend is for more working-level exchanges, but not
necessarily high-level exchanges. The biggest question arising
from the PLAAF’s involvement in foreign affairs is whether these
exchanges are helping it improve its capabilities to conduct warfare
against U.S. and Taiwan forces, or whether they are providing
an opportunity for the current and next generation of leaders to
understand the importance of peaceful global interaction.
ORGANIZATION
Summary.
The chain of command is organized into four operational and
administrative levels:
• Headquarters Air Force
• Military Region Air Forces
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• Air corps, command posts, and bases
• Operational units and elements
Although the PLAAF has always been subordinate to the ground
forces, its operational and administrative structures were not fully
synchronized until the late 1990s. The operational structure can be
divided into two components: (1) the campaign command structure,
which includes the military regions, air corps, command posts, and
bases, and (2) the campaign and tactical unit (budui) and element
(fendui) force structure.
The administrative structure closely followed, but did not
always match, the PLA’s structure until 1998, when the GED was
established. The most important exception was the fourth first-level
department that was responsible for aviation maintenance and was
subordinate to the General Logistics Department prior to 1998.
From 1949 to 1971, the PLAAF created a total of 50 air divisions.
Beginning at the end of the 1980s, however, the number of air
divisions has gradually been reduced to just over 30.19 These changes
have taken place in order to incorporate new weapon systems,
retire older systems, meet new mission requirements, and reduce
personnel.
The PLAAF’s campaign command structure at the MRAF level
did not match the ground force structure until 1985, when the PLA
reorganized its eleven military regions into seven. The PLA did not
begin to fully integrate the PLAAF into the campaign command
structure until the late 1980s, when the MRAF commanders became
concurrent MR deputy commanders. The PLAAF also began
reducing the size of its campaign and tactical force structure in
the 1990s in terms of numbers of air divisions and the number of
regiments per division.
Since 1949, the PLAAF has implemented five reductions in force
(1960, 1970, 1975, 1985, and 1992), all of which were part of larger
PLA force-reduction programs.20 The current force is less than
400,000 personnel.21
Background.
According to the PLA’s writings on force structure, the PLAAF’s
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organizational system includes the administrative structure, five
operational branches/service arms, specialized support units, plus
academies, schools, and research institutes.22 It also has maintenance
and logistics support units, including repair facilities, hospitals, and
sanitoriums. In addition, there are various types of training bases,
regiments, and groups that are directly subordinate to either HqAF
or to the seven MRAF Headquarters.23
Administrative Structure. Over the past 50 years, the overall
administrative organization from HqAF down to the lowest unit can
be compared to a deck of cards that occasionally gets reshuffled.24
Only a few new cards have been added, and the other cards have
merely been moved to a different location in the deck. HqAF,
located in Beijing, is equivalent to the U.S. Air Force’s Air Staff
and is organized into four first-level administrative departments
— Headquarters, Political, Logistics, and Equipment — and
their subordinate second-level functional departments, bureaus,
divisions, offices, sections, and branches. This structure is basically
copied down to the lowest units, where many of the functions are
combined into smaller offices.
For all practical purposes, the administrative organization has
been similar to the ground forces’ structure, but there have been
notable exceptions, especially concerning aircraft maintenance.
Between October 1949 and mid 1957, the CMC created a total of
8 subordinate PLA general departments (General Staff, Training
Inspector General, Armed Forces Inspection, General Political,
General Cadre, General Logistics, General Finance, and General
Armament) and their second-level departments and bureaus.
Between mid 1957 and late 1958, the eight general departments
underwent a major reorganization, so that by the end of 1958 there
were only three general departments — GSD, GPD, and GLD. This
structure remained until the GED was added in 1998.
The PLAAF started out with only three first-level administrative
departments — Headquarters, Political, and Logistics — but by the
end of 1949, HqAF adjusted its structure to somewhat match the
eight PLA general departments.25 As a result, from 1949 to 1955, it
had six first-level departments — Headquarters, Political, Training,
Engineering, Logistics, and Cadre/Personnel.
In May 1955, HqAF was restructured to include 11 first-level
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administrative departments plus a Military Law Division. Between
1955 and 1969, further additions and mergers occurred, but the
number of first-level administrative departments remained at 11. In
conjunction with a PLA-wide reduction in force in 1969, the number
of first-level departments was reduced to the Headquarters, Political,
and Logistics Departments.
Throughout its history, one of the lessons learned about its
administrative organization was the need to have a separate
structure for aircraft maintenance. Maintenance for all other
equipment and weapon systems came under the PLAAF’s Logistics
Department and the GLD. Although it tried to match its structure
to the three general departments’ structure in 1969, it found the
need to recreate a separate department for aircraft maintenance.
Therefore, in May 1976, the Aeronautical Engineering Department,
which had been downgraded to a second-level department in 1969,
was re-established as the fourth first-level department. In November
1992, the PLAAF changed the name to the Equipment-Technical
Department.26 Following the April 1998 creation of the GED, the
PLAAF changed the name of the Equipment-Technical Department
to the Equipment Department and moved several second-level
departments from the Headquarters and Logistics Departments to
the Equipment Department.27 In this particular case, it was a matter
of the PLA changing the structure of the general departments to
meet that of the services and branches, rather than the other way
around.28
Air Divisions and Independent Regiments. Over the years, the
PLAAF has adjusted the size of its total aviation force in terms of
numbers of divisions and numbers of regiments per division to
incorporate new weapon systems, retire older systems, and meet
mission requirements. From October 1950 to early 1954, it deployed
a total of 3,000 aircraft in 28 new air divisions composed of 70
regiments, plus five independent regiments (three reconnaissance,
one bomber, and one transport). The air divisions consisted of
fighters, bombers, transports, ground attack, and reconnaissance
aircraft.29
From January 1954 to 1971, the PLAAF created an additional 22
air divisions throughout China for a total of 50 air divisions. The
introduction of new aircraft such as the A-5 ground attack aircraft
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and the B-5 and B-6 bombers also influenced the formation of new
combat units.30 While some units merely upgraded to the new
aircraft, other units were formed using the new aircraft as their basis.
Many of the early divisions relocated several times as the PLAAF
expanded to meet operational needs, especially during the late 1950s
opposite Taiwan and the 1960s during the Vietnam War.
Since the 1950s, the standard table of organization and equipment
(TOE) for a fighter division has been 72 aircraft (plus 8 trainers) and
120 pilots — a 1:1.5 ratio — with each fighter regiment having 24
aircraft and 40 pilots.31 The TOE for a bomber division is 54 aircraft
and 90 crews — a 1:1.7 ratio — with each regiment having 18 aircraft
and 30 crews. When it began forming its first air divisions, most
divisions had two regiments, but a few divisions had three regiments,
stationed at one to two airfields. By 1953, it began upgrading all of
its divisions to three regiments. Each regiment has three to four
subordinate groups (dadui), which, in turn, are divided into three
to four squadrons (zhongdui).32 One confusing event that occurred
between 1964 and 1970, was that the PLAAF changed the name
of each regiment to a group without changing the organizational
structure. Thus, the 24th air division’s 70th air regiment in 1963 was
renamed the 70th group in 1964. In 1970, the regiment name was
reinstituted.
According to a 1999 Department of Defense report, the PLAAF’s
combat aircraft are currently organized into some 30 air divisions,
plus about 150 transport aircraft organized in two air divisions.33
A June 14, 2000, Jane’s Defence Weekly report stated that the PLAAF
currently consists of 33 divisions, including 27 fighter, 4 bomber, and
2 transport divisions.34
The Other Branches.
1. SAM and AAA Troops. Prior to 1985, SAM and AAA units
were structured as separate organizations. In most cases, they were
organized into divisions or brigades with subordinate regiments. In
some cases, the regiment was the highest level structure. In 1985, the
PLAAF began restructuring some of its AAA and SAM regiments
into combined brigades, with the goal of eventually combining
as many SAM and AAA units as possible.35 The process involved
turning over most of the AAA to the ground forces, and combining
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some of the remaining AAA regiments with SAM regiments into
combined brigades. By the end of the 1980s, all of the SAM and
AAA divisions had apparently been abolished, but some individual
SAM and AAA brigades and regiments still existed.36 By the end of
the 1990s, the PLAAF had reinstituted the division level, at least
for SAMs, and had apparently raised at least some, if not all, of the
combined brigades to a combined division level starting in 1993.37
This change probably reflects the PLAAF’s acquisition of the S-300s
from Russia, and an increased number of SAMs overall, plus the
view that the combined brigades may not be the best solution to
accomplishing the air defense mission.
2. Radar Troops. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the basic
radar unit was the regiment. By the early 2000s, radar brigades were
noted in the Shenyang, Beijing, Nanjing, Chengdu, and Guangzhou
MRAF’s.38 This indicates that the number of radar units in these five
military regions has grown considerably, thus necessitating higher
level headquarters to maintain a proper span of control.
3. Airborne Troops. The airborne forces have also gone full circle.
The PLAAF’s airborne forces began in the early 1950s as a single
brigade and then expanded to become a division.39 In 1961, the CMC
redesignated the PLA’s 15th Corps as the PLAAF 15th Airborne
Army and subordinated the original airborne division to this
new organization. By the mid 1970s, the airborne army had three
airborne divisions.40 Sometime after 1984, the three divisions were
reduced to brigades, but were again enlarged to divisions in 1993,
each with about 10,000 troops.41 Although the airborne forces were
sometimes mentioned as the sixth PLAAF branch through the 1980s,
they apparently became an official branch around 1992.42
Operational Control of the Force. As the PLAAF rapidly increased
the number of its air divisions and independent regiments, it also
created command organizations to control the aviation and air
defense assets. Over its 52 year history, it has established a total of
nine MRAFs, 13 air corps, and several command posts and bases to
control large geographic areas that were somewhat aligned with the
ground force MRs and military districts. Some of the organizations
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were responsible for only a major city and its surrounding area. Each
of these command organizations controlled one or more air divisions
and air defense assets (SAMs, AAA, radar). As the PLAAF created
its first 28 air divisions between 1950 and 1954 to deal primarily with
the Korean War, it also established five air corps to control those
assets. One more air corps was created opposite Taiwan in the mid
1950s.
When the PLAAF deployed 16 new air divisions in the 1960s in
response to the Sino-Indian border conflict, the Vietnam War, and
the new Soviet threat, it also formed six air corps and two command
posts. During the Cultural Revolution, many PLAAF command
organizations ceased to exist and were reestablished during the
late 1970s. In addition, it added only three new air divisions and
one air corps in the 1970s. As the PLAAF expanded and realigned
its operational areas to match those of the ground forces during the
late 1970s and early 1980s, several of the air corps either replaced
MRAF headquarters, were abolished, or were downgraded to a
command post. The key point is that these command organizations
were composed of staff members only. When they moved, they did
not necessarily have organic aviation and air defense units that
moved with them. As these command organizations were moved
around to replace existing organizations or establish new command
organizations, they took control of aviation and air defense units
that already existed in the command area.
According to General Wang Hai’s autobiography, the PLA
wanted to abolish the MRAF headquarters completely following
the 1985 MR realignment, but the PLAAF fought and won to keep
them.43 Beginning in 1993, all of the command posts, with the
exception of Lhasa, were further reorganized as bases.44 For all
practical purposes, a command post and base are identical, except
that a command post is equal to an air corps (Grade 5), while a base
is a deputy corps level (Grade 6) organization. One of the primary
reasons command posts replaced air corps was to meet reduction
in force requirements, to eliminate unnecessary administrative
functions, and to make the command post an operational rather than
an administrative organization.
Today, the PLAAF still has seven MRAFs (Shenyang, Beijing,
Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Chengdu), five air corps
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(1st/Changchun, 7th/Nanning, 8th/Fuzhou, 9th/Wulumuqi, 10th/
Datong), six bases (Dalian, Tangshan, Xian, Shanghai, Wuhan, and
Kunming), and one command post (Lhasa).45
Personnel Force Reductions. Since 1949, the PLAAF has implemented
five reductions in force (1960, 1970, 1975, 1985, and 1992), all of which
were part of larger PLA force reduction programs.46 Early programs
were aimed primarily at cutting the size of headquarters staffs from
15 to 20 percent. In December 1975, the PLAAF reduced its entire
force by 100,000 people, and in August 1985, it further downsized
20 percent by eliminating some organizations, reforming the unit
organization structure, and eliminating old equipment. In October
1992, it carried out yet another 20-percent reduction.
THEORY
Summary.
The PLAAF has three levels of theory: strategic, campaign,
and tactical. Throughout its history, the Air Force has gradually
developed campaign and tactical theory and the supporting
regulations based on its own combat operations and Soviet doctrine,
but it has yet to articulate a strategic theory. The closest attempt at
a strategic concept was introduced by commander Wang Hai in
1987, which called for the Air Force to have the goal of “moving
from defending the country’s air space to building an air force with
simultaneous offensive and defensive capabilities.”47
Given the preeminence of the ground forces in the PLA, the
PLAAF has always focused on operations to support the Army at
the campaign and tactical level. The PLAAF’s campaigns can be
conducted independently or as joint service campaigns in positional
or mobile modes. Based on their characteristics and objectives, air
force campaigns can be divided into three basic types:
• Offensive air campaigns
• Defensive air campaigns
• Air blockade campaigns
Although the PLAAF has adhered to the PLA’s strategic
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guidelines of active defense, it was not until the 1990s that the Air
Force’s offensive component began receiving the greatest attention.
Background.
During its first few decades, theory and operations were
primarily formulated to support the ground forces’ needs. This is
not surprising, since only 29 of the 5,500 original members of the
PLAAF had any aviation background. The remaining troops came
from the ground forces.48 In 1951, commander Liu Yalou wrote, “The
PLAAF must oppose two erroneous tendencies. The first tendency is
to believe the PLAAF is a new service that can disregard the legacy
of the Army. The second tendency is to be complacent with just
some of the Army’s experience. Both of these tendencies are wrong
and will impede development.” In February 1951, the first expanded
meeting of the PLAAF Party Committee formally affirmed the
guiding principle that “the Air Force will be developed on the basis
of the Army.”
As late as the early 1980s when the PLA began reorganizing
its ground forces into group armies, the PLAAF was tasked to
provide defense for group army positions. The CMC gave specific
guidance that “each branch and unit of the PLAAF must establish
the philosophy that they support the needs of the ground forces
and that the victory is a ground force victory.”49 This dependence
is enhanced by the fact that the PLAAF must use ground force
campaign terminology as the basis for its own theory.
Developing Theory and Regulations. When it was founded, the PRC
did not have any experience in developing aviation theory, so the
PLAAF used the Soviet Air Force as its model.50 In 1957, it began to
make changes to Soviet doctrine by developing and teaching its own
theory based on its experience in the Korean War and operations
against the Nationalists on the islands off of Zhejiang Province.
In 1959, the Air Force created a Regulations Committee that wrote
over 300 regulations, including the first elements of China’s airpower
theory.51 In 1962, the committee published the draft PLAAF Combat
Regulations (Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Kongjun Zhandou Tiaoling)
that laid out the concepts for its air superiority mission, which it
divided into two types:52 strategic air superiority and campaign and
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tactical air superiority.
The PLAAF defines strategic air superiority as “the ability to
influence a war by conducting air superiority for the entire war or
a specific period of time at a particular location or locations over
a sustained period of time.” Tactical air superiority is defined as
“the ability to influence a battle by conducting air superiority over
a critical or limited area for a short period of time.” In the past,
however, tactical air superiority pertained primarily to areas around
China’s airfields, since its aircraft did not have long legs and its SAM
coverage was limited.
Although the PLAAF compiled teaching materials on tactics
during the late 1950s and early 1960s, it was not until the 1980s that it
published several documents on tactics theory for each of its aviation
troop components and airborne troops.53 During the mid 1960s, it
wrote a set of rules and regulations, courses of study, and teaching
materials that showed its military theory had entered the phase of
“using the PLAAF as the dominant factor” (yi wo wei zhu). Little
progress occurred, however, in the way of developing theory during
the late 1960s and 1970s as a result of the Cultural Revolution.
The PLAAF’s research on military theory since the early 1980s
began to focus even more on air force campaign theory. The PLA
describes a military campaign (zhanyi) as “combat operations
consisting of a series of battles conducted by juntuan-level
organizations under a unified command to achieve a local objective
or an overall objective in a war.”54
Serious changes in the way the PLAAF thought about its future
really began as a result of Deng Xiaoping’s 1985 “strategic decision”
that directed the armed forces to change from preparation for an
“early, major, and nuclear war” to preparing for “local limited
wars around China’s borders, including its maritime territories and
claims.” These changes included writing new teaching materials,
conducting research on simultaneous offensive and defensive
capabilities, and doing research on campaign and strategic theory.
Other events helped spur on these changes, including the burgeoning
foreign military exchange program, the start of the F-8-2 foreign
military sales program (Peace Pearl) with the U.S. Air Force, and the
move to establish a rapid reaction force composed of “fist units,” of
which the 15th Airborne Army would be a lead element.
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Searching for Strategic Theory. The PLAN began developing its
own offshore defense (jinhai fangyu) strategy in the mid 1980s to
protect China’s growing maritime trade, but the PLAAF is still
searching for its own strategic theory in the new century. While
the PLA has always had an active defense (jiji fangyu) strategy, it
was not until commander Wang Hai laid out a program in 1987
that the Air Force formally set forth the concept of “moving from
defending the country’s air space to building an air force with
simultaneous offensive and defensive capabilities.” This concept
was formally identified in the 1987 publication Science of Strategy
(Zhanlue Xue) as the PLAAF’s long-term goal.55 Wang emphasized
that the combined arms combat environment of the 1980s required
a force that could move quickly over long distances, could fight in
an electronic environment, could have the capability to attack an
enemy, and could keep it from sustaining complete damage from
an enemy air attack — none of which the PLAAF had at the time.
Recent discussions with PLA officers in Beijing indicate that the Air
Force still does not consider this concept as a strategy.56
Although Wang Hai initiated the concept of simultaneous
offensive and defensive operations in 1987, it did not receive much
publicity until late 1996, when Chinese leaders, including CMC
Chairman Jiang Zemin and the PLAAF’s new commander, Liu
Shunyao, began to emphasize the need to fight offensive battles. The
timing coincided with Taiwan’s final preparations to receive its first
squadron of 150 F-16s and 60 Mirage 2000-5s in April 1997.57
An illuminating article in the March 2000 issue of Zhongguo
Kongjun magazine stated, “If the PLAAF is to have direction in the
future, then it must have the means to accomplish it as well. This
means developing its own strategic theory. Only in this way can
each branch and each department become unified and take the form
of a joint force.”58 The article further stated, “It is heartening the
PLAAF’s strategic theory is now receiving high-level attention, and
the training system will change appreciably as a result.”
PLAAF Campaign Theory. The PLAAF has traditionally conducted
its combat operations as a series of air campaigns within the PLA’s
overall campaign, so it has focused on campaign and tactical
theory rather than strategic theory.59 The PLAAF spent three years
(1984 to 1987) compiling material for its first book on campaign

108

theory entitled Air Force Science of Campaigns (Kongjun Zhanyi
Xue).60 In 1988, the GSD’s Training Department published PLA Air
Force Science of Campaigns (Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Kongjun
Zhanyi Xue), which explained the characteristics of campaigns, the
development of campaign theory, and the mission of the PLAAF’s
campaign juntuan, and how these three elements pertain to a unified
command organization.61 This was the first time it included the idea
of attack (jingong) in its earlier Soviet formulation of an air campaign.
Thereafter, Air Force Campaign Course Materials (Kongjun Zhanyi
Xue Jiaocheng) and complementary categories of teaching materials
were published to guide campaign training.
The PLAAF has been methodical in the way it has defined its
campaign theory and used it to provide operational guidance for its
forces. The term “air force campaign” is a general term for all types
of air force campaign operations.62 It describes an air force campaign
as “using from one to several campaign large formations (zhanyi
juntuan) or campaign tactical formations (zhanyi zhanshu bingtuan) to
carry out the integration of a series of battles (zhandou) according to a
unified intention and plan to achieve a specific strategic or campaign
objective in a specified time. An Air Force campaign is implemented
under the guidance of the national military strategy and the
PLAAF’s strategy.”63 PLAAF juntuan level organizations refer to the
seven MRAF headquarters, and bingtuan level organizations include
air corps, command post, division, and brigade headquarters.
The PLA also describes an air force campaign as “a campaign
conducted independently by an air force campaign large formation
or with the coordination of other services and branches. An air force
campaign is guided by the national military strategy and is limited
by the PLAAF’s strategy. An air force campaign involves various
air-to-air, air-to-ground, and surface-to-air battles to achieve specific
military objectives. The campaign determines the battle’s character,
goals, missions, and actions, and directly supports the local and
overall war.”64
PLAAF campaign theory can be categorized into campaign theory
for aviation (aircraft), air defense (SAM, AAA, and radar troops), and
airborne troops.65 Not surprisingly, these three categories reflect the
way it is organized administratively and operationally in terms of
its five branches (aviation, SAM, AAA, radar, and airborne troops)
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and support elements (political structure, logistics, maintenance,
communications, etc.).
Based on command relations, the PLAAF’s campaigns can be
conducted independently or as joint service campaigns in positional
or mobile modes.66 Based on their characteristics and objectives, air
force campaigns can be divided into three basic types — offensive,
defensive, and blockade.
OPERATIONS
Summary.
This section highlights PLAAF operations in the Korean War,
the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the 1979 border conflict with
Vietnam.67 It also provides an overview of the PLAAF’s air defense
operations from 1949 to 1969.
Several key points come out of this discussion. First, the
PLAAF was basically unprepared for each of the conflicts, but
made preparations and deployed troops fairly rapidly once the
decision was made to launch the campaign. Second, ground support
personnel preceded the deployment of aviation and air defense
weapon systems by several days or weeks. Third, a good deal of
political work was necessary to motivate the troops and to inform
the local population about the necessity of what was happening.
Fourth, the CMC established specific rules of engagement for each
conflict. Fifth, the PLAAF used each conflict to train its troops as well
as to engage in combat operations. Sixth, it has been able to mass
hundreds of aircraft near the border for each conflict, using Chinese
territory as a sanctuary. Finally, there will always be a discrepancy
among the participants in statistics for aircraft losses, but these
discrepancies could foster a false sense of accomplishment and
expectations for the PLAAF for any future conflict.
The Korean War.
Although a small number of pilots from the North Korean Air
Force (NKAF) and Soviet Air Force took part, the PLAAF was the
primary air force involved in the Korean War on the communist
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side.68 From the PLAAF’s perspective, the Korean War accomplished
several goals. The most important of these were to establish a
command organization, repair and build suitable airfields inside
China, acquire substantial numbers of modern combat aircraft
organized into 28 air divisions, and gain combat experience for its
pilots, staff, and support personnel. As discussed earlier, the basic
organizational structure developed during that time still exists
today.
Lessons Learned. As part of its official history, the PLAAF provided
an analysis of the Korean War and drew six principal conclusions.69
The first conclusion focused on the policy of trying to repair
North Korean airfields as stepping stones toward the south and for
providing direct support to the ground forces. It was not until the
end of 1951 that the Chinese military leadership conceded this policy
would not work because the United Nations (U.N.) forces controlled
the skies over North Korea and could bomb the airfields at will.
The CMC also determined the PLAAF could not directly support
the ground troops. As a result, the mission changed to maintaining
air superiority in northwestern Korea, providing point protection
of key transportation lines and military and industrial targets, and
providing indirect support for the ground forces.
The second lesson was the primacy still placed on the human
factor. Even though the U.N. forces had higher-quality equipment
and technology, the PLAAF insisted its forces were superior because
they had come from the ground forces accustomed to difficult
situations and were willing to sacrifice themselves for China.
The third lesson was that high technical skills among pilots and
maintenance personnel are the keys to victory. For example, the
PLAAF compared the kill ratio and aircraft malfunction ratio during
the war. From September 1951 to May 1952, according to PLAAF
data, the USAF kill ratio was purportedly 1.46:1, and the PLAAF had
an average of one maintenance malfunction for every 558.8 sorties.
After October 1952, when the F-86 became the primary fighter, the
USAF kill ratio was 1.42:1, but the PLAAF had an average of only
one malfunction for every 1,000 sorties.
The fourth lesson was the imperative need to improve the
command level to ensure victory. Several instances were cited of
missions being conducted mechanically that resulted in the needless
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loss of aircraft.
The fifth lesson was the pivotal importance of equipment. Specific
examples included PLAAF claims of a kill ratio of 1:7.8 against the
F-80 and F-84. The situation changed when the U.N. forces acquired
the F-86, but the PLAAF’s acquisition of MiG-15bis fighters evened
up the odds. For example, of the 125 air battles engaged in during
1952, 85 were with F-86s. Of these, the PLAAF purportedly won 9
(i.e., shot down at least one F-86 with no PLAAF losses), came out
ahead in 15 (had fewer losses than the U.N. forces), tied 34, and had
more losses in 27. In the remaining 40 battles against other aircraft,
the PLAAF won 20, came out ahead in 10, tied 8, and lost 2.
The final lesson was the continued importance of the political
commissar system’s emphasis on political work among the troops to
ensure victory.
But these “lessons learned” reveal a disconnect, even today,
between the Chinese and American versions of the war. The wide
discrepancy in air-to-air combat figures cited by both sides of
the Korean War is a good illustration of the PLA’s difficulties in
analyzing the effectiveness of airpower.
According to the PLAAF’s published history, the PLAAF shot
down 330 aircraft and damaged another 95 in air-to-air combat,
compared to having only 231 aircraft shot down and 151 damaged —
a ratio of 1.1:1 in favor of the PLAAF. According to USAF data, U.N.
forces together destroyed 976 enemy aircraft in air-to-air combat. In
the course of its operations, U.N. forces lost a total of 1,986 aircraft,
of which 1,041 were destroyed by hostile action and only 147 were
lost in air-to-air combat. The number of U.N. aircraft damaged in
air-to-air combat was not given.70 In his autobiography, former
commander Wang Hai, who flew in the Korean War, responded to
the figure of only 147 U.N. aircraft lost in air-to-air combat quoted in
Futrell’s book by saying, “This is a lie as big as the heavens.”71
It should be noted that the USAF had gun camera film to support
most of its claims, and it is doubtful whether the Chinese had any
similar accountability system. Some of the differences may be
explained by Russian and North Korean participation. For example,
in 1993 a pair of Russian authors challenged the authority of gun
camera film by stating “some of these MiG-15s, seemingly shot
down on Sabre gun camera film, actually landed at their airfields
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with damage.” More interesting is their revelation that Soviet losses
totaled 345 MiGs.72
The real key to analyzing the war and the effectiveness of the
PLAAF’s air-to-air capabilities, however, comes from examining
combat between the F-86 and MiG-15. According to Futrell, by the
conclusion of the war, Sabre pilots had destroyed 810 enemy planes,
including 792 MiG-15s, some of which were piloted by Soviet
airmen. Meanwhile, Far East Air Force (FEAF) lost a total of 139
aircraft in air-to-air combat, including 78 Sabres. The Sabre pilots
thus maintained a 10:1 margin of victory over the MiG-15.73
Despite its problematic record in certain areas, the PLAAF
nevertheless scored some significant accomplishments. In only a few
years, the PLAAF had grown from a force of a few obsolescent combat
aircraft to 28 divisions and 3,000 aircraft, many of which were highly
advanced systems for their time. Chinese forces virtually stopped
the FEAF B-29s from flying daytime missions and, according to their
statistics, shot down more than 140 aircraft in air-to-air combat, thus
gaining a training edge that put it ahead of most of the world’s air
forces. The PLAAF had also gained valuable combat experience,
established a command organization and administrative structure,
built and refurbished countless airfields, and trained a cadre of
maintenance and logistics personnel under combat conditions. The
Korean War experience also helped the PLAAF lay the foundations
for future growth, and provided the operational experience for the
PLAAF’s leaders in the 1980s and 1990s.
The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis.
In 1956, the PLA began building a new group of airfields in
Fujian, Zhejiang, and eastern Guangdong Provinces to counter the
Nationalist Air Force, which basically controlled the skies from
Taiwan to Shanghai. In the aftermath of a 2-month-long meeting
of the CMC between May and July of 1958, Beijing began a sharp
upsurge in propaganda calling for the “liberation” of Taiwan. The
plans called for the Air Force to enter Fujian and for artillery to
begin shelling Quemoy. In response, Washington announced its
forces in the Far East were going on alert and would conduct naval
and air force patrols north to Okinawa and south to the Philippines.
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In addition, Taiwan put its forces on alert and began conducting
reconnaissance flights along the coast of Fujian and Guangdong,
publicly calling this “preparations to quickly counterattack the
mainland.”
PLAAF Preparations. Overall, the battle for air superiority took
three months and can be divided into two phases.74 Phase 1 took
place from July 27 to August 22, and consisted of moving into Fujian
and Guangdong. Phase 2 took place from August 23 to mid October
and consisted of air cover for the naval and army artillery shelling
and the blockade of Quemoy.
As in the Korean War and, subsequently, in the 1979 SinoVietnamese border conflict, the political commissar system expended
considerable propaganda efforts to increase political mobilization by
explaining to the troops and local Chinese populace the reason for
entering Fujian.
During preparations for the assault, the CMC also established the
following three rules of engagement (ROE) for the Air Force:
1. The Air Force could not enter the high seas to conduct operations.
2. If the Nationalist Air Force did not bomb the mainland, the PLAAF could
not bomb Quemoy and Matsu.
3. The Air Force was not allowed to attack the U.S. military but could defend
against any U.S. aircraft entering Chinese territory.

PLAAF Operations. Once the general plan and ROE were
established, the order to implement the plan was given.75 Once the
command, radar, and AAA units were in place, the first aircraft
(MiG-17s) deployed to Liancheng and Shantou. Prior to these
deployments, the United States and Taiwan were not fully cognizant
that the Soviets had provided the PLAAF with the MiG-17.
During Phase 1 of the air operations (July 29 to August 22),
PLAAF statistics showed that its units flew 1,077 sorties in 255 groups
and engaged in four battles, shooting down four aircraft, damaging
five, and losing one. Assuming that only the six regiments (about
200 aircraft) deployed along the front line conducted these sorties,
each fighter flew an average of five sorties over the 23-day period
— one sortie every four days. If the number of aircraft was greater,
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the number of sorties declines accordingly. This indicates that the
PLAAF logistical support capabilities were still far from adequate.
Phase 2 was also highlighted by further deployment of aircraft
on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and larger air battles. The PLAAF
redeployed some of its aircraft to airfields in Fujian and eastern
Guangdong. The United States also deployed more troops and 140
F-100s and F-104s to Taiwan. In addition, the Nationalists, who
began using U.S.-supplied Sidewinder air-to-air missiles for the first
time, flew 100 to 200 sorties a day, including 30 to 80 aircraft at a time
along the coast. During this period, there were seven air battles.
During one skirmish over Quemoy, PLA AAA units shot down a
PLAAF aircraft. As a result, the Air Force and artillery commanders
met and came up with the following principles, which were intended
to guide all future air and ground combat coordination:
• If there is an air battle in progress, the ground artillery will not
fire.
• If PLAAF aircraft cannot take off or if there are no friendly
aircraft in the air, the ground artillery will engage the enemy.
• If the enemy is conducting bombing, the ground forces will
engage the aircraft even if there is an air battle going on
between enemy and friendly forces.
• Coastal forces should not open fire, except when enemy forces
are attacking their specific positions.
By the end of October, Beijing deescalated the crisis with a
temporary cease-fire followed by intermittent shelling of Quemoy
and Matsu. The air defense situation had reached a stalemate, with
the Nationalists controlling the airspace over the Strait and the
PLAAF gradually controlling the airspace over Fujian, Zhejiang,
and Guangdong provinces. Over the next few years, the Nationalists
continued to probe the mainland’s defenses with reconnaissance
flights (including high-altitude U-2 flights, of which the PLAAF shot
down five between 1962 and 1967).
As in many cases, the data on combat victories and losses reported
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by the opposing sides vary widely. For example, according to
China’s data, the PLAAF and naval aviation flew 3,778 sorties in 691
groups (five to six aircraft per group). Their aircraft were engaged in
13 air battles, shooting down 14 and damaging 9. On the other hand,
according to USAF data, there were 25 air-to-air engagements, with
Nationalist pilots destroying 32 aircraft, downing probably 3 more,
and damaging 10. Nationalist forces lost four of their own aircraft.76
On the positive side for the PLAAF, it now had a permanent
presence opposite Taiwan, and the Nationalists no longer owned
the airspace over Fujian and eastern Guangdong provinces. On
the negative side, the PLA was not able to take Quemoy or Matsu,
and, at least according to U.S. statistics, the Nationalists had an 8:1
kill ratio over the PLAAF. Coordination between fighter forces and
ground-based defenses had been found wanting as well. Although
the PLAAF deployed over 500 aircraft to the area, they did not
capitalize on their numerical superiority, nor did they show any
type of surge capability.
Finally, despite mounting frictions with Moscow at that time,
China continued to receive military assistance from the Soviet
Union. In October 1958, China received its first SA-2 missiles (5
launchers and 62 missiles) from the Soviet Union, which were
deployed around Beijing.
PLAA Air Defense Operations: 1949–69.
In January 2002, former PLAAF deputy commander, Lieutenant
General Lin Hu, wrote a book describing the Air Force’s air defense
operations for the period of 1949 to 1969.77 In the book, Lin stated the
PLAAF shot down a total of 95 aircraft and damaged 200 additional
aircraft during this period while conducting its air defense mission
over China and along China’s periphery. The numbers were broken
down into 38 aircraft destroyed and 21 damaged in air-to-air combat,
48 destroyed and 158 damaged by AAA, 9 aircraft downed by SAMs,
and 1 aircraft damaged by radar troops using high-powered rifles.
These figures do not cover any aircraft engaged over Korea during
the Korean War. Lin stated the PLAAF drew five lessons from its
air defense operations that are applicable to the Air Force today as
follows:
1. Mao Zedong Thought is the PLAAF’s magic weapon (fabao) for defeating
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the enemy.
2. Always being alert is the necessary requirement to take the initiative while
in a passive mode.
3. The PLAAF must continue to develop new air defense tactics to
complement its mobility and flexibility.
4. The PLAAF must use crack troops for combat and must continue to
advance its weapons.
5. China must develop its own aircraft engines or China will not be able to
become self-sufficient.

The 1979 Sino-Vietnam Border Conflict.
China’s “punitive war” or “self-defensive counterattack” with
Vietnam lasted from February 17 to March 17.78 Deng Xiaoping
was named the overall commander of Chinese forces, Marshal Xu
Xiangqian and Marshal Nie Rongzhen were appointed deputy
commanders, and Geng Biao was named the chief of staff. Under
the central command, two fronts were established — northern
and southern. The Northern Front, which included the Shenyang,
Beijing, Jinan, Lanzhou, and Xinjiang MRs, was placed under the
command of Li Desheng, who already served as commander of the
Shenyang MR.
Because the war was being fought in the south, the arrangement
for the Southern Front was more important and complicated.
Xu Shiyou (commander of the Guangzhou MR) was appointed
commander; Yang Dezhi (new commander of the Kunming MR)
was the deputy commander; and Zhang Tingfa (commander of the
air force) was the chief of staff and the commander for all air forces.
The Guangzhou MRAF commander (and future PLAAF
commander), Wang Hai, was placed in charge of PLAAF troops
in the Guangxi operations area.79 The Kunming MRAF command
post director, Hou Shujun, was placed in charge of PLAAF troops
in the Yunnan operations area. Each operations area was further
divided into several operational routes, and a combined command
post was established at one strategically located airfield within each
operational route to command and coordinate all matters among
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different branches, aircraft types within that district. The Guangzhou
MRAF headquarters also established a forward command post at an
unidentified location, which worked closely with the 7th Air Corps
at Nanning as the unified authority for the PLAAF’s participation in
the conflict.
Drawing from several MRs, the Chinese assembled approximately
31 divisions (330,000 men, which equated to about 10 percent of total
ground force strength) and 1,200 tanks on the border. Depending
on the source, figures vary from 800-1,100 aircraft stationed at 15 air
bases in Yunnan, Guangxi, Guangdong, and Hainan, many of which
deployed to these areas from elsewhere in China.
PLAAF Involvement. The PLAAF’s operational capabilities had
declined seriously over the previous 14 years due to the Cultural
Revolution.80 The military reforms launched during the Third Party
Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in 1978 came too late to improve
PLA capabilities in a substantial way during the 1979 conflict. The
PLAAF had been so decimated during China’s protracted internal
upheavals that it simply was not prepared mentally or operationally
for the border conflict with Vietnam.
Although the PLAAF deployed hundreds of aircraft to the border
area, neither the PLAAF nor the Vietnamese Air Force flew missions
in direct support of their ground troops.81 According to the PLA
General Staff, “the Vietnamese Air Force did not dare start anything
during the border conflict, which the Chinese limited to a certain area,
time frame, and goals, because the PLAAF was able to maintain air
superiority.”82 The air force also cites its “deterrent capability” as the
primary reason the Vietnamese Air Force did not become involved
in the conflict. In reality, neither side wanted to escalate the limited
conflict by introducing aircraft into the campaign.
According to PLAAF statistics, a total of 8,500 sorties, using 3,131
groups of aircraft, were flown. Transport aircraft performed a crucial
function, flying 228 sorties, carrying 1,465 troops and 151 tons of
materiel.83 These figures most likely represent all activity over a 2 to
3-month period, including area familiarization, flights during the 30day conflict, helicopter evacuation of wounded personnel, and postconflict sorties. Given a total of almost 1,000 aircraft deployed to the
border area, this is only about ten sorties per aircraft over a minimum
of 60 days — about one sortie every 5 days.84 Thus, the low sortie
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rates achieved in the conflicts with Taiwan during the late 1950s
had not been improved upon and probably reflected continuing
problems in support functions, which were further exacerbated by
the effects of the Cultural Revolution. According to PLAAF data,
maintenance personnel achieved a 97.5 percent readiness rate and
a 99.7 percent takeoff rate for aircraft — probably not a difficult feat
with such a low sortie rate.
Besides not wanting to escalate the conflict, the PLAAF was
probably not capable of providing direct fire support for the ground
troops or of gaining air superiority over the battle area. As a result,
the PLAAF restricted its missions to fighter reconnaissance and
early-warning missions along the border, helicopter rescue missions
to pick up wounded soldiers, and air transport missions. It did not
fly any ground attack aircraft or bomber sorties over the border
during the conflict. Later PLAAF analysis of the conflict criticized
the lack of effective reconnaissance and early warning capabilities
and identified these as areas for improvement. The Air Force did,
however, use the conflict to build, repair, or acquire new equipment
and facilities as far north as the Shenyang MR, which it had not been
able to do during the Cultural Revolution.
According to a summary of the report produced by the Chengdu
MR, as one of its first missions, the PLAAF identified the need to
educate the troops in Guangxi and Yunnan about the reasons for
the upcoming operations and the need to motivate them to work all
out preparing for the influx of additional troops.85 Upon receiving
the combat readiness alert, the PLAAF’s political commissar system
provided all of the troops in the region with intensive education by
having them study the Military Commission’s and HqAF’s orders
and relevant newspaper articles. In addition, three simple principles
were put forth — everything is subordinate to war; resolutely carry
out orders; and hard work comes first.
One of the most important tasks prior to the conflict was to
prepare the airfields in Guangxi for the influx of about 20,000
PLAAF aviation, SAM, and AAA troops and more than 700 aircraft
of different types. Because the Vietnamese Air Force was equipped
with a limited number of MiG-21bis, the PLAAF deployed some
units equipped with F-7s to front-line airfields in Guangxi and
Yunnan; however, the PLAAF’s F-7s were having major problems

119

and the entire program was in jeopardy at the time.
Before and during the conflict, the PLAAF’s logistics organizations
had two primary missions — support housing for those troops
already stationed in Guangxi and prepare housing, food, water,
and electricity for the incoming troops. These organizations issued
about 10,000 mobile beds, more than 32,000 meters of water pipe,
and 200 km of electric cable; built 43,000 m2 of bamboo sheds; and
repaired more than 23,000 m2 of old housing. In addition, the Air
Force used vehicles and its boat troops to transport mobile housing
with the troops to Tianyang. During the conflict, the Nanning Wuxu
field station dispatched over 16,500 vehicles to provide support for
portions of one aviation regiment and one independent air group.
The logistics organizations also had to acquire and supply
enough fuel for the incoming aircraft. Based on initial estimates of
the amount of fuel required, the PLAAF’s fuel supply was totally
inadequate, and several depots were almost empty. Therefore,
during the preparation period, fuel depots at all of the region’s
airfields were filled. This included the depot at Tianyang, which
relied on water transport for its fuel supply. Some of the airfields
did not have rail spurs, so vehicles had to bring in all the fuel. In
addition, all of the combat-readiness tanks available throughout the
MR and some from outside the MR were quickly transferred to the
front-line airfields. These expanded the amount of aviation kerosene
by over 50 percent. By the time the conflict began, the amount of
fuel supplied to all the Guangxi airfields was 4.3 times the normal
amount.
Supplying fuel during peacetime in China was difficult enough,
but it proved even more difficult during wartime. Because some
airfields, such as Ningming, are close to the border, their fuel storage
was partially underground, and the rail lines supplying the bases
were overscheduled. As a result, the PLAAF was concerned that the
Vietnamese might destroy or disrupt fuel supplies. Because of this
situation, the PLAAF took about 45 days to build more than 50 km of
semipermanent fuel pipes to three different airfields.
Since it did not fly any actual combat missions during the
conflict, only about one-fourth of the fuel estimated for combat was
used, and the difficulties with fuel consumption were fewer than
expected; however, several organizational and facilities problems
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were highlighted. For example, the fuel depot capacity at the
PLAAF’s airfields was too small, and there was no way to support
several types of aircraft or the sustained combat use of fuel for
several batches of aircraft. In addition, the refueling equipment was
deemed backwards and incompatible.
Once the conflict began, the air force flew numerous sorties along
the border, but found that its on-station time was severely limited
due to the distance it had to fly and the limited range of the F-6s.86
On the other hand, the air force flew a large number of helicopter
sorties to transport wounded soldiers to Nanning. Since the nearest
point was 110 km and the farthest was 280 km, each helicopter trip
took 2 to 4 hours. During most sorties, the helicopters could not
turn off their engines or refuel at the pickup points. Altogether, the
helicopters picked up 628 wounded soldiers from front-line field
hospitals and transferred them to the rear.
Lessons Learned. The 1979 border conflict was a wake-up call
for the PLAAF. Following the devastating years of the Cultural
Revolution, the PLAAF took advantage of the conflict to begin
rebuilding its logistics and operational infrastructure throughout
China. The conflict also helped launch Wang Hai into the PLAAF
commander’s position in 1985. In addition, air units began rotating to
the border region for several months at a time for area familiarization.
These rotations helped lay the foundation for the rapid-deployment
concept that was developed in the late 1980s.
The PLAAF also made some concrete decisions regarding the
future of its fighter aircraft acquisitions, which is discussed in the
section below on weapon systems.
WEAPON SYSTEMS
Summary.
The PLAAF’s aircraft acquisition can be divided into five
overlapping phases. With a few exceptions, the PLAAF’s weapon
systems have either been reverse engineered from Soviet/Russian
systems, purchased outright from the Soviet Union/Russia, or have
encompassed significant amounts of technology from several foreign
countries. This process has allowed the PLAAF to modernize fairly
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rapidly when the procurement pipelines were open, but it has also
placed specific limitations on what it could receive, especially when
there were internal and external political constraints. The process
has also kept China’s aviation ministry from developing its own
systems, and has placed the PLAAF at the mercy of foreign suppliers
for spare parts.
During its formative years, the PLAAF acquired primarily
defensive weapon systems to be able to provide an adequate air
defense capability for its major cities and industrial areas. Units
appear to have been established, merged, and abolished based on
three criteria: the need to have a presence in a particular area, such
as in the Guangzhou MRAF during the Vietnam War; production
of new types of aircraft with new missions, such as the A-5 and B-6;
and mission requirements that demand a specific overall force size.
As the PLAAF’s campaign theory shifted in the late 1980s toward the
goal of simultaneous defensive and offensive operations, it sought to
acquire specific weapons in a systematic way. Fortunately for China,
the Russian arms market opened up in 1990, or the PLAAF would
not be as far along as it is in reaching its goals.
Background.
Because PLAAF history books and articles have all focused
on aviation, there is very little information available in Chinese
writings about the history of the AAA, SAM, and radar branches
and acquisition of their systems. Acquisition of the aviation branch’s
weapon systems can be divided into five overlapping phases.87
The first two phases, which covered the relationship with the
Soviet Union in the 1950s, had a lasting impact on the development
of China’s aviation industry. During that period, China acquired vast
numbers of Soviet aircraft, including transports (An-2), helicopters
(Mi-4), trainers (Yak-18), fighters (MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19, and
MiG-21), ground attack aircraft (Il-10), and bombers (Il-28, Tu-2, Tu4, and Tu-16). Of these, China received production rights to the MiG15, MiG-17, MiG-19, MiG-21, Il-28, and Tu-16 but did not receive
all the technical material or machinery before the Soviets withdrew
in 1960.88 China also received its first Soviet SAMs and air-to-air
missiles (AAM) in the 1950s. Although the Chinese did not receive
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the production rights, they reverse engineered most of the SAM and
AAM systems by the mid 1960s.
Phase One. The first phase covered 1950 to 1954, as the PLAAF
force structure expanded rapidly following the PRC’s intervention
in Korea. Having started with only a handful of aircraft left from
the Japanese and Nationalist forces, the PLAAF quickly began
purchasing hundreds of aircraft from the Soviet Union. In January
1950, China purchased 586 combat aircraft. The pace accelerated
when the Korean War began, and by mid 1951, China had acquired
1,050 aircraft. By early 1954, the PLAAF had purchased a total of
3,000 aircraft.89
Phases Two and Three. The second phase began in December
1953 when the Soviet Union agreed to give China production rights
to produce the MiG-15bis and YAK-18 trainer, and China began
designing its own aircraft based on existing Soviet aircraft. The third
phase began in July 1960 when the Soviet Union notified China it was
withdrawing all of its specialists and canceling all of its contracts.
Once this happened, China took several years to either modify
or reverse engineer some of the aircraft and missiles furnished by
the Soviet Union. Chinese efforts reached a peak around 1965 only
to be severely disrupted by the Cultural Revolution. Between 1969
and 1971, continued disruptions led to profound quality-control
problems. As one history of the aviation industry notes, “It was a
time of industrial anarchy or semi-anarchy . . . the whole industry
was in the difficult position of trying to preserve order.”90
For its part, the aviation industry places the blame on the direct
interference of PLAAF commander Wu Faxian and the military.
Official accounts claim, for example, in 1971 alone, 27 types of
aircraft were authorized to be developed. Even though there were
no blueprints for any of them, the industry was expected to bring
them to the production stage in two to three years. Development
time for aircraft stretched out for 10 to 15 years or more because
production decisions were constantly delayed by protracted
development problems or by leadership indecision. According to
the official history of the aviation industry, 46 projects went into
operation without the necessary materials or designs between 1969
and 1971; 36 of the projects had not even been approved.91
Phase Four. The fourth phase began following the 1979 border
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conflict with Vietnam, when the PLAAF realized the F-6 could no
longer meets its long-term needs. At the same time, the military
began establishing its relationship with the United States. During
the conflict, the F-6s were barely able to fly to the border from the
existing bases, loiter for a few minutes, and return home before they
ran out of fuel. As a result, the F-6 program was terminated that
summer, and money was infused into the F-7 and F-8 programs,
which were faltering at the time.
Modernization of the F-7 has continued in various forms since
the late 1980s, but it still lacks a good engine and fire control system.
In 1964, the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation began a development
program to design, manufacture, and test fly the F-8, whose baseline
was a Soviet aircraft that was never approved for production. Because
of serious design and economic problems related to the Cultural
Revolution, the first aircraft was not deployed until December 1979
— 15 years after development began — but the PLAAF still called
the F-8 an “operational testbed aircraft” 10 years later.92 Shortly after
the first F-8 was deployed, the PLAAF established its modification
requirements for the F-8-2, with emphasis placed on the following
areas:
• Change the nose intake into side inlets to allow for a larger radar
antenna, resulting in an increased search and track capability.
• Exchange the engine for a more powerful one.
• Upgrade the avionics (to include electronic counter-counter
measures [ECCM], a fire control system, an automatic flight
control system, etc.) to enhance combat efficiency.
• Increase maintainability.
From its first flight in 1984, the Chinese F-8-2 development
project actually consisted of two programs. One program was the
integration of an American fire control system acquired through
the “Peace Pearl” program.93 The second program involved the
installation of a Chinese fire-control system. Following the military’s
involvement in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, the U.S. suspended
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arms sales to China. The first F-8-2s with the Chinese-designed
fire-control system were deployed to a Naval Aviation regiment on
Hainan Island in 1992.94
Phase Five. The fifth phase began in 1990, when China returned
to Moscow for weapon systems and technology. In May 1990, just
prior to CMC Vice Chairman Liu Huaqing’s visit to Moscow to
negotiate the first Su-27 contract, the PLAAF laid out its plans for
future weapon systems procurement to meet its doctrinal needs and
budgetary constraints.95 The PLAAF stated that if China relied on
developing these capabilities exclusively through indigenous efforts,
it would take many years to satisfy its needs. Although self-reliance
in designing and developing new equipment remained a strategic
goal for the aviation industry, the PLAAF had few alternatives to
selective acquisition of much-needed components and subsystems.
Given this acquisition strategy, the PLAAF planned to modernize its
equipment according to the four criteria of “new, quality, modify,
and introduce.”
• New meant using the newest weapons and equipment already
in the inventory.
• Quality meant focusing on acquiring and employing
weapons and equipment that provided meaningful military
capability and possessed a high operational rate. It also meant
maintaining aircraft and engines to extend their service lives.
• Modify meant using new technology and materials to upgrade
existing equipment, thus giving it new life. Designing and
developing a new aircraft from the ground up was not
considered a feasible option and would consume vast amounts
of capital.
• Introduce meant acquiring and integrating advanced weapons
and equipment from abroad.
The PLAAF also stated it would concentrate its deployment
of modern equipment based on the size of the threat among the
theaters of operations. In this manner, it could be ready to form
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quickly for battle and could organize its training more easily. It also
stated it should avoid trying to give every unit the same equipment,
which would only dissipate its strength where it would be needed
the most.
When deciding which weapons and equipment to modernize,
the PLAAF stated it must focus on six combat capabilities: air
superiority, ground attack, transporting troops and supplies, airborne
early warning and reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures, and
maintenance and logistics.
The 1990 plan also laid out the following general guidelines for
proportionally developing its force, although no precise percentages
or numbers were specified:
• Fighter aircraft must have the highest priority.
• The proportion allocated for ground attack aircraft must
be larger than the portion for bombers, since ground attack
aircraft with a refueling capability could be used against rearechelon targets.
• There must be a certain proportion of bombers, especially
strategic bombers.
• Reconnaissance aircraft, jamming aircraft, and airborne early
warning aircraft must be supplied in relevant proportions.
• Development of transport aircraft, which have a strategic
capability of moving troops and supplies, cannot be slowed
down.
• Aerial refueling must constitute a certain proportion of
combat aircraft as a force multiplier.
• China must pay attention to developing helicopters, especially
armed helicopters, for the Army and Navy.
• The Air Force must develop ground-based weapon systems,
particularly air defense missiles, radar, and communication
systems.
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Over the past decade, the PLAAF has implemented its acquisition
strategy to varying degrees, primarily because of its access to
Russian systems.96 The list of Russian aviation and air defense
weapons procured so far includes Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, Il-76
transports, S-300s SAMs, and Mi-17, Ka-28, and Mi-8 helicopters.
The PLAAF has also deployed its first B-6 aerial refueling tankers
for F-8-2 fighters. So far, the PLAAF has not met its goals in the area
of strategic bombers and acquisition of an airborne early warning
and control (AEW&C) aircraft.
For more than 3 decades the PLAAF has shown a great interest
in an AEW&C capability to help offset deficiencies in its air defense
system.97 Although acquisition of a dedicated AEW&C system
has again been deferred following Israel’s cancellation of the A50I Phalcon system in July 2000, indications are that the PLAAF
will most likely buy or lease a small number of A-50U/E aircraft
from Russia. A number of formidable challenges will test the Air
Force’s ability to effectively employ any future systems. First,
there are some indications the PLAAF has yet to institute a major
training program for its AEW&C mission crews. Second, because
maximizing on-station time close to an area of interest is the main
reason to have such a system, the PLAAF will have a difficult but
expensive requirement of rapidly increasing annual flying hours to
unprecedented levels. Third, the PLAAF will have to address the
issue of basing for the aircraft, so that the crew can practice with
the appropriate aviation and air defense units as often as possible.
Fourth, the PLAAF will require certain types of logistics support
from Russia to sustain training and operations, perhaps as several
airfields. Fifth, the PLAAF must determine whether the systems will
perform strategic or tactical surveillance missions, or both. Sixth, the
PLAAF must decide how best to protect the aircraft while they are
on the ground during a conflict.
TRAINING AND EDUCATION
Summary.
The PLAAF’s system for training and education is an integral part
of the greater PLA’s system. The PLA is proud of the fact that “while
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it had successfully extricated many, but not all, cadres [officers] from
illiteracy when the PRC was formed, more than 70 percent of the
cadres had a college-level education or above in the year 2000.”98
When looking at the PLA’s schools and academies, a distinction
must be made between training and education.99 For simplicity,
“training” can be defined as preparing cadets to effectively perform
their responsibilities in their respective specialties once they reach
their combat or support unit. The cadets learn how to perform their
duties at the “tactical and technical” level of war. Officer training
takes place at the PLA’s technical schools and the majority of the
academies. As officers’ responsibilities increase with grade, their
training requires a broader focus and “education” for conducting
their specialties at the campaign and strategic levels of war.
Education begins to take place when members of the PLA attend
one of the various service’s command colleges and the National
Defense University. Conscripts receive their training in specialized
training bases, regiments, and groups. They do not attend schools
and academies.
Since the late 1980s, the PLA’s training and education has
been based on the “5–3” tier system, which consists of five tiers
of specialized or technical training and education for officers:100
secondary specialized, specialized college or equivalent, university
or equivalent, masters degree program, and doctorate program.
As a result, most PLA schools and academies specialize in
training cadets in basic skills for their branch or support function.
For example, there are separate branch (infantry, artillery, and
armor) academies for the ground forces, and separate branch and
support service academies within the PLAAF for pilots, maintenance,
logistics, AAA, SAMs, communications, and radar.
There also is a three-tier system of professional military training
and education for officers at the various command colleges — basic,
intermediate, and advanced.101 The basic level is aimed at “training”
staff officers who work in the various headquarters and platoonlevel officers for the tactical level of war. The intermediate level
“trains and educates” officers at the regiment level in the tactical
and campaign levels of war, including combined arms operations.
The advanced level is aimed at “educating” officers at the corps and
group army level at the campaign and strategic levels or war.
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Given the PLA’s origins as a peasant army and the previous
emphasis on “Red versus Expert,” the PLA has tended to focus
primarily on training instead of education. This was especially true
during the Cultural Revolution and into the early 1980s, when most
PLA schools were closed and officers were selected from the enlisted
ranks based on political rather than technical qualifications.
The PLAAF’s system for training and education can be divided
into two basic categories based on the type of institution involved.
The first category consists of schools and academies for officers, plus
a single school for NCOs focusing on communications. Within this
category, the emphasis is on training cadets and educating middleand senior-level officers.
The second category consists of basic training and combat
training for the entire force. Basic training institutions are primarily
aimed at teaching technical skills to conscripts and advanced
pilot skills to flying academy graduates who are transitioning to
combat units. This training takes place at specialized training bases,
regiments, and groups. After the officers and conscripts reach their
combat unit, individual and unit training continues throughout the
rest of their career.
Since the late 1980s, the PLAAF has gradually upgraded its combat
training so it can eventually meet its doctrinal requirements and carry
out its training guidance concepts. The PLAAF has concentrated on
aviation combat tactics in various locations, including the Flight Test
and Training Center near Tianjin, the tactics training center in the
Gobi Desert near Dingxin, Gansu Province, and at combined arms
tactical training zones in the various military regions. The PLAAF
also created a “Blue Army” aggressor unit to simulate offensive and
defensive operations against the “Red Army.” The tactics developed
are now being moved to the unit level, where several units have
begun to turn these new combat theories and concepts into liveammunition exercises. To round out the PLAAF’s tactical training
and help make up for the limited number of flying hours per year,
the PLAAF has increased its use of flight simulators. As a result of
these changes in training, PLAAF pilots have been noted flying in
more sophisticated simulated air-to-air combat.
In 1951, the PLAAF issued its first training guiding concepts. Since
then, it has revised them 7 times, with the last revision taking place
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in October 2001. These guiding concepts are then operationalized
through the PLAAF’s training program.
The PLAAF’s increased training has been accompanied by
problems with pilot and maintenance proficiency. As a result, the
PLAAF revived a program in 2002 known as the “Two Overall
Inspections” to help remedy the situation.
PLAAF Schools and Academies.
The PLAAF has always placed great emphasis on training
officers to be proficient in “tactical and technical” skills, but did not
begin focusing on officer education until the mid 1980s. Whereas the
schools before the 1980s taught officers to fly, maintain, and support
aircraft, they did not spend much time on teaching theory on how to
conduct war at the campaign and strategic levels. Like the rest of the
PLA, in 1986 the PLAAF changed the name of most of its schools to
academies so that it could begin offering masters degrees in certain
subjects. In 1999, three schools were combined administratively to
become the PLAAF Engineering University, so that doctorates could
be offered.
Unlike the USAF, the PLAAF does not have a single academy.
The PLAAF has always had several flying academies plus specialized
technical schools for officers in each branch and support element.
Each school lasts from 2 to 4 years, depending on the specialty.
Except for pilots, who spend 1 year at a transition training base after
graduation from their flying academy, all other officer graduates
are assigned directly to an operational base, since they receive their
technical training at the academy. Basic and technical training for
conscripts is conducted at various training bases, regiments, and
groups throughout China.
The total number of PLAAF schools and academies has expanded
and contracted over the years in reaction to policy changes regarding
training objectives or war preparations. For example, there were as
many as 17 flying schools during the Cultural Revolution, when
Minister of Defense Lin Biao and PLAAF Commander Wu Faxian
were advocating a doctrine of imminent war. Today, there are
8 flying colleges, 10 specialty colleges (Command, AAA, SAM,
Communications, Engineering, Logistics, Political, Radar, and two
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for aircraft maintenance), and one NCO school for a total of 19
schools and colleges.
Because of the political and economic turmoil during the Cultural
Revolution, the PLAAF stagnated. In matters involving flight safety,
education, training, strategy, and tactics, PLAAF historians claim
there was actual atrophy.102 Almost all PLAAF nonflying schools
were closed for nearly 6 years, halting nonflying and ground training.
Within the flying academies, all classes on theory were dropped.
From 1966 until at least 1982, officers were promoted from
within the enlisted force based on political reliability rather than
operational capabilities. In addition, “intellectuals,” “technical
officers,” and anyone with a college education were looked down
on. This was especially true for the PLAAF, which was considered
a technical service. Under Deng Xiaoping’s guidance, the situation
gradually began to change during the early 1980s. For example,
during an interview in 1985, PLAAF commander Zhang Tingfa
discussed changes by saying, “People throughout our country are
talking about respecting knowledge and talented people and taking
loving care of intellectuals. So is the PLAAF, because knowledge
and talented people are indispensable for the modernization of our
troops.”103
In response to new operational concepts in the 1980s, the senior
PLAAF leadership joined other services in placing a greater emphasis
on officer training and education.104 Qualitative improvements
were introduced for academic education, flight training, combined
arms training, and joint exercise training. Academic excellence
was increasingly stressed in the PLAAF, as it was throughout the
military. To support this objective, the PLAAF closed some schools
to consolidate resources and upgraded many schools into academies.
For the first time, new pilots were expected to graduate from PLAAF
academies with college degrees. Seven PLAAF academies also began
in 1985 to confer masters degrees in technical fields.105
Because the PLAAF does not have an NCO corps like the
USAF, officers are trained for hands-on operations. For example,
maintenance officer cadets at the PLAAF’s Engineering College and
two Maintenance Technical Training Academies complete from 2 to
4 years of hands-on training on aircraft maintenance, and once they
are assigned to an operational unit, they conduct much of the actual
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aircraft maintenance. The same is true for the other schools and
subsequent jobs in the operational units.
In 1993, the Command College implemented an in-depth
teaching reform to change the PLAAF’s operating methodology
from “employing single branches and single types of aircraft to
using multiple branches and several types of aircraft in an air force
combined arms campaign, with the goal of shifting to operations in a
joint service campaign.” Previously, the training of middle-ranking
commanders was aimed mainly at directing combat involving a
single branch and single types of aircraft in warfare under general
conditions.106 Commanders who graduated from such training were
good at the tactical operations of their own types of aircraft and
their own branch, but they did not know much about other types of
aircraft or other branches and services. Joint operations consisted of
cover airplanes and attack airplanes flying far apart from each other
and not having much to do with each other.
A 1996 Zhongguo Kongjun article discussed the lack of adequate
combined arms and joint service training facing the PLAAF in the
early 1990s.107 During one exercise, several types of aircraft were
deployed simultaneously to an airfield in southern China for combat
readiness training. What the Air Force found out, however, was that
it did not have a competent joint force commander. The person
selected could handle only administrative affairs and could not direct
the training and combat of other types of aircraft, resulting in errors
in identifying the type of aircraft entering into the exercise airspace.
In another similar exercise involving a mixed formation of fighter
and attack aircraft, the commander did not know how to arrange the
formation. During a joint Navy and Air Force exercise, the Air Force
commander was concerned only about the take-off time, route, and
destination of the Air Force aircraft but did not know anything about
the Navy’s actions and demands, not to mention how to coordinate
with the Navy to bring into full play the power of air attacks at
the critical moment. The PLAAF summarized its commanders as
“lacking knowledge, having poor concepts, and being incompetent
in joint operations.”
As part of the reforms to produce “transcentury commanders,”
the Command College also began focusing on theories such as
joint combat operations, mobile warfare, information warfare, and
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electronic warfare and updated its combat theory. The new combat
theory embodied the following “four changes”:108
• Change from studying air combat under general conditions to
studying air combat under high-tech conditions.
• Change from stressing air defense to stressing air offense.
• Change from air combat supported by joint operations with
the Army to air combat supported by joint operations of Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
• Change from warfare involving a single branch and single type
of aircraft to combined arms warfare involving the multiple
branches and types of aircraft.
PLAAF Training Guiding Concepts and Program.
Beginning in 1951, the PLAAF established specific “military
training guidance concepts” (junshi xunlian zhidao sixiang) as the basic
principles for its military training.109 These concepts summarized
the basic direction Air Force training would take in the future.
The concepts were issued to unify training ideology service wide,
address major problems the Air Force faced at the time, note specific
training limitations, and establish certain training objectives. PLAAF
senior officers have pointed out it is essential to review and modify
military training guidance concepts when situations and mission
development change, weapons and equipment are replaced, and
new regulations and outlines are implemented.
The PLAAF has stressed that training guidance concepts
are time-specific. The PLAAF’s Party Committee issued the first
training concepts in 1951, and has revised them 7 times since then
— 1952, 1954, 1958, 1965, 1974, 1987, and 2001. In October 2001, the
Party Committee changed the concepts to “closely adhere to actual
combat situations (jintie shizhan); stress training against opposing
forces (tuchu duikang); be hard and strict during training (cong nan
cong yan);110 and apply science and technology during training (keji
xingxun).
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Since the latest concepts were issued in 2001, all PLAAF
branches, training units, schools, and support elements have tried
to implement them in conjunction with carrying out the military
training program (kongjun junshi xunlian dagang), which was
revised in 2002 based on the new training guidelines. According to
the PLAAF Dictionary, the dagang is the general plan for Air Force
training. The program includes training goals, principles, content,
implementation phases and procedures, timing, methods, and
quality-control inspection procedures.111 The program is divided
into several categories, including training for command personnel,
headquarters department, branches (aviation, AAA, SAM, airborne,
and radar), and all support elements such as the communications
troops.
An April 2002 article in Kongjun Bao provides a good look at
how the PLAAF has implemented the latest program, which was
formally issued that month.112 The article explained the PLAAF has
now incorporated more flying time and training periods than in the
past.113 Under the new program, each pilot can fly one to two more
sorties per period than under the old program. In addition, whereas
the old program allowed each pilot to fly only 2.5 hours each day,
the new guidelines allow pilots to fly 3.5 hours or more each day.
PLAAF Aviation Combat Unit Training.
Since the late 1980s, the PLAAF has gradually upgraded its
combat training to eventually meet its doctrinal requirements
and carry out its training guidance concepts. In 1987, the PLAAF
established a Flight Test and Training Center at Cangzhou airfield
near Tianjin. This center has three primary missions:114 1) test new
aircraft under development by the aviation ministry, 2) train the
initial cadre of pilots in new type aircraft before the aircraft are
deployed to an operational base for the first time, and 3) devise new
air combat tactics.
Based on various articles in Jiefangjun Bao over the past decade,
the Training Center also established a “Blue Army” aggressor unit
located nearby to simulate offensive and defensive operations
against the “Red Army.” The aggressor aircraft (F-7s and F-8s)
engage in exercises against PLAAF operational units, employing
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dissimilar aircraft air intercepts utilizing evasive maneuvers. The
tactics developed at the training base and through the “Blue Army”
are now being moved to the unit level, where several units have
begun to turn these new combat theories and concepts into liveammunition exercises. According to various interviews, aggressor
units have been established in each of the seven MRs.115 The
aggressor aircraft engage in exercises with local units, employing
dissimilar aircraft air intercepts utilizing evasive maneuvers.
In 1958, the PLAAF built a large center for testing its AAMs and
SAMs in the Gobi Desert near Dingxin, Gansu Province.116 During
the mid 1990s, the PLAAF began expanding this base to include
a large tactics training center, where multiple PLAAF units could
practice the tactics developed at Cangzhou and tested in individual
units throughout the force. The training base has a sophisticated
command and control center and air and ground tactical training
ranges, plus a mock-up of Taiwan’s Chingchuankang (CCK) airbase,
including the runways, air defense SAM and AAA sites, radars,
command posts, ammunition depots, and oil depots. Since the mid
1990s, several large-scale exercises have been conducted at the base.
The PLAAF has also apparently established combined arms
tactical training zones where different types of aircraft can train
together with SAM and AAA units. For example, in 1995 the Nanjing
MRAF set up a coordinated tactical training zone composed of strike,
ground attack, bomber, and reconnaissance air units.117
In April 2000, the PLA Navy’s North Sea Fleet and an
unidentified air division in the Jinan MRAF agreed to conduct joint
service training for the first time.118 It is not clear whether the PLAAF
has similar agreements with the East and South Sea Fleets. During
July 2000, the PLAAF’s attack aircraft, most likely A-5s, conducted
single-ship and formation attacks on a flotilla as they each made
tactical maneuvers. The flotilla and the air division also practiced
ship-to-aircraft communications, identification friend or foe (IFF),
air reconnaissance, and shipborne ground controlled interception
(GCI). The ships also practiced calling in the aircraft for air cover.
The aircraft conducted 150 sorties during the two-day exercise. The
article did not mention anything about Naval Aviation participation
in the exercise.
To round out the PLAAF’s tactical training and help make up for
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the limited number of flying hours per year, the PLAAF has increased
its use of flight simulators. The PLAAF now reportedly conducts
more than 90 percent of its tactical training on simulators.119
As a result of these changes in training, some PLAAF pilots have
been noted flying in more sophisticated simulated air-to-air combat
with the aggressor units, training in an ECM environment, flying
over the Taiwan Strait and East and South China Seas, conducting
live missile firings beyond the coast, and dropping live bombs at
ranges, as well as flying at night, under different weather conditions,
and at low altitudes. They have also practiced emergency mobility
deployments to permanent and auxiliary airfields within and
outside their assigned MRs. All of these changes have been aided by
the acquisition of improved navigation equipment.
The current description for PLAAF fighter, bomber, and
ground attack mobile offensive air campaign operations can be
summarized as “transregional rapid mobility integrated longdistance strikes at night in all weather conditions from multiple
levels and different directions under unknown conditions. These
attacks can be conducted against land or maritime targets, and the
navigation routes can be over land or over water.” Media reports
discussing the PLAAF’s exercises have mentioned all of the above,
but, from the PLAAF’s perspective, one of the newest aspects of its
training program is that during exercises both antagonists are told
when a war begins, but they are not told the other side’s number
of sorties, location, or altitude. Therefore, they must decide how to
achieve victory in a completely unknown environment. An exercise
conducted by a Jinan MRAF fighter regiment indicates the PLAAF’s
trend in training for emergency mobile transregional operations.
According to a November 2000 report in Kongjun Bao,120
A regiment of fighters consisting of over 20 aircraft departed its
home base in the Jinan MR [Shandong and Henan Provinces] on
a rainy night “under concealment” in late October. The aircraft
flew to an airfield south of the Yangzi river [probably in the
Nanjing MR] to conduct air patrols and render air support to
the war zone. This emergency combat mobility drill signified a
new breakthrough in its capability for large-fleet, long-range, allweather operations at all hours and in all airspaces. The regiment
holds monthly simulated drills of emergency take-off, mobility,
and change of alert conditions. It has switched to unfamiliar field
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targets for target practice, and changes ground markers frequently
to enhance aviators’ capabilities for independent navigation and
target identification. It flies frequent low- and ultra-low altitude
flights, some over sea areas under unknown conditions. It also
subjects aviators to maximum daily flying time training. Training
for complicated weather conditions is conducted in minimal
weather conditions. On one exercise, the regiment practiced using
ECM, penetrating enemy defenses from different directions,
coordinating attacks from high and low altitudes, and simulating
attacks over water.

The Two Overall Inspections.
During 2002, the PLAAF also revived a program known as
“The Two Overall Inspections (liangge da jiancha)” that was initially
implemented in 1977 but had not received much attention since
then. In 1997, Deng Xiaoping, who at that time was Chief of the
General Staff and vice-chairman of the CMC, ordered the PLAAF
to implement the inspection program, because the PLAAF had
suffered numerous serious aircraft accidents.121 Over the course of
the year, the Air Force inspected several thousand pilots, more than
1000 flight commanders, and about 200 division and school leaders.
In 2002, the PLAAF reinvigorated the program “due to poor pilot
and maintenance personnel performance.”122
LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE
Summary.
Over the past decade, the PLAAF’s logistics and maintenance
forces have gradually made adjustments to their organizational
structure and methods of operations to support the PLAAF’s shift
toward joint mobile offensive operations.
The PLAAF’s logistics organization has begun to establish small
elements capable of supporting aircraft deploying from their home
unit to alternate airfields or different types of aircraft from another
unit deploying to their airfield.
The PLAAF logistics forces have also been working on refueling
aircraft, which has been one of its weakest links. New systems have
been developed for at-home refueling and for refueling at alternate
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and field runways.
Although the PLAAF has made a concerted effort to improve its
mobile logistics capabilities, several exercises have pointed out that
many difficulties still lie ahead.
Background.
Prior to the 1990s, the PLAAF’s logistics and maintenance
structure was organized to support 1 or 2 types of aircraft at a single
airfield without outside support.123 Therefore, each base had about
one year’s worth of spare parts for the aircraft. However, because
many subsystems and spare parts produced in China are not made
on a standardized model and each aircraft is put together by hand,
an aircraft might not be able to fly until the broken part is fixed and
reinstalled in the same aircraft.124
Over the past decade, the PLAAF has emphasized its desire to
transform itself from a force capable of employing single branches
and single types of aircraft in positional defensive campaigns to
using multiple branches and several types of aircraft in air force
combined arms, mobile offensive operations campaigns, with the
goal of shifting to operations in joint service campaigns. Within
this goal, the PLAAF’s logistics and maintenance forces have had to
change their operational structure and methods of operation from
supporting single types of aircraft at their home base to supporting
multiple types of aircraft at their home or deployed bases for short
and long periods of time.
It appears that the PLAAF’s logistics system has made
progress toward reaching its goal of supporting mobile forces.
Organizationally, it has established emergency mobile fendui of
platoon or company size to support deploying aircraft into and
out of airfields. These fendui are also responsible for helping set
up mobile operations at field airstrips and highway landing strips.
Although the articles reviewed discuss the need to preposition
adequate material in the campaign areas before a war breaks out,
they did not discuss whether this has actually happened.
From a training perspective, it appears that the PLAAF’s logistics
forces are applying their theory to operational exercises. As noted
in several Zhongguo Kongjun magazine articles with accompanying
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photos over the past 2 years, the exercises involve repairing damage
to airfields after notional enemy attacks, including runway repairs,
taking care of wounded personnel, putting out fires, and preparing
to recover aircraft that are en route home and have been damaged
during their mission. At the same time, the logistics forces have
deployed some fendui to begin preparing the field airstrips or
highway landing strips for recovering aircraft or for generating
follow-on combat sorties. During 2002, the PLAAF also conducted a
major exercise involving civilian fuel trucks.125
One of the most important issues that is not clear from the
articles reviewed is how proficient the PLAAF would be during a
real conflict, especially if some of the key first-line airfields were
destroyed — as the PLA anticipates will happen in a conflict
involving the United States. Would the PLAAF, in fact, be able to
conduct combat sorties out of field airstrips and highway landing
strips, or would it merely be there to disperse the aircraft until they
could fly to another operational airfield? Would the PLAAF opt to
move its aircraft further to the rear as its airfields began sustaining
damage? Will the PLAAF actually be able to provide logistics
support to multiple types of aircraft at a single base?
Many airfields have a single regiment with two types of aircraft
(generally F-6s with F-7s or F-8s), or have two regiments with
different types of aircraft, such as one regiment with F-7s and one
with F-8s. While these field stations, which are the PLAAF’s aviation
maintenance organization at the unit level, are organized to support
more than one type of aircraft, other field stations with only a single
type of aircraft are not prepared to do so. But how proficient will
the logistics forces at first-line airfields be if they have to support
several regiments of different types of aircraft? Although bombers
have conducted exercises where they stopped at multiple airfields,
the media reports did not specify the types of airfields they transited
or the types of support they received.
Two probable weak links for the logistics forces during a
campaign will be communications and transportation. According
to Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, “When lines of
communication are disrupted, logistics along this chain are also
disrupted. Therefore, the PLAAF needs to establish an independent
command communications network, consisting of radio, landline,
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and computers.”126 It is not clear from the media reports or the PLA
books reviewed whether this is actually taking place.
Although the PLAAF has ordered that transport aircraft should
be used to move logistics forces during campaigns, road and
rail will still be the most likely means. A logistics transportation
exercise conducted during summer 2001 in the Guangzhou MRAF
emphasized the PLAAF is not yet prepared to operate under poor
weather conditions or nonscripted exercises. During his critique, the
Guangzhou MRAF transportation director emphasized “training
still consists of form without substance just to pass the test. Some
units were thrown into disorder with just the slightest change in the
predetermined disposition.”127
The PLAAF has already constructed additional airfields and
aircraft shelters, some of which are hardened shelters and some are
environmental shelters, at bases near the coast and land borders.128
Additional fuel-storage facilities have been built. For example,
during the mid 1990s, the Chengdu MRAF increased investment
to speed up the modernization of the logistics support system of
Air Force stations in Tibet, where POL and ammunition reserve
bases were built and their supportive warehouses and logistics
support systems were also built or improved; aviation control
centers and modern logistics command systems were connected
with the operational logistics command offices by system networks;
construction of logistics support facilities for rear-area airports was
stepped up; the conditions for logistics support for airports were
improved; and aircraft parking areas were enlarged.129 During the
period immediately leading up to the start of a campaign, the PLAAF
would ensure there is adequate fuel at each of the key bases.
CONCLUSIONS
Having examined the PLAAF from seven different perspectives,
the question is whether the PLAAF has really learned anything
that will help prepare it to fight and win local wars under modern
high-technology conditions? In August 2002, Major General He
Weirong, the PLAAF’s deputy chief of staff for training, addressed
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this question in a significant article that revealed the state of PLAAF
pilot training.130 In the article, General He stated,
The PLAAF is in an important development period. It is
gradually transitioning from being primarily a support service
toward being a strategic air force. It is also transitioning from a
national territory air defense type of air force to one that conducts
simultaneous offensive and defensive operations. The PLAAF’s
equipment is rapidly becoming newer. Military training guidance
concepts are undergoing an important adjustment. The military
training program is also undergoing serious reform.

General He also identified serious flaws in the PLAAF’s training
regimen. Based on having led several delegations abroad to observe
foreign training, he emphasized the PLAAF must “borrow methods
and experiences from foreign militaries and adopt them to upgrade
quality and effectiveness.” He pointed out that foreign pilots carry
out large amounts of tactical and technical battle training based on
real requirements at their flying academies and transition training
bases. He emphasized,
This is not the case for the PLAAF, which does not conduct
tactical training until after pilots have been assigned to their
combat units and completed transition training in their assigned
aircraft. Furthermore, while conducting their technical training,
they do not deviate their altitude, speed, or direction. Most
importantly, this is the reason for the PLAAF’s long history of
inflexible combat methods.

General He laid out specific problems associated with the
PLAAF’s ground attack training by stating,
When the PLAAF conducts ground attack training, the targets
used for the flying academies, transition training bases, and at
combat units are either triangles or circles. Pilots follow the same
pattern under strict ground control. This type of rote training does
not allow pilots any flexibility or creativity, and is not conducive
to training pilots to learn to take tactical initiative, distinguish
between real types of targets, and conduct independent combat
missions. Furthermore, the quota for flight time has been going
down but pilots have erroneously filled out their log books.
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General He concluded his observations by recommending “the
PLAAF should use real war requirements as the standard and
completely overhaul the entire training program, training and
teaching materials, manuals, scoring standards, and regulations.”
Besides the limitations General He identified, the PLAAF has
faced a wide range of political, budgetary, personnel, equipment,
and structural limitations to becoming a more modern force. Over
the past decade, the PLAAF has readily acknowledged the following
limitations to becoming a modern air force:
• Lack of an Air Force strategy;
• Minimum per-pilot sortie generation capability;
• Reliance on strict GCI;
• Flying aircraft to less than full capabilities;
• Lack of dissimilar aircraft training;
• Lack of upward professional mobility;
• Lack of over water flying;
• Inadequate combined and joint service training;
• No airborne early warning and control aircraft;
• No aerial refueling capability until the late 1990s, and only
limited since then;
• Insufficient airlift for the airborne forces;
• A force composed mostly of 30-year-old F-6s and other aging
aircraft;
• Lack of good air-to-air missiles, precision guided munitions,
and cruise missiles;
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• A force still structured primarily for positional rather than
mobile warfare; and,
• An aviation industry incapable of designing and producing
weapon systems to meet the PLAAF’s needs.
Therefore, given these limitations, can the PLAAF implement
General He’s vision? If the PLAAF does have to engage in battle
sometime in the near future, the keys will be pilot proficiency, sortie
generation and sustainability, adequate logistics support across
the board, reliable communications and real time intelligence, and
equipment maintenance capabilities. It is clear, at least from reading
PLAAF writings, that much of what it wants to do is still aspirational,
but it is definitely putting the pieces of the administrative and
operational structure in place to accomplish its goal of simultaneous
offensive and defensive operations sometime in the future.
The PLAAF has adopted a formal campaign theory to guide
it toward the future, and is working on strategic guidelines. The
PLAAF is starting to acquire the modern weapon systems, including
Su-27s, Su-30s, aerial refueling, airborne early warning and control
aircraft, and S-300 SAMs to conduct an offensive campaign, but may
also be too reliant on foreign technology and weapon systems, as it
was in the 1950s.
The PLAAF has begun moving from exercises involving a single
type of aircraft to using multiple types of aircraft in a combinedarms and joint service environment. The Air Force has established a
“Blue Force” aggressor squadron and a tactics development center at
Cangzhou, and a “USAF Red Flag-type” tactics training center in the
Gobi Desert, all of which are starting to show positive results, both
operationally and psychologically. Whereas the PLAAF rarely flew
over water in the 1980s, it is a routine matter for some units today.
The PLAAF is also beginning to formalize its training with the North
Sea Fleet, as indicated by the memorandum of understanding for
joint training signed in 2000. The logistics forces are beginning to
move from being able to support one or two types of similar aircraft
only at their home base to supporting large numbers and types of
deployed aircraft at home and away.
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What is apparent is that the PLAAF is part of a larger PLA
campaign process based on coordinated action plans. What is not
apparent, however, is whether the PLAAF, which has not had any
significant aerial combat since 1958, is capable of sustaining sortie
generation in an environment where its own airfields could come
under attack from long-range cruise missiles. What is clear is the
PLAAF’s realization that it lacks any real-time reconnaissance
capability, hence the emphasis on conducting operations in an
unknown environment. According to the 2002 U.S. Department of
Defense report on the PLA,
The PLAAF does not appear to have been putting large numbers
of aircraft in the air simultaneously, controlling large numbers of
engagements, or sustaining high sortie rates for extended periods
of time. Pilot proficiency is improving, but China’s best pilots lag
behind their Taiwan counterparts in terms of capabilities. PLAAF
and Naval Aviation fighter pilot tactical training continues,
albeit slowly. During 2001, some of the PLAAF’s more advanced
aircraft reportedly conducted advanced tactical training involving
fighters of dissimilar types. PLAAF and Naval Aviation exercise
activity during 2001 reportedly concentrated on mobility, air
defense, and support to amphibious assault forces. Air defense
exercises were said to be highly scripted and the scenarios lacked
realism, limiting the benefit PLA pilots could have gained from
the exercises.131

Based on analysis of previous campaigns, it is clear that the CMC
will provide specific rules of engagement (ROE) for the PLAAF
before it becomes involved in any conflict. In the past, those ROEs
have kept the PLAAF from engaging certain forces, whether in the
air, on the ground, or at sea, that could lead to an escalation of the
conflict. In any future conflict, it might be more difficult to impose
and adhere to strict ROEs, especially if the PLAAF’s airfields and air
defense sites come under attack.
There is no doubt the PLAAF should be proud of its recent
accomplishments, but it should also be careful not to overemphasize
its capabilities to Beijing’s leaders based on its performance during
the Korean War. For example, the PLAAF consistently points out it
has shot down a total of 1,474 and damaged 2,344 aircraft over the
past 50 years. What it neglects to mention is the breakout for air-
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to-air combat and those aircraft downed or damaged by AAA and
SAMs.
In the final analysis, however, the PLAAF may lack the most
sophisticated weapon systems today, but it should not be sold short.
Based on the author’s interviews throughout Asia over the past 5
years, China’s neighbors are definitely concerned about what the
PLAAF will look like in 20 years, especially if China’s economy
remains strong and the PLA’s modernization efforts continue at
their current pace. As the PLAAF has shown in the past, it could
move hundreds of aircraft, SAMs, and AAA, as well as thousands of
support troops to unsophisticated airfields near the front in a short
period of time if necessary. It may not be as far along as it would like
in training to implement its air offensive theory, but it would salute
smartly and attempt to carry out its orders if required to do so.
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CHAPTER 5
THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY NAVY
AFTER HALF A CENTURY:
LESSONS LEARNED IN BEIJING
Bernard D. Cole
INTRODUCTION
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) was officially
established in May 1950; almost a quarter-century after the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA). This chapter will examine how Beijing has
viewed the PLAN as an instrument of national security strategy.
In particular, what “lessons learned” has the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) government drawn about employing its navy? The
answers to that question should allow some tentative conclusions
about how Beijing may aspire to take advantage of the “ubiquitous
striking force of sea power.”1
This chapter will review the PLAN’s role as an instrument of the
nation’s security strategy during the past half-century, since that
history provides guidance toward how current Chinese leaders view
naval power as an instrument of the state. Beijing is modernizing
its navy; does this program aim to change the PLAN from a coastal,
“brown-water” force to an open ocean “blue-water” service able to
secure Beijing’s vast maritime territorial claims?2
Lessons Learned.
The first question about China’s maritime lessons learned is
the degree to which Beijing has learned or not learned the value of
maritime power as an instrument of national policy. The post-1949
regime has consistently made national security decisions within a
historically and geostrategically continentalist framework. Hence,
Chinese views of naval power as an instrument of national power
are likely to be constrained by a focus inland, to the north and west.
That said, the PRC government has never ignored sea power, has
employed naval force on several occasions, and has learned some
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hard lessons about the benefits, drawbacks, and requirements of
employing that military instrument. The first interpretive period in
this chapter is from 1949 to 1960, from the founding of the PRC to the
apparent resolution of the post-Korean War struggle for control of
PLA strategy and modernization. Beijing faced the full spectrum of
strategic challenges during this decade, from very serious domestic
unrest to possible global nuclear war. Domestic political events were
an important influence on the development of China’s navy, and,
by inference, the leadership’s view of its value. The Korean War
exacerbated the lack of resources available for naval development
in China, and the new PLAN relied on the Soviet Union for ships
and assistance until 1960. Chinese policymakers learned the value
of naval power in executing several national security missions:
conducting joint amphibious operations with the army and air force,
defense against amphibious raids, protection of sea-borne merchant
traffic — including blockade-breaking — and establishing law and
order on coastal and inland waters. These missions required only
a limited, coastal defense navy, a “lesson” that China’s experience
in the Korean War did little to contradict, despite the ability of the
allies to directly affect the course of that conflict through their almost
unchallenged command of the sea.
Naval developments during the next period, from 1961 to 1976,
were highlighted by the war in Southeast Asia, the split with the
Soviet Union, the after-effects of the Great Leap Forward, and
especially by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR).
Chinese strategic thought remained focused on land warfare, with
the PLAN assigned to support the army; the primary naval role was
to oppose a possible Soviet amphibious assault. Beijing apparently
did not learn lessons about the greater usefulness of its navy from
the PLAN’s victory over a South Vietnamese task force in the South
China Sea’s Paracel Islands in 1974. Similarly, and as was the case
in the Korean War, the American ability to use its command of the
sea to launch air strikes and logistically support its forces ashore
in Southeast Asia seemed not to impress Chinese strategists. The
leadership did seek during this period to develop naval strategic
nuclear deterrent power.
The following period, 1976-early 1990s, was marked by the
end of the Cold War and the U.S. final emergence as sole global
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superpower. One Chinese analyst, who decried the constraints
imposed on naval developments during the GPCR, implied that the
PLAN did not recover from that cataclysm until at least 1980, when
“the Navy actively initiated research on weapons development
planning.”3 The PLAN played no significant role in the 1979 war
with Vietnam, although it defeated a Vietnamese naval force in 1988
in the Spratly Islands. This victory was the first step in an extended
series of South China Sea island seizures that lasted through 1995,
when China occupied Mischief Reef.4 Beijing’s view of the PLAN
as a coastal force, dedicated primarily to opposing possible Soviet
attack, started to change towards the end of this period. China’s
strategists apparently learned from allied operations in Southwest
Asia the lesson that the PLAN had to be larger, technologically
modernized, and capable of executing a range of national security
missions.
The final period, 1995 to the present, began dramatically with the
1995-96 events in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait. Other influential
events were the allied campaign in the Balkans, highlighted by the
bombing of China’s Belgrade embassy, and Beijing’s attempts to take
advantage of post-Cold War events which have had an increasing
non-nation state flavor. This period’s new naval lesson to China’s
leaders may well be a Mahanian5 belief in the PLAN’s role as an
instrument of national strategy. More to the point, Beijing learned
from the spring 1996 events that to be effective, any policy toward
Taiwan requires a creditable PLAN, if only to give pause to possible
U.S. intervention.6
THE FRAMEWORK: GEOPOLITICS AND HISTORY
Although China includes over 11,000 miles of coastline
and contains more than 6,000 islands, it historically has been a
continental rather than a maritime power, more often viewing
the sea as a potential invasion route for foreign aggressors rather
than as a medium for achieving national goals. China has always
depended primarily on ground forces to guard its national security
interests — for the simple reason that threats to those interests have
consistently arisen in the northern and northwestern Asian vastness.
However, China, in spite of its historic focus on continental security
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concerns, has not ignored its maritime boundaries. There have been
periods during which the government has deployed powerful fleets
dedicated to vital national security interests.
Chinese historians date organized naval warfare in their
nation to the 6th century BC, Spring and Autumn period.7 Navies
were built, doctrine developed, and a supporting administrative
infrastructure established intermittently during the Song, Yuan,
Ming, and Qing dynasties, from approximately 900 to 1900 AD.
These naval forces were used to pursue national security objectives,
but when these objectives had been achieved the navy was largely
disestablished, as the government diverted resources to the more
consistently important continentalist and domestic elements of
national security.
No dynasty fell as a direct result of maritime invasion or pressure;
the navy was never vital to a dynasty’s survival. Nonetheless, the
Imperial period offers what may be significant cues to the way
current Chinese leaders intend to employ their navy.
By the 19th century, China had fallen so far behind the global
norm in naval power that it was unable to prevent the influx of
imperialists — who came almost entirely by sea.8 As China reeled
from this onslaught, “self-strengthening” efforts adopted the slogan
“Chinese learning as the fundamental structure, Western learning
for practical use.” Naval modernization embodied admiration of
modern warship technology and a belief that China’s humiliating
defeat by the imperialist powers had been made possible by their
naval and commercial sea power. China had deployed a modern
navy by 1884, using three approaches to build the new force:
indigenous production, purchases abroad, and reverse engineering
foreign systems.
The new navy suffered from high-level
governmental corruption and weak administration and soon came
to grief in war with two foreign naval powers: France in August
1884 and Japan 10 years later.9 Beijing’s 19th century fleets failed to
become a coherent, national navy. Land warfare also dominated the
civil war and Japanese aggression that lasted from 1911-49; naval
forces were weak and peripheral to the struggle.
CHINA “STANDS UP”: THE PLAN, 1949-60
The communist victory in 1949 was an army victory, but the
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terminal stages of the war against Kuomintang (KMT) forces
had required the PLA to deal with a riparian environment.10 The
precursor to the PLAN was a naval force established in February
1949 by the Third Field Army in East China, under the leadership
of Marshall Chen Yi. Chen “informed” General Zhang Aiping that
he was to oversee the project, with orders to complete the process
by the end of 1949 so the new navy could be used to transport and
support infantry troops against Taiwan.
Zhang immediately organized the East China Navy. His task
was “jump-started” in April, when 25 warships of the KMT Navy’s
Second Fleet under the leadership of Admiral Deng Zhao-xiang
defected to the communist regime. Zhang also began building
a shore-based infrastructure, with a naval school established in
Nanjing in August, and organized a rudimentary maintenance and
logistics infrastructure.11
The East China Navy began augmenting its forces by rapidly
repairing available ships. By the end of October, the first group of
16 escort vessels and gunboats was ready for operation, forming the
communist regime’s first navy unit.12
China’s new rulers recognized the need to deal with maritime
issues. The nation’s policymakers were mindful of China’s recent
history: “In the past hundred years,” wrote one PLA strategist, “as a
result of our complete lack of coastal defense, imperialist aggression
against us has come mostly from the sea. . . . naval defense is an
important component part of national defense and that our national
defense would not be solid unless there is a powerful naval defense
force.”13 In late August, Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders decided
to send Zhang Aiping to the Soviet Union to discuss importing Soviet
vessels and inviting Soviet naval advisors. Zhang’s naval delegation
arrived in the Soviet Union in mid-September and “quickly received
positive Soviet responses to their demands.”14
The new government in Beijing immediately faced attacks on its
coastline and island territories by the KMT regime that had fled to
Taiwan. In fact, on June 21, 1949, the KMT government announced
a blockade of all coastal ports in the CCP “occupation zone,” and its
naval and air forces started harassing merchant ships operating to
and from the mainland; mines were laid to block the mouth of the
Yangzi River; KMT bombers attacked coastal cities and former KMT
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naval vessels that had defected to the CCP.15
Chinese new naval forces were assigned specific missions on
several occasions. First, two maritime threats were perceived in
1949: the local threat from Taiwan, and a more general threat from
the United States. This perception was accurate insofar as the
KMT navy continued raiding coastal installations, landing agents,
attacking merchant craft and fishing vessels, and threatening
invasion of the mainland on a larger scale. Hence, in 1950 coastal
defense was emphasized as the primary mission of the newly created
“East China Military Command,” headquartered in Shanghai and
deploying more than 450,000 personnel.
Second, Beijing recognized China’s maritime vulnerabilities
and opportunities, including a long, exposed coast, dependence
on fisheries, reliance on coastal commerce, weak economy, and a
historic continentalist defense orientation.
Third, when the “East China People’s Navy” was established on
May 1, 1949, its mission was described as defending China’s coast
against “imperialist aggression from the sea,” continuing the fight
against Chiang’s forces, and helping with economic reconstruction.16
The navy’s commander repeated its mission in slightly different
words, averring that the fleet was needed to safeguard China’s
independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty:
against imperialist aggression. . . . to destroy the sea blockade of
liberated China, to support the land and air forces of the People’s
Liberation Army in defense of Chinese soil and to wipe out all
remnants of the reactionary forces.”

Fourth, senior strategy makers in China saw the need for naval
forces to establish law and order on coastal and riverine waters,
in addition to the oft-stated missions of helping the army capture
offshore islands still occupied by the KMT, and preparing for the
capture of Taiwan. Hence, the CCP Politburo charged the new navy
with “defending both [eastern and southeastern] China coasts and
the Yangtze River.”
In other words, even before the PRC was formally established
in October 1949, its leaders had learned that the new government
needed an effective navy. The PLAN was formally established in
May 1950 under the command of General Xiao Jinguang.
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Not at all surprisingly, given the emphasis on defense and the
paucity of resources, Beijing adopted a maritime strategy — in so
far as it adopted one at all — of the Soviet coastal defense doctrine
known as the Young School. This strategy emerged in the Soviet
Union in the very early 1920s, as the new revolutionary regime
lacked the means to do little more than defend itself against White
Russian and foreign assaults. This strategy relegated naval forces to
supporting the army.
There were striking lessons for PRC leaders to draw from
comparing the strategic situations of their new regime and the early
1920s Soviet Union:
1. a new regime that was under military and political attack by
several capitalist countries and had not completely quelled
domestic fighting;
2. a regime that expected to be attacked by capitalist nations, with
amphibious attack a current fact and future threat, especially
from “the ultimate bastion of imperialism, the United
States;”17
3. a navy that was in disarray, and almost entirely manned by
captured/defected former enemy personnel;
4. budgetary shortages that limited the amount available to spend
on expensive naval systems;
5. lack of an industrial infrastructure to produce indigenously
modern naval armaments; and
6. a maritime frontier hemmed in by adversarial fleets and
bases.
The most practical lesson from such a comparison was that
the PRC needed an inexpensive naval force that could be quickly
manned and trained. When the PLAN conducted a ceremony to
name its ships on May 23, 1950, it had 51 combat vessels, 52 landing
vessels, and 30 auxiliary vessels, with a total tonnage of about 43,000;
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it already outclassed the KMT in both quantity and quality, at least
on paper.
Generals Zhang Aiping and Xiao Jinguang were typical of early
PRC naval leadership: revolutionary officers who had spent their
entire career as ground commanders and were transferred to the
navy for reasons of political reliability and proven combat record,
rather than for any naval experience. In fact, this system continued
to dominate until 1988, when career PLAN officers began leading
the navy. That effective naval commanders require a different
background of education, training, and experience than do army
commanders is an example, perhaps, of a lesson not learned until
relatively late in the life of the PRC.
Soviet Assistance.
Soviet assistance for establishing the PLAN had been obtained
by Mao Zedong during his 1949-50 visit to Moscow: China used
half of the initial Soviet loan of $300 million for the navy, including
the purchase of four old Soviet submarines, two destroyers, and
a large number of patrol boats. The new force also included
about 10 corvettes, 40 ex-U.S. landing craft, and several dozen
miscellaneous river gunboats, minesweepers, and yard craft, all
from the Nationalists.18 Moscow helped establish a shore-based
infrastructure, including shipyards, naval colleges, and extensive
coastal fortifications.
The Soviet Union provided old, poorly maintained ships, and
insisted that China pay for its purchases. This exacerbated the
PLAN’s acquisition problem, since Mao Zedong instituted two
priorities for the first Five-Year Plan in 1953: fighting the war in
Korea and rebuilding industry. The armed services were limited to
30 percent of national expenditures. Hence, the PLAN was limited
in the amount of money allocated for the purchase of foreign ships,
while even domestic shipyard allocations had to be “based upon
China’s industrial growth,” meaning that warship construction was
not necessarily prioritized over commercial ship construction.19 One
reason for this low priority was the lesson Chinese leaders drew
from the Korean War: land power remained the dominant element
in national defense.
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Events during this initial period of navy building highlighted
to Beijing issues that had to be resolved before effective maritime
forces could be deployed. These included recruiting, training,
and educating enlisted and officer personnel and the industrial
requirements of building and maintaining a fleet.
LESSONS: THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS
Beijing’s immediate goal in 1949 was seizure of the offshore
islands still occupied by the KMT; the invasion of Taiwan was
initially scheduled for the spring of 1950, but soon postponed to the
summer of 1951. Mao Zedong’s strategic goal was to complete the
unification of China and hence bring the revolution’s initial phase
to a successful close. He considered the capture of Taiwan “an
inseparable part of his great cause of unifying China.”20 Mao lacked
experience in naval warfare, but quickly learned that a successful
campaign against Taiwan would require adequate amphibious
training, naval transportation, “guaranteed air coverage,” and the
cooperation of a “fifth-column” on the island — requirements that
still apply.
Most of the islands that remained under Nationalist control lay
within 25 nm of the mainland. Most prominent among these many
island garrisons were the approximately 20,000 KMT troops who
had retreated to the Kinmen (Quemoy) Islands; perhaps 5,000 to the
Dongshang Islands, about 1,000 to Mazu (Matsu) Island, and 160,000
to Hainan. 21
Initial efforts by the new regime to capture these islands, including
Daxie, Jintang, and Taohua, succeeded with little difficulty; as a
result, PLA commanders probably underestimated the difficulty in
completing the occupation of all the islands, including Taiwan. But
the PLA in late 1949-early 1950 still lacked significant air and surface
elements, was short of shipping suitable for troop lift (and lacked the
crews to man what it possessed), and was ignorant of the parameters
of even short-range amphibious operations.
The first hard lesson about amphibious operations was learned
when a 10th Army Corps division made a landing on Kinmen on
October 25, 1949. The KMT held control of the sea and the air, and
knew that the invasion was coming. They destroyed all the PLA
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transport vessels after their embarked troops landed on the island;
the invading soldiers were quickly defeated and thousands captured.
Then, a division of the PLA’s 7th Army Corps — between 5,000 and
7,000 men — landed on Dengbu Island on November 7 and was
similarly routed. These defeats “shocked the CCP leadership.”22
The losses made the military and party leadership realize that
the PLA demanded new skills and training. The strategic goal
— reuniting all insular territory with the mainland — remained the
same, but operational doctrine and tactics had to change.
China achieved a major amphibious victory in April 1950 when
the PLA occupied Hainan, after Taiwan the second-largest island
held by the Nationalists. The campaign cost heavy PLA losses, but
more than 90,000 Nationalist troops were captured. This victory
resulted from careful planning, followed by the neutralization of
superior Nationalist ground, naval, and air forces.23 Shore-based
artillery was employed to gain effective control of the sea and
airspace between Hainan and the mainland, and Taiwan’s senior
commanders performed poorly.
In retrospect, China did not have to be concerned about American
intervention in its island campaigns, even that involving an assault
on Taiwan; neither the United States nor any other foreign power
was likely to intervene in what promised to be the final stages of the
Chinese civil war.
The U.S. Navy considers amphibious warfare to be the most
difficult of all naval operations to conduct, a lesson learned by the
PLA during this period. Previous success in land warfare did not
necessarily lead to success in island warfare. As it learned in the
early island operations, PLA victory against Taiwan would require
effective joint warfare, with the cooperative efforts of land, sea, and
air forces.
The list of specific lessons learned by Beijing during the 1949-50
island campaigns was headed by that of simply finding a way to
cross intervening straits. Other major problems included acquiring
sufficient transport vessels; how to load, organize, and control those
vessels to transport troops and then to use small boats to land the
troops; how to avoid soldiers’ seasickness; how to establish and
then exploit beachheads; and gathering information about weather,
currents, tides, and bottom topography. Developing plans for
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invading Taiwan included mobilization of all civilian vessels in the
coastal provinces, with the organization of three naval task forces to
transport the troops necessary for the cross-strait operation.24
LESSONS: TAIWAN
First Phase.
Extending Beijing’s rule over Taiwan has remained near or at the
top of China’s list of vital strategic interests since 1949. On June 14th
of that year, Mao Zedong ordered General Su Yu, the Third Field
Army commander, to “pay attention to studying the problem of
seizing Taiwan,” stating that,
if Taiwan is not liberated and the KMT’s naval and air bases not
destroyed, Shanghai and other coastal areas will be menaced
from time to time. If Taiwan is not liberated, we will not be able
to seize hundreds of thousands of tons of vessels. Our coastal
and inland water transportation will thus be controlled by foreign
merchants.25

Chinese shipyards hastened the repair and construction of
transport vessels, at a cost of 1.9 trillion yuan.26
By January 1950, twelve armies had been assigned to the Taiwan
campaign, with four armies designated for the assault phase. This
force probably numbered approximately 150,000 troops. 27 General
Su Yu estimated that 760,000 tons of shipping, plus 2,000 small boats,
were needed to execute this campaign plan, but these forces were not
available.28 The general knew even more troops would be required,
since the KMT forces on Taiwan were becoming more capable with
the passage of time, but more troops required more transports and
supporting vessels. PLA planners in 1950 had to try to compensate
for the shortage of the most vital resource for carrying out an assault
on Taiwan, troop lift, which remains a problem for the PLA.
Hence, the PLA was far from completing preparations for
the Taiwan campaign at the outbreak of the Korean War. These
preparations were effectively shelved in July 1950, when both
Generals Su Yu and Xiao Jinguang were transferred to serve as
commander and deputy commander, respectively, of the Northeast
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Border Defense Army.
Second Phase.
The Korean War so absorbed China’s military attention and
resources that the PLA would never again come as close to being
prepared to assault Taiwan, as it had been in the early spring of 1950.
The strategic ambition remained, but no serious effort was made to
deploy a navy sufficiently strong to carry it out. The most obvious
evidence of this is that during the 1950s Beijing did not authorize
construction of a single amphibious ship.29
China’s leaders remembered the lessons of the 1949 Kinmen
battle: a joint operational capability was required for successful
amphibious assaults, and shipping requirements were complicated
by the fact that it was not enough to offer sufficient transport vessels
to the first line forces; if the second-line forces did not have adequate
means of transportation, the first-line forces would be cut off from
logistics support, isolated, and defeated.
Beijing’s fear of American intervention was heightened in June
1950, when President Harry Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet
into the Taiwan Strait at the outset of the Korean War. Although he
explained America’s reentry into the Chinese civil war as a means of
preventing either side from attacking the other, Beijing believed that
Truman was in fact committing the United States to the defense of
Taiwan — after having refused to do so for many months. Premier
Zhou Enlai called Truman’s move “violent, predatory action by the
U.S. Government [that] constituted armed aggression against the
territory of China and total violation of the UN charter.”30 Beijing
recognized the complete U.S. air and sea superiority in East Asia.
Although some smaller KMT-held islands were captured in the
summer of 1950, in August General Chen Yi, commander of the
PLA’s East China Headquarters, recommended to the CCP Central
Committee that the Taiwan campaign be delayed from 1951 to 1952.
The Central Military Commission (CMC) approved, noting that “It is
also decided not to [re]assault [even] Kinmen before April 1951.”31
Third Phase.
The Korean War presented mixed naval lessons to China. The
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amphibious landing at Inchon in September 1950 was a major
turning point of the war, while allied command of the sea allowed
aircraft carriers and battleships to bombard Chinese and North
Korean forces at will. The U.N. forces suffered only one significant
maritime defeat, when a planned amphibious assault on the east
coast port of Wonsan in October 1950 had to be canceled because of
North Korean mines. Overall, however, Korea was not a maritime
conflict and the PLA’s efforts were evaluated as successful, which
contributed to continued belief in a defensive, coastal navy.32
This conclusion was not unanimous; after witnessing the effects
of modern weaponry first-hand in Korea, some PLA leaders wanted
to modify Mao’s theory of “People’s War” by acknowledging
the importance of “modern weaponry.” Peng Dehuai, who had
commanded Chinese forces in Korea, was the most prominent of
these. Peng reportedly stated that “People’s War and such stuff are
outdated [at sea because] in battle the Navy relied upon the tonnage
of its vessels, the caliber of its guns and the slide rule.”
Peng’s attempts at “regularization and modernization” of the
military brought the accusation that he was trying to “negate the
principle of people’s war” by placing “military technique in the
first place and [denying] that political and ideological work is the
primary factor in building up” the PLA’s “combat strength.” His
attempt to modify Mao’s military theories was one of the reasons he
was dismissed from office in disgrace in 1959.33
The end of the Korean War gave rise to apparent debate at the
senior-most levels of the CCP about the means of implementing
national security strategy. This debate may be simplistically
described as a contest between those who wished to modernize the
PLA based on Korean War experiences, and those who believed in a
more fundamentalist version of “people’s war.”
Naval lessons were “learned” by some PLA leaders, then, but
were subsumed within a debate that involved the economic and
social disasters inflicted on China by Mao Zedong, and probably
included something of a leadership struggle. Mao and his adherents
prevailed, with severe impact on the PLAN: modernization was
extremely limited, focusing almost entirely on Mao’s directives to
develop a sea-borne nuclear deterrent. Any Korean War lessons
learned in maritime warfare were disregarded for the near-term.
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The PLAN was not ignored, however: in December 1953, Mao
stated at an expanded session of the Central Committee Politburo
“we must build a strong navy”: (1) to get rid of disturbances by
ocean pirates and protect the security of ocean channel shipping;
(2) to prepare the strength to recover Taiwan at an appropriate
opportunity and eventually unify our entire country; and, (3) to
ready our forces to resist an invasion of imperialism from the sea.
He qualified these goals, however, by noting that the navy had
to be built “in a planned, progressive way in accordance with the
situations regarding industrial development and finance.”34
Recovering Taiwan remained a key national goal for Beijing,
but little was done to equip the PLA to achieve that goal. The navy
during the decade following the end of the Korean War had little
standing in military budget priorities; few ships were acquired
and it was only in the latter half of the 1960s that the PLAN began
acquiring vessels equipped with guided missiles and other relatively
modern equipment.
Taiwan remained too weak for its stated goal of recovering the
mainland to serve as anything but empty rhetoric. On Beijing’s
side, Taiwan was treated as a means of national security signaling,
with Beijing creating the crises of 1954-55 and 1958 in the straits.
China naval operations in the mid-1950s focused on defeating the
continuing KMT attacks against the mainland and on capturing
islands still held by Taiwan.
The first of these major incidents began in September 1954, when
PLA artillery began shelling Kinmen Island. This barrage continued
until May 1955, and included KMT naval vessels as targets; in
November 1954, the 1,400-ton KMT destroyer escort Taiping was
sunk.”35 The 1954-55 episode included PLA capture of the Dachen
Islands, an effort that took advantage of superior PLA air power and
a well-coordinated amphibious assault against an outlying island.36
China demonstrated that it had learned the lessons of the Kinmen
debacle regarding the conduct of amphibious warfare.
This success at the operational level was more than offset by
the strategic defeat Beijing suffered when Chiang Kai-shek was
able to use the crisis to leverage a mutual defense treaty with the
United States. The de facto American intervention that had followed
Truman’s June 1950 action had now become a de jure alliance. As
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demonstrated by the role played by U.S. naval forces in helping
to evacuate the Dachen Islands in 1955 and to resupply Kinmen in
1954-55, the PLAN remained a limited factor in the Sino-American
strategic equation.
Mao renewed the strait crisis in the summer of 1958, primarily
with artillery barrages that peaked between August and October.37 In
neither of these straits crises did Beijing apparently intend capturing
Kinmen or Mazu, and the incidents emphasized the PLAN’s limited
capabilities.
Nonetheless, the 1950s ended with Chinese possession of all the
disputed islands except Kinmen, Mazu, and, of course, Taiwan. The
PLAN also stopped most of the KMT raids on the mainland, as well
as attacks on merchant and fishing vessels.38 Beijing clearly had
learned the lesson of the need for naval forces to protect sea-borne
trade and the fishing industry.39
This was a turbulent period in China, due to the break with the
Soviet Union, the Great Leap Forward, and power struggles within
the CCP. It was not a time of innovation or significant change in the
military structure. Despite the naval lessons so painfully learned
during the 1950s, the most important military experience of the
decade for China’s leaders had been Korea, overwhelmingly a land
war for the PLA. Hence, the PLAN’s “lessons learned” had little
effect on the strategic thought and policymaking of the nation’s
political-military leadership at the end of the PRC’s first decade.
A NEW SITUATION: 1960-76
The PLAN began to grow and modernize during this period,
despite the severe disruptions of the GPCR, the break with the Soviet
Union, and the continuing standoff with Taiwan. The navy’s input
to the third 5-year plan was approved by the CMC in April 1967,
including the design and construction of “advanced medium-sized
surface ships, medium-sized submarines, and nuclear submarines.
. . .[and] a new missile seaward defense boat.”40 This program
indicates an early move toward “offshore active defense,” the term
frequently used in recent years by Chinese analysts describing the
PLAN’s strategic role in national security strategy.
For nuclear deterrent forces, Beijing initially relied on the Soviet
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Union during the 1950s. The stresses in the alliance with Moscow
became more divisive as the decade progressed, however, in part
because Mao Zedong was determined that China develop its own
nuclear forces, proclaiming “even if it takes 10,000 years, we must
make a nuclear submarine.”41 The budgetary priority accorded
nuclear weapons, the economic disruptions resulting from the
disastrous Great Leap Forward, and continuing belief in Maoist
orthodoxy all contributed to the lack of resources for building a
strong Chinese navy during the late 1950s and 1960s. The PLAN
had been organized, sent to sea, and proven effective as a coastal
defense force within 10 years of its founding, but except for the
CMC-controlled program to launch a sea-borne nuclear deterrent
force, the navy remained in a supporting role for the army.
Despite the split with the Soviet Union and the war in Vietnam,
China’s strategic focus during this period was domestic, mostly
because of crises of the leadership’s own making. Problems for the
PLAN resulted from the Soviet withdrawal in 1960, fuel shortages,
maintenance inadequacies, difficulty finding well-educated recruits,
and continued second-class status in the national security strategy
hierarchy. Another bit of evidence that Beijing was slow to learn
how to deploy a modern, effective navy was the “auxiliary maritime
militia,” a Maoist hangover composed of fishermen and coastal junk
sailors. This force, probably numbering approximately 750,000
people aboard some 140,000 craft, was intended to supplement the
navy’s ability to conduct coastal reconnaissance and surveillance
operations.42 In fact, the militia served as little more than a dead
zone for already scarce PLAN resources.
The 1960s were marked by major foreign and domestic events that
further constrained development of a sea-going navy. The split with
the Soviet Union was signaled during Nikita Khrushchev’s October
1959 meeting with Mao Zedong in Beijing and was dramatically
executed in mid-1960, when Soviet advisors (and their plans) were
withdrawn from China. The navy suffered with the rest of the PLA,
as projects were left in turmoil. Furthermore, none of the other
significant events in the early 1960s, including battles with India and
the Southeast Asia conflict, directly involved the navy; they did not
provide justification for improving the PLAN, but rather served to
limit naval modernization.
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Although the PLAN’s strategic role remained limited by a Maoist
emphasis on People’s War, Minister of Defense Lin Biao may have
wanted to institute a policy of technological development coequal
with “politics in command.” He did not press his ideas, however,
and as the decade ended was solidly on the side of “politics,” writing
“long live the victory of people’s war.”43 This may have simply
reflected Lin’s belief that the CCP had to remain firmly in control
of the PLA for China to survive and that ideological reliability was
more important than modern hardware, a strategic view certain to
maintain the prominence of army forces at the expense of the navy.
China’s strategic picture changed radically during the 1960s as
relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated to the point of armed
conflict along the Amur River. The former ally was now the enemy;
soon the United States would be China’s ally, which meant that
Beijing’s strategic focus was primarily to the north and west — away
from the sea.
The GPCR, lasting from 1966 to 1976, seriously hampered naval
modernization; even the relatively sacrosanct missile, submarine, and
nuclear weapons programs were affected.44 The PLAN continued
to serve in support of the army; modernization was limited, since
People’s War viewed technology and weaponry as less important
than soldiers imbued with Maoist ideology.
A review of global naval developments indicates that PLAN
modernization was retarded by perhaps two decades as a result
of the program restrictions and personnel losses that occurred
during this political maelstrom. Except for the evolution of
maritime nuclear power, the PLAN missed or was very late joining
common developments in most warfare areas during the 1950s and
1960s, including guided missiles in anti-air (AAW), anti-surface
(ASUW), and anti-submarine warfare (ASW); automation and
computerization of command and control (C3); the expanded use of
ship-borne helicopters; automation of gunnery and sensor systems;
and even the advent of automation and gas turbine technology in
ship propulsion.
PLAN modernization was still hamstrung at the end of the GPCR
by the “Gang of Four.” For instance, Jiang Qing led an attack on
naval missile development. Another member of the “Gang of Four,”
Zhang Chunqiao, expressed the Gang’s anti-navy position and
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support for the “continentalist view.”45 Despite this attitude and
a lack of resources for major conventional force development, the
PLAN had moved into the missile age by 1976, deploying a Sovietdesigned ballistic missile submarine and the first frigate armed with
anti-ship cruise missiles.
Mao’s determination that China become a nuclear power carried
through the ideological turmoil of the late 1950s, 1960s, and early
1970s, as Beijing invested heavily in developing nuclear-armed
missiles and a nuclear-powered submarine to launch them. These
were national rather than PLAN projects, however, and did not
significantly increase the navy’s strategic status in the view of the
leadership. Strategic thought in Beijing remained focused on land
warfare, with necessary airpower and nuclear adjuncts; the PLAN
remained characterized as a supporting arm of the army.
1976-99.
Mao Zedong reportedly supported the development of a modern
navy in May 1975 at a meeting of the CMC.46 He was probably
reacting both to the Soviet threat and to the development of a
powerful navy by China’s ancient protagonist, Japan. The PLAN’s
first priority in the 1970s was defending against possible Soviet
amphibious assault from the northeast, since Moscow’s navy was
considered a major threat, despite the weak Soviet amphibious
forces in the Pacific.47 Other missions included combating criminal
activities such as smuggling, piracy, and illegal immigration; sea and
air rescue (SAR); and safety of navigation. These were important,
but did not have strategic implications.
Perception of an increased maritime threat from Moscow was
heightened by Soviet naval developments in the 1960s and 1970s,
even though they were defensive in motivation and aimed at the
United States. China’s concern about Soviet maritime power was
strengthened when Moscow demonstrated its new global navy in
the 1975 Okean exercises.
The Soviet Pacific fleet had become the largest of Moscow’s four
fleets by the mid-1970s, almost doubling in size and including the
latest combatants, notably nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed
surface ships and submarines. Soviet merchant and fisheries ships
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were also omnipresent in Pacific waters vital to China’s economic
interests. The Soviet navy in the late 1970s and 1980s was poised
to threaten sea lines of communications (SLOCs) vital to Beijing’s
rapidly increasing merchant marine and overseas trade, as Moscow’s
naval forces maintained a continual presence in the South China Sea,
Indian Ocean, and North Arabian Sea.
Several factors continued to impede development of a large,
modern Chinese navy during the early years of this period. The
political after-shocks of the GPCR, as Hua Guofeng and Deng
Xiaoping contested for the leadership of post-Mao China, limited
the resources devoted to military modernization. This struggle was
not resolved until 1980, with Deng emerging on top.
After the Gang of Four were arrested in October 1976, Premier
Hua Guofeng noted the PLAN’s nuclear deterrent mission. In
1980, however, Deng Xiaoping reemphasized the navy’s role as a
coastal defense force, a view retained throughout the first half of
the decade. “Our navy,” Deng asserted, “should conduct coastal
operations. It is a defensive force. Everything in the construction of
the navy must accord with this guiding principle.”48 CMC Standing
Committee Vice-Chairman Yang Shangkun reemphasized this in
August 1985, when he declared that “the construction of the Chinese
Navy has been determined by the nature of our state. . . . The Navy
is fundamentally a coastal defense force. The Navy must be built in
accordance with this characteristic.”49
Naval growth was also limited by disorder in China’s economic
and social structures that lasted beyond the end of the GPCR.
This turmoil especially affected the military-industrial complex,
hindering PLA modernization efforts. Furthermore, the PLAN was
not significantly involved in the 1979 “punishment” of Vietnam; the
sobering lessons of that conflict applied most directly to the army.
Hence, the PLAN’s position within the PLA almost certainly did
not improve by comparison with the army; the recognized need to
improve that branch’s capability probably lessened the budgetary
resources available to the navy.
Finally, the triangular play among China, the Soviet Union,
and the United States meant that by 1980 Beijing could rely on the
world’s largest, most modern navy to counter the Soviet maritime
threat. Furthermore, given the U.S.-Japan security treaty, Beijing
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could subsume concern about future Japanese aggression within
its strategic relationship with Washington.50 Hence, the PLAN
could not expect a more significant role as an instrument of national
strategy in Beijing as the 20th century approached its final decade.
There was no reason for China’s strategists in the early 1980s to have
learned new lessons about the value of the PLAN as an instrument
of national policy.
Events soon occurred, however, that probably raised the PLAN’s
profile in the minds of China’s leadership. First was the new
military strategy adopted by the CMC in mid-1985, shifting the
PLA’s focus from a major (nuclear) war with the Soviet Union to
local, limited wars on China’s periphery. Five types of limited wars
were discussed in Chinese military journals in the late 1980s: (1)
small-scale conflicts restricted to contested border areas; (2) conflict
over territorial seas and islands; (3) surprise air attacks; (4) defense
against deliberately limited attacks into Chinese territory; and, (5)
“punitive counter-attacks” launched by China into enemy territory
to “oppose invasion, protect sovereignty, or to uphold justice and
dispel threats.”51 This new paradigm, especially case (2) above,
implies a lesser role for heavy army units, and a greater role for
naval forces. Major exercises in the past decade and a half seem to
cover these five scenarios, with the PLAN the dominant service in
several, including annual events since 1988.52
Second was the end of the Cold War and the concomitant decay
of the Russian Pacific Fleet to the point where few of its warships got
underway on a regular basis. Third was the heated up sovereignty
disputes in the South and East China Seas during the first half of the
1990s. The complex situation in the South China Sea occurred in an
area where the PLAN was used to victories (in 1974 and 1988); this
record continued during the imbroglio with the Philippines during
1995-98. In the East China Sea, where China and Japan dispute
the sovereignty of the Daoyutais (or Senkaku Islands in Japanese),
Beijing and Tokyo worked successfully to keep the lid on the
disagreement.
Fourth was China’s increasing dependence on imported sources
of energy, a dependence that began in 1992 and continues to increase.
This brought to the fore the traditional navy mission of maintaining
the security of the SLOCs, a mission the PLAN was and remains
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capable of performing only in China’s coastal waters.
Fifth, Beijing’s analysis of the post-Cold War world assumed
that a multilateral international structure would emerge. That
this did not occur was probably disappointing and perhaps even
disillusioning to Chinese policymakers. However, the world that
did develop in the 1990s, although featuring the United States as
“unipower,” was also disruptive enough to give some credence to
the more diffuse international political situation envisioned by some
Chinese analysts. The decade’s events in the Persian Gulf, Africa,
the Middle East, Southeastern Europe, Russia, and South Asia may
have lent credence to those who believed that the PLAN should
be developed as a primary instrument of enforcing sovereignty,
especially in view of China’s very long coastline, plethora of islands,
and offshore territorial claims.
Sixth, the economic disaster that befell most of East Asia after
mid-1997, exacerbated by Japan’s continuing economic torpor, has
left China in a position of relative economic strength not seen since
the height of the Qing Dynasty. This has allowed double-digit
increases in the PLA (and the PLAN) budget, as well as providing a
comfortable zone within which senior policymakers could entertain
projecting China’s presence on a more consistently global basis, a
role best carried out by the PLAN.
The navy also proved its value as an instrument of the state
across a wide spectrum of nationally sanctioned activities during
the 1980s. These included several deployments to the South Pacific
to support intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) flight tests; the
first successful launch of a long-range missile from a submerged
submarine; support of early satellite launches; Arctic and Antarctic
explorations; and the conduct of foreign port visits, including in
1989 the first PLAN visit to a U.S. port.
In short, major changes in China’s domestic and international
situation in the 1980s heightened the importance of maritime power
to national security strategy. Beijing’s second maritime priority,
after the Soviet threat, was securing offshore territorial claims.
Taiwan was the most important of these, but the South China Sea
was also significant. Successful action against South Vietnamese
naval forces in 1974 resulted in Chinese possession of the disputed
Paracel Islands; whether Beijing learned any lessons from this
episode — other than that other claimants to the South China Sea
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islands and reefs would not accede meekly to Beijing’s territorial
claims — is difficult to evaluate, since we lack detailed knowledge of
PLA planning and intentions preceding the actual battles.
This episode may have convinced Chinese strategists of the
need for a force dedicated to amphibious warfare, and hence
contributed to the 1979 resurrection and assignment to the South
Sea Fleet of the PLAN’s Marine Corps, which first had formed in
1953 but disbanded in 1957. The navy’s slender amphibious assets
were improved and concentrated in the South Sea Fleet, with a
training regimen that included “island seizing” exercises.53 This
development strengthened Beijing’s policy view of the PLAN as
necessary to enforcing insular territorial claims.
Another date which may have been pivotal in China’s post-Cold
War national security view actually occurred before that period was
clearly over: the June 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square, which
effectively cut Beijing off from American military assistance and
eased the turn to Moscow for modern weaponry, especially for
the PLAN. Furthermore, Beijing employed its navy as a primary
instrument for combating the U.S.-led efforts to isolate China after
the Tiananmen events by conducting a campaign of ship visits
throughout Southeast and South Asia in the second half of 1989 and
1990.
By the turn of the 21st century, China’s leaders came to understand
and value the PLAN’s role in diplomacy and as a deterrent force.
The navy’s role in national strategy was greatly enhanced over that
of 1950, 1960, or 1980, but still remained secondary to land forces in
terms of value as an instrument of national defense.
THE NEXT PLAN
One useful list of generic naval missions includes (1) maritime
diplomacy; (2) domain maintenance; (3) maritime presence; (4)
sea control/sea denial; (5) deterrence; (6) tripwire; and (7) power
projection.54 Counterpoised to this list are Beijing’s most important
national security concerns today, and how the PLAN fits into those
priorities. What lessons about employing naval power have been
absorbed by China’s national security policymakers? At one level,
Beijing’s number one national security priority is maintaining
the CCP in power, which requires maintaining social peace and
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domestic stability; the second is achieving status as East Asian
regional hegemon, and the third is status as a world power. At a
second level is defense of continental China; defending and exerting
sovereignty, including disputed insular territories; and reuniting
Taiwan with the mainland.55
A strong PLAN is, ipso facto, necessary to achieve these seven
goals, since the first depends on accomplishing the latter five. Naval
units are particularly useful for exercising diplomatic presence,
for demonstrating China’s interests throughout East Asia and
indeed throughout the world; a two-ship PLAN task force recently
completed a circumnavigation of the globe, the first in China’s
history, visiting Asian, African, European, and Western Hemisphere
nations.56
Naval forces also are inherently mobile and flexible instruments,
and hence particularly well-suited for “wars on the periphery.” This
mobility also allows naval forces to serve as a “force multiplier,”
affecting a security situation to a degree greater than the strength of
the units involved.
Naval expansion and modernization may also have been spurred
during the 1980s by the coastal concentration of China’s burgeoning
economy and military facilities. Also, the resources necessary for a
modernized PLAN became available as a result of China’s dramatic
economic development and increasing wealth. Beijing’s increasing
focus on the national security issues posed by Taiwan and other
insular disputes strengthened the apparent value of naval forces as
an instrument suited for their resolution.
Several events contributed to an environment favorable to
PLAN modernization in the 1990s. First was Beijing’s 1985 strategic
decision that the Soviet Union no longer posed a major threat to
China in terms of global nuclear war, and that in the future the PLA
would have to prepare instead for “small wars on the periphery” of
the nation. The emphasis on a “peripheral” (to a significant extent
maritime) rather than continental strategic view improved the
PLAN’s position in obtaining resources within the PLA.
Second was the rise to prominence of General Liu Huaqing. He
had been schooled in the Soviet Union, served most of his career in
the science and technology arms of the PLA, and was close to Deng
Xiaoping. Liu’s appointment to head the navy was unusual, since he
held substantive (general/admiral) rank senior to that (lieutenant179

general/vice admiral) normally held by the PLAN commander.
His promotion indicated that Deng wanted to improve the navy’s
capability and status within the PLA, and raise its profile as an
instrument of China’s national security strategy.
Liu exerted a strong force on naval developments as navy
commander from 1982-87, and then as vice-chairman of the CMC
until 1997. He is best known for promulgating a three-stage
maritime strategy for China that provided justification on which
PLAN officers and other navalists could base their plans for a larger,
more modern navy. More important were his accomplishments in
reorganizing the navy, redeveloping the Marine Corps, upgrading
bases and research and development facilities, and restructuring the
school and training systems.57
Third, China’s widening maritime concerns and increased budget
resources in the 1980s raised interest in a strong modern navy.
PLAN modernization proceeded along three paths — indigenous
construction, foreign purchase, and reverse engineering — much
as had the Qing Dynasty’s “self-strengthening” navy of 100 years
earlier. The 1980s program proceeded at a measured pace, however,
and Beijing did not embark on a major naval building program.
China’s national security strategy in the 1980s and 1990s shifted
between the United States and the Soviet Union as the Cold War
ended. Throughout, Beijing seemed to follow Lord Palmerston’s
dictum that a nation has no permanent allies, but only permanent
interests.58 China’s strategic concerns remained primarily domestic
and continentalist, but the maritime element gained in importance.
Current maritime strategic thinking in China remains somewhat
opaque, with most public statements made by uniformed officers
who have an obvious interest in advancing such strategy. A good
summary of such thought still remains Allen Whiting’s 1996 article on
PLA threat perceptions.59 He cites both naval officers and business/
government leaders as to the value of the PLAN’s mission; they cite
national interests — sovereignty, defense of the homeland, offshore
economic deposits — that are not new but that are increasingly
important to an increasingly anachronistic communist regime in
Beijing striving to retain power over an increasingly capitalistic
society. Hence, the PLAN has almost certainly garnered new regard
as an instrument for achieving national strategic goals.
The navy has grown and modernized at a steady if moderate
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pace during the past 2 decades. Construction has included guidedmissile destroyers (DDGs) and frigates (FFGs), replenishment-at-sea
ships, conventionally and nuclear-powered attack-submarines, and
support craft including missile-tracking ships and officer-training
vessels. Foreign purchases were at first concentrated in the west,
with the United States selling China modern maritime gas-turbine
engines and torpedoes, and western European nations selling
weapons and sensor systems that included Italian torpedoes, French
cruise missiles, and British radars.
More recently, the PLAN has gone to Russia for ships, weapons,
and sensor systems. European nations, including Israel, have
continued serving as a source of some systems. This acquisition
process reflects an increased budget for the PLAN, not just in its
“regular” budget, but also in “special” funding allocated by the
CMC for the purchase of major systems, such as the Sovremennyclass DDGs and Kilo-class submarines.
The nation’s recognition of its globalizing economic interests
may have resulted in a more Mahanian view of the value of naval
power to protect and perhaps expand those interests that are
increasingly important to the well being of China’s huge population,
and the continuing empowerment of the CCP. Protecting offshore
petroleum assets, other seabed minerals, and fisheries also received
increased attention.
CONCLUSION
China is a maritime nation, dependent on sea-borne trade, energy
imports, and fisheries. Despite this maritime environment, China’s
national security concerns during the past 75 years focused almost
entirely on internal security and continental threats, except for
Taiwan. China fought the KMT, Japan, the Soviet Union, Vietnam,
India, South Korea, and the United States during that period; none
of those conflicts involved significant Chinese naval participation,
although the sea provided Japan, the United States, and the Soviet
Union with a haven from which China could have been attacked.
The new regime in 1949 recognized the importance of maritime
issues. Mao Zedong understood that conquering Taiwan required a
navy with expertise in amphibious warfare, sea-borne logistics, and
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maritime air power. The effort to organize such a navy was aborted
because of the Korean War, however, and thereafter limited by
domestic political events.
Naval development was all but frozen during the 1960s by
the Sino-Soviet split and the GPCR. Only at the end of the 1970s,
after the end of the GPCR and the post-Mao power struggle, was
the PLAN in a position to “take off.” No such take-off occurred,
however, because Beijing’s security concerns remained focused on
continental threats posed by the Soviet Union and India, as well as
by border instabilities with Vietnam and in Central Asia.
Beijing did begin devoting significantly greater resources to
the PLAN in the 1980s and 1990s, apparently in recognition of the
increasing importance of its maritime concerns. This trend has
continued, and the PLAN today probably receives more than its
share of China’s defense budget, although the military remains
dominated by the army.60
China’s leadership has viewed its navy through much the
same prism as its imperial and Republican predecessors; the navy
building for the 21st century owes a good deal to this history,
marked by some enduring legacies. First, while Chinese naval
power has never held top priority in Beijing’s strategic calculations,
its utility in resolving specific issues usually has been understood.
Two senior naval officers at the PLAN’s leading research institute
argued that a strong navy is necessary for homeland defense, since
“the seas have become the new high ground of strategic competition
. . ., a key national security defense . . ., [and] of crucial importance to
a country’s prosperity and honor . . . .”61
Second, PLAN modernization has been closely linked to the
nation’s economic development, with the claim that a nation not
understanding the importance of the ocean is a nation without a
future.62 Naval modernization will almost certainly continue, in
view of China’s continuing economic growth.
Third, Chinese naval development has been marked by
significant interaction with foreign navies, most notably reliance
on Soviet/Russian advisors, strategy, equipment, technology and
engineers.63
Fourth, the Chinese government has on several occasions
employed naval force in pursuit of national security goals.
Furthermore, island campaigns of 1949-55, the Straits crises of 1954182

55 and 1958, and the 1974, 1988, and 1998 actions in the South China
Sea are almost all evaluated by Beijing as successful.
Finally, Beijing wants a navy capable of ensuring coastal
defense and the success of discrete, well-defined campaigns to
defend its maritime territorial claims. A major sea power must be
capable of defending its maritime territorial rights. Additionally,
China’s willingness to resort to naval force even when apparently
outgunned bears a cautionary message for foreign analysts, and
Beijing’s willingness to employ military force to “teach lessons,”
means that the PLAN may be deployed in situations not anticipated
by opponents.
The post-Cold War focus on offshore sovereignty, economic,
and resource issues has added to the PLAN’s perceived importance,
as has the core issue of reunifying Taiwan. China today aims to
deploy a modern navy capable of operating on, above, and below
the sea’s surface, to “become a Great Wall at Sea.”64 Chinese
maritime strategists discuss the need for a strong navy in geopolitical terms, including the demand for increased lebensraum for a
nation that supports almost a quarter of the world’s population on
approximately seven percent of its arable land.65 Beijing’s focus on
its maritime borders was highlighted in a 1996 statement by a PLA
strategist who claimed that
in the last 109 years, imperialists have repeatedly invaded China
from the sea . . . .470 times, . . . 84 of these being serious invasions.
The ocean has become an avenue for the aggressors to bring
in their troops and haul away our wealth . . . . the ocean is not
only the basic space for human survival, but also an important
theater for international political struggle . . . . The better people
can control the sea, the greater they have the sea territorial
rights [which have] become inseparable from a country’s
sovereignty . . . .66

China’s naval “lessons” since 1949 may be readily identified;
the degree to which they have been “learned” — understood
and translated into strategic policy, doctrinal developments, and
operational applications — is more difficult to evaluate. The island
campaigns of the 1950s offered operational-level lessons that were
understood but implemented only on a limited basis. Fear of first
American and then Russian aggression was viewed largely in a
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continentalist context; the PLAN was improved but as an adjunct of
the army.
Recent PLAN exercises have demonstrated several “lessons
learned,” including:
• the need for a reliable, comprehensive material acquisition
infrastructure, with minimal dependence on foreign
suppliers;
• the need to integrate logistical support, to include cooperation
with the civilian sector;
• the requirement for well-educated, well-trained, wellexercised, dedicated personnel;
• the need for a clear, coherent command structure to ensure
an effective linkage from Beijing headquarters to fleet
operatives.
• the importance of effective joint operation of air, surface, and
ground forces, especially for amphibious operations.
Nations have traditionally devoted the resources necessary to
become naval powers when they meet three criteria. First, they are
secure on their land borders; second, domestic tranquility is assured;
and third, indigenous technology is sufficient to support a state of
the art naval force. China has concerns about all these criteria.67
The problematic nature of these factors limits Beijing’s learning
from its use of naval power. China’s leadership understands the
navy’s role as an instrument of national security strategy, but
the PLAN is not being allocated the attention and the resources
necessary to make it a primary instrument for accomplishing
strategic objectives. China’s leadership recognizes the nation’s
maritime dependence, but the lessons learned from the PLAN
record continue to be limited in application.
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CHAPTER 6
THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AND
CHINA’S SPACE AND MISSILE DEVELOPMENT:
LESSONS FROM THE PAST AND PROSPECTS
FOR THE FUTURE
Mark A. Stokes
INTRODUCTION
On September 18, 1999, Jiang Zemin, President of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), and members of the Political Bureau of the
Standing Committee assembled in the Great Hall of the People to
honor central figures in one of the PRC’s most ambitious long term
development projects in history. The ceremony eulogized aerospace
and nuclear engineers involved in China’s “two bombs, one satellite”
(liangdan yixing) program that produced China’s first nuclear bomb,
strategic ballistic missile, and satellite. Medals were conferred upon
23 engineers, such as Qian Xuesen, who sparked the imagination of
a nation and rekindled the martial spirit and grandeur of China.1
As demonstrated by the September 1999 ceremony, the PRC
has long recognized the importance of aerospace power. In the
21st century, a nation’s military prowess often is defined in terms
of its aerospace power. Aerospace power provides a country a
credible means to deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for
the purposes of deterrence. It also presents a nation with trappings
of prestige and the ability to wage war quickly and at reduced costs.
Since shortly after establishment of the nation, the PRC’s space
and missile establishment has been a primary element of China’s
nuclear deterrent. Its aerospace power has provided the PRC with
prestige and power that few nations enjoy. Today, aerospace power,
including tactical missiles and supporting assets, are important
coercive tools and force multipliers that could play a decisive role in
a future conflict around China’s periphery.
A number of drivers have prompted Beijing to build up its
aerospace technology base. These include the desire to develop
and maintain an assured nuclear retaliatory capability; a need for
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prestige and international respect; the availability of technology
and expertise; and a requirement to dominate conflicts around its
periphery quickly and at low cost. Developing the ability to deliver
payloads across continents, launch satellites, and, more recently to
strike targets around its periphery with conventional payloads did
not come easy. It has been a long and bumpy road from the time Qian
Xuesen made his initial proposals in 1956 to today. This winding
path was fraught with failure, frustration, political landmines, and
intermittent success. Today, however, China’s long history of space
and missile development and the sacrifices of its first generation of
aerospace engineers have established a viable foundation to use
force to pursue its national security interests.
This chapter traces the development of PRC aerospace power.
Space and missile development are integrated under the heading
of hangtian, a Chinese term that captures satellites, launch vehicles,
ballistic missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and cruise missiles. This is
juxtaposed against the aviation, or hangkong, industry. This chapter
focuses primarily on space and ballistic missile programs, and
its primary customer, the Second Artillery of the PRC’s People’s
Liberation Army (PLA).
This chapter focuses on technological development instead of
defense organizations, doctrine, and operations. First, the Second
Artillery and the General Armaments Department, which is
responsible for space operations, are two of the most technologically
advanced organs in the PLA today. There is a close affiliation
between these two entities and their industrial supporters. Secondly,
there is a paucity of information regarding the Second Artillery.
This chapter examines key factors that have driven the
development of aerospace power; addresses key organizational and
personality issues; and traces the development of key space and
missile programs since the inception of the PRC aerospace industry.
This paper divides China’s space and missile development into three
phases: Phase 1: establishment of China’s aerospace industry and
the Second Artillery (1957-84); Phase 2: China’s quest to maintain
strategic sufficiency (1984-91); and Phase 3: relative shift in focus
to maintaining national sovereignty (1991 to the present). The
chapter concludes with a general discussion of potential future
developments.
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ESTABLISHING THE FOUNDATION: THE EARLY YEARS
(1957-82)
The humble origins of China’s aerospace industry coincide
with the return to China of prominent U.S. Air Force engineer
Qian Xuesen in 1955. Sent to the United States on a scholarship in
1935, Qian was educated at MIT and Caltech and became one of the
initial cadre of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. As one of the world’s
foremost experts in propulsion and aerodynamics, Qian worked on
a number of advanced aircraft and missile projects. As an Army
Air Corps colonel, he was a member of the U.S. team dispatched to
Germany after World War II to debrief Werner von Braun, designer
of the German V-1 and V-2 missiles. As a member of the U.S. Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board, he authored futuristic concepts
including nuclear powered aircraft propulsion, manned space flight,
and rocket powered transcontinental aerospace vehicles that travel
at speeds in excess of 10,000 mph. Qian participated in the drafting
of the U.S. Air Force’s first long range vision, Toward New Horizons.
However, suspected of harboring communist sympathies, Qian was
deported to China in 1955.2
Shortly after his return to China, Qian urged Minister of Defense
Peng Dehuai to make development of ballistic missiles, satellites,
and launch vehicles a national priority. On February 17, 1956, Qian
submitted a formal proposal to the party leadership to establish
research and development (R&D) facilities for space and missile
development. Premier Zhou Enlai convened a special conference to
consider the proposal and on October 8, 1956, he formally directed
the establishment of the Fifth Academy under the PLA. Qian Xuesen
was appointed as its initial director of an organization composed of
10 research sections.3
In November 1957, the Fifth Academy organization was
readjusted. The First Sub-Academy (diyi yanjiu fenyuan) was
responsible for engine development, while the Second Sub-Academy
was responsible for control systems. In addition, an aerodynamic
testing range was formed, along with a ballistic missile training unit.
Zhou Enlai and Nie Rongzhen recruited into the Fifth Academy
more than 30 engineers, most of whom were Western educated.4
The early years of China’s space and missile program were
marked by assistance from the Soviet Union. Discussions began
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in September 1957 when a delegation, led by Nie Rongzhen,
visited Moscow to negotiate a technical assistance agreement. The
two sides signed an agreement on October 15, 1957. It included
provisions for the transfer of missiles for reverse engineering (two
R-1 and 14 R-2 ballistic missiles), the technical data packages for
the missiles, acceptance of Chinese students at Soviet military
engineering academies, and assignment of approximately 100
Russian technicians to assist China in its missile program. Russian
assistance was terminated, however, when Soviet technicians
abruptly departed China on August 12, 1960.5
In March 1958, Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai approved a
proposal for construction of four R&D bases (general systems and
engine, control and guidance, engine testing, and aerodynamics) and
one test base in Gansu province. With Soviet assistance, the design
of the Gansu test facility (Northwest Missile Test Base), located near
the ancient town of Jiuquan, was completed by September 1958 and
construction began a month later. A rail line was constructed that
connected Jiuquan with Fifth Academy facilities in Beijing. China’s
initial test of an R-2 missile, loaded with Chinese propellants, was
carried out on November 5, 1960, using radio control.
Between 1961 and 1965, China’s space and missile industry
witnessed a remarkable expansion. The Third Sub-Academy,
responsible for anti-ship cruise missile development, was established
in September 1961. Shanghai Academy of Space Technology
(SAST), responsible for surface-to-air missile and sounding rocket
development, was formed from the Second Electro-Mechanical
Bureau on August 1, 1961.6 To oversee China’s expanding strategic
weapons program, the Chinese Communist Party established the
Central Special Committee in November 1962.
In June 1964, central authorities established another organization—
the Fourth Branch Academy — for research, development, and
production of solid motors. The Fourth Sub-Academy, located
in Hohhot, Inner Mongolia, created at the urging of Qian Xuesen,
centered on a small group of engineers that constituted the Solid
Motor Institute, a small organization that was formed in 1961.7
In January 1965, the aerospace industry was reorganized. The
PLA Fifth Academy became the Seventh Ministry of Machine
Building (qijibu). Subordinate subacademies became full-fledged
academies, and all military personnel within the new Seventh
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Ministry were demobilized. Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Chairman Liu Shaoqi appointed PLA Air Force Deputy Commander
Wang Bingzhang as Minister.
Deliberations began in early 1967 concerning the establishment
of a unified entity for space technology and to ensure China’s
objective of launching a satellite by 1970 was met. Combining a
number of institutes involved in space-related activities (i.e., the 651
Institute, Beijing Scientific Instrument Factory, Lanzhou Institute of
Physics, Shanxi Taihua Scientific Instrument Factory, etc.), the China
Academy of Space Technology (CAST) was formed on February 20,
1968.8
During this timeframe, China’s central leadership also began
to develop “third line” facilities to augment key space and missile
research and production centers in Beijing and Shanghai. In March
1965, the CCP Central Committee approved a Seventh Ministry plan
for diversifying design, R&D, and production in “third-line” bases
deep inside China, such as Sichuan, Hunan, Shaanxi, and Guangxi.
At the same time, design and production facilities in Shanghai were
expanded.9
At the same time, the space and missile industry developed an
R&D and production strategy. The strategy, called “Three Moves
in a Chess Game” (sanbuqi), called for three models in the R&D/
production cycle at any one time--one system in trial manufacturing
and testing; a follow on model under design and R&D (xinghao
yanzhi); and preliminary research (yuxian yanjiu, or yuyan) on basic
technologies associated with a generation-after-next model. Chief
designers were appointed to coordinate efforts among various
research institutes, academies, academic centers, and industries.10
As it expanded and developed strategies for fielding ballistic
missiles and satellites, however, the Seventh Ministry was paralyzed
by the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. During the summer of 1966,
Nie Rongzhen attempted to shield engineers, accused by some of
being “reactionary elements,” by soliciting assistance from the
Beijing Garrison Command. However, the Seventh Ministry divided
into factions in 1966, the September 15 Rebellion Corps (“915”),
dominated by administrative personnel; and the September 16
Rebellion Corps (“916”), dominated by the engineering community.
On January 23, 1967, a young missile engineer, Ye Zhengguang,
overthrew the Seventh Ministry leadership and forcibly removed
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Minister Wang Bingzhang, Vice Minister Qian Xuesen, and other
senior cadre. Violence between the two factions reached a crescendo
on June 8, 1968, when a mob killed one of China’s foremost missile
engineers, Yao Tongbin. After Yao’s death, Zhou Enlai directed that
key engineers be placed under special protective custody.11
Others were persecuted as well. Missile guidance specialist
Song Jian, leading an R&D effort into ballistic missile defense, had
his home ransacked and property confiscated in June 1968. For a
period of time, Qian Xuesen and Huang Weilu, in charge of the JL-1
project, were forced to do manual labor. Missile tests were delayed
due to local disputes, and educational institutions within the space
and missile industry were closed. Many in the third line industries
suffered due to an overzealous attempt at a hasty expansion.
The effects of the Cultural Revolution on the focus and pace of
China’s strategic programs were severe. While various programs
sputtered along, the loss of morale, vision, and momentum after
the Cultural Revolution were significant. A factionalized Seventh
Ministry was rife with vengeful engineers and administrators who
were skeptical of their national leadership. They had also wasted
precious time in their race to maintain some degree of symmetry
with the West.
After suffering 10 years of political turmoil, however, the CMC
decided to hasten the development of key projects. In order to
focus its resources and regain lost momentum, China’s leadership
initiated the “Three Grasps” (sanzhua) in September 1977. The
“Three Grasps” centered on three programs: development and
testing of intercontinental and submarine launched ballistic missiles;
and launch of a communications satellite. With Song Renqiong
appointed as the new Seventh Ministry minister, Tu Shou’e was
designated as the chief designer of the ICBM; Huang Weilu as chief
designer of the SLBM; and Ren Xinmin as the chief designer of the
communications satellite.12
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT
Between the mid-1950s to the early 1980s, China dedicated itself
to developing its first generation of ballistic missiles and establishing
the Second Artillery Corps. During the this period, China space and
missile industry, guided in large part by Western-trained engineers,
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equipped the Second Artillery with two intermediate range ballistic
missile (IRBM) variants and one intercontinental ballistic missile.
China’s initial ballistic missile program, under the heading of
Project 1059, was based on reverse engineering two Russian 600kilometer range R-2 ballistic missiles that were delivered to Beijing
in December 1957. This program, led by Chief Designer Liang
Shoupan, began in October 1958. Despite a series of failed tests and
withdrawal of Soviet support in 1960, the Fifth Academy began trial
production of the R-2 ballistic missile in 1960. China’s first launch of
a ballistic missile took place on November 5, 1960. 13
After the successful production of the R-2 (DF-1) ballistic missile,
China turned its sights to the DF-2 medium range ballistic missile
in the Spring of 1960. China’s senior leadership assigned Xie
Guangxuan and Ren Xinmin to serve as chief designers of China’s
first inertially guided ballistic missile. The initial test of the 1050kilometer range DF-2 from the Northwest Missile Test Base (Jiuquan,
or the 20 Base) failed in March 1962. After a series of successful tests
between May and July 1964, China decided to expand the range of
the missile to 1250 kilometers through use of a more efficient liquid
fuel in February 1965. The expanded range version of the DF-2 was
tested several times from November 1965 to mid-1966. The first test
of a nuclear armed ballistic missile, the DF-2, occurred on October 27,
1966, 4 months after standing up the Second Artillery Corps. More
than 100 DF-2 missiles were produced between 1962 and 1969.14
Shortly after branching off from the PLA in 1965, the Seventh
Ministry leadership approved an Eight-Year Plan (1965-1972) for
development of missile technology. The plan involved four kinds of
missiles by 1972 (banian sidan). The first two missiles — the extended
range DF-2 (designated the DF-2A) and the DF-3 already were well
along. However, the second two, the DF-4 and the DF-5 presented
new technical challenges due to the ranges involved. The plan
envisioned a phased program toward an ICBM that would include
a 4000 kilometer range missile (the DF-4) that could hold Andersen
AFB hostage; and the 12,000 km range DF-5 that could cover the
United States from sites in northern China. These two systems
would be developed in parallel.15
In March 1965, the China’s senior leadership approved a
program for the intermediate range DF-3 ballistic missile, China’s
first independently designed missile. Key players in the missile’s
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development, which began as early as April 1964, included Sun
Jiadong, Ren Xinmin, Hao Fujian, and Yao Tongbin. The initial
flight test was conducted in December 1966 but encountered engine
difficulties. In December 1968, the 2,650-kilometer range DF-3 was
taken to the newly constructed Northwest Missile Test Center (Base
25) for full range testing. The missile, capable of carrying a 2,150
kilogram payload, was deployed to the Second Artillery in May
1971. In 1981, the First Academy initiated a modification to the DF-3
to increase its range to 2,800 kilometers; two flight tests in December
1985 and January 1986 were successful.16
After a 9-month technical feasibility study, R&D on China’s next
missile, the “intermediate-long range” DF-4, began in March 1965.
Ren Xinmin was appointed as chief designer. Using the DF-3’s first
stage, the DF-4, China’s first multiple staged missile, was designed
to carry a 2200-kilogram warhead. The missile was first tested in
November 1969 from Jiuquan. However, the second stage failed
to separate from the first and the missile was detonated. A second
test, carried out on January 30, 1970, was successful. A full range
test was conducted in November 1970 from the newly constructed
Northeast Missile Test Base (near Jingyu, in the northwest province
of Jilin). Shortly thereafter, work began on extending the range
of the DF-4. However, due to complications associated with the
Cultural Revolution and the higher priority allotted to the DF-5,
further progress on the missile was deferred until 1975. The missile
eventually was tested in a series of tests from May 1976 to October
1980 to a range of 4,750 kilometers, and began deployment to the
Second Artillery in November 1980.17
The DF-5 was intended to be able to range the entire continental
United States from sites in northern China. The DF-5 R&D
proceeded in parallel with the DF-4. In 1966, Qian Xuesen advocated
development of an advanced DF-5 warhead with penetration aids,
including electronic countermeasures and light exo-atmospheric
decoys.18 The initial successful test of the DF-5 took place on
September 10, 1971, approximately 20 months after the first test of
the DF-4. Alarmed by actions of the former Soviet Union, the PRC
accelerated deployment of the DF-5 in 1980. Shortly after two full
range flight tests in the western Pacific Ocean in May 1980, the DF-5
was deployed in an operational training mode in June 1980, into an
experimental unit in December 1980, and into two operational silos
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by the end of 1981. In 1983, China’s senior leadership approved
development of an extended range version of the DF-5, known
as the DF-5A, a system that can carry 3200 kilograms over 13,000
kilometers.19
Solid Fueled Ballistic Missiles.
China had attempted to elicit Soviet support on solid motor
development but to no avail. Preliminary research on solid
propellants began in the late 1950s. Under the leadership of Li
Naiji, a solid motor research group was established in Hohhot, Inner
Mongolia, and a series of solid motors, ranging in diameter from
77 to 286 millimeters, were tested between 1960 and 1962. After
formation of the Fourth Sub-Academy in 1964, formal work began
on developing solid motors in August 1965. The Sub-Academy was
granted full academy status in January 1965. The academy next
fabricated 28 motors, all 300 millimeters in diameter, for the purposes
of testing. Sufficiently confident in its mastering of smaller motors,
the Fourth Academy began to develop a 1400-millimeter motor,
which was tested on December 1, 1966. It also began development
of a 770-millimeter motor to serve as the third stage for China’s first
launch vehicle, the Long March-1.20
With a 1400-millimeter test successful, a formal decision to move
to the next development stage of a solid-fueled ballistic missile was
made in March 1967. However, due to the turmoil of the Cultural
Revolution, conceptual design work did not commence until August
1978. Leadership over the project was turned over to the Fourth
General Design Department, with Huang Weilu appointed as Chief
Designer.21
Construction of test facilities for the JL-1 and DF-21 began at the
North China Missile Test Site near the city of Taiyuan, in Wuzhai
county (also known as 25 Base) in 1973 and was completed by
June 1980. Initial JL-1 tests were conducted in December 1980 and
January 1981, but failed. A subsequent test in June 1981 from the
25 Base succeeded. At least four follow-on tests were conducted
between November 1981 and January 1982. The missile was declared
operational in August 1983, although testing continued on a second
production batch through early 1985. Planning for the land based
version of the JL-1, known as the DF-21, began in 1978. A series of
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ground tests were conducted from April to May 1984 and the first
test of the DF-21 was conducted in May 1985. 22
Establishment of the Second Artillery.
Shortly after the formation of the Seventh Ministry of Machine
Building in 1965, the Central Military Commission formed the
Second Artillery Corps, an organization that has expanded and
diversified its missions since its founding in the 1960s. As China
began its ballistic missile program, China’s first strategic missile
training group (dadui) was formed in Changxindian, in the
southwestern suburbs of Beijing, in December 1957. Six hundred
officers and technical specialists were drawn from throughout the
PLA and defense industry. Eighteen months later, in July 1959, this
training group was transformed in a launch battalion that serve as
a “seed unit” (zhongzi budui) to provide the initial cadre of missile
launch specialists that could form subsequent units.
After a survey team led by then Deputy Chief of General Staff
Zhang Aiping examined four military regions, each formed their
own surface-to-surface missile battalions in March 1960. At least
one battalion, located in Northwest China, was formed from an
artillery school. These battalions consisted of a headquarters
department (chu), political department, logistics department, as
well as subordinate technical companies. These four battalions
were upgraded to regiments in January 1964. From 1963-1966,
these units conducted four exercises that involved the launching
of eight missiles (six of the launches were successful). In 1966, the
PLA Artillery commander, Wu Kehua, proposed to the Central
Military Commission the formation of an independent service arm
that should be formed from artillery and Chinese People’s Public
Security units (zhongguo renmin gong’an budui). Mao Zedong and
the CMC approved this concept in June 1966. Zhou Enlai named the
organization the “Second Artillery” to sow confusion among outside
observers as the true purpose of the organization.23
The Second Artillery was officially established in a ceremony on
1 July 1966. Commanded by General Xiang Shouzhi, the original
organizational structure had the standard headquarters, political,
and logistics departments (bu), as well as engineering, intelligence,
surveying, calculation (jisuan), weather, chemical defense, and
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camouflage support (baozhang) units. With the primary Second
Artillery command post established in Beijing, an underground
reserve command post (yubei zhihuisuo) was established at Taibai,
south of the Shanxi city of Baoji.24
While under the General Staff for administrative purposes, the
Second Artillery units were to report directly to the CMC. Initially
equipped only with short range ballistic missiles, DF-3 intermediate
range ballistic missiles were introduced into the Second Artillery
inventory in 1971. “Intermediate-long range” missiles (i.e., the DF4) and the DF-5 intercontinental ballistic missile began introduction
in the early 1980s.
Over the next several years, six Second Artillery bases, numbered
51-56, were established throughout China. Between 1966 and 2000,
each base oversaw between one and three regiments or brigades.
While initial units were equipped with the DF-2 medium range
ballistic missile, four DF-3 units, consisting of about 120 missiles
and 40 launchers, were formed near Dengshahe, Liaoning (51 Base);
Lianxiwang, Anhui (52 Base); Jianshui, Yunnan (53 Base); and
in Qinghai (56 Base). Two DF-4 units, managing approximately
40 missiles, were established in the 1970s in western Hunan and
Qinghai provinces. The Second Artillery established two DF-5
ICBM brigades in the 1980s in Hunan and Henan provinces.25
SATELLITE AND LAUNCH VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT
Like its missile program, the impetus for China’s satellite
development lies with Qian Xuesen, who stressed the importance
of a space program shortly after returning to China. More calls for
initiating a space program began shortly after the launch of Sputnik
in October 1957. In January 1958, Qian and a group of engineers
drafted a formal proposal to develop a satellite and launch vehicle
and designate a team to work on the project under the code name
“581.” To observe Soviet satellites, China developed an early
satellite observation network centered on China’s space observatory
on Purple Mountain in Nanjing. Other satellite tracking sites, which
provided data to the Purple Mountain observatory, were set up in
Beijing, Guangzhou, Yunnan, and Shanxi.26
Mao Zedong committed to developing a Chinese satellite on
May 17, 1958 during a speech before Central Committee meeting
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in Beijing. Development of a satellite was included in the August
1958 12-Year plan for Scientific and Technical (S&T) Development.
The project, originally assigned to the Chinese Academy of Sciences,
was code-named the “581 Program.” A leading group in charge
of the project was directed by Qian Xuesen, who established three
design institutes responsible for general systems design; automation
and control; and space physics. Members of the leading group
made a visit to Soviet satellite developing facilities in October
1958. The satellite R&D was centered in Shanghai. To assist in
its satellite development, Shanghai-based research centers focused
on development of sounding rockets for exploration of the upper
atmosphere. At this time, China’s Academy of Sciences also began a
series of conferences and R&D on manned spaceflight.27
China temporarily shelved its satellite program in January 1959 in
favor of concentrating on its ballistic missile development. However,
in 1962, at the urging of Qian Xuesen, China’s leadership decided
to resume satellite R&D after initial successes in China’s ballistic
missile and sounding rocket programs, and after France and Great
Britain launched their first satellites. Qian Xuesen recruited a team
of four designers from Shanghai’s Institute of Electro-Mechanical
Design and drafted a game plan for the development of satellites. In
January 1963, the Shanghai Institute of Electro-Mechanical Design
was integrated into the Fifth Academy.
Definitive plans for the launch of China’s first satellite began
in January 1965. In August 1965, the Central Special Commission
approved a CAS proposal for satellite development, but assigned
the Commission for Science, technology, and National Defense to
organize and coordinate the satellite development and launch center,
while CAS would handle the ground segment. A 64-day design
conference (known as the “651 conference”) began in September
1965. In January 1966, the “651 Design Institute” under CAS began
conceptual design work on China’s first satellite. China’s first
satellite, the DFH-1, was launched on a Long March-1 on April 24,
1970. A second satellite project for scientific research, known as the
Shijian-1 (SJ-1), was launched in March 1971. Afterwards, there was
a 4-year gap before the launch of the next satellite in 1975.
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Reconnaissance Satellites.
Because of the need for accurate targeting data, China’s
reconnaissance program is intimately related to its nuclear missile
program. Since the modest beginnings of a satellite reconnaissance
program in early 1966, China has launched at least 22 reconnaissance
satellites.28 Initial space reconnaissance efforts were geared toward
developing the optical cameras, receivers, and attitude control
mechanisms to support imagery and electronic reconnaissance
programs.
Under the leadership of Wang Xiji and Sun Jiadong, the
recoverable project was divided into four phases: 1) program
assessment from early 1966 to September 1967; 2) the conceptual
design from September 1967 to March 1970; 3) prototype development
from March 1970 to January 1973; and 4) flight model development
after January 1973.29 After a 3-day conference, the Eighth Design
Institute (now the 508th Research Institute) forwarded a conceptual
proposal for a film-based recoverable system to the Central Military
Commission in September 1967, which approved and assigned
the project to China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) in
February 1968. Development of the optical remote sensing devices
was initiated in November 1967. Key developmental issues for the
project, dubbed the 911 Program, that had to be tackled included
the solid motor and parachutes for braking the reentry capsule; the
attitude control system; satellite structure (heat protection); and the
optical sensors. After initiating work on a prototype in early 1973,
the initial test of the satellite on a Long March 2 launch vehicle was
conducted on November 26, 1975; the 4-day mission was a partial
success, and subsequent test launches were conducted in December
1976 and January 1978. The program entered the applied phase in
1979, with the initial launch of the Jianbing-1 (JB-1) in September
1982.30 After launching six JB-1 satellites between 1982 and 1987, the
PRC developed a second-generation reconnaissance satellite, the JB2, which was launched in 1987.
To augment its optical reconnaissance program, Zhou Enlai
directed initiation of the 701 Program and its launch vehicle, the
FB-1, on 14 August 1969. The PRC experimented with electronic
intelligence (ELINT) satellites, euphemistically called “technical
experimental satellites” (jishu shiyan weixing), in the mid-1970s
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under the Shanghai Bureau of Astronautics’ 701 Program. The first
Chinese ELINT satellite was launched from Jiuquan in July 1975 on
the FB-1 launch vehicle, which was specifically designed to meet the
weight and orbital accuracy requirements of ELINT platforms. The
FB-1 launched two more experimental ELINT satellites in December
1975 and August 1976. For unknown reasons, the program was
discontinued.31
Communication Satellites.
Having mastered smaller reconnaissance satellites in low earth
orbit, Beijing’s space industry focused on larger communications
satellites in geosynchronous orbit, 36,000 kilometers above the
equator. Such a program required a much more powerful launch
vehicle and a new launch site. Inspired by U.S. ability to beam
images into American living rooms during the visit of President
Richard Nixon in 1972, Beijing began to evaluate its requirements for
communications satellites. Theoretical studies on a communications
satellite were carried out in the mid-1960s. However, it was not
until the Central Committee approved a State Planning Commission
proposal in February 1975 that serious R&D was initiated. Mao
granted final authorization in April 1975, naming Sun Jiadong as chief
designer. After evaluating a number of orbital concepts, including
the Soviet Molniya orbit, the PRC settled on a geosynchronous
orbit. A formal application was submitted to the International
Telecommunications Union in March 1977. Initial mock-ups
were produced in 1977, the first electrical design prototype was
developed in 1979, and the final integrated satellite, labeled as the
DFH-2, was completed in Spring 1983. The satellite was transported
to Xichang Space Launch Center in January 1984 and launched on
a LM-3 vehicle on January 26, 1984. However, technical failure of
the third stage resulted in the satellite being stranded in a low earth
orbit. A second DFH-2 satellite launched on April 8, 1984, this time
successfully.
SPACE LAUNCH INFRASTRUCTURE
China's space program was dependent upon the successful
development of a space launch infrastructure, including launch
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vehicles, launch centers, and tracking, telemetry, and control
network. Work on China's first launch vehicle, designated as Long
March-1 (LM-1), began during the second half of 1965. The vehicle,
which served as the basis for subsequent launchers, was developed
for the specific purpose of launching the DFH-1 satellite. The
technical challenge was development of multiple engine stages that
could generate 100 tons of thrust and lift a 300-kilogram satellite into
a 440-kilometer low earth orbit. Initial design work was carried out
by the Seventh Ministry's 8th Design Institute, but was transferred
to the China Academy of Launch Technology (CALT). Under the
guidance of CALT director, Ren Xinmin, liquid engines for the first
two stages of the LM-1 were derived from the YF-2 engines used
in the DF-3 intermediate range ballistic missile. The third stage
incorporated a 770mm diameter solid motor developed by the Fourth
Academy in Hohhot, Inner Mongolia. Subsystem development was
completed by Fall 1968, when general assembly and large scale
ground tests began. To ensure uninterrupted progress on the LM-1
project, Zhou Enlai placed 3,456 specialists on the special protection
list. The LM-1 was delivered to Jiuquan Space Launch Center on
March 26, 1970, and successfully delivered the DFH-1 satellite on
April 24, 1970. The LM-1 launched a second payload, the SJ-1, on
March 3, 1971.32
China's second generation launch vehicle, the LM-2, is
a modification of the DF-5 intercontinental ballistic missile.
Preliminary research on the heavy lift vehicle began in 1966. Under
the leadership of chief designer Tu Shou'e, model design work on
the LM-2 began in 1970 for the purpose of launching China's first
generation reconnaissance and scientific satellites. The launch
vehicle was designed to place a 1800 kilogram payload into a low
earth orbit. The initial LM-2 launch on November 5, 1975, failed
to place its payload into proper orbit due to a fractured wire in its
control system. A second successful launch occurred on November
26, 1975.33 The LM-2 launched two more satellites in December 1976
and January 1978.
Because the system essentially duplicated the LM-2, initiation of
the Fengbao-1 (FB-1) program in Fall 1969 was an anomaly of the
Cultural Revolution. The decision to develop two nearly identical
rockets concurrently can be blamed on the turbulent factional
politics after the Cultural Revolution. Prompted largely by the
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“Gang of Four” to provide a larger role for Shanghai based space
establishment, a design team was centered on the Shanghai Second
Bureau of Electro-Mechanical Industry. General system design, led
by Shi Jinmiao, was started in December 1969. Like the LM-2, the
FB-1 was a derivative of the DF-5 ICBM. Under the heading of the
701 Program, the ostensible purpose of the FB-1 space launch vehicle
was to boost a “technical experimental” payload into orbit. The first
prototype was assembled and delivered for testing in October 1970.
The first launch of the FB-1 from Jiuquan took place in August 10,
1972. The final launch, involving the placement of three satellites on
one vehicle, took place in 1981, a year after the Gang of Four were
tried in court and handed lengthy prison sentences.34
China’s decision in 1976 to deploy a communications satellite
required a new launch vehicle. The design that was selected — the
Long March 3 (LM-3) was a three-stage launch vehicle designed for
delivery of a 1,500-kilogram satellite into geosynchronous transfer
orbit. Assigned to the Seventh Ministry’s First Academy (CALT), the
LM-3 and its communications satellite payload were designated as a
national priority under the “Three Grasps” campaign in September
1977. Xie Guangxuan, assisted by Long Lehao, was appointed as
chief designer. The first two stages of the LM-3 are similar to those of
the LM-2. However, what made the LM-3 unique was its third stage
that used a cryogenic (liquid hydrogen and oxygen) engine capable
of multiple ignitions. The first launch of the LM-3 from the Xichang
Space Launch Center took place on January 29, 1984. However,
the third stage failed to re-ignite a second time and the satellite did
not reach its proper orbit. A second attempt on April 8, 1984, was
successful.35
In August 1978, China’s senior leadership decided to develop
a backup launch vehicle for the communication satellite project.
Designated the Long March 4, the Commission of Science and
Technology for National Defense (COSTND) assigned the project
to the Shanghai Astronautics Bureau and conceptual design work
began in February 1979. In addition to backing up the LM-3, China’s
senior leadership decided in October 1982 to use the LM-4, which
uses a conventional third stage instead of a cryogenic engine, to
launch China’s first generation of weather satellites. Sun Jingliang
was assigned as LM-4 chief designer. After the successful launch
of the DFH-2, the LM-4’s primary mission became the launching
208

of sun synchronous weather satellites. The first weather satellite,
Fengyun-1 (FY-1) was launched from Taiyuan Space Launch Center
on September 7, 1988.36
Launch Centers.
The initial decision to construct space launch centers coincided
with the March 1965 decision to develop third line industries. A
decision had already been made as early as 1958 to construct a
missile test (Number 3 Launch Area) and space launch facility
(Number 2 Launch Area) in the Gobi desert near the town of Jiuquan.
Construction on the initial portion of the Jiuquan Space Launch
Center, known as the “5020 Launch Complex” was completed in
April 1967 and hosted the initial LM-1 launch in April 1970. The
second center, known as the “138 Launch Complex” was completed
in 1970 and hosted the initial launch (probably ballistic missile) in
September 1971; the FB-1 in July 1975; and 1981 DF-5 test into the
Pacific Ocean.37
Because the Jiuquan Space Launch Center was considered
unsuitable for launches into geosynchronous orbit, the State Council
and CMC decided in December 1970 to construct a new launch site
further south and closer to the equator near the town of Xichang,
Sichuan province. The Cultural Revolution and engineering
challenges associated with constructing a space launch facility
in mountainous terrain resulted in slow progress until the 1977
decision to hasten development of the communications satellite and
associated launch facilities. Construction was completed in 1983,
and the first satellite launch on an LM-3 (DFH-2) took place in April
1984.38
China’s senior leadership also decided to diversify the mission
of its North China Missile Test Site near Taiyuan to include a space
launch capability in 1966. Due to complications associated with the
Cultural Revolution, progress was delayed until November 1977,
when the central leadership decided to launch sun synchronous
satellites from Taiyuan. The Taiyuan Space Launch Center was
completed at the end of 1987.39
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Satellite Tracking, Telemetry, and Control.
A space infrastructure requires a capable ground segment
that can locate, track, and monitor satellites during and after
launch. China’s space tracking network, based on its astronomical
observatories, began shortly after the launch of Sputnik in October
1957. Formal planning for establishing a dedicated space tracking
began in 1965. Led by Wang Daheng and Chen Fangyun, a group
of engineers proposed that the China Academy of Sciences develop
a national network. In Spring 1967, after assigning responsibility
for developing the TT&C network to COSTND, satellite tracking
tests against foreign satellites were conducted from sites in Beijing,
Nanjing, Shanghai, and Wuhan. Plans were laid for adding a seabased component for the network. Weinan, Shanxi province, was
established as the command center for the network in 1970. Upon
completion, a new organization was formed — China Launch and
Tracking Control General (CLTC), which functioned as the space
launch operations arm of the PLA. Roughly analogous to U.S.
Space Command, CLTC was commissioned to oversee three satellite
launch centers and China’s vast tracking, telemetry, and control
(TT&C) network. 40
MAINTAINING STRATEGIC SUFFICIENCY (1984-91)
The PRC leadership and its incipient aerospace industry adjusted
its focus during the early 1980s to ensure the vitality of its new
nuclear retaliatory force and consolidate technical achievements in its
space program to support military modernization and development
of the national economy. As China’s space and missile program
accumulated successes, President Ronald Reagan’s announcement
of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in March 1983 served as a
rude awakening, demonstrating how far China had fallen behind
the rest of the world. China’s leadership directed a series of studies
to evaluate the effect SDI would have on the ability of the Second
Artillery to reach its targets. By 1986, Chinese experts generally
agreed there were three potential responses: expansion of offensive
forces; development of technical countermeasures; and deployment
of anti-satellite (ASAT) systems to destroy space-based ballistic
missile defense (BMD) systems.41 In February 1986, the reorganized
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Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National
Defense (COSTIND), with CMC support, sanctioned the overall
long-term development effort and further directed the formation of
18 study groups to focus on designated critical technologies.42
Some within the defense S&T community believed COSTIND’s
plan was not sufficient to meet the technical challenges posed by SDI.
In March 1986, some of China’s most prominent defense engineers
presented a petition to the Central Committee on establishing a
“High Technology Research and Development Plan Outline.”
The plan, referred to as the 863 Program, was jointly managed by
COSTIND and the State Science and Technology Commission and
functioned as a guide and funding source for numerous preliminary
R&D projects, including space systems, high powered lasers,
microelectronics, and automated control systems.43
Organizational Issues.
Beginning in the early 1980s, the space and missile industry
underwent a series of reorganizations to help manage the postCultural Revolution environment and support Central Committee
decisions made in December 1978 to prioritize economic
development. In May 1982, the Seventh Ministry of Machinery was
restructured to become the Ministry of Astronautics Industry, with
Zhang Jun appointed as Minister. In April 1988, the Astronautics
Industry was merged with the Aeronautics Industry in an attempt to
reduce management overhead and merge the technology base of the
aviation and aerospace sectors. To consolidate senior level oversight
of space and missile activities, the State Council and CMC decided
to establish a State Space Leading Group in March 1989, with the
Executive Secretariat of the group located within headquarters of
COSTIND. In 1993, the Ministry of Aeronautics and Astronautics
was split, and the astronautics sector was incorporated as the China
Aerospace Corporation (CASC).44
Ballistic Missile Developments.
In the mid-1980s, China implemented a gradual program to raise
the level of sophistication of its space and missile programs. During
the annual senior meetings at Beidaihe in 1984, the central authorities
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issued an edict that no major world war was expected in the next 1015 years. China would have a decade or more to improve its first
generation ballistic missiles and develop a second generation of
missiles based on solid motor technology. On December 26, 1984, the
space and missile industry released a directive shifting the emphasis
away from liquid to solid fueled ballistic missiles; from strategic to
tactical ballistic missiles; from first generation strategic missiles to
second generation missiles; and from experimental to operational
satellites.45 With the Fourth Academy achieving success in testing
a two-meter diameter solid motor at the end of 1983, China’s senior
leadership began model R&D on a solid-fueled replacement for the
DF-4, known as the DF-31, in early 1986. Plans also began for a
more advanced solid fueled ICBM, the DF-41.46 The move toward
solid-fueled ballistic missiles was driven at least in part by a desire
to enhance the survivability of its small nuclear force in the wake
of U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s announcement of the Strategic
Defense Initiative in March 1983. Commercial interests served as the
primary impetus for development of conventional tactical ballistic
missiles.
During the mid-1980s, Beijing’s senior leadership began to develop
options for arming solid fueled ballistic missiles with conventional
warheads. During Spring 1984, the First Academy submitted
proposals for developing conventional short and medium range
ballistic missiles. Engineers believed that technologies associated
with China’s new generation of solid-fueled ballistic missiles could
be adapted for operational purposes. Initial conceptual design work
on the 600-kilometer range DF-15 began in April 1984. The missile
was marketed at the First Asian Defense Exhibition in November
1986. An agreement to sell the missile to Syria ostensibly was signed
in early 1988, before the initial test of the missile in June 1988.47
Another entity, the 066 Base in western Hubei province, entered
the competition for conventional ballistic missiles. Also known
as Sanjiang Space Corporation, the 066 Base, which previously
developed solid motors for the Third Academy, evolved into an
independent R&D and production base during the latter half of
the 1980s. In 1984, the 066 began development of the 300 kilometer
range DF-11 ballistic missile, which was first tested in mid-1990 and
sold to Pakistan in 1991.48
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SATELLITE AND SPACE LAUNCH DEVELOPMENTS
During this phase, China’s space and missile industry focused
on increasing its space lift capabilities in support of the PLA and the
civilian economy. After three successful launches of the LM-2, work
began in 1980 on enhancing its lift capacity into low earth orbit from
1,800 to 3,000 kilograms. The LM-2 variant, known as the LM-2C,
was first launched from Jiuquan Space Launch center in September
1982. Another LM-2 modification was initiated shortly after China’s
commitment to enter the international space launch market. This
vehicle, known as the LM-2E utilized four external boosters to raise
the lift capacity to 9,200 kilograms. China also developed subsequent
variants of the LM-3. The LM-3A utilizes the first and second stages
of the LM-3, but uses an improved cryogenic third stage to allow
lifting of a 2,650 kilogram payload into orbit. Another variant, the
LM-3B, uses the same three stages as the LM-3A, but adopts the LM2E’s external boosters to allow the vehicle to launch a 5,000 kilogram
payload. 49
In 1986, China’s senior leadership formally directed initiation
of model R&D on the next generation communication satellite, the
DFH-3. Satellite development went through four phases: conceptual
design (lunzheng sheji); program design (fang’an sheji); preliminary
design (chuyang sheji); and primary design (zhengyang sheji). Three
satellites were produced during the preliminary design phase for
electronic, structural, and heat testing. Testing was completed in
September 1994 and launch on an LM-3A took place from Xichang
Space Launch Center on November 30, 1994. Equipped with 24
transponders, the DFH-3 carried six times the communications
capacity as the first generation DFH-2 and filled an important gap in
civil and military telecommunications.50
In addition to the DFH-3, China’s strategic sufficiency period
witnessed the launch of its second-generation reconnaissance
satellite. The system, known as the Jianbing-2, reached IOC in
September 1987 when it was launched from Jiuquan Space Launch
Center and returned to earth with its film in Sichuan. The JB-2
provided for wide area imaging and orbited for eight days. Four JB2 satellites were launched between 1987 and 1992. In 1993, a problem
in its attitude control system resulted in a failed JB-2 mission. The
final JB-2 satellite was launched from Jiuquan in July 1994. 51
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A follow-on variant of the JB-2 satellite, known as the JB-2A,
carries 2,000 meters of film and has a resolution capability of at
least 10 meters. The first JB-2A was launched in August 1992, with
subsequent launches in 1994 and 1996. One of the more significant
aspects of the JB-2A was its demonstrated maneuvering capability.
The JB-2A orbited for 15 or 16 days before returning to earth with
its imagery package.52 On October 20, 1996, using the LM-2D from
Jiuquan, China launched another “scientific survey” (kexue shence)
satellite, which orbited 15 days before returning to earth.53 The
1996 JB-2A launch was expected to be the last in this series as China
moves to a more advanced imaging system.54
International Cooperation.
In the early 1980s, China’s space and missile industry stressed
development of international contacts as a means to diversify its
sources of expertise and to generate additional income to subsidize
its budget. China signed a contract with Germany’s Deutsche
Aerospace for technical assistance with its DFH-3 program. Taking
advantage of high international demand for launch services in the
mid-1980s, China began marketing its launch vehicles in 1985. With
a credible success record, China was able to undercut U.S. and French
competition by offering launch services at 30-75 percent below the
cost of Western providers. After signing a bilateral agreement with
the United States, the Ministry of Astronautics Industry signed initial
contracts for satellite launching services with U.S. and European
companies. Between 1987 and 1990, Swedish, German, French, and
Pakistani space industries contracted for Chinese launch vehicles to
carry experimental payloads.55
MAINTAINING NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY (1991 TO THE
PRESENT)
Since 1991, the space and missile industry has focused on
supporting limited wars under high technology conditions. A
renewed confidence and vision regarding the purpose of its space
and missile assets have characterized this most recent phase. A
series of events in the early 1990s, reinforced by a series of political
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shocks later in the decade, have created a sense of urgency that has
not existed since the Cultural Revolution.
The 1991 Gulf War was a rude awakening for the Central Military
Commission and the aerospace industry. The awesome display of
military power demonstrated how vulnerable the Chinese homeland
is to attack from a potential enemy. The war proved the preeminence
of air power and long range precision strike, augmented by space
based command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. According to one
source, in a December 1995 meeting the CMC concluded “ground
fighting can only enhance the results of battle.”56 The war also
highlighted the political and potential military utility of conventional
ballistic missiles.
As China was absorbing lessons from the Gulf War, events on
Taiwan sounded alarm bells in Beijing. In May 1991, The Period
of Mobilization for Suppression of the Rebellion, which had been
in force since the withdrawal from the mainland in 1949, was
terminated. That same year, the National Unification Council
adjusted its definition of “One China,” claiming for the first time that
“China is temporarily divided” and that “each side of the Taiwan
Strait is administered by a separate political entity.” In April 1992,
open advocacy of Taiwan independence was legalized. Adding to
Beijing’s consternation was the announcement in September 1992 of
the release of U.S. F-16A/B fighters to Taiwan.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the willingness
of Russia and Ukraine to assist China’s aerospace development
presented opportunities that had not existed since August 1960.
Access to foreign assistance, combined with other events later in the
decade, reinforced and intensified Beijing’s sense of urgency to field
a new generation of solid fueled ballistic missiles with penetration
aids; a space-based C4ISR architecture; and conventional ballistic
missiles. The visit of Lee Teng-hui to the United States in May 1995
and the U.S. dispatch of two aircraft carrier battle groups off the
coast of Taiwan in March 1996 removed any doubt that the PLA
would require an ability to deter or complicate U.S. intervention in a
Taiwan Strait conflict.
A series of events that occurred between March and August
1999 sharpened PRC focus on the United States and Taiwan in its
strategy and force planning. There is a large body of evidence that
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suggests an important high level decision was made in the early to
mid-May 1999 timeframe to accelerate key weapons systems R&D
and production programs. After the initiation of the NATO air
campaign in March 1999, media reporting suggests the CMC lobbied
for funding to accelerate several programs, including new ballistic
missile variants, land attack cruise missiles, and other systems.
During a April 10, 1999, meeting, CMC Vice-Chairman Chi Haotian
was alleged to have announced that CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin
had signed a work report to speed up and intensify R&D on 15
projects and to advance and expand production on 12 programs. 57
The accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in May 1999
further increased the leverage of hardline elements within the PLA.
The Politburo and State Council were alleged to have approved
fiscal support to a CMC R&D and production acceleration scheme
on or about May 15, 1999. General Equipment Department Director
Cao Gangchuan directed that extraordinary efforts be expended to
achieve breakthroughs in key areas and reduce the time needed
for development and testing of systems. The State Planning and
Development Commission had the responsibility of coming up with
the means to fund the effort. The direction to accelerate R&D and
production was a key theme of a June 1999 GED-sponsored AllArmy conference on military armaments.58
Responsibility for accelerating weapon system R&D and
production largely fell on the two entities that constituted the
China’s space and missile industry after a 1999 reorganization of
China Aerospace Corporation: China Aerospace S&T Corporation
(CASC) and the China Aerospace Electro-Mechanical Corporation
(CAMEC). On May 10, 1999, China Space News reported that key
academies under CASC and CAMEC held a May 9, 1999 meeting to
review the status of key R&D programs and develop a game plan for
acceleration of weapon system R&D.59
On May 18, 1999, the aerospace industry leadership convened
a second meeting, chaired by CAMEC Director Xia Guohong, on
Kosovo and China’s aerospace policy. The meeting of China’s
foremost experts on aerospace technology concluded that future
warfare depends on precision guided munitions and long range
precision strike; integrated air and missile strikes supported by
space technologies; and electronic countermeasures. Then-Deputy
Director of the Second Academy, Yin Xingliang, noted, “all of these
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characteristics serve to tell us that future wars will be face-offs
decided by real military strength in the air. It is not likely that a
ground war between large countries will break out.” According to
Xia, the solution to China’s security lies in “trump card” (shashoujian)
weapons and increasing the precision of China’s tactical missiles. 60
Organization.
To meet the challenges of the 21st century, the State Council and
CMC directed the reorganization of its space and missile industry on
April 13, 1999. CASC was divided into two organizations — China
Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (new CASC, or
zhongguo hangtian keji jituan) and China Aerospace Machinery and
Electronics Corporation (CAMEC). Wang Liheng, a cruise missile
specialist, was appointed as CASC director, but acknowledged that
he would serve only as an interim leader as the new organization
settled. The new organization, responsible for strategic ballistic
missiles, launch vehicles, and satellites, incorporated the China
Academy of Launch Technology (First Academy); the Fourth
Academy; CAST (Fifth Academy); Shanghai Academy of Space
Technology (SAST, or the Eighth Academy); 062 Base (Jiangnan
Space Group); and the 067 Base. CASC reshuffled its leadership in
December 2001, with Wang Liheng retiring and 40-year-old Zhang
Qingwei assuming his position. Jin Zhuanglong and Xu Dazhe were
appointed as deputy directors.61
To place additional focus on precision inertial guidance and
navigation, the State Council and CMC directed the formation of
a new academy under CASC for development and production
of navigation, guidance, and control systems. On July 28, 2001,
CASC announced the formation the China Academy of Space
Navigation Technology (zhongguo hangtian daohang jishu yanjiuyuan).
Also known as the 10th Academy (also Space Era Instruments
Company), the new organization, which consists of 5,200 engineers
and technicians, absorbed various entities from the First Academy,
067 Base, and SAST.62 CASC also recently elevated the status of the
067 Base to research academy. On April 26, 2002, CASC formed the
Sixth Academy, also known as the Academy of Space Propellant
Technology (hangtian tuijin jishu yanjiuyuan), based near Xian,
Shanxi province.63
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The second half of the space and missile industry, CAMEC,
assumed responsibility for conventional aerospace weaponry,
such as cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, solid fueled launch
vehicles, and a portion of the short range ballistic missile portfolio.
Armed with a doctorate degree from the University of California, Xia
Guohong was appointed as CAMEC director. 64 CAMEC absorbed
the Second and Third Academies and the 061 and 066 Bases. On
September 6, 2001, CAMEC was renamed China Aerospace Science
and Industry Corporation (CASIC, or zhongguo hangtian kegong jituan).
Xia Guohong retained the CASIC directorship and Yin Xingliang, a
noted ASAT and missile defense specialist, was appointed as deputy
director.65 In July 2002, CASIC also formed four large enterprises
that integrate existing academies and miscellaneous companies and
research departments.66
To place greater emphasis on solid motor development,
CAMEC/CASIC formed a new research academy on August
21, 1999. The new organization, known as the CAMEC Sixth
Academy, was established from the old Inner Mongolia Command
(Neimenggu zhihuibu), also known as the Hexi Chemical Machinery
Corporation. The Sixth Academy, known as the Academy of Solid
Motor Technology (guti huojian fadongji jishu yanjiuyuan), develops
a range of solid motors for strategic and tactical missiles.67 In light
of the continued existence of the CASC Fourth Academy, the reason
for the new solid motor academy under CASIC is unclear. Given
the continued work of the Fourth Academy under CASC, there may
be an intentional effort to create competition between CASIC and
CASC solid motor R&D and production entities.68
BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT
Led by a group of relatively young engineers, China’s space
and missile industry is developing a range of advanced strategic
and conventional ballistic and land attack cruise missiles. Building
upon its experience in solid motor development since the late
1950s, the First Academy and 066 Base are continuing R&D on
mobile solid fueled ballistic missiles. The Second Artillery is said
to be equipped with 350 conventional short-range ballistic missiles
(SRBMs) distributed among three brigades opposite Taiwan. One
source indicates that during annual meetings at Beidaihe in August
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1999, China’s senior leadership decided to accelerate the production
and deployment of enough ballistic missiles to outfit four SRBM
brigades by 2002.69 Western sources believe the PLA may deploy
as many as 650 SRBMs opposite Taiwan over the next several years,
while Taiwan Ministry of National Defense statements indicate that
as many as 800 SRBMs could be deployed by 2006.70 These missiles
would be distributed into as many as seven brigades in the 20052010 timeframe.71 Aerospace industry journals indicate the PLA has
established a requirement for ballistic missile accuracy to be less
than 50 meters circular error of probability (CEP) and a land attack
cruise missile (LACM) accuracy of less than 16 meters.72 CASC and
CASIC researchers have conducted extensive feasibility studies of
the use of conventional ballistic missiles against aircraft carriers.73
The establishment of the 10th Academy is indicative of the
emphasis China places on precision guidance. Most recently,
CASC engineers are prioritizing terminally guided ballistic missiles.
Options include terrain matching terminal guidance, which makes
use of digitized stored images (electro-optical or radar) and matches
them against the images acquired in the seeker. The First Academy
began preliminary research on terrain contour matching (TERCOM)
terminal guidance as early as 1977.74 Radar matching was used on
the U.S. Pershing-II and optical matching is currently used on a
Russian variant of the SCUD-B.75 First Academy engineers believe
digital scene matching can result in a 5-12 meter accuracy for their
ballistic missiles.76 There is evidence that China intends to design
up to six different payloads for its conventional ballistic missiles.
CASC writings indicate prioritization of submunition payloads, and
electromagnetic pulse, penetrating, and fuel-air explosive warheads
for use against air defense sites, radar, airfields, semi-hardened C4I
centers, and ports. 77
SRBM Development.
China’s current R&D is aimed at extending the range and
increasing the lethality of its short range ballistic missiles. The PRC
deployed its first DF-15 short range ballistic missile brigade in 1994
and allegedly is deploying a growing number of 300 kilometer range
DF-11 and 600 kilometer range DF-11A missiles opposite Taiwan.
The DF-15 is a solid-fueled, 600 kilometer SRBM. Manufactured by
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the First Academy, the DF-15’s detachable payload reportedly has
an attitude control mechanism that permits steering corrections from
separation to impact.78 The First Academy is said to be developing
a 1000-kilometer range version of the DF-15.79 Some reporting
indicates the DF-15 currently has a 100-meter CEP.80 However, there
are indications that the DF-15 has been flight tested to an accuracy of
better than 50 meters.81 The 066 Base’s 600-kilometer range DF-11A
program began in 1995 and reached design finalization (dingxing)
in 1999.82 Taiwan sources indicate that the first DF-11A brigade is
being formed in the Yong’an/ Nanping area.83
MRBM Development.
A longer range version of the DF-21, the 2,500 kilometer range
DF-21 Mod 2, is reportedly under development. Both the DF-21
Mod 1 and Mod 2 likely have missile defense countermeasures,
including endo-atmospheric decoys that were tested in 1995 and
1996.84 In addition to continuation of its nuclear DF-21 program,
CASIC is focusing its efforts on a conventional version of the DF-21.
To support its warfighting mission, the PRC has been developing a
conventional variant of the DF-21 since the early 1990s. This system,
known as the DF-21C, may adopt a terminal guidance package that
uses on board computers to correlate stored images with landmarks
that theoretically could achieve a CEP of 50 meters or better.85 Such
a capability naturally would require a maneuverable reentry vehicle.
The reentry speed of the DF-21C is likely to be fast enough to
preclude engagement by lower-tier missile defense systems, such as
the PAC-3. Equipped with a conventional warhead as large as 1,500
kilograms, the DF-21C could force defenders on Taiwan to move
toward mid-course or upper terminal phase missile defenses, such
as the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and
sea-based mid-course interceptors. As many as two conventional
DF-21 brigades could be in operation before 2010.86
ICBM Development.
Today, CASC is focused on fielding a new generation of mobile,
solid-fueled ICBMs. Slated for deployment before 2005, the DF-31
eventually will replace the DF-4 long intermediate range ballistic
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missile. The DF-31 is estimated to carry a single warhead and could
incorporate penetration aids, including decoys and chaff. At least
10-20 DF-31 missiles can be expected to enter the Second Artillery
over the next 5 years, sufficient to outfit one brigade with a notional
structure of 9-16 launchers assigned to three or four battalions.87
Two variants of the DF-31 also are under development. First
is an extended range version of the DF-31 with a range of at least
12,000 kilometers. This longer range missile, known as the DF-31A,
likely will be tested within the next several years and will be targeted
primarily against the United States. Japanese observers note that
the DF-31A is in some respects more advanced than some Russian
systems, such as the Topol-M. As many as 10 DF-31A ICBMs could
be fielded by 2010. Another variant of the DF-31 — the JL-2 — will be
launched from submarines. The JL-2 missile was successfully tested
in early 2001. A modified Type 94 submarine will carry the JL-2.
Projected for deployment by 2005, the 8,000-kilometer range missile
would be able to strike targets in Alaska, Hawaii, and the western
part of the United States when operating in Chinese coastal waters.88
Indications exist that the timeline to field the DF-31, its longer range
variant, and the JL-2 was accelerated in May 1999.89
MIRVs.
CASC has had the capability to develop and deploy a multiple
reentry vehicle system for many years. As of January 1996, the First
Academy was in midst of developing multiple warhead payloads,
each with its own guidance system and maneuvering capability.90
Research and development on multiple independent reentry vehicles
(MIRVs) was initiated as early as 1970. Technical difficulties,
however, stalled the program. The First Academy renewed research
and development shortly after the SDI announcement in March
1983. The DF-5A, able to strike targets throughout the United States,
was the designated recipient of the MIRVs, although there is no
evidence to date that they have been deployed. The U.S. intelligence
community assesses that China could develop a multiple RV system
for the DF-5 ICBM in a few years. Chinese pursuit of a multiple
RV capability for its mobile ICBMs and SLBMs would encounter
significant technical hurdles and would be costly.91
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Missile Defense Countermeasures.
Beijing is concerned about projected deployment of U.S. missile
defenses that threaten to reduce the viability of its strategic and
tactical ballistic missile forces. China’s interest in missile defense
countermeasures dates back to the 1960s, when Qian Xuesen
proposed in 1966 the development of on-board jammers and
light exoatmospheric decoys. With further studies and research
conducted in the 1980s providing the foundation, Beijing has
embarked upon a far-reaching and multi-faceted program to
develop missile defense countermeasures. These programs include
technical countermeasures and an expansion of its missile force, as
well as asymmetrical measures, such as anti-satellite operations.
The PRC is investing significant resources into countering missile
defense through the development of technical penetration aids.
Contemporary Chinese literature on technical countermeasures is
focused on “two categories and eight major penetration technologies”
(liang dalei, ba datufang jishu): These include countersurveillance
(electronic countermeasures, stealth, decoys, and fast burn motors)
and counterintercept (multiple warheads, maneuvering reentry
vehicles, hardening, and saturation).92
Land Attack Cruise Missile Development.
In addition to ballistic missile development, the PRC has placed a
high priority on the research, development, and production of land
attack cruise missiles (LACMs). CASIC’s Third Academy could field
China’s first generation land attack cruise missile for the PLA Air
Force within the next 2 years Western sources and publications from
Taiwan indicate Beijing’s first air launched land attack cruise missile,
a Silkworm variant dubbed the Yingji-63 (YJ-63), will be launched
from Hong-6 (H-6) bombers. As of June 2000, six ALCM-capable
H-6 bombers had been produced and a total of 25 are to be expected
to be in service by 2005. Each H-6 will be able to carry between two
and four YJ-63s. The YJ-63 will feature a TV-guidance package and
will have a 500-kilometer range, and at least 200 are expected to be
in service by 2005.93 Taiwan sources note Chinese efforts to develop
a generation-after-next cruise missile modeled after the Tomahawk
cruise missile, which is expected to be in service in the 2005-2010
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timeframe. The LACM will be capable of carrying conventional
or nuclear payloads and could have a range of between 500-1,500
kilometers.94
SATELLITE AND LAUNCH VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT
As it conducts more advanced R&D on ballistic missiles, CASC
is investing in more sophisticated satellites and launch vehicles.
The CASC’s Fifth Academy (China Academy of Space Technology)
is developing a range of systems, including high capacity
telecommunications satellites and high resolution electro-optical
imaging systems. At the same time, the space and missile industry
is continuing to diversify its family of launch vehicles.
Communication Satellites.
In the area of communications satellites, there have been three
significant developments. First, China launched its first secondgeneration communications satellites, the DFH-3 in 1993. A key
follow-on to the DFH-3 is the Feng Huo-1 (FH-1), China’s first
satellite to provide military units with both C-band and Ku-Band
communications. Xinhua news agency reported that the satellite,
also known as the 2,300 kilogram Zhongxing-22, was launched on
a LM-3A on January 25, 2000. Western reporting suggests that the
Fenghuo is the first of several military communications satellites
for the “Qu Dian” integrated command, control, communications,
computer, and intelligence (C4I) system, China's first such system.
CAST began formal R&D on its third generation communications
satellite, the DFH-4, in late 2001. The DFH-4 will be a direct
broadcast satellite with 50 transponders and a life of 15 years. The
system is expected to be launched in 2005.95
Reconnaissance Satellites.
China plans to field an integrated dual use space reconnaissance
architecture by the end of the decade. In the 10th Five-Year Plan,
CASC plans on deploying a limited reconnaissance architecture,
euphemistically referred to as an “environment and disaster
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monitoring system,” that consists of two electro-optical (EO) and one
synthetic aperture radar satellite. This “2+1” satellite constellation
will be expanded in the 11th Five-Year Plan to four electro-optical
and four synthetic aperture radar satellites (called the “4+4”).96
CASC and China’s electronics industries have made notable
progress in charged couple devices (CCD), a technology that is
essential to the development of real-time EO imaging systems.97 An
EO satellite enables Beijing to beam images back to ground stations
directly from space. The Ziyuan-1 (ZY-1), developed jointly between
the PRC and Brazil, is China’s first EO satellite. R&D on the ZY-1
satellite began in 1988, entering initial R&D (chuyang yanzhi) phase
in 1989. Launched in October 1999 on an LM-4, the ZY-1 has a 2-year
lifespan and incorporates a data transmission system to beam images
back to earth. The ZY-1, operating at an altitude of 778 kilometers,
was limited to a 20-meter resolution, but adds to China's experience
base in EO imaging systems.98 The ZY-2, launched in September
2000, has a significantly improved resolution that will provide better
services for PLA intelligence analysts. Like the ZY-1, the ZY-2 has
a 2-year lifespan and can transmit images back to ground stations
within line of sight of the satellite.99 This sytem, equipped with an
improved CCD camera, has a resolution of five meters or better.100
In addition to the ZY series, China also is developing micro
satellites weighing approximately 150 kilograms. The satellites,
developed jointly by the Fifth Academy, China Academy of Sciences,
Harbin Institute of Technology, and Qinghua University, include a
remote sensing package with a spatial resolution of 10 meters or
better. With initial funding under the 863 Program, the satellites,
known as Chuangxin-1 and Tansuo-1, will have an orbit of 600
kilometers and will carry out mapping missions and monitor natural
disasters. A constellation of microsatellites is planned.101 Also under
development is a solar telescope (taiyang wangyuanjing) that could
have some military applications. This system, scheduled for launch
in 2005, will be equipped with both EO and X-Band sensors and is
advertised as one of China’s most sophisticated satellites to date.
R&D began in 1992 and systems integration in July 2000.102
Shortly after the Gulf War, China’s senior leadership approved
a program for development of a synthetic aperture radar satellite.
Initial research that began in 1991 was funded under the 863
program.103 In addition to imaging systems, there are indications
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that CASC is investing in space-based electronic reconnaissance.
Chinese technical writings indicate that the Shanghai Academy of
Space Technology (CASC Eighth Academy) is evaluating options for
a space-based electronic intelligence (ELINT) system. At least one
potential design is a constellation of small ELINT satellites, which
can ensure precise location data and survivability. 104 In addition,
some credible observers believe that the Shenzhou-3 had an ELINT
mission, specifically targeting frequencies from around 300-1,000
MHz. The Federation of American Scientists also believe that many
of China’s scientific research satellites bear characteristics of ELINT
missions.105
In other developments, China integrated global positioning
system (GPS) receivers on its satellites in the mid-1990s for georeference purposes. After initiating preliminary research in 1991 and
model R&D in 1994, the 503rd Research Institute tested its first GPS
system on board China’s 17th remote sensing satellite launched in
October 1996.106 In a final development, China’s planned deployment
of a data relay satellite (DRS) system will provide an extended range
near-real-time targeting capability.107 A Chinese DRS architecture
under development is expected to include at least two geostationary
satellites that could provide 85 percent coverage of the earth and
support 5-10 satellites at the same time.108
Navigation Satellites.
China’s first generation navigation satellite, the Beidou 1,
was launched in 2000. The concept for navigation was initially
developed in the 1980s by one of China’s pre-eminent engineers,
Chen Fangyun. The concept, known as Shuangxing (Twin Star),
was to involve two satellites in geosynchronous orbit. After initial
tests using DFH-2 communications satellites, the program moved
from its preliminary R&D into applied research phase in 1993. The
Beidou project uses the DFH-3 bus and will eventually consist of as
many as four satellites that will serve as back-ups.109 There has been
discussion between Chinese and Russian space officials regarding
Chinese funding of replacement Global Navigation Satellite System
(GLONASS) satellites. In exchange, the PRC would obtain access to
their services. The issue was allegedly a topic of discussion between
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Chi Haotian and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov
during Chi’s 16-18 January 2000 visit to Moscow.110
Launch Vehicle Developments.
Over the last 10 years, China has focused on diversifying its
space launch capability, to include development of launch-ondemand, solid fuel launch vehicles for small satellites. To support
fielding of small satellite constellations, China’s senior leadership
have authorized CASIC to develop solid fueled launch vehicles.
Under the leadership of CASIC’s Fourth Design Department, small
solid fueled launch vehicles, most likely a derivative of the DF-21,
will be able to place small payloads in orbit at a time and place of
the PLA’s choosing. China intends to field these mobile, solid fueled
launch vehicles by 2005. Reduced size and complexity allows for
faster manufacturing time and production in significant numbers. 111
In addition to the solid rocket launcher, there is some consideration
of resurrecting the LM-1 design, redesignated as the LM-1D, for
launching of small satellites.112 As CASIC develops a solid fueled
launch vehicle (LV) for small satellites, China also is working on a
three stage heavy lift LV that uses kerosene/liquid oxygen (LOX)
and LH2/LOX. The new vehicle, expected to be fielded by 2007, is
designed to lift a 25 ton payload to low earth orbit and up to 13 tons
to geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO).113
Satellite Tracking and Control.
Over the last 10 years, the PLA has modernized and expanded
its space tracking network. This network, operated by the PLA
China Launch and Tracking Control (CLTC), is needed for tracking
and control of a projected increase in China’s domestic satellites, its
international satellite launch business, and manned space program.
The PLA has added overseas links in Chile and the South Pacific
island of Kiribati, and has contracted with France for access to
data from its space tracking network.114 CLTC and Swedish Space
Corporation (SSC) signed an agreement for Chinese access to
Sweden’s space tracking network in early 2001.115
China Academy of Sciences’ astronomical observatories in
Nanjing and Kunming feed into the CLTC network, providing
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orbital prediction data for CLTC. CAS and CLTC are upgrading
their network of high resolution telescopes, augmented by laser
tracking devices. China’s space community claims an ability to
detect objects in space down to 10 inches.116 While the network is
designed for cooperative targets, it does provide the framework
for improvements against noncooperative targets. The CLTC space
tracking network likely supports the Second Artillery through
alert messages indicating that foreign reconnaissance satellites are
passing overhead.117
International Cooperation.
Since 1991, China has become heavily reliant upon the former
Soviet Union for its space and missile program. Space cooperation
began in May 1990, and a formal agreement was signed 2 years later.118
The relationship was solidified on December 18, 1992, when China’s
space and missile industry and the Russian Space Agency signed an
official protocol for the sharing of space technology. A subsequent
agreement was signed in 1994 that covered at least ten areas of
space cooperation, including satellite navigation, space surveillance,
propulsion, satellite communications, joint design efforts, materials,
intelligence sharing, scientific personnel exchanges, and space
systems testing.119 The two sides meet yearly to review the status
of programs.120 Cooperation has centered on cryogenic technology
for use in upper stages for launch vehicles. Russia sold China three
RD-120 cryogenic upper stage engines in 1995.121 Russia also is
assisting China in its manned space program.122 Space cooperation
agreements have also been concluded with Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan. Areas of cooperation with Ukraine include remote
sensing, satellite communications, and aerospace material research
and development.123
CASC and CASIC have not limited their international cooperation
to the former Soviet Union. China’s space and missile industry has
developed close working relationship with France, Germany, and
Italy. Based on a June 1994 agreement, CASC and France’s National
Center for Space Studies (CNES) are cooperating in the areas of
small launch vehicle, navigation satellites, satellite attitude control
systems, communication satellites, and meteorological satellite
technology.124 China will work with France in developing the Proteus
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small satellite bus.125 Areas of cooperation with Germany include
satellite communications (SATCOM) transponder technology, solar
panels, and orbital control systems.126 China is also working with
Germany on a two-ton solar telescope that will orbit around the
moon around 2005.127
MANNED SPACE FLIGHT
Since publication of Qian Xuesen’s Interplanetary Flight, China
has dreamed of manned space flight. In April 1968, Qian established
a manned space flight research center, known as the Beijing Institute
of Space Medical Engineering (507th Research Institute) to study
how humans would respond to space flight. The decision to proceed
in R&D into manned space platforms and reusable space vehicles
was reflected in the 1986 Mid-to-Long Term S&T Development
Program.128 A new astronaut training facility, the Beijing Space
Technology Experiment Center, was opened in 1995 in northwestern
Beijing. All astronauts in training are experienced PLA Air Force
pilots with at least 1,000 hours of flying time.129 Under a 1995 contract
with CAST, Russia’s Yuri Gagarin Center near Moscow is providing
training for 70-80 Chinese astronauts, engineers, and managers in
1997-98. Russia’s Krunichev Space Center and Energia Company,
and Ukrainian space agency are assisting in the development of the
capsule and booster capable of lifting 20 tons.130
China is conducting an extended test program (Project 921-1)
before launching a man in space. Under the leadership of chief
designers Qi Faren and Wang Yongzhi, the first unmanned test
(Shenzhou I) took place on November 19-20, 1999 and lasted 14
orbits. Launched by the LM-2F, the module returned and landed
in Inner Mongolia. Shenzhou 2 flew in January 2001 on a more
aggressive mission. This unmanned flight was a modification of
Shenzhou 1 flown to test the life support systems. The multi-module
space vehicle performed a 7-day, 108-orbit mission and ejected a
return capsule carrying biological specimens that touched down
in Inner Mongolia. An orbital module that ground controllers put
through an extensive set of maneuvers was left behind in space.
The Shenzhou 3 module was launched on a LM-2F in March 2002.
Following a week of flight, the vehicle's return module equipped
with test dummies returned to Earth on April 1. Once again, the
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spacecraft's orbital module remained in orbit. There is speculation
this still-in-orbit hardware might become a rendezvous target for the
follow-on Shenzhou 4 mission in a few months time. There is some
speculation that the Shenzhou 5 may carry a two or three-person
Chinese crew, perhaps by year's end.131
The Shenzhou project is intended to lay the foundation for
subsequent space shuttle (hangtian feiji) and an aerospace plane
(kongtian feiji) programs (Project 921-3). Since 1989, China has
embarked upon a serious effort to deploy a space shuttle. Space
shuttle designs are somewhat alarming. According to one U.S.
analysis, a 1991 design was meant to optimize transfer between
coplanar orbits, essential for military related space activities to
include ASAT operations. Other Chinese studies confirm interest
in coplanar transfers.132 The project ostensibly is valued at RMB 11
billion (approximately U.S. $1.35 billion), weighs 22 tons, carries a
payload of up to 3.5 tons, and is operated by a crew of three. The
shuttle will have a service life of 30 missions, with a typical mission
length being 3-5 days.133
Taking space shuttle concepts a step further, COSTIND is
directing an effort to master technologies associated with a
hypersonic single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO, or danji rugui) aerospace
plane. GED’s Beijing Institute of Systems Engineering (BISE), with
technical assistance from the launch vehicle/ballistic missile and
cruise missile industries (CASC’s First and Third Academies), is
responsible for the aerospace plane’s systems design, which will
incorporate scramjet engine (chaoran chongya fadongji) technology.134
In 1996, First Academy President Li Jianzhong indicated that one
design concept weighs 2,000 tons and will have manned and
unmanned versions.135 China is also laying the groundwork for a
space station around the year 2020.136
CONCLUSION
China’s progress today in space and missiles can be traced to
Qian Xuesen, Ren Xinmin, and other early pioneers involved in
the liangdan yixing program. This generation of relatively young
engineers was motivated by a revolutionary zeal to raise China’s
international status and prestige. In the course of a few years,
this group was able to pull off a miracle by developing an ability
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to launch ballistic missiles and satellites during a time when the
country could barely build a decent car or bicycle. They worked
in primitive conditions: there were no metal workshops, aerospace
institutions of higher learning, or infrastructure for jet propulsion.
Despite rapid progress in the late 1950s and the first half of
the 1960s, the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 reduced
progress to a sclerotic pace and soured a generation of space and
missile engineers. Faced with a U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative
that threatened to widen the gap between China and the rest of
the world, Beijing launched an effort to hasten development of its
technological base and maintain its nuclear deterrent. At the same
time, with its economic opening to the world, China’s leadership
opened its rudimentary space launch business to foreign customers.
However, it was not until the 1990s that a series of events, including
the Gulf War, Taiwan’s drift toward greater autonomy, and the
NATO campaign in Yugoslavia, provided the perception of an
increasingly threatening environment and the shock necessary for
China to rekindle the liangdan yixing spirit.
China’s past achievements have established the foundation for
significant advancements in the future. A sufficient body of evidence
suggests that China has a number of goals associated with its space
and missile development. As noted in the July 2002 DoD Report to
Congress on PRC Military Capabilities, Beijing’s force modernization
is driven largely by the desire to stem Taiwan moves toward
greater autonomy and to deter or complicate U.S. intervention. The
availability of Russian technical expertise, on a scale similar to that of
the late 1950s, could enable Beijing to achieve its goals at a hastened
pace and at reduced cost.
This vision requires a viable C4ISR architecture with a significant
space-based component; a responsive and diverse space launch
infrastructure; long range precision strike capability; and a
survivable nuclear deterrent. China’s space-based reconnaissance
and communications capability is proceeding at a relatively
advanced pace. The PLA should have an EO, radar, electronic, and
weather monitoring architecture before 2010; portions of this system
are available today. Beijing should have the ability to rapidly launch
small reconnaissance satellites that can monitor events around its
periphery and in the Western Pacific Ocean within the next 3-5
years.
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Beijing is making significant advancements in its long range
precision strike capability based upon an arsenal of increasingly
accurate and lethal conventional ballistic and land attack cruise
missiles. The space and missile industry is striving to achieve
ballistic missile accuracies of less than 50 meters. China also is
developing a diverse range of payloads, including runway cratering
submunitions and penetration and radio-frequency warheads. To
maintain the viability of its nuclear arsenal, the PRC is conducting
R&D on a range of technical countermeasures to U.S. missile
defense programs and fielding a new generation of solid fueled
intercontinental ballistic missiles.
China’s space and missile ambitions come with a price tag. How
this multi-billion dollar modernization program is funded remains
shrouded in obfuscation and mystery. A large portion likely comes
from extra-budgetary sources, such as the space launch business,
CASC and CASIC civilian enterprises, the 863 program, or the central
government space budget. Funding for many satellite programs may
be derived in large part from other government entities responsible
for weather, civil telecommunications, cartography, earthquake
monitoring, and remote sensing. Regardless, as the July 2002 DoD
Report to Congress on PRC Military Capabilities notes, annual defense
spending is expected to increase in real terms over threefold to
fourfold between now and 2020.137
China’s space and missile industry and the PLA have been
able to absorb lessons from the past that will guide its future
development. China understands that it can not rely solely
on indigenous development in order to achieve significant
technological breakthroughs. After years of isolation, Beijing has
opened up to the West and states of the former Soviet Union in the
hope of attaining access to critical technologies. Organizationally,
the PRC understands that reliance upon a sole source for R&D
and production does not produce significant incentives for quality
control and advancement in technology. For the PLA, the Gulf War
and Operation ALLIED FORCE provided valuable lessons on the
utility of space for command and control, reconnaissance, weather,
navigation, and other combat support functions.
For those interested in China’s space and missile program,
the next 5-10 years promise to be exciting. The PLA-watching
community can expect a significant expansion of the Second
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Artillery as new conventional SRBM and MRBM brigades are
formed. One also should anticipate one or two new DF-31 brigades
to be formed within this decade. One should watch how new space
launch vehicles are organized and subordinated. With the foregoing
in mind, observers should project expansion of DF-21 production
facilities as new conventional ballistic missiles and DF-21 derived
launch vehicles are fielded. New and mysterious satellites will be
launched, presenting challenges as to their real utility.
In short, inspired by the liangdan yixing spirit, nationalism,
an increasingly sophisticated technology base, and assisted by a
willing cadre of foreign advisors, a young, educated, and energetic
generation of engineers is likely to pave the way for the significant
advances in PRC military capabilities. As a result of developments
within its aerospace sector, the PLA is adjusting its warfighting
doctrine to accommodate anticipated advances in C4ISR, long range
precision strike, and other strategic dimensions of warfare.
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PART III:
THE CAMPAIGNS

CHAPTER 7
HOW BEIJING EVALUATES MILITARY CAMPAIGNS:
AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT
Ron Christman
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
China’s known criteria for measuring the effectiveness of military
campaigns prioritize evaluating success in terms of the impact on the
Chinese Communist Party’s ability to control the “overall situation.”
Direct military, strategic, and political results are secondary in
nature when compared to the leadership’s subjective assessment
of its control of the overall situation. In theory, this assessment
is derived by calculating a campaign’s impact on the leadership’s
ability to ensure central authority; preserve leadership solidarity
and national unity; maintain momentum behind the nation’s central
task; and balance the need to deter or defeat primary adversaries
while simultaneously containing domestic instability and securing
secondary fronts.
The priority Beijing places on controlling the overall situation
is different from the tendency of Western leaders to weigh military
success in terms of dominant quantitative indicators, to include
weapons and equipment destroyed, personnel killed in action, and
public approval ratings. This difference is driven, in part, by direct
lessons political and military leaders have learned regarding the
importance of controlling the overall situation. Key sources of these
lessons include battles in ancient China, Marxist-Leninist thought,
Maoist military thinking, the War with Japan, the Chinese Civil War,
and China’s own domestic and geopolitical circumstances.
The assessment criteria identified thus far provide insights into
how China’s leadership intends to exercise strategic leadership in
wartime. However, there are a number of human, organizational,
and procedural variables that might erode the leadership’s ability
to apply these criteria in future war. Indeed, the emphasis placed
on controlling the overall situation is designed, in part, to prevent
these variables from degrading Beijing’s ability to base decisions on
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national, vice subnational, interests.
The key to gaining a deeper understanding of how China’s
leaders would evaluate military campaigns is to gain greater access
to China’s assessment criteria. Critical areas for future research
include how Beijing intends to organize strategic leadership in
wartime, establish a culminating point for victory, determine an exit
strategy, and set a ceiling for acceptable costs.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to assess what criteria, if any,
China’s leadership is likely to use in measuring the effectiveness of
military campaigns. In so doing, this chapter will address what we
know about China’s measures of effectiveness (MOE) criteria; how
these criteria compare to what we know about Western MOE criteria;
where these criteria derive from, especially in terms of lessons the
leadership has learned; and the potential for what we know about
Chinese criteria to be based on deceptive or confusing information.
I have only begun to “scratch the surface” of this vexing question.
Hence, the findings in this chapter are inherently an “initial
assessment.” In this context, this chapter will identify those factors
that might erode the leadership’s ability to apply these assessment
criteria in a future war. Finally, the chapter will identify information
acquisition strategies and key topics and issues for future research.
In examining this question, it is important to explicitly define
what it is we are examining and the level of analysis at which we will
operate. First, our focus will be on how the national-level leadership
in China, defined as the senior-most Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) and Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leaders, is likely
to measure or evaluate the progression and outcome of operational
military campaigns conducted by the PLA. This chapter does not
examine how the PLA’s General Staff Department (GSD) or lowerlevel command headquarters are likely to measure the military
effectiveness of campaigns.1
Second, we will be employing a relatively loose definition
of the concept of a military campaign. We want to gain a better
understanding of how China’s national-level leadership would
evaluate the effectiveness of “major military actions” conducted
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at what the United States would consider to be the “operational
level” of warfare. This definition is consistent, in my view, with
China’s own definition of a military campaign representing “the
principal means to achieve objectives in a war.”2 In so doing, I
fully recognize that the execution of an “operational plan” by the
Chinese may involve the conduct of several military campaigns
(combat operations) simultaneously. However, I believe it would be
more useful to focus on the general question of how Beijing3 would
measure major military actions conducted at the operational level
of war than to seek to examine how senior leaders would evaluate
individual campaigns that derive from one operational plan. Put
simply, we want to know how Beijing evaluates PLA operations
that are progressing in the field and how it would assess whether
the end-result of these operations is likely to constitute success or
failure.
METHODOLOGY
We face a number of fundamental challenges in seeking to identify
and characterize the criteria China is likely to use in evaluating the
effectiveness of operational military campaigns. These challenges
are driven by:
• The lack of extensive research on the specific subject of how
Beijing evaluates military campaigns;4
• The high likelihood that China, like other countries, seeks to
conceal its assessment criteria from foreign view; 5
• Inherent limitations associated with various research
strategies, to include case studies, in examining the four
hundred or more campaigns the PLA has conducted since
1927;6 and,
• The potential for study of this topic, which can be considered
a subset of decisionmaking, to become subject to the
same problems that have bedeviled the development of
decisionmaking theory.7
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SOURCE MATERIAL AND WORKING HYPOTHESIS
Given these issues, I have sought to “bound” research for this
chapter by examining source material since the last major war for
China (1979) that might shed light on how Beijing conceives of
assessment criteria in the aftermath of the major and minor wars the
CCP and PLA have fought since 1927. The primary sources examined
include various Chinese language source documents providing
potential indications of how the Chinese leadership conceives of
the art of “strategic leadership.” In particular, I examined several
doctrinal PLA publications developed by the PLA’s National Defense
University (NDU) and its Academy of Military Science (AMS). Since
China’s senior leadership is likely to be composed of both military
and civilian leaders, I also examined information that derived from
CCP organs. In so doing, I consulted several Chinese language
publications or reports that emanate from the CCP’s Central Party
School (CPS), various administrative organs of the CCP, as well as
the CCP Constitution itself. In particular, I examined source material
that outlined how the CCP currently conceives of the correct “stand,
viewpoint, and method” for problem solving.8
The basic working hypothesis is that “framing effects” are likely
to play a substantial role in shaping how the Chinese leadership
defines a situation, calculates the merits of alternate courses of
action, and ultimately measures the success or failure of the course it
has chosen.9 The primary reason I chose this approach is my belief
that there are several potential conditions in the Chinese leadership
milieu conducive to the emergence of a common “framework”
amongst Chinese leaders for how to assess military operations or
other actions. These conditions include the role of history in shaping
Chinese perceptions, the likely role of strategic culture in China’s
national security realm, the existence of concepts of statecraft in
China with ancient origins, the existence of “military science” in
China’s military-strategic community, and the apparent efforts of
the CCP historically to develop a “doctrine” for problem solving.10
WHAT WE KNOW AND WHY
The central question remains: what criteria are China’s leaders
likely to use in evaluating military campaigns? The answer is that
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it is possible to identify and characterize how China’s leadership is
likely to conceptualize and aspire to evaluate military campaigns in
wartime. The Chinese rarely assert what their assessment criteria
are in military writings on strategy, campaigns, strategic leadership,
and various doctrinal party documents or statements, etc. The
source material tapped thus far is certainly not exhaustive; however,
it represents some of the more authoritative Chinese documents on
strategic leadership, the study of campaigns or strategy, and military
or party “doctrines” for problem solving methods. In reviewing
these and other documents, there is little information that provides
direct clues as to the Chinese leadership’s likely campaign-level
MOE criteria. Two lone exceptions are a 1990 PLA NDU book on
the fundamental art of operations and various public statements
and articles by CCP CPS Vice President Zheng Bijian regarding the
current “stand, viewpoint, and method” that Chinese leaders should
employ in problem solving.
One reason we have so few indications of China’s assessment
criteria may be that these criteria are purposely “hidden” from
foreign, nonparty, or non-PLA observers. These criteria may
exist in writing somewhere in an internal CCP or PLA document
related to deliberate planning for military operations or wartime
management by national-level leaders. Conceivably, the reason
we have so few indications may also be that the current postMao and post-Deng Chinese leadership itself has never actually
explicitly established what its criteria would be for measuring
military campaigns in wartime. China has not been engaged in a
war since 1979, and military affairs in China have been secondary to
economic development for 2 decades. The focus of civilian leaders
on military affairs, including potential wartime assessment and
decisionmaking issues, is undoubtedly secondary or tertiary in
nature. For example, an article in 1999 by Maj Gen Lu Haozhong,
President of the PLA’s Second Artillery Command Institute, implied
that the senior leadership has yet to establish what its criteria would
be for approving the use of nuclear weapons.11
It is therefore difficult for me to say with high confidence that we
really “know” what China’s assessment criteria are for evaluating
campaigns at this juncture. We face practical limitations in gaining
access to internal information on Chinese assessment criteria or to
information that Chinese leaders themselves have yet to consolidate.
257

Nonetheless, I was able to uncover some information that sheds
light on what China’s pre-planned assessment criteria might be or
on the criteria that China’s leaders are likely to ultimately settle
on when evaluating campaigns in wartime. In particular, there is
one primary Chinese language source that provides unique insight
regarding the specific criteria China’s leadership would use in
measuring the effectiveness of operational military campaigns in
wartime. Moreover, the main criterion identified in this military
document is corroborated in the CCP’s own doctrine for problem
solving, as outlined below.
The Military Approach.
According to a 1990 PLA NDU text on the “Fundamental Art
of Operations,” the art of command necessitates a “full appraisal”
of the “values” of a campaign by the leadership when making
campaign decisions, weighing alternate campaign plans, or gauging
the success or failure of an operational campaign.12 The “true value”
of the potential outcome of a campaign as well as its progress cannot
be discerned by simply measuring its direct results. Instead, the
value of a campaign is demonstrated by the following four “factors:”
• The direct military results of the campaign, defined in terms of
the ability to annihilate the enemy’s effective combat strength,
to include enemy personnel and weapons/equipment, or the
capture or defense of a certain place;
• The impact of the campaign in question on China’s next
strategic move, including follow-on PLA campaign
operations;
• The impact of the campaign on the psychology, politics,
economy, and internal personal relations of the enemy; and,
• The role of the campaign in enhancing, maintaining, or
degrading the national leadership’s ability to grasp and
control the “overall strategic situation.”13
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This NDU textbook emphasizes that, as a matter of principle, a
commanding officer should seize every opportunity to annihilate
the enemy’s effective combat strength and to fight every battle that
can lead to the enemy’s annihilation. Indeed “annihilation of the
enemy means victory.” In addition, commanding officers, especially
high-ranking ones, should also possess a “strategic consciousness.”
This quality is of particular importance since the “real values” of a
campaign are reflected in “its status and role in the overall situation
of a war.”
These four criteria, despite their limited base of sourcing, provide
the clearest evidence available to the author of China’s likely criteria
for measuring the effectiveness of military campaigns. They provide
a potentially useful tool for understanding how China’s leaders
would evaluate the progression or outcome of a campaign. I will
deliberately limit our assessment in this chapter to the last one of
these four criteria. The first three are relatively easier to understand
and explain. I am confident one could document their use in Chinese
language material, based on references I have seen to these concepts
in reading PLA doctrinal articles and other information.14 Moreover,
this framework strongly points to the overall situation as being the
most important MOE, and, therefore, the most important subject of
analysis.
The Party Approach.
The credibility of the NDU textbook’s emphasis on the “overall
strategic situation” as being the most important criterion is enhanced
by the fact that the importance of this criterion is evident in the
party’s own doctrine for solving problems in general. Article 34 of
the CCP Constitution stipulates that “leading party cadres” at all
levels must “strive to use the Marxist stand, viewpoint, and method
to solve practical problems.”15 According to CCP CPS Vice President
Zheng Bijian, the incorporation of Deng Xiaoping Theory into the
CCP Constitution in 1997 has direct implications for the “stand,
viewpoint, and method” and “world outlook” that CCP leaders
should employ in solving contemporary problems.16
Based on Deng Xiaoping Theory, the specific “stand, viewpoint,
and method” for problem solving outlined by Zheng is captured by
the following eight Chinese characters: Overall Situation (Daju), Test
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(Kaoyan), Opportunity (Jiyu), and Confidence (Xinxin).17 Without
examining this formula at length in this chapter, the concept of “test”
in essence involves how Beijing assesses a situation; “opportunity”
is a short-hand term for how Beijing would weigh the subjective
strategic advantages or disadvantages and the objective material
gains or losses associated with a course of action; and “confidence”
is a short-hand explanation for the “calculations in the temple” that
Beijing would conduct before a major action to “assure victory”
beforehand. This process of assessment and calculation would
include assessing the strategic configuration of power Beijing
is operating in, assuming the appropriate posture (disposition),
establishing a feasible war aim, and adopting the appropriate
resolve.18 According to Zheng Bijian and other CCP officials,
the party’s ability to “grasp” and “control” the overall situation
is the most important criterion. As Zheng explained it once, the
implication of China’s current international and domestic situation
is that “every issue of major or principled importance is in the final
analysis, related to our view of the overall situation in contemporary
China and the world.”19
In this context, a key question to answer is what does China’s
leadership really mean when they refer to the importance of the party
“grasping” and “controlling” the “overall strategic situation” in both
military and nonmilitary contexts. The answer is that a simple key
word search on the terms “overall situation” or the “overall strategic
situation” reveals that the Chinese have a relatively well-thought
out definition of what is required to maintain control of the overall
situation.20 Essentially, China’s party and military establishments
emphasize the importance of controlling the overall situation as the
most fundamental way of coping with an immediate challenge or
“test” within the context of China’s complex domestic situation and
vast geopolitical circumstances.21 These conditions create several
local, regional, departmental, factional, and personal interests that, if
not properly managed, work to erode the senior leadership’s ability
to base decisions and strategy on a comprehensive understanding of
China’s “national interest.”
Hence, one of the challenges for Chinese leaders in making
decisions and measuring the success of a strategy is the need to take
steps to “checkmate” these subnational interests, thereby ensuring
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that China’s “national interests” prevail.22 As Deng Xiaoping once
described it, whether or not the CCP controls the overall strategic
situation cannot be assessed from the perspective of a small number
of people or from the perspective of these “local” or subnational
interests. Deng advocated using the concept of the “overall strategic
situation” and the “interests of the majority of the people” when
judging if policies are “correct” and in determining the degree to
which they are correct. Specifically, Deng stated that “we should
frequently take 90 percent as the standard and see whether or not
they [a policy] represent 90 percent of the people and whether or not
they are supported by the people.”23 The author doubts that Deng’s
call for using “90 percent as the standard” signifies an interest
in basing CCP decisions on a solid majority of political support
from the Chinese population. Undoubtedly, the judgment as to
whether 90 percent of Chinese society supported a policy would
be made by senior CCP leaders. Nonetheless, Deng’s comments
underscore the extent to which the Chinese leadership’s approach
to problem solving involves an active effort to “check-mate” various
subnational interests that could influence China’s policies in ways
that may not accord with China’s national interests or the interests of
senior CCP leaders. These subnational interests include the desires
of individual leaders, “factions” in the party or military, the interests
of various “xitongs” in China (to include the foreign affairs, PLA,
and economic establishments), regional interests in China (inland or
coastal provinces), or county-level or lower “local” groups. The risk
of these interests pursuing “subnational” interests at the expense of
the national interest is compounded by the pervasive influence of
corruption in Chinese society, especially elite circles.
Research on China’s concept of grasping and controlling the
overall situation reveals that China’s leaders are likely to use four
specific sub-criteria when evaluating whether a military campaign is
enhancing, eroding, or maintaining Beijing’s control of the “overall
situation.”
• The extent to which the senior leadership maintains “strong
central authority” to include absolute control of the PLA.24
• The extent to which a “common understanding” exists
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between CCP leaders, between the party and the PLA, and
between the party and the Chinese population; and the extent
to which national unity is maintained in a large society with
multiple ethnic groups (56 total groups);25
• The extent to which the party and nation is able to maintain
“momentum” behind the country’s top priority task —
which is generally defined as either continued development
of comprehensive national power or the maintenance
or enhancement of a favorable position in the strategic
configuration of power, depending on the degree of foreign
or internal threat to China’s interests;26
• Finally, the extent to which the leadership is able to
simultaneously maintain an appropriate “center of gravity”
between several objectives in its military-strategic calculus.27
With this formula as a baseline, further research reveals
that Chinese leaders are likely to define the sub-criteria they
would evaluate in assessing whether the progression or
results of a military campaign enable Beijing to maintain a
“center of gravity” in its China’s military-strategic calculus.
This calculus can be broadly defined as comprising four
distinct elements:
• The defeat of any specific challenge to China’s sovereignty
and territorial integrity;28
• The deterrence or limitation of foreign military
intervention in any war between China and a third
party;
• The containment and repression of any internal sources
of domestic instability or civil unrest; and,
• The ability to defend Chinese interests, territory, and
sovereignty against challenge on secondary fronts along
China’s periphery.
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From the Chinese perspective, a central task in China’s
military-strategic calculus is the need to meet these four objectives
simultaneously. An illustrative example of this calculus in Chinese
thinking is the following quote from an AMS doctrinal chapter on
Strategic Command and Support. In describing the importance
of stipulating the basic attack orientation when making a strategic
decision, this chapter emphasized the following:
The basic orientation is the focus of the struggle between the
enemy and us and the center of gravity for the use of force, and it
determines the combat situation and the development of the war.
Whether or not we can check a war of aggression launched against
us by an enemy, with simultaneous threats from two or multiple
enemies, or whether or not when we find ourselves in a combat
environment with two or multiple fronts we can deal forcefully
with the primary enemy, or whether or not in a defensive war we
can break through the enemy’s offensive, or whether or not in a
offensive war or strategic offensive we can defeat the enemy fairly
smoothly, are all closely related to the determination of the basis
attack orientation, and strategic commanders must pay particular
attention to doing a good job of resolving this issue, which is of
decisive significance.”29

COMPARISON TO WESTERN CRITERIA
It is important to understand where this Chinese approach to
assessment criteria fits in relationship to what we know about the
approach of other nation’s elites to measuring military effectiveness.30
In particular, this initial understanding of China’s MOEs enables us
to gauge how China’s assessment criteria might be different from
Western or U.S. approaches to measuring operational success. Is
China’s focus on the leadership’s subjective assessment of the
impact of a military campaign on the party’s ability to control the
overall strategic situation similar to or different from the approach
of Western leaders to evaluating the success of military operations?
The basic answer to this question is that China’s campaign-level
assessment criteria are markedly different from the approach that
Western leaders tend to take to evaluating military campaigns. As
with the case of China, much work needs to be done in developing
a more in-depth understanding of Western assessment criteria.
Based on a preliminary review of some of the work that has been
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completed, China’s approach to evaluating military campaigns
contrasts with the tendency of Western leaders to weigh military
success in terms of dominant quantitative indicators, to include
weapons and equipment destroyed, personnel killed in action, and
public approval ratings.
Scott Gartner’s recent study of strategic assessment in war (see
endnote 5) examined four case studies: British decisionmaking on
anti-submarine operations in World War I and World War II; U.S.
decisionmaking regarding the ground strategy in the Vietnam War;
how the U.S. Army and Marines evaluated success in the Vietnam
War; and U.S. decisionmaking in the Iranian hostage rescue attempt
in 1979. In all cases, national-level leaders relied primarily on socalled “dominant quantitative indicators” when deciding how a
war or campaign was going and whether a change in strategy was
necessary. In some cases, these dominant quantitative indicators
were “battlefield indicators” (tonnage of Allied shipping lost, number
of U-Boats sunk, destruction and construction of Allied merchant
shipping, enemy or allied personnel killed in action, enemy weapons
captured, or the impact of an operation on quantitative indicators of
social stability in Vietnam). In one case (the Iranian hostage crisis),
the dominant quantitative indicator was public approval ratings
for the U.S. President. In all of these cases, changes in strategy
were prompted by sudden, accelerating changes in the dominant
indicators used as assessment criteria.31 Essentially, national-level
leaders changed their strategy if the dominant indicators suggested
that the war or strategy was “going bad” and the rate of performance
was decreasing at an increasingly rapid rate.
The main difference between China’s approach to evaluating
campaigns and the approach of U.S. and British leaders is the clearcut tendency in the Chinese approach for using subjective measures
vice quantitative indicators of performance. It is conceivable that
the Chinese may rely on specific quantitative indicators (public
opinion polls, force exchanges, and economic performance figures,
etc.) when making conclusions about the desired level of central
authority, party solidarity, national unity, strategic momentum, and
balance in China’s military posture. For example, China’s criteria
for measuring the direct results of a campaign include gauging
the extent to which PLA actions are annihilating or paralyzing the
enemy’s effective combat strength. These measures clearly can, and
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probably are gauged by using quantitative indicators, to include
weapons and equipment destroyed or personnel killed in action.
However, I judge that the Chinese are likely to rely primarily
on qualitative, subjective assessments when making conclusions
about military performance in war. The use of specific quantitative
indicators is likely to be secondary in nature, given the traditional
emphasis in Chinese strategic culture on the battle of “wits, wisdom,
and strategy” being more decisive in determining war outcomes
than actual engagements between opposing military forces. Indeed,
senior leaders in China’s military operations research community
frequently lament the limited use of their various analytic tools and
research results by national-level leaders.32
LESSONS LEARNED
One of the primary reasons that China’s leaders use different
assessment criteria is that the Chinese have a number of powerful
internal sources of strategic culture and approach to warfare.33 To be
sure, the Chinese readily admit that they study how other nation’s
approach international security affairs, to include grand strategy,
in an effort to enhance their own approach to issues of strategy,
security, and national development.34 However, I have been able to
identify and characterize seven distinct sources of strategic thought
that can be traced to China’s emphasis on the “overall situation”
as the key measure of success in evaluating military campaigns.
Only one of these sources, Marxist-Leninist Thought, can be traced
to foreign roots. Lacking an extensive role for foreign sources and
outlets in shaping how China’s leadership intends to evaluate
military campaigns in wartime, it should not be surprising that
China’s assessment criteria are different from those employed by the
West. The role of these seven sources in shaping China’s assessment
criteria is outlined below.35 Each of these sources has taught China’s
leadership key “lessons” regarding the important of the overall
situation as the main criterion.
Ancient Battles.
According to an official, authoritative PLA source on wartime
strategies, one known “law of war” currently taught to PLA officers
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is the concept that “in dealing with strategy and campaigns, and the
relationship of battles over time, the important thing is to execute
campaigns and battles on the basis of the overall strategic situation,
thereby having campaigns and battles become part of the overall
strategic situation.”36 The example that this PLA document cites
as the first instance when the Chinese learned the importance of
the overall strategic situation was the struggle between Liu Bang
(founder of the Han Dynasty) and Xiang Yu (Liu’s chief rival) during
the formative period of the Han Dynasty (202 BC) after the fall of the
Qin Dynasty.37
The reason the Chinese believe this struggle is such an important
event in military history is that it reveals how it is possible to emerge
victorious in war when operating from a position of inferiority and
despite having lost multiple battles prior to the last one. Essentially,
this struggle teaches that the inferior can defeat the superior provided
the inferior side has a “comparatively more strategic mindset.”
Based on NDU’s account in 2000, Xiang Yu was defeated because he
lacked long-range overall strategic planning for the entire war. He
pursued lots of “big battles” with “definite blindness” even when
he won these battles. Xiang failed in “taking these battle victories
with the overall strategic situation and tying them together.” From
the perspective of the overall strategic situation, Xiang “again and
again took unwise actions.” In contrast, Liu Bang was “proficient at
inferior strength,” had a tendency to “plan the overall arrangement,
and thus form a “strategically decisive strong approach, finally
going through a decisive campaign operation to being victorious
in the war.” In the end, Liu maneuvered Xiang into a “death trap,”
and, when finally cornered, Xiang slit his own throat.38
Marxist-Leninist Thought.
The Chinese Communist Party subscribes to the viewpoint
that Marxist-Leninist philosophy provides a scientific worldview
and method for understanding the relationship between things.39
In particular, materialist dialectics holds that regardless of which
thing one is trying to understand, it should be viewed as comprising
a “whole,” that is, a sum total of all aspects, relationships, and
elements within the thing, which should be viewed as the “parts”
of the “whole.” In this context, the parts and whole constitute
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an important pair of philosophical categories that have universal
applicability in understanding the “complex links” between things
and the process of developing things. According to this line of
reasoning, it is impossible to understand and grasp specific aspects,
relationships, or elements of a thing without proceeding from the
links of the whole “entirety” of a thing.
The Chinese believe that Marxist-Leninist dialectics, including
the relationship between the parts and whole has applicability in
understanding warfare.40 Specifically, Chairman Mao Zedong has
pointed out that “any war situation which acquires a comprehensive
consideration of its various aspects and stages forms a war situation
as a whole.”41 More recently, then-PLA GSD Chief General Fu
Quanyou stated that “in order to direct a future high technology
local war, the army guidance for war should adhere [in part] to both
historical materialism and dialectical materialism and uphold the
Marxist view on wars and the Marxist military dialectics.”42
The practical implication of this emphasis on dialectics and
understanding the relationship between the “part” and the “whole”
in wartime is that it places a premium on the national leadership
“reducing blindness” and “short-term actions” in decisionmaking
by basing those decisions “on the overall situation” and on “seeing
the interests of the whole as higher than everything else.” At the
same time, this emphasis on the whole should lead to a solid
understanding of the role and importance of each “part” of the
overall war situation. The analogy used is to equate warfare with
chess in the sense that one wrong move can lead to the entire game
being lost. According to this analogy, that one wrong move was a
“part” that had “decisive significance for the whole situation.”43
The effect of these concepts on how Beijing is likely to evaluate
military campaigns in wartime is that they have led the Chinese to
define military campaigns as actions that are best gauged in terms of
their impact on the overall strategic situation. As the AMS describes
it,“strategy is a whole, and campaigns and combat actions are
parts.”44 According to the dialectic logic of the whole and the part, if
a local operation (campaign) is feasible, based on an understanding
of the local situation, but not feasible in the overall situation, “the
partial must be subordinated to the overall.” Conversely, if the local
command does not believe a campaign is feasible, but the central
leadership believes it should be conducted in the interest of the
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“overall situation,” then the interests of the “partial” (i.e., the local
commander) must subordinate itself to the “overall situation” by
implementing the campaign as directed from higher authorities.45
This logic manifests itself in recent PLA commentary on
the relationship between campaigns and the overall situation.
According to the PLA NDU’s 1999 textbook, On Military Campaigns,
one characteristic of a campaign is that it “carries out the task given in
consideration with the overall situation of a war.”46 The PLA NDU’s
2000 book, Science of Strategy, also stipulates that campaigns must be
carried out, “according to the requirements of the overall wartime
situation.”47 In future, high-tech local wars, this close linkage between
a campaign and the overall situation of a war will become even more
pronounced. “It may just take one or a few campaigns to end a war.”
In this context, it is possible for a campaign to be aimed at achieving
local “and even the overall objectives of a war.”48 From retired AMS
Vice Commandant Lieutenant General Mi Zhenyu’s perspective,
“in a local war, every campaign, and even every battle, may have
a direct bearing on the overall situation. Therefore, there will be
more occasions in which the strategic commander finds himself
directly involved in guiding a campaign or even an important
battle.”49 While some of this thinking reflects Chinese perceptions
of the nature of high-technology local war in the modern period, to
include improvements in modern telecommunications capabilities
that support the command and control of military operations, this
thinking has its roots in Marxist-Leninist thought, which the Chinese
have incorporated in developing their own notions of “military
dialectics.”50
Maoist Military Thinking.
A third source of China’s emphasis on the “overall strategic
situation,” would be Chairman Mao Zedong and his thinking on
military-strategic matters. The AMS’s recent publication, Science of
Strategy, defines the concept of strategy itself as being “the planning
and guidance for the overall situation of war.”51 This definition is
based on an earlier definition of strategy that Mao articulated in
his 1936 article, “The Strategic Issues in the Chinese Revolutionary
War.” From Mao’s perspective, “as far as there is war, there is
the overall situation of war. The whole world can be the overall
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situation of war; a country can be the overall situation of a war; a
dependent guerilla district and a major and independent operational
front can also be the overall situation of a war. All the things that
have the nature of taking care of all aspects and all phases are the
overall situation of war.”
Mao also articulated the concept of a “campaign” existing
in-between strategy and tactics. He pointed out that there were
“internal objective rules” within strategy, that were not the product
of subjective will, which led strategy to focus on the overall
situation instead of any concrete answer to any local issue.52 Mao
believed it was essential for both the top commander and the “battle
commanders” and “tactical commanders” to possess a certain degree
of understanding of the “overall situation in a war.”53 From Mao’s
perspective, “knowing the entire situation would facilitate the use of
its parts. Because the parts constitute the whole.”54
Chinese military strategists point to Mao’s emphasis on the
overall situation as being one of the primary factors driving Mao to
adopt a strategy of conducting a protracted war against the Japanese
that would pass through three phases: strategic defense, stalemate,
and strategic counteroffensive.55 From this perspective, Mao selected
this strategy based on his assessment that China was operating from
a position of inferiority (as far as “numbers” were concerned) in the
overall situation, especially in the balance of power with Japan. Mao
also assessed that in every local area, and in every specific operation,
China possessed conditions in which it could establish “absolute
superiority.” In this context, Mao advocated avoiding a “battle of
attrition” in favor of a protracted war strategy of mobile warfare
supplemented by guerilla and positional warfare. Mao calculated
that “as time goes on” we will gradually “gain superiority in the
overall situation” until we reach a point where we can conduct a
strategic counteroffensive and eventually defeat the enemy’s war
aim.56
For practical purposes, we will limit our examination of Mao’s
command practices to this one example. Nonetheless, a fuller
examination of Mao’s military writings and behavior probably
would find more instances in which Mao explicitly used the concept
of the “overall strategic situation.” The bottom line is that Mao
clearly emphasized the critical importance of the senior leadership
understanding and seeking to control the “overall war situation.
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According to the new AMS Science of Strategy book, Mao firmly
believed that “The commander should know the entire war effort.
The success or failure of the war could be determined by whether
attention was paid to the entire front.”57 In this context, it seems
a logical conclusion that Mao was a strong advocate of measuring
military campaigns in the context of their impact on the overall
situation.
Lessons from the War with Japan.
Chinese military strategists point to at least three examples in
the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45) in which they learned
direct lessons regarding the importance of the “overall situation” as
the main criterion for judging the effectiveness of war strategies or
campaign operations. The first lesson concerned the fact that the
CCP and the Kuomintang (KMT) pursued different war strategies
towards Japan resulting in two diametrically different results.
According to the PLA’s own interpretation of the war, the CCP
followed a “policy of conducting guerilla warfare but not letting up
efforts to conduct mobile warfare under favorable conditions, and
led the people’s armed forces in conducting guerilla warfare behind
enemy lines, opening large liberated area battlefields” and achieving
favorable results in war. In contrast, “the KMT followed a policy of
passive defense, and was not only unable to effectively strike at the
enemy, but also forced to stay in a passive position, thus suffering
repeated serious setbacks on frontal battlefields.” From the PLA’s
perspective, the clear lesson of this situation is that “whether the
strategic policy is correct or not will have a fundamental impact on
the overall situation in a war.”58
The second example they cite is the so-called Long March in
which the Central Workers and Peasants Red Army initially decided
to go to western Hunan to join up forces with the 2nd and 6th Field
Armies. Based on various military moves by Chiang Kai-shek’s
main force and other forces, Mao Zedong analyzed the situation and
proposed abandoning or changing original plans on four separate
occasions. Given that the Long March was ultimately successful,
Chinese strategists point to Mao’s assessment and changed plans as
an example where “timely and ongoing accurate assessment of the
war situation, looking at the overall situation and knowing when to
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change and being adept at doing so, enable our forces to continue
to extricate themselves from dangerous situations and gaining the
initiative in the strategic transition” of the war.59 China’s strategists
are also known to cite the Long March as an example in which the
massive objective material costs of a major military action (the PLA
lost more than 90 percent of its personnel and much of its equipment
during this strategic retreat), were ultimately worth it. In their view,
the end result of the Long March was strategically advantageous in
the sense that the CCP and PLA avoided military defeat in central
China and were better positioned to fight both the Japanese and the
KMT afterwards. Although I do not have a reference to the “overall
situation” logic handy, this situation is another example of where
the Chinese could argue that the “part” (i.e., the 90 percent who
died) had to subjugate its interests to the “whole.”60
The third lesson the Chinese draw from the War of Resistance
Against Japan regarding the “overall situation” is the critical
importance of the senior leader assessing the situation and basing
his or her judgments on an understanding of the overall situation.
During this war, there were 19 different liberated areas created.
From the Chinese perspective, it was not necessarily inevitable that
the war would be won, especially because, due to communication
and transportation problems, the leaders in each liberated area did
not have a “sense of the overall situation.” Hence, they turned for
guidance to the CCP Central Committee, and victory can be directly
attributed to Mao Zedong’s wise leadership and guidance to each
liberated area, according to the Chinese.61
Lessons from the Chinese Civil War.
Given the rich history of the Chinese Civil War, there undoubtedly
are multiple situations in which Chinese strategists have learned
lessons regarding the importance of measuring success or failure in
terms of the overall situation. For practical purposes, however, I will
limit our analysis to one specific campaign that the Chinese point
to as a “textbook” example of the importance of weighing military
campaigns in the context of the “overall strategic situation.”
The specific campaign the Chinese cite as an example of the
importance of weighing the consequences of a local action in terms
of the overall situation, in both military and civilian circles, is the
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Dabieshan campaign of the summer of 1947 and early 1948.62 In CCP
and PLA history, this campaign is considered a critical victory in the
civil war because the Liu-Deng Army made a strategic advance that
enabled the PLA to hold an important location, despite significant
costs and losses, a move that played a crucial role in enabling the
PLA to “gain strategic momentum and obtain overall victory” in the
war.63
Under Mao’s guidance, the Liu-Deng (Liu Bocheng-Deng
Xiaoping) Army deployed in June 1947 on a 1,000 li march
(approximately 335 miles) with the goal of occupying and holding
the Dabieshan mountain area in central China.64 Both Mao and
Deng calculated there would be serious costs associated with this
move, but Mao believed that “paying the price and holding the
position” would constitute victory. After the Liu-Deng Army
reached Dabieshan, they essentially drew a massive encirclement
and suppression campaign by KMT forces, in which more than 50
percent of Chiang Kai-shek’s forces along the southern route were
located in the Central Plains area.
In order to defeat this campaign, Deng divided his force into
two commands, and dispatched one force, led by Liu Bocheng to
the Huabei area while operating behind enemy lines. The Central
Military Commission dispatched the Chen-Xie Army to exert
pressure on Wuhan, thereby relieving some of the pressure on the
Deng-led Army in Dabieshan. However, Deng advised the central
leadership that his Army could hold out longer, despite having
already suffered several months of intense enemy pressure. Deng
argued that doing so would draw the enemy force around it so that
other PLA units could launch a counter-attack against KMT forces.
In the end, Deng’s advice was adopted, and his Army was able to
hold out, despite being a solitary force behind enemy lines with no
support force nearby and no way to receive additional supplies. The
successful defense of the Dabieshan area enabled the Liu Bocheng
forces at Huaibei and the Chen-Su and Chen-Xie Armies to score
major victories in attacking KMT forces in the Central Plains area.
The direct implication of this example for our subject is that both
Deng and other CCP leaders, including Mao Zedong, consider it a
textbook case of a partial local interest (i.e., the Dabieshan campaign
force led by Deng Xiaoping) successfully subordinating itself to
the interest of the CCP and the PLA as a whole in a way that had a
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fundamental strategic impact on the overall situation in the war. In
an important speech after the campaign, Deng Xiaoping outlined how
“many comrades” mistakenly viewed the situation from the “partial
situation at Dabieshan” and concluded, based on a “pessimistic
mood,” that the situation was extremely serious.65 In contrast,
Deng outlined how he used dialectics to proceed from the overall
situation, to conclude that whether the Dabieshan counteroffensive
was a success or failure “can only be fully understood by properly
calculating the accounts.” This calculation involved comparing
the number of troops eliminated on both sides and assessing the
state of the war in several different national areas. According to
Chinese accounts, Deng’s use of the method of “doing the accounts”
directly, clearly, and powerfully showed the importance of looking
at questions from the overall situation.66
China’s Geopolitical Situation.
China’s geopolitical situation also shapes the emphasis placed by
the Chinese on the need to grasp and control the so-called “overall
strategic situation.” China has 22,143 kilometers of land boundary
and 14,500 kilometers of coastline and claims 3 million square
kilometers of ocean territory. The security of China’s land borders,
coastline, and offshore islands historically has been difficult to
maintain because of the vast size of its periphery and the traditional
inadequacies in Chinese military power. The implication of this
geopolitical situation historically, according to the PLA AMS, has
been that China’s leaders have faced a “hard issue” in “choosing
the direction of strategic defense.” In particular, there has been a
traditional debate in China over the primary importance of “sea
defense” or “fort defense” in determining the strategic deployment
of armed forces.67
This hard choice regarding strategic deployment has created
tension between two competing “principles of strategic action” in
Chinese military-strategic thought: “correctly setting a primary
strategic direction” or “looking after the whole situation and
grasping the center of strategy.”68 Chinese strategic thought clearly
emphasizes that correctly setting a primary strategic direction is
the “foremost problem that strategic planning and guidance must
solve.”69 The Chinese define the primary strategic direction as the
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“key point of the overall situation” and the “standardized direction
for centralized employment of strategic forces.” Failure to set a
primary strategic direction that goals, forces, and means can be
organized around in time and space results in military forces and
strategic means becoming “loose sands.” In contrast, setting a
primary strategic direction enables your side to concentrate forces
for deployment and form a favorable strategic posture in important
combat directions, either offensive or defensive.
According to the AMS, in China’s “complicated international
strategic setup and peripheral security environment,” it is imperative
for the strategic commander to “grasp the major contradiction
affecting our national security and determine the main opponent
and principal threat to security.” In particular, “when there are two
or more directions under deterrence, he should separate the good
one from the bad one and make a distinction between the primary
and secondary strategic direction.” Doing so will enable the strategic
commander to “raise the actions in this direction to the height of the
overall situation,” thereby creating opportunities to “smoothly push
forward the whole war situation.”70
In this context, while Chinese strategic thought defines correctly
setting a primary strategic direction as the “foremost problem that
strategic planning and guidance must solve,” it also asserts that
the “most essential issue related to success or failure of the war” is
whether the strategic commander can “control the whole situation
and look after all parts therein to generate strategic value for the
actions of all parts in the whole situation.”71 A key challenge for the
strategic commander in looking after “all parts” is the need to grasp
what the Chinese define as the “center of strategy (schwerpunkt).”
This center of strategy is a changeable, unfixed part of the whole
whose success or failure will affect the fundamental interests of the
whole situation. It is essentially the “focal point of confrontation and
struggle between the two belligerent sides,” and there is only one
strategic center in a given time and space. Given that the Chinese
assume each period, war, and strategic stage has its own situation,
the “strategic center” of a war can change. The strategic commander
must therefore be good at adjusting to this change. From the Chinese
perspective, a “change in the ratio of forces between two belligerent
sides is the fundamental base to transform the strategic center.”72
Based on the logic in footnote 30 above, China’s geopolitical
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situation has probably been a primary factor shaping the emphasis
of Chinese strategic thought on setting a primary strategic direction,
grasping the relationship between the parts (i.e., campaigns
and stages) of the war effort and the “overall situation,” and on
understanding and adapting to changes in the estimated strategic
center of the war. Essentially, the Chinese are likely to measure the
extent to which a military campaign is achieving China’s objectives
in a primary or secondary strategic direction, the impact of this
campaign on the leadership’s estimate of the “strategic center” in
the war, and whether the progression or outcome of a campaign
conducted along one strategic direction necessitates a reevaluation
of Beijing’s judgment regarding what strategic directions should be
primary or secondary in nature.
One gets the sense that before, during, and after a campaign, the
strategic leadership or its subordinates would view it as necessary
to constantly assess the “strategic center” in the war to determine if
Beijing has struck the right balance in apportioning resources to the
war effort along various strategic directions. Given that every war
that China has been engaged in since 1949 has involved two-front
war situations for the leadership to consider, it would be interesting
to see if case studies of leadership decisionmaking during these wars
uncovered evidence of Chinese calculations regarding the “strategic
center,” determining the primary and secondary strategic directions
in the war, and the degree of leadership confidence in its ability to be
engaged on two fronts simultaneously.73
China’s Domestic Context.
China’s domestic context undoubtedly shapes how Beijing is
likely to evaluate a military campaign’s impact on the leadership’s
ability to control the overall strategic situation. According to CCP
CPS Vice President Zheng Bijian, the CCP draws a fundamental
distinction between the “fundamental importance” of the “overall
domestic situation” in comparison to the “overall international
situation,” which is mainly viewed in terms of its influence on the
domestic situation. From Zheng’s perspective, China has never in
its history embarked on a modernization drive as extensive as the
current one. Its ability to withstand and resist risks is limited because
it has many weaknesses, to include the existence of “competing
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schools of thought” regarding the appropriate “world outlook” for
China.74
This emphasis on the fundamental importance of the overall
domestic situation is reflected in the subcriteria that the CCP
apparently use in defining its ability to “grasp” and “control” the
overall strategic situation. Of these four subcriteria, three address
issues that are primarily internal in nature, whereas the fourth
addresses China’s military-strategic calculus. The first and second
subcriteria deal with the issues of CCP central authority, party
solidarity among CCP leaders, and national unity inside China. The
third subcriterion — momentum in China’s central task — deals, in
part, with China’s economic development program, which is crucial
to China’s effort to maintain internal stability. Moreover, China’s
military-strategic calculus places a premium on the leadership’s
ability to simultaneously balance a number of objectives, to include
containing domestic instability and civil unrest. Finally, when
describing the characteristics that a leadership should possess in
order to control the overall strategic situation, the Chinese emphasize
the need for a “political outlook” and a need to “maintain political
sensitivity,” since “public feelings affect the overall situation.”75
The implication of this domestic factor for how Beijing is likely to
evaluate military campaigns is two-fold. First, prior to the initiation
of any campaign, it appears that the leadership would probably
make assessments regarding the impact of a military campaign
on the CCP’s ability to uphold central authority, party solidarity,
national unity, and momentum in the nation’s central task and to
contain domestic instability and civil unrest. In theory, fundamental
concerns regarding the extent to which a military campaign would
erode the leadership’s ability to maintain any of these conditions
would be a factor prompting the leadership towards foregoing or
delaying a military campaign.
Once a war is underway, the leadership is likely to also assess
whether a campaign’s progression or outcome has maintained or
eroded its ability to maintain any of these domestic conditions.
Should the campaign be viewed by leaders as working to erode its
ability to maintain these conditions, this would, in theory, increase
pressures on the leadership to end a campaign, scale-back original
war aims, or find some nonmilitary solution to the war. Moreover,
the extent to which the end result of a campaign has eroded the
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leadership’s ability to maintain these conditions is likely to shape
leadership perceptions of whether a campaign should be viewed as
a success, even if the campaign achieved clear-cut favorable results
on the battlefield, strategically, or in impacting the internal political
situation for the enemy.
Finally, the domestic political impact of a military campaign could
also be one factor pushing the Chinese leadership towards initiating
a war, or a military campaign, or otherwise continuing a military
campaign despite poor results on the battlefield. The prospects for
such a situation would be greatest if the leadership calculates that a
military campaign or its progression is likely to enhance the party’s
ability to maintain central authority, party solidarity, national unity,
and momentum in the nation’s central task or to contain domestic
sources of instability and civil unrest. For example, a recent study
of eight historical cases in which the Chinese used armed force since
1949 has concluded that Beijing’s use of force always served the
purpose of domestic mobilization. Both Mao and post-Mao leaders
“fully understood that the tension created by an international crisis
provided them with the best means to call the whole nation to act
in accordance with the CCP’s terms and will.”76 Moreover, in their
evaluation of the effect of China’s use of force, Beijing’s leaders “put
more emphasis on whether or not the military action promoted the
Communist regime’s legitimacy [internally] than on the material
losses China suffered on the battlefield (such as heavy casualties
on the battlefield, and the emphasis on using resources for military
purposes at the expense of economic reconstruction).”
POTENTIAL DECEPTION OR CONFUSION?77
It is prudent and necessary to ask the question of whether our
understanding of China’s assessment criteria is based on deceptive
or confusing information. The criteria and subcriteria identified
and characterized seem rational in nature. Perhaps these are the
assessment criteria that China wants us to believe, given that, as Sun
Tzu asserts, “all warfare is based on deception.”78 Closely related to
this question, we also need to ask ourselves whether these assessment
criteria actually yield insight on China’s likely thinking or whether
we are simply “confusing ourselves” in using this information.79
At this juncture, I believe there are two areas where we would risk
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deceiving or confusing ourselves if we are not careful in relying on
these assessment criteria in seeking to understand China’s calculus.
The first would be the potential for the term “overall situation” to
mislead many Western readers regarding China’s relative priorities
in wartime. In various public statements, the Chinese often define the
overall situation as “peace and development” or “regional peace and
development,” which are the terms they use to define their current
assessment of the international strategic environment (i.e., peace is
the “trend of the times,” and development is the primary focus of
most powers).80 In many of these same statements, they also use this
term to describe an emphasis by Chinese leaders on “looking ahead”
and placing immediate problems or issues within the broader context
of China’s long-term interests as well as its self-described interest in
global or regional stability. Moreover, the Chinese have developed
an almost ritualistic emphasis on encouraging U.S. policymakers to
“take the overall situation into account” when conducting bilateral
relations. In so doing, this theme usually is accompanied by other
themes that involve pressures on the United States to overlook
or downplay various contentious issues in U.S.-China bilateral
relations, especially related to controversial Chinese behavior in the
human rights, proliferation, trade, and security arenas.81
In this context, there is a risk that emphasizing a Chinese
propensity to evaluate military campaigns in the context of the
overall strategic situation will convey unintentionally to readers
that China is likely to weigh campaigns broadly, by only gauging
the impact on China’s long-term interest, self-professed stake in
international stability, and stable bilateral relationships with many
other powers, especially the United States. In reality, China’s
emphasis on weighing the direction and outcome of military affairs
in the context of the “overall strategic situation” is primarily geared
towards criteria that are largely internal in nature or focused squarely
on China’s own position in a regional military balance. The relative
importance of global or regional stability or on specific bilateral
relations with foreign powers is clearly secondary or tertiary in
importance. Hence, there is no inherently inevitable likelihood that
China will forego, curtail, or limit military campaigns if it believes
the progression or outcome of a campaign would erode regional
stability or China’s relationship with a foreign power.
Second, the critical importance of “maintaining momentum in the
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nation’s central task” in peace or war can be easily misunderstood
if one “straight-line” projects China’s current approach to the
“central task” in a wartime scenario. Since 1978, China’s leadership
has clearly prioritized economic development as the central task
of the party and nation in developing comprehensive national
power, based on an assumption that China is likely to face a
generally peaceful security environment for the foreseeable future.
Hence, many foreign observers of China are likely to assume that
economics would be China’s top priority, even in wartime. The
practical implication of such an assumption is that it would suggest
that economics would work as a “restraining factor” in the Chinese
leadership’s risk and cost calculus in wartime.
However, such an assumption is potentially deceptive in
nature and could lead a foreign observer to underestimate China’s
willingness to incur costs and risks in wartime. The evidence
available thus far suggests that China’s definition of its “central task”
in wartime is likely to be a function of China’s threat assessment and
the scale of the scenario that Beijing was involved in. Deng Xiaoping
and CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin have indicated, on separate
occasions, that China’s fundamental peacetime stake in maintaining
momentum in the central task of economic development is based
on an assumption that China faces a generally benign security
environment. However, both leaders have indicated that China
would change its central task to ensuring safety and national security”
if a “world war” erupted, China faced the credible prospect of a
“military invasion” of the mainland, or the nation was involved in a
“large-scale war.” In making these assertions, however, both leaders
indicated that one of China’s war aims in these circumstances would
be to end the war on favorable terms “as soon as possible,” so Beijing
could refocus on the central task of national development.82
In this context, one should not necessarily assume that China’s
leaders would always evaluate military campaigns in circumstances
where economic construction is the nation’s central task, to include a
Taiwan Strait war. Indeed, if China executes a major attack against
the island of Taiwan itself, above and beyond a naval blockade or
other limited actions, there is a very strong likelihood, at that point
in time, that China’s “central task” would have been reordered
by the leadership to place safety and national security ahead of
economic development. This would be especially true if the United
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States intervened. Chinese media sources indicate China is likely
to declare national, vice partial, defense mobilization if the United
States intervenes on Taiwan’s behalf.83 Conversely, if China is
conducting limited military actions against Taiwan — to include a
show of force, the seizure of an offshore island, or the imposition of a
naval blockade — this is probably a sign that the leadership intends
to win a “local war” against Taiwan while simultaneously retaining
its emphasis on economic development as the nation’s “central task.”
Put simply, a Chinese leadership that prioritizes national security as
its “central task” is more likely to tolerate risks and cost in wartime
than a leadership that prioritizes “economic development” as the
central task.
OUTLOOK AND TOPICS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
The key findings in this chapter should be viewed as an initial
assessment of a very elusive subject matter rather than a finished
assessment of how China will evaluate military campaigns in a future
war. The assessment criteria that I have identified and characterized
provide, at best, an initial understanding of how China’s leadership
intends to exercise “strategic leadership in wartime.” As stated
earlier, whether China’s leadership has ever actually employed these
criteria in evaluating the approximately 400 campaigns the PLA has
conducted since 1927 remains to be tested and examined. Towards
this end, a case study approach to prior campaigns or a series of
campaigns has the potential to yield insights on whether and how
the leadership uses these criteria or other ones in practice.
Moreover, there are a host of various human, organizational,
and procedural variables that would need to be studied prior to
gaining a more complete understanding of China’s assessment
propensities in wartime. As the Chinese themselves admit when
conceptualizing the importance of the overall situation as the main
criterion, these other variables could potentially complicate or erode
the leadership’s ability to exercise strategic leadership in wartime.
In the end, the author judges that current and emerging leaders are
likely to ultimately settle in wartime on assessment criteria that stress
the importance of the concept of controlling the overall situation as
the main criterion, since this concept seems to address many of the
problems that current, past, and future Chinese leaders are likely to
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have to cope with in wartime. However, there is likely to be some
delay and internal friction as emerging leaders reach agreement
on how to go about maintaining control in a society that has not
experienced a major war in 20 years or more. Nonetheless, much
remains to be learned regarding how China’s fourth generation
of leaders, who lack extensive wartime experience, would go
about exercising strategic leadership in war, to include their likely
assessment criteria for evaluating campaigns.
The key to gaining a deeper understanding of how China’s
leaders would evaluate military campaigns is to gain greater access
to China’s assessment criteria. The information that I used in
completing this chapter, while relatively authoritative, nonetheless
represents a limited body of material from which to draw insights.
Continued translation of Chinese language material would be
essential to carrying this research effort forward. Such material
should be drawn from both military and civilian sources, given
the likelihood that China’s senior leadership group would be led
primarily by party leaders in wartime. In general, these leaders
have had limited exposure to Chinese military-strategic thinking.
Moreover, our understanding of this subject would be enhanced
if we examined any information available on how senior Chinese
civilians involved in directing national development programs and
overseeing economic affairs would evaluate military operations
in wartime. Finally, critical examination of the following research
topics could yield additional insights on the factors shaping the
Chinese leadership’s approach to strategic leadership in wartime.84
• Organizing Strategic Leadership in Wartime. The CCP Central
Committee’s Central Military Commission is frequently referenced
by Chinese and foreign observers as China’s “national command
authority” in wartime. However, it is populated predominately by
military officials and, hence, may not be well suited to integrate civil
and military interests and perspectives in wartime. Moreover, the
CCP reportedly organized a “Supreme Command” (Tong Shuai Bu)
in the war with Japan and the Chinese Civil War. Although it has
been difficult to identify this command operating in Chinese wars
fought since 1949, Chinese officials frequently reference it when
describing wars fought since then and in describing China’s future
national command and control arrangements. Examination of this
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enigma might shed light into how China would go about assessing
campaigns in wartime. It would seem the formation of a “Supreme
Command” would better position China’s leadership to base
decisions on an integration of military and civilian interests than
the CMC. The emergence of the State Council’s National Defense
Mobilization Office as a key wartime leadership organization would
also facilitate the integration of political, military, and economic
interests.
• Establishing a Culminating Point for Victory. China’s
emphasis on the need to maintain or enhance CCP control of the
overall situation raises fundamental questions regarding Chinese
concepts of what constitutes victory. If accurate, this concept
implies that China’s leadership could define victory in terms that are
not a function of direct military, strategic, or political effects attained
during the progression or outcome of military campaigns. In effect,
this criterion implies that the Chinese could define any situation that
does not degrade or destroy the CCP’s ability to control the “overall
strategic situation” as constituting “victory.” This logic may explain
China’s termination of wars against India in 1962 and Vietnam in
1979 on terms that did not result in clear-cut military, strategic, or
political success. Moreover, this logic implies that China’s leadership
might be willing to incur substantial military or strategic losses
before it concludes that its ability to control the overall situation has
been degraded or destroyed.
• Determining an Exit Strategy. China’s current doctrine for
conducting military campaigns is based on a hedging relationship
between military campaigns of “fast resolve” and “protracted war.”
This doctrine asserts that the PLA should conduct a campaign of
“fast resolve” to defeat the enemy and realize the campaign intention
“in the shortest period of time possible.”85 If this short-war strategy
does not work, China should shift to a “protracted war” strategy.
However, this doctrine raises fundamental questions regarding
how China would determine an exit strategy in a protracted war
scenario in which continuation of a protracted strategy is degrading
or destroying the CCP’s ability to grasp and control the overall
strategic situation? There appears to be a potential disconnect
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between China’s doctrine for conducting military campaigns and
its likely criteria for measuring success. This disconnect could serve
as a “blind spot” in China’s strategic calculus that has its roots in
the tension between China’s tradition of protracted warfare and its
transition into an increasingly modernized and developed society
that generally lacks extensive wartime experience.
• Setting a Ceiling for Acceptable Costs.86 China’s approach to
evaluating military campaigns implies the objective material costs of
a campaign would weigh less in Beijing’s calculus than its subjective
assessment of the impact of a campaign on several political,
strategic, and military sub-criteria that comprise its ability to control
the overall situation. This logic suggests that Beijing may be willing
to incur substantial economic losses and dislocations in pursuing a
campaign before it concludes the campaign is degrading or eroding
its ability to control the overall strategic situation. However, it
remains to be seen whether Beijing would be willing to stick by these
measures of effectiveness in wartime, especially a Taiwan Strait
war. Approximately 60 percent of China’s gross national product is
consolidated in provinces along China’s eastern seaboard, which has
been referenced as an “economic center of gravity” by PLA strategists.
Most of the facilities and infrastructure that support and sustain this
product is located in fixed, unhardened, above-ground facilities or
installations that would be vulnerable to conventional strikes by an
adversary, including stand-off attacks. In this context, the author
suspects there is tension between the CCP’s traditional criterion
for measuring military success and these economic realities. This
tension probably manifests itself in a renewed emphasis by China
on civil air defense (People’s Air Defense) in recent years in tandem
with periodic concerns expressed by PLA strategists regarding the
military implications of China’s coastal development strategy and
the vulnerability of major infrastructure in developing China (the
Three Gorges Dam, for example).
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CHAPTER 8
FROM SURPRISE TO STALEMATE:
WHAT THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY LEARNED
FROM THE KOREAN WAR — A HALF-CENTURY LATER
John J. Tkacik, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
It is a paradox that the Korean War — the People’s Liberation
Army’s (PLA) first real taste of “positional warfare” — is held out
by the PLA’s historians and tactical instructors as proof of Mao
Zedong’s theories on “mobile warfare.” While it is true that Chinese
“mobile war” tactics and operations yielded tremendous successes
in the early months of the Korean War against an enemy with
superior firepower, total air supremacy, and an advanced armor,
mechanized transport, and supply infrastructure, victories were
purchased at terrifying costs. United Nations (U.N.) forces were
vastly outnumbered and their technical advantages served as “force
multipliers” that prevented them from being completely annihilated
by human waves of marauding Chinese interlopers. But Chinese
troopers died by the tens of thousands--killed by their two greatest
enemies of the war, the overwhelming mass of enemy weaponry
and lack of adequate logistical preparation and supply.
The Chinese People’s Volunteers’ (CPV) wins came with tactical
surprise and good mobility off-road and away from heavily patrolled
highways, but after 7 months of vicious combat in five separate
campaigns, the battlefront finally stabilized at roughly the mid-line
of the Korean Peninsula on the 38th Parallel. From then on, the CPV
and their North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) comrades found
themselves locked in “positional” battle. Their bitterest lessons
from the Korean War came in the trenches and deep tunnels of the
front line and under the incessant storm of American bombing,
strafing, and cannonade which deprived them of adequate food,
ammunition, sleep, sanity, and — in the case of “several hundred
thousand troops” — their lives.1 Nonetheless, in the end the Chinese
wrestled American-led U.N. forces with superior weaponry and
total command of air and sea to an utter deadlock.
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The lesson? It is simplistic to say the PLA took away from the
Korean Conflict the lesson “never fight positional war.” Indeed, after
the summer of 1951, Beijing’s political aims could also be achieved
by simply avoiding defeat on the battlefield. It seems likely that
after the initial failure to destroy the U.N.-South Korean forces in the
first surprise campaigns, the Chinese resigned themselves to a war
of attrition because any effort to expand the bounds of that particular
war could result in the war spreading to China’s homeland. By the
end of the war, Chinese commanders had basically learned to cope
with their Sisyphean existence. Sheer endurance, it seems, was a
valuable lesson in how to succeed against a superior enemy.
The PLA also learned some broader strategic lessons from the
Conflict that will not be addressed in this chapter. They learned, for
instance, never to take for granted their military allies — especially
the Soviet Union — whose ulterior war aims were opaque to them.
Moscow’s political behavior rarely made sense, and Comrade Josef
Stalin’s promises of military support were rarely translated into
prompt action.2
How might the PLA practice the lessons of the Korean War in
future campaigns — particularly in a Taiwan scenario? Consider
that the two key lessons are, first, that complete and utter tactical
surprise are essential to early victories; and second, that without
adequate logistical preparations or the means to defend supply
lines, patient endurance of years of punishment in a limited war
may be necessary to avoid defeat against a technologically superior
foe. One final thought might be that that a well-timed coup or some
other “regime change” in a key enemy government can bring about
an ultimate political victory when a military one is denied on the
battlefield.
THE IMPERATIVE OF MOBILE WAR
The Korean War really was the exception that proved Mao
Zedong’s rule — mobile warfare is preferable to positional battle.
In Korea, Chinese forces were effective at both mobile fighting so
long as they had surprise and initiative on their side and positional
battle after being beaten to a standstill. Mao’s generals were acutely
aware of Mao’s own teachings “on protracted war.” Mao’s “Selected
Military Writings” were standard issue in the PLA.3 Mao had little
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use for positional warfare and preferred to concentrate forces
against enemy armies rather than stand and hold territory. As such,
Mao had inculcated in his generals an appreciation for “deliberately
creating misconceptions for the enemy and then springing surprise
attacks on him.”4
As the commander of the “Chinese People’s Volunteers” (CPV)
Marshal Peng Dehuai5 prepared to move his armies into North
Korea, Chairman Mao telegraphed him instructions. First, Mao
cautioned, the battle will turn on whether or not Chinese troops
can use “total surprise” to swiftly destroy “two, three, or even four
puppet divisions.” If the initial attacks fail to throw the enemy into
a “passive position,” then the enemy will quickly regroup and gain
the upper hand. Second, enemy air power has the potential to inflict
massive losses on Chinese troops and paralyze unit movements.
Mao asked if Peng’s troops had practiced night movements
sufficiently to carry out operations under the threat of massive U.S.
air power. Finally, Mao asked if the Americans could increase their
troop presence by five-to-ten divisions, “or if, before the Americans
were able to bring up reserves, the Chinese troops could destroy
another few U.S. or South Korean divisions in a mobile campaign
against their isolated positions.”6
Whether Chairman Mao indeed sent such prescient instructions
is debatable. Certainly it has become the stuff of legend, and many
Chinese memoirs of the Korean War are filled with page after page
of Mao’s cables, instructions, and general musings among officers
of “what would Mao do?”7 Even General Hong Xuezhi who
commanded the CPV logistical effort, recalls that in the very first
days of the Chinese entry, Marshal Peng received a cable from Mao
advising that
at present there are two key objectives to the campaign, first to
isolate the Puppet [i.e., Republic of Korea or “ROK”] Seventh
Division at [Guchang Chu], to not let them escape, and this
will force the Puppet 1st, 6th, and 8th Divisions to bring up
reinforcements — there you can fight them! Second, the full
force of three armies should be moved to [Qikai]8 to complete the
launch the campaign, and this will give us maximum momentum
at the time of attack and guarantee annihilation of the enemy.9

While it is hard to believe that Marshal Peng appreciated this kind
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of micromanagement from Zhongnanhai, he kept his grumbling to
himself. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Chinese PLA cherishes to
this day these brilliant insights of Mao Zedong as the apotheosis of
“Lessons Learned” in the Korean War.
HEALTHY RESPECT FOR AIR POWER
In any event, it is doubtful that Marshal Peng, General Hong,
or anyone else needed the gifted eye of Mao to see that the key to a
victory in Korea was avoiding American airpower to fullest extent.
In fact, General Hong’s memoirs open by recounting a crisp
autumn evening in the Chinese border city of Andong on October 7,
1950. He and General Deng Hua had just finished dinner — it was
the day they learned that U.S. forces had crossed the 38th Parallel.
Suddenly, Hong recalled, there came a “whump-whump-whump”
sound from the south, getting louder, and presently there appeared
a large black spot in the southern sky. General Deng shouted
“aircraft, American aircraft!” It was a flight of dozens of huge B29 bombers accompanied by smaller P-51 Mustang fighters tightly
arranged in layers.
Within moments, the phantom bombing fleet droned over the
North Korean city of Sinuiju just opposite Andong on the Korean
side of the Yalu River. “With my own eyes,” said General Hong,
“I saw Sinuiju become a vast sea of fire in the space of just a few
minutes. The fires soon turned into a “towering pillar of thick,
smoky cloud and soon the entire city was shrouded in the pall.”
The next morning, Sinuiju was a plain of rubble. The emotion of his
prose reflects how profoundly the incident colored his assessment of
America’s air supremacy in Korea.
At the time, General Hong noted that the U.S. bombers failed
to hit the bridges crossing the Yalu from North Korea, and it was
only years later that he understood the U.S. Government had issued
orders that the bridges were not to be touched because “it would
mean war with China, and a war without limits.”10 Nonetheless, the
Chinese high command understood throughout the war that their
supply lines and their own aircraft would have sanctuary north of
the Yalu — but no mercy south of it. Unfortunately, Beijing didn’t.
On the afternoon of October 17, 1950, even as Chinese troops had
already crossed into Korea, General Hong and General Deng Hua
296

phoned Marshal Peng (then in Shenyang) to report
we concluded the river-crossing deployment conference
yesterday, and after quite a bit of discussion the comrades feel that
the air-defense artillery is insufficient and we have no air cover,
the enemy can concentrate major air strikes, artillery barrages
and tank forces without any fear that we can counterattack in
strength. Moreover, the Korean mountains, lowlands and paddy
fields are frozen solid and impossible to dig in for shelter. If the
enemy launches a massive attack, our positions would be very
difficult to support.11

Then General Hong advised that was “everyone’s recommendation” that because the forces had not been sufficiently
indoctrinated, “it would be suitable to wait out the winter and move
next spring.”12 Unfortunately, Marshal Peng had just received orders
from Mao Zedong to return to Beijing to consult with Premier Zhou
Enlai. Zhou had just returned from Moscow, and the date was set.
Marshal Peng showed General Hong’s telegram to Mao, but the die
had been cast. The CPV would continue deployments into Korea in
force. Peng relayed the order back to CPV headquarters in Andong
— under Mao’s name.13
THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE
Surely, no one in PLA headquarters was under any illusion that
the CPV mission would be a straightforward task. Secrecy and
deception were essential to frustrating American air power. In
hindsight, there can be little gainsaying the conventional Chinese
wisdom that American “arrogance” — or at least complaisance
— was the source of the surprise.
In the first month of the CPV entry into Korean War — from
October 16 to mid November — the U.N. command had little idea of
the scale of the Chinese intervention. From August to early October,
in utter silence and tremendous discipline, endless trainloads of
240,000 CPV personnel in nine armies comprising thirty infantry
divisions and four artillery divisions from Southern and Central
China had converged on the Chinese side of the Yalu River.14 There
they joined more than 160,000 Chinese troops already in Manchuria.
After months of careful observation of American reconnaissance
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aircraft hovering over northern Korea, Chinese commanders timed
the infiltration of their divisions to avoid aerial observation. Under
cover of night 18 Chinese CPV divisions, about 200,000 men,15 slipped
across the Yalu “all at once” and proceeded by secondary roads
and trails to wooded staging areas to await their initial offensive.16
Surprisingly, Chinese sources do not describe the CPV tactics for
infiltrating into northern Korea. American historians credit Chinese
fighter aircraft with keeping U.S. RB-29 aircraft away from the Yalu
River and “excellent camouflage discipline” for concealing the CPVs
once they penetrated the Korean mountains.17
What was left of Kim Il-sung’s NKPA probably had ample
intelligence on the disposition of the increasingly diffused
American and South Korean forces. But how intelligence sources
communicated with operations staffs at headquarters is a mystery.
When Marshal Peng Dehuai had his first conference inside Korea
with North Korean President Kim Il-sung on October 22, 1950,
General Hong Xuezhi was dismayed to learn from a female cadre in
Kim’s entourage that “we here don’t have a telephone, nor a radio
set, nor a car, so we can only send people on foot with messages.”18
Chinese reticence to analyze the success of their deception may also
signal that they did not, in fact, get intelligence from Korean sources,
but rather through separate channels. The lack of discussion in
Chinese sources may, therefore, be a continued effort to protect halfcentury-old intelligence sources and methods.
Both Chinese and American historians agree on what happened
next. Over the coming weeks, small American and ROK units, some
as small as battalion strength, found themselves isolated along a thin
front line, or simply clumped in forward area outposts, surrounded
by superior numbers of Chinese troops — and though they did not
know it at the time, the Chinese were often at division strength or more
of 10,000 combat fighters. Following Mao’s dicta on mobile warfare
and surprise attack, the Chinese would deploy their formations in
strength around unsuspecting U.N. positions and on high ground
along escape routes hoping to “lure reinforcements into pockets.”19
Battle maps drawn by both Chinese and American historians agree
— these battles often involved at least one, sometimes two and three
Chinese armies ranged against battalions or regiments of American,
ROK, or U.N. forces.
But even for Marshal Peng, the First Campaign was a “battle
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of chance encounters.”20 On October 21, a division of the Chinese
40th Army (some 30,000 men) ran into ROK soldiers near Bukjin
and wiped out the unit. On October 29, 1950, the CPV 39th Army
tightened the noose on the ROK First Infantry Division at Unsan from
the northeast, the northwest and the southwest, while the CPV 66th
Army, again over 30,000 men, moved toward Kusong and prepared
to interdict elements of the U.S. 24th division, which it anticipated
would advance to relieve its Korean allies. General Hong describes
several other encounters with ROK forces between October 25 and
November 1, including some that were hampered by the backrush of
retreating NKPA troops and North Korean civilians trying to avoid
the shooting. The 112th Division of the 38th Army was struck by a
sudden attack near [Miaoxiang Shan] hill and were slowed in getting
to their rendezvous point.21
Marshal Peng’s writings say the “First Campaign ended in
victory” on October 25, 1950, but noted that “because of their high
level of mechanization, the U.S. British and Puppet troops were able
to withdraw speedily” to the Chongchon River where they dug in.
Peng explained “it would have been unfavorable for our Volunteers
to engage the enemy in positional warfare with the equipment they
had at the time. They might have suffered defeat.”22
Even as late as November 6, it was still quite apparent that the
Americans had no idea of the magnitude of Chinese strength against
them. U.N. Commander General Douglas MacArthur’s intelligence
identified elements of five Chinese divisions, the largest element
being a regiment.23 When mauled by a full Chinese army, neither
the Americans nor their ROK allies knew what hit them. U.S. Eighth
Army commander General Walton Walker attributed the collapse
of the ROK divisions, not to overwhelming enemy numbers and
firepower, but to “psychological fear of Chinese intervention, and
previous complacency and overconfidence in all ROK ranks.”24
Of course, the Chinese were keeping out of sight on purpose.
“Although the enemy had regrouped, they were still dispersed and
unclear about our armies’ situation,” General Hong notes with pride.
The Chinese, on the other hand, were quite clear about the locations
and strengths of all the U.N. units: “north of the Chongchon River,
the enemy only had a bit more than 50,000 combat personnel, while
we could concentrate 10 to 12 divisions, 120,000-150,000 men, two or
three times the size of the enemy.”25
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Given his vast numerical superiority, plus the fact that the ROK
troops were completely clueless about the Chinese dispositions,
Marshal Peng proposed to swiftly outflank the ROK 8th, 7th, and 1st
infantry divisions, come in behind them, annihilate them, and then
move on to strike the American and British forces further west.
Peng then cleared the plan with Mao in Beijing, who approved it,
and wrote back helpfully
for this battle, you want the full force of the 38th Army and one
division of the 42nd Army to guarantee cutting off the enemy
retreat line from the Chongchon River, the other armies and
divisions should boldly interdict escape routes from the enemy
flanks and rear, and then carry out a piecemeal destruction of
their forces, thus will victory be achieved.26

It was, no doubt, a comfort to Marshal Peng to have Mao’s
personal attention and expert guidance. In any event, there is
always the unexpected. Peng’s 39th Army was ready to hit the
ROK 1st Infantry Division at Unsan at 1930 hours the evening of
November 1. But at 1350 that afternoon, CPV spotters saw signs
the ROK division was withdrawing from its position. (In fact, the
ROK division was changing places with the 8th Regimental Combat
Team (RCT) of the U.S. 1st Cavalry division, which took up the ROK
positions in Unsan.)
Unaware that the well-equipped American armor-supported
regimental combat team had changed places with the ROK, the
Chinese enveloped the position with eight infantry regiments, two
regiments, and an independent battalion of artillery, and at 1700
hrs launched the attack. The battle raged until the early hours of
November 2, by which time “a large portion of the American and
Puppet troops were annihilated and over 70 U.S. tanks and trucks
destroyed.”
The 3rd Battalion of the 8th RCT was retreating along the road
south from Unsan when it was surrounded and badly treated. Only
with fierce and persistent air and armor support were the Americans
able to survive until November 3, but attempts to break out of the
encirclement were fruitless. By evening November 3, the CPV 39th
Army finally overran the American positions.27
The action was the first time in the war that Chinese forces had
inflicted such punishment on the well-armed U.N. forces, and General
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Hong believed it to be one of the most significant actions of the war.
Nonetheless, Chairman Mao, ever looking over the shoulders of his
commanders, cabled the front at 1900 hrs on November 2:
pay attention how you use the 38th Army to control ground
in the Anju, [Junyu li] and [Qiuchang] sectors, construct strong
fortifications, focus on [Junyu Li] as the strong point, focus on
cutting the enemy’s north-south lines at [Qingzhou], destroy
the American 2nd Division moving north (from Pyongyang)
to relieve the remnants of the ROK 6th, 7th and 8th Divisions,
then it is highly likely that you can extend lines southward to
Pyongyang. If this is successful, it will be a strategic victory.28

The purpose of this chapter is not to recount verbatim the
Chinese version of each of these battles, but simply to underscore
that the Chinese were most in their element in mobile fighting.
Marshal Peng convened his first headquarters staff meeting of the
war on November 13 to review the lessons of the first campaign. In
general, Peng may have been pleased with progress, but his face did
not reflect it. General Liang Xingchu’s 38th Army had been unable
to keep pace, fought poorly, let the enemy slip away, and Marshal
Peng berated him in front of his colleagues.29
While the old Marshal may have been crotchety, he rarely turned
on his subordinates. But winter was locking in, and Peng no doubt
was feeling the pressure of lost initiative, regrouping U.N. forces,
increasingly powerful U.S. air strikes, freezing temperatures, and
ill-clothed and fed CPV. Along the western sector, the CPV 4th
Group Army failed to make headway “primarily because the enemy
artillery was highly concentrated, it was impossible to divide forces
and simultaneously confront the enemy.”30
But the CPV also appreciated the U.N. forces’ ability to organize
a coordinated retreat supported by overwhelming air and artillery
cover. In both the east and west sectors of the battlefront, the story
was the same. “Because the enemy forces were entirely motorized,
the attackers had no way to keep up, and had to satisfy themselves
by wiping out a small number of covering forces.”31
Moreover, as the element of surprise wore off, the U.N. forces
quickly comprehended the CPV tactic: “to launch large-scale night
time point attacks and penetrate to the rear of the enemy positions to
control the entire battle area.”32
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But Marshal Peng knew his surprise offensive had not run
out of steam purely because of “a hundred aircraft above and a
hundred tanks ahead,” but because his own units were running out
of ammunition. In two separate fights, the 3rd Brigade of the 337th
division at [Longyuan Li] and the 3rd brigade of the 335 division at
[Songgu Feng], “used up their ammo, and used rocks, fists and teeth
in their fight to the death with the enemy.”33 By December 27, food
and supplies shipped from China could only supply one-quarter of
the minimum requirements of six CPV armies (the 38th, 39th, 40th,
42nd, 50th, and 66th), and the Chinese had to rely on requisitions
of 30,000 tons of grain from Korean peasants to keep the armies
moving.34
LOGISTICS, THE CPV’S FATAL FLAW
Marshal Peng, therefore, was acutely sensitive to the slapdash
nature of the PLA’s logistical network. In PLA doctrine up to the
Korean War, logistics was mostly a matter of relying upon the
goodwill of the local population for food and relying upon the
cowardice of the defeated Kuomintang (KMT) troops for captured
weapons and ammunition. It is interesting to note General Hong’s
recollection that the first time his CPV happened across a retreating
column of NKPA, the Koreans were puzzled. The Chinese CPV
were wearing Korean-style uniforms, but were carrying American
weapons. “You’re Chinese, aren’t you?” a Korean officer asked. The
NKPA soldiers were all carrying Soviet arms.35
Marshal Nie Rongzhen36 who oversaw PLA logistics at the
Central Military Commission headquarters in Beijing describes how
the PLA prepositioned stockpiles at the Korean border in the months
before China entered the war.37
. . . For example, during the Second Campaign, we had originally
planned that two armies plus two divisions could handle
campaign responsibilities in the western sector of the advance.
But because we couldn’t transport the required amounts of
rations up to the front, we were forced to cancel the two extra
divisions and this had an impact on our failure to achieve greater
results from the operation. In the East sector, the troops which
entered Korea had not made sufficient preparations and faced
even greater difficulties. Not only did these troops not have

302

enough to eat, their winter uniforms were too thin and could not
protect their bodies from the cold. As a result, there occurred a
large number of non-combat casualties. If we hadn’t had these
logistical problems as well as certain other problems, the soldiers
would have wiped out the U.S. First Marine Division at Chongjin
Reservoir. In fact, the Americans announced the loss of that
division on their radio broadcasts, but they subsequently were
able to evacuate them by sea.38

Marshal Nie’s prose fails to convey the full horror of that
campaign, however. According to prisoner of war debriefs by
U.S. Army intelligence, in the 2 weeks between November 27
and December 12, General Song Shilun’s 9th Group Army lost an
estimated 45,000 soldiers and coolies to “death by freezing.”39
General Song’s 9th Group Army was a case in point. Surprise
is best when it is preceded by adequate planning. The 9th Group
Army suffered from “inexperience” and “lacked both doctrinal and
material preparations.” The Army only received orders from the
Central Military Commission (CMC) to deploy to Korea when it
was entrained for Manchuria from Central China, and was given its
winter uniforms as it changed trains in Shenyang--but “a portion”
of the troops failed to be given their winter kit and went into Korea
without adequate clothing. They were left to make do by wrapping
cotton scarves around their heads and covering themselves with
“carpets” they had managed to pick up on the way. The 9th Group
Army’s artillery units remained in Manchuria to be reoutfitted with
Soviet cannon, and the Group Army’s divisions entered Korea with
only ten “old American 75mm mountain guns.” According to a
non-PLA history, “these troops braced temperatures of 30-below, as
they snuck their way through the high mountains, dense forests, and
narrow paths of eastern Korea.”40 Needless to say, that history failed
to recount the fate of the ill-clad CPV soldiers.
As the battle lines moved southward, the CPV supply lines
stretched out and the logistical problems multiplied.41 By the
time of the Fourth Campaign in early 1951, food and ammunition
stocks dwindled, and attacking CPV infantry could never get
adequate artillery cover. It was quite common for CPVs to run out
of ammunition completely, Marshal Nie recalled. Often, the CPV
offensives finished up with bayonets, adrenalin, and a din of trumpets
and screams. During the Fifth Campaign (April 22 to June 10), “our
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troops were able to break through enemy lines in the [Xianli] Sector,
but because they didn‘t have food or bullets, they stopped the attack
for three days and lost the initiative.” Nie explained:
Our troops also surrounded brigade and battalion-sized
formations of enemy forces, but because we lacked the firepower,
we were unable to complete their destruction. Other units,
because they were insufficiently supplied, were obliged to retreat,
and this seriously affected their combat morale. In sum, during
the actual operational battle stages of the Korean War, there were
a fair number of examples of the CPV’s having to cease an attack
in the midst of battle or of incurring heavy casualties because of
insufficient rations and ammunition.42

General Hong Xuezhi recalls that on April 8, 1951, a massive
American napalm bombing run set 84 rail cars afire, destroying
1,500 tons of grain, 408,000 uniforms, and 190,000 pairs of boots.
General Hong reports that as much as 40 percent of all supplies were
destroyed by U.N. aircraft while being transported to the front line
by truck and rail. “The U.S. airmen were experienced World War
II veterans,” Hong explains, “with over 1,000 hours of flight time
each.” During the day, “they’d prowl the mountains and ravines, at
night they search for lights.” One day, said Hong, “I saw with my
own eyes a P-51 Mustang fly underneath an electric high-voltage
cable.”43 These fliers, Hong complained, destroyed over 3,000
Chinese trucks in the first 7 months of the war, “over 400 trucks a
month.”44 To hide from the American fliers, Hong said, trains and
truck convoys would drive deep into train and road tunnels, but the
Americans “steering with one hand, aiming with the other,” would
loose missiles into the tunnel mouth, and “the bombs would streak
70 meters inside the tunnel” destroying all inside.45 Marshal Nie was
more pointed. Loss of over 70 percent of a transport column or train
set was not a rare event, and air strikes often destroyed 80 percent of
the materiel at staging depots.46
That Marshal Nie had a high regard for U.S. air power was
apparent in his description of its effects. Because of enemy air
strikes, Korean rail lines and highways were in a chronic state of
impassability. Equipment in need of repair on the front could not
be returned to the rear areas for service, and after transport trucks
reached the front lines, it was equally difficult for them to get back
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in a timely manner to the rear areas for reloads. By the autumn of
1951, the number of rail cars needed to supply the Korean War was
fully 20 percent of the entire domestic rolling stock in China. For
example, from late September to mid-October 1951, Chinese troops
needed about 12,000 railcars of food, cooking oil, ammunition, and
other supplies, but they were only able to get about 6,000 rail cars
through.47
The effects of this constriction of supplies on Chinese foot soldiers
was profound.
For instance, the rations problem was like this. Because of enemy
bomb and rocket strikes, we couldn’t get enough food up to the
front, and when we could get it up there, the troops didn’t dare
cook it because the campfire smoke would draw enemy strafing
runs. There was just no way. In the heat of battle, for instance,
quite a few soldiers could only rely on the ‘handful of fried
noodles, and a handful of snow’ to keep body and soul together.
One ought to say that fried noodles had their use during the
active combat part of the war. However, when fried noodles were
mixed with snow-water, they readily caused diarrhea.48
One visitor from Beijing who went to the front lines during the
beginning of the Truce Talks recalled that the CPV troopers
referred to the U.S. Aviators as the “iron and steel magnates”
because they profligately dumped their iron and steel on the
Korean market.49

However, July 20, 1951, brought an enemy even more devastating
than the American aircraft. A flood which raised river levels three
to four meters, sometimes as high as 11 meters above normal, with
flows four, six, and even seven meters per second, hit the frontlines
hard. It washed out campgrounds, supply depots, ruined hand guns
and rifles, flooded medic tents, and even destroyed heavy weapons.
In the rear areas, electric power lines collapsed, hundreds of miles of
roadbeds eroded, 205 highway bridges were washed away, and all
transportation was halted for over 20 days. In fact, bridges that were
rebuilt were flooded away again in short order as torrents continued
to stream off mountain sides. An anti-aircraft battalion at Samtong
was decimated when a high-voltage line crashed into the flooded
artillery revetments. The personnel had no experience in dealing
with power lines, and 167 men were killed by electrocution. The
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cannons and tractors were washed away as well.50
U.S. Air Force and Navy bombers and fighters took advantage
of the disaster to plaster the CPVs in their chaos. Their bombing,
napalming, and strafing continued mercilessly in a 6-month
air campaign that both the Americans and the Chinese termed
“Operation STRANGLE.”51 At this point, resupply to the front line
became desperate. Road and rail repairs were solely the work of
the rear-echelon logistics department, which had assigned “a few
regiments of construction troops” to the job. CPV logistics chief
General Hong approached CPV deputy commander General Chen
Geng to put every available CPV trooper not already at the front line
to work rebuilding road and rail lines.
He also wanted North Korean civilians dragooned into labor
corvees. Whether it took General Hong 6 weeks to get his act
together or whether the proposal was just slow working its way
up to Marshal Peng and Korean leader Kim Il-sung is not known.
But on September 8, 1951, the order for all hands — and Korean
peasants, too — to join the road gangs was finally issued from
CPV headquarters. Second line troops from eleven armies, nine
construction brigades and three engineering brigades, over 100,000
workers in total, managed to repair their rear area transport lines in
25 days — presumably by October 3. There was one big problem,
however, with the trains. The inexpertly repaired bridges couldn’t
bear the weight of the locomotive engines, so locomotives simply
pushed long strings of lighter train cars across the rickety bridges,
where engines on the other side would hitch up and pull them
down the track to the next bridge.52 Still, in the strategic Sinanju[Xipu]-[Jiechuan] “rail triangle” trains could run only 7 days a month
from September to December 1951. With the rail lines all but out of
commission, the CPVs resorted to trucks, donkey-carts, and human
backs to get supplies from the Yalu River down back roads and
footpaths through mountains and forests to the front lines.53
But for nearly 3 months the entire mass of the CPV forces were
on half-and third-rations. Marshal Peng demanded that General
Hong find at least a 5-day supply for the troops on the east flank of
the front line. Hong was reduced to salvaging 300,000 waterlogged
ration units by raking them into the sun, drying them out and rebagging them. Hong had to report twice daily to the Marshal on
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the food situation: how much was en route from China, how much
didn’t make it, and how much actually got to the frontline fighters.
On September 18, 1951, Marshal Peng asked Kim Il-sung for
permission to “raise funds” for Korean food, using a term (choucuo)
which makes it sound like the CPVs would hold yard-sales to finance
their purchases, but was probably closer to outright uncompensated
requisitioning of grain from North Korean peasants. Kim replied
that life was just as rough for Koreans as for the CPVs, but promised
to help. By November, Kim had begun food and grain disbursals
to the CPV, which totalled at least 58,000 tons by the end of the
war. Evidently Kim was also worried about the inflationary impact
of simply confiscating grain from the peasants and paying with
increasingly worthless North Korean paper money. Kim demanded
the CPVs set up commercial canteens in which Korean peasants
might be able to buy commodities with their stacks of North Korean
currency notes. In the end, the CPV logistics department had set
up civilian supply centers in Pyongyang, [Shali Yuan], [Yangde],
[Chengchuan], [Qiuchang], Anju, [Dingzhou], [Xuzhou],[ Dezhou] and
[Yichuan].54
But with most of the countryside pockmarked with bomb
craters, farming was useless. Korean peasants near the front lines
were without food and had to be evacuated to the rear or starve.
On October 22, Kim Il-sung reached an agreement with the CPV
to transport Korean farming families and their goods from the
battlefronts back to the rear in the empty resupply trucks returning
to China.55
The Korean peasants, it seems, were also well sensitized to the
American air attacks. In late October, as General Hong Xuezhi
returned to the front lines from business in Pyongyang, his jeep
was waved off the road by a young Korean boy with a knife. The
boy kept pointing his dagger to the sky and beckoned the General’s
old American Jeep to follow him along the streambed into a wood.
Within minutes, a flight of 20 P-51 Mustangs zoomed overhead,
and soon disappeared following the highway into the distance. As
the road of aircraft engines silenced, the general’s driver whistled,
“you’ve got some real good luck, boss.”56
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CHINESE TROOPS COPE WITH U.N. AIR POWER
All along the battle lines and well into the rear areas, the
countryside was a moonscape, especially so along roadbeds. U.N.
aircraft dropped 500-1,000 kilogram bombs that left craters eight
meters deep and rubble middens ten meters high for miles on end.
In heavy rain, these would fill with water, making them look like
shallow potholes — deadly at night. At this point, Chinese lorrydrivers only drove at night, but all too often their heavily laden
trucks barreling along in the dark without lights would drive into
a bomb crater, wrecking the vehicle, injuring personnel and, if the
crater was filled with water, soaking the cargo. General Hong
Xuezhi complained that “even with a hundred men it took forever to
fill in a crater,” and even before it was refilled, it would be replaced
quickly with yet another crater nearby.57
Because the Americans controlled the air, there was “basically
no movement in daytime.” Another Chinese general, Wu Xiuquan,
described what it was like in November 1951 to drive in the darkness
with headlights off, feeling the way at a snail’s pace under the
enemy’s night patrols overhead.
. . . suddenly a rifle shot. It was an air raid warning shot. Several
vehicles raced across to a fortified area; others scattered to hiding
places. All one could hear was the enemy aircraft flying across
overhead. The air was filled with parachute-flares dropped by
the planes. Hills, forests, rivers and roads hidden in the darkness
just moments earlier were in a burst illuminated in bright light.
The light of drifting flares then flickered uncertainly, and as
one died out another flashed into brilliance . . . The enemy had
discovered some target or another and a squadron of night patrol
planes was circling the area not far from us, dropping bombs and
firing repeated bursts. The scorched earth was already a mass of
smoke and flame.58

Days later, General Wu moved nearer to the front.
There were considerable numbers of vehicles coming and going.
What’s more, their drivers went at speeds that terrified us. One
night, we had a rare adventure. As we drove ahead nervously
without lights, a huge dark shape suddenly appeared in front of
us, gradually getting bigger and bigger. As our eyes focused, we
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realized it was a big truck! Right before our vehicles collided, our
driver veered sharply to the right. We felt only a smooth rumble
of our jeep as it soared up rapidly lightening its load — then
expelling all of us with a slamming jolt before we knew what had
happened. Had we collided on rocks or against tree trunks we
would have been smashed to bits, or at least have been very badly
injured. As it was, we crashed into a puddle. Feeling chilly, we
found our woolen overcoats soaked through.59

General Wu and his men righted their overturned American Jeep,
and the driver found that it started-up without a problem. Several
miles down the road, they managed to find a CPV camp where they
dried out their clothes. But the incident clearly left its mark on the
general. Almost all the towns and cities Wu had driven through in
North Korea had been leveled by “indiscriminate bombing,” and
only rarely did he ever even see a countryside building intact. Wu
was to be the Chinese negotiator at the 1951 peace talks in Kaesong
— which was the only place on the front line relatively untouched.
To identify it as the site for negotiations, the area was surrounded by
large barrage balloons, and at night searchlights swept the sky.
Throughout 1951, General Hong was constantly tormented
by the CPV’s feeble resupply infrastructure and its vulnerability
to U.N. air power. So much so that he claims to have personally
warned Premier Zhou Enlai that “our soldiers now have three
worries: first that they have no food to eat; second that they have no
bullets to shoot; and third, nobody to take care of them after they are
wounded.”60 Indeed, the Chinese commanders had to adopt severe
measures to increase the efficiency of their supply lines. As the Fifth
Campaign battle lines stabilized along the 38th Parallel, logistics and
supply continued to be Hong’s biggest headache. So much so that
Chairman Mao himself ordered 300,000 troops be withdrawn from
the battle areas and returned to Manchuria. This, said Marshal Nie,
made clear improvements in the CPV’s logistical situation.61
POSITIONAL WAR: IN THE TRENCHES
No doubt there was considerable bickering among the CPV
troopers to see who would be rotated back to sunny Manchuria for
rest and recuperation. Those who remained at the front line would
surely be pounded relentlessly day and night by air and cannon,
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so much so that they dug deep underground to shelter themselves.
General Yang Dezhi, 19th Group Army commander, says a random
sample of one square foot of earth he dug at the Chinese front lines
contained 287 bomb and cannon fragments of different sizes. His
Group Army’s positions, he said, had been hit by an estimated
7,784,000 shells, and he marveled that the Chinese would need
at least 51,000 trucks or 4,400 rail cars just to transport such an
inventory.62
The devastating onslaught, of course, had the effect of driving
the CPVs deep into their trenches and tunnels — mostly the latter.
The CPVs adopted a practice of digging “J” shaped “cat ear caves”
well into hillsides as protection against bombardment. General
Yang proposed “under the principle of protracted warfare” the
integration of defense breastworks, trenches, and tunnels from
“mountaintops, slopes and bases, coordinate those on plain and hill
areas, and construct open shelters and tunnel embrasures.” He also
designed a “fish-scale” pattern of “cat-ear” tunnels and trenches
in triangle patterns to deny the enemy the ability to outflank the
Chinese positions.63 Within these patterns two “cat-ear” caves
together formed a “U” shaped tunnel with two exits — in which the
CPVs could withstand heavy artillery shelling, and when the enemy
overran their positions, the CPVs could “burst out and kill them.”64
At least that was the theory. At any rate, the cave-dwelling proved
one way to equalize the survivability of the CPVs with the U.N. and
ROK forces which didn’t get quite the same type of pummeling from
Chinese guns.65
With the Chinese literally dug in to stay, there was little
substantial movement at the front lines for the balance of the war.
Each Chinese soldier “had a rifle in one hand and a shovel in the
other,” says General Hong. There was so much steel on the ground
that the 12th Army alone set up 40 blacksmith forges and made tools
from the scrap, 16,000 new tools, and repaired 75,000 other tools
to boot. After a time, the CPVs settled in, expanded their tunnels,
dug more exits, raised headroom, excavated bigger galleries. The
Americans, for their part, developed heavier bombs and used
deeper, more penetrating artillery shells.
This was positional warfare in its purest form. In May 1952, the
CPV Command ordered a “third defensive belt” of trench and tunnel
fortifications be dug from [Zhonghe] to [Shali Yuan], [Yichuan] and on
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to [Huiyang], in which an additional CPV armies could be deployed.
By the end of August 1952, the CPVs had dug almost 200 kilometers
of tunnels and an additional 650 km of defensive trenches and dry
transportation canals big enough for motorized vehicles.
By this time, tunnel and trench fortifications were the backbone
of China’s strategy to endure the Korean Conflict, and indeed they
had “marked a new phase in the war.”66 They protected the men
against the onslaught of bombs and artillery and occasionally served
as a springboard for the CPV’s frequent but short-lived offensives.
Although the CPV counterattacks from tunnel fortifications were
often effective, by mid-1952 U.N. Command forces had developed
countermeasures. Once a tunneled acre of real estate was taken by
UNC troops, UNC soldiers would immediately seal tunnel entrances.
After a period of time the tunnels were opened and any surviving
CPV soldiers would readily give up. According to prisoner of war
interrogations, Chinese officers in the tunnels shot soldiers who
tried to dig out and surrender.67
As Americans routinely used napalm and machine-gun strafing
against the CPV supply depots small and large, by the first half of
1952 virtually all CPV warehousing was underground, either in
thick rammed-earth revetments or, more desirable, in rock-face
tunnels. In open country, the covered revetments could withstand
napalm but flooded easily in rain, and it took the Chinese engineers
some time to design standardized drainage systems for them. In
mountainous areas, abandoned mines were ideal supply depots.
One refurbished mine near Namtang-Ri held 600 truckloads of
ammunition. On May 8, 1951, it was struck in a raid by 368 sorties
of U.N. aircraft, but suffered no losses. On August 4, 1952, almost
2 years after China decided to enter the war, Mao Zedong reported
joyfully to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress that
“food problems, in fact problems with our entire military supply,
were unsolvable for a very long time. Then, we didn’t know to dig
tunnels, to store our food in tunnels, but now we know. Now every
division has three months provisions, the all have storehouses . . .”
SURVIVAL IN THE TUNNELS
This is not to say that the tunnels were ideal living. Under a
steady rain of U.N. bombs and artillery shells, CPV troopers spent
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weeks on end deep inside their bunkers, “with the biggest problem
being not seeing daylight for days and days.” Again, the biggest
CPV victories seemed to be in little things, like how to cope with
the darkness of the caves. Infantrymen fashioned oil lamps out of
anything they could lay their hands on; old crockery, tea caddies, tin
cans, shell casings. Fix a cotton wick, fill it with some kind of oil, and
fiat lux. In a 60 meter length of tunnel, there would be at least eight
lamps, 30 lamps would light an entire subterranean channel. For
an entire battalion in 16 trench-tunnels, however, keeping the fires
lit continuously would use 200 kg of cooking oil a month. An army
would burn 50 tons of valuable vegetable oils each month.
Of course, that meant there wasn’t enough oil for cooking, let
alone lighting. But the real problem with the lamps was the fact that
there was still too little light and too much smoke. General Hong
spends a page of his memoirs describing the ingenious hand crafted
lamps his men fashioned. Still, he had to admit life in the tunnels
was “difficult.”
One of the biggest trials of the tunnels was the lack of water
during dry summers and autumns. All water had to be brought in
from outside, and at the 38th Parallel most springs were far from
the tunnels and close to enemy lines where artillery bombardment
was heavy. Water was not only necessary to survive but, more
importantly, without it men in the caves began to develop mouth
and throat lesions and chronic nosebleeds. Resolving water supply
problems became a top priority for General Hong’s logistical troops
and by the war’s end, most tunnels had concrete wells and water
troughs. In the winter of 1951-52, troops feverishly sliced large
ice blocks from rivers and lakes and stored them in underground
icehouses. This alleviated the problem somewhat and was repeated
the following winter.
Tunnel fighting confounded another bit of conventional
wisdom that the CPVs cherished from their early “mobile war”
campaigns: that “the sunshine belongs to the American Devils, and
the moonlight belongs to the CPVs.” Because the CPV had no air
cover, all operations were at night. Daytime was spent in cavernous
darkness. But without sunlight, the Chinese troopers developed
serious vitamin deficiencies.68 With a diet almost exclusively of
“fried noodles” and not getting out in the day time, lack of biotin
caused chronic night-blindness for CPV troopers, making them
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useless for any offensive maneuvers in the dark.
Needless to say, this caused serious alarm among CPV logistics
planners, who made frantic orders for massive shipments of
peanuts, yellow beans, egg powder, and liver. But “because the
shipments were small in quantity, the troops vast in numbers,
these shipments were a drop in the bucket, and the problem was
not solved easily.” Then, mirable dictu, Korean peasants revealed
an herbal medicine treatment for night-blindness in the form of a
complicated distillation of “pine needle tea.” The decoction was
extremely bitter without sugar, but sure enough, after a week of
drinking the stuff, night-sight returned. Of course, this also meant
one had to find the proper evergreens on the denuded slopes of the
Korean landscape. Nonetheless, the logistical department gathered
as much as possible from the rear areas and shipped all they could
to the fighters at the front.
The helpful Korean country folk also noted that tadpole embryos
just sprouting limbs were also a rich source of dietary vitamins.
Just scoop a handful of the little black wrigglers out of a waterfilled crater, “pop them into a tea pot with some water — best with
some sugar, but okay without — and gulp, gulp them down alive,
three times a day, and in two days you begin to see results.” There
were rivers and streams, not to mention bomb craters, all across
the countryside which provided a constant and abundant source of
tadpoles in the summer. “We got every unit mobilized to play with
this clever beverage.” Says General Hong, “once again, the night
returned to us.”
MORE THAN SURPRISE IS NEEDED
This chapter is not meant to be a recitation of all the tactical,
operational and strategic lessons the PLA learned from the Korean
War — only the important ones. First, operational surprise is
essential if the PLA is to make use of its massive numerical superiority
against an enemy massively superior in advanced weaponry.
Second, when the surprise wears off, the PLA must be prepared to
suffer horrendous pain for extended periods in a “protracted” war
— unless, of course, one side or the other abandons constraints of
limited war and escalates to total war.
The surprise achieved as China entered the Korean War may
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have been serendipitous. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai had, after all,
told the Indian Ambassador in Beijing, K. M. Panikkar, twice, once in
August and again on October 1, 1950, that China would enter Korea
if U.S. troops crossed the 38th Parallel. Surely Zhou’s warning
should have alerted U.N. Command forces that China was prepared
to enter the war — hardly a recipe for surprise.69 Moreover, the
question of China’s possible entry into the Korean War was a regular
feature of political debate in Washington, as well as in most capitals
allied in the United Nations Command. To be sure, Beijing did not
go out of its way to announce troop movements to Manchuria, and
the infiltration of several hundred thousand CPVs into Korea was
done in the utmost secrecy.
The lesson for future PLA strategists, therefore, must be to strike
decisively and hard without operational warning. With this lesson
in mind, a 21st century attack on Taiwan, for example, will be in
a context of an extended period of political warnings — such as
Zhou’s to Panikkar — which establish the casus belli over time but
do not alert the enemy to observe any mobilization along China’s
East Coast.
Moreover, every effort should be taken to prevent the enemy
from knowing he’s been hit decisively — possibly for several days
after the attack has begun — as in the Korean War. Again, a future
operation against Taiwan would involve military strikes masked
somehow.
SCENARIO FOR A SURPRISE?
One wins no prizes for pointing out the PLA’s reverence for the
power of tactical surprise. It is amply documented and is a central
feature of the Pentagon’s 2002 Report on the Military Power of the
People’s Republic of China.70 But do the lessons of the Korean War
help understand how the PLA would operationalize the “role of
surprise and preemption in local conflicts”? The Pentagon Report
stresses:
PLA operational theory reflects the transition undertaken during
the 1990s to shift from predominately annihilative to coercive
war-fighting strategies. Shock and surprise are considered by
PLA strategists as crucial to successful coercion. Accordingly,
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PLA operational theory emphasizes achieving surprise and
accruing “shock power” during the opening phase of a campaign.
The pre-eminent role that surprise and pre-emption have in
potential conflicts is best illustrated in the fundamental principles
of “Actively Taking the Initiative” and “Catching the Enemy
Unprepared” in PLA operational doctrine.
• “Actively Taking the Initiative” stresses the necessity of attack at
the optimal point and time to catch the enemy unprepared.
• “Catching the Enemy Unprepared” emphasizes the role of
concealment of intentions and capabilities through camouflage,
deception, feints, and the use of stratagem to allow a relatively
small amount of force to dominate the enemy through
surprise.71

In a Taiwan invasion scenario, how would the PLA mask such an
attack for such an extended period in an age of satellite reconnaissance,
internet communications and a very densely populated battle area?
Over the past 4 years, there have been several incidents highlighting
Taiwan’s infrastructure vulnerabilities that offer clues.
Identifying Taiwan’s Achilles Heels.
The first one occurred suspiciously in July 1999, 3 weeks after
Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui articulated a “special state-to-state
relationship” with China which Beijing saw as setting Taiwan on a
road to independence. At 11:31:18 pm — exactly — on Thursday
night, July 29, 1999, a 34.5 kilovolt cable tower at Tso-chen township
near Tainan collapsed in a landslide, breaking circuits at all North
Taiwan power transformers and sinking nine million households
into Taiwan’s biggest blackout in 50 years.72 Although Kaohsiung,
Pingtung, Taitung, and Hualien were spared, 34 trains on the northsouth rail line, businesses, hospitals, television and radio stations,
in fact, everything hooked into Taiwan Power Company’s North
Taiwan grid, came to a halt. With tensions across the Taiwan Strait
already strained, rumors spread that the Chinese had caused the
blackout in preparation for an invasion.
A more spectacular incident several weeks later was not so
suspicious — it was seen on seismographs across the globe and
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was immediately identified as a natural phenomenon. At 1:47
am Tuesday morning, September 21, 1999, a massive earthquake
blasted whole city blocks off their foundations throughout central
Taiwan, killing thousands and destroying transportation, power,
and sanitation infrastructures. It wasn’t until 32 hours later at
8:00 am Wednesday morning, September 22, that power was
restored to three-quarters of the 6,497,800 households blacked-out
during the quake. Taiwan’s six nuclear power units, which shut off
automatically during the quake, were not back on-line until 7:00 pm
Friday evening, September 24. Power lines and broken ultra-high
voltage transformers destroyed by the quake in isolated locations
were more difficult to repair quickly, and little electricity from
down-Island power plants was able get onto the north-Island grid.73
Other incidents, however, appear to have been man-made — by
PRC actors. Twice in 2001, on February 9 and March 9, undersea
cable problems cut off Taiwan web surfers from North Americanbased internet sites. The first incident was reportedly caused by an
“electrical malfunction” in the cable. A fishing trawler severed the
cable in the second instance. Both incidents occurred off the coast
of China near Chongmingdao, an island near Shanghai. Although
internet service for Taiwan was rerouted within 24 hours through an
older cable to Japan and the United States, service was spotty for 10
days thereafter.74
Exploiting Infrastructure Vulnerabilities.
An obvious scenario, therefore, would incorporate a massive,
early evening shock attack on Taiwan’s electric power grids, its
communications infrastructure, and its airports, harbors, and rail
and highway lines. The Pentagon Report is explicit that the PLA
is studying “lightning attacks and powerful first strikes” against
“radar, radio stations, communications facilities, and command ships
as priority targets vulnerable to smart weapons, electronic attack,
and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons.” Radiofrequency attacks
could jam wireless transmissions not already debilitated by strikes
on central mobile-phone exchanges. At the same time, Taiwan’s
international telecommunications would be blocked, and substitute
data transmissions would mask the attack to the outside world.
Initially, a spectrum of counterfeit news reporting would indicate
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that another earthquake had hit Taipei causing massive damage.
After several hours, or as day broke, additional reports would note
that key figures in the central government were missing.
Without electric power, or domestic telecommunications, and
with rumors spreading of seismic activity, Taiwan’s own military
command and control systems would be challenged beyond their
limits.
In November 1950, the appearance of MiG-15 fighters and heavy
anti-aircraft fire from the Chinese side of the Yalu River discouraged
UNC RB-29s from peering too closely at the Yalu bridges while
Chinese troops were crossing. The U.S. Air Force’s limited
reconnaissance assets also degraded the quality of intelligence
the U.N. Command received on the magnitude of the Chinese
intervention.
An integrated PLA strike on Taiwan in the 21st century,
therefore, would also focus on disguising a missile attack on the
island. Whether that would require direct blinding of U.S. space
surveillance platforms, and/or striking only on days where severe
weather would complicate satellite optics, or simply waiting until
there is a long lag time between satellite overflights, are doubtless
tactics the PLA is seriously studying. At any event, the lesson of the
Korean War must be that optimal results demand that neither the
Taiwan nor the American command authorities are even aware that
an attack has struck until several hours, or indeed days, afterwards.
DECAPITATING POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
The June 2002 Pentagon Report notes that “the PLA also could
adopt a decapitation strategy, seeking to neutralize Taiwan’s political
and military leadership on the assumption that their successors
would adopt policies more favorable to Beijing.”
This, too, is a lesson from the Korean War. There is documentation
that the Chinese leadership suspected Stalin started the Korean War
in order to prevent the PLA from liberating Taiwan.75 Looking back
on the War several decades later with the benefit of documents
from both the Soviet and American (and perhaps even their own)
archives, it may well seem to the leaders of the PLA that they were
closer to reclaiming Taiwan in the summer of 1950 than they ever
imagined at the time.
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The outbreak of the Korean conflict aborted an incipient
military coup against the Nationalist Chinese leader on Taiwan,
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, by one of Chiang’s most respected
soldiers, General Sun Li-jen (Sun Liren).76 General Sun, it seems,
was one of the very few Nationalist Chinese leaders on Taiwan with
whom the Chinese Communist leadership believed they could deal.
A military coup and the installation of a friendly regime in Taipei in
1950 would have saved the PLA the massive bloodshed and treasure
they had prepared for a Taiwan invasion, which was to take place
sometime after August 1950.
Indeed, documents from U.S. Department of State Archives report
that credible intermediaries of Marshal Chen Yi, then chairman
of the PRC’s “East China Bureau” headquartered in Shanghai,
had approached the still-resident U.S. Consul General in the city,
Walter P. McConaughy, in January and February 1950 to propose
that strained relations between the Chinese Communists and
Washington would ease once there was a regime in Taipei that the
Communists “could deal with.”77 One name mentioned by Marshal
Chen’s intermediary was General Sun. Chen’s cutout explained that
the Marshal feared a “pro-Soviet” faction in Beijing would emerge
preeminent in the Chinese Communist Party leadership, and Chen
hoped to counteract their influence by a warming in ties with the
United States. Chen’s overture came several months after a similar
approach by Zhou Enlai (June 1949) to the U.S. Consul General in
Peiping, O. Edmund Clubb.78 By early June 1950, the groundwork
had been laid in Taipei for a coup, and the State Department had
prepared plans for General Sun’s imminent takeover.79
It was, however, not imminent enough. The outbreak of the
Korean War on June 25 put plans on hold, and eventually they were
abandoned altogether. Some scholars, Chinese and American, saw
this as the real reason Stalin was persuaded to unleash Kim Il-sung:
to strangle prospects either for a U.S.-China rapprochement or for a
successful PLA invasion of Taiwan later in the summer of 1950.80 It
seems clear that PLA historians are well versed in the circumstances
of General Sun’s abortive coup.
A final lesson of the Korean War, then, is that a friendly politicalmilitary leadership must be installed in Taiwan simultaneously with
a PLA “shock attack.” Somehow, the existing political leadership on
Taiwan must be liquidated and replaced with a local politician with
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some reasonable color of legitimacy. Some praetorian guard must
be emplaced as a bulwark while the new Taiwan leaders contact the
United States to ensure them that all is well and there is no need to
get involved. It would also help if Taiwan’s military leadership is
sufficiently ambivalent to dither about a reaction.
The Pentagon Report notes that PLA special operations units “are
expected to play an important role in achieving objectives in which
limited goals, scale of force and time would be crucial to victory.”
SOF missions likely include conducting denial and deception and
information operations — and no doubt political “decapitation”
operations.
CONCLUSION: SURPRISE TO STALEMATE
It takes no inordinate leaps of imagination to see that with the
lessons of the Korean War in mind the PLA could manage to invest
Taiwan in a sudden shock attack. Surprise could indeed afford the
PLA an ample bridgehead in Taiwan along the lines of the Argentine
investment of the Falklands in 1982 or the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait
in 1990.
The test of the PLA would then come in the subsequent stalemate
of a “protracted war” with the United States — and, hopefully,
with the rest of the civilized world — that would follow. How the
international community would react in the months and years after
an attack, and how Beijing’s occupation would sustain itself in a
prolonged stalemate faced with an unruly populace in Taiwan and
an indignant, possibly hostile, international world would determine
who wins the ultimate victory.
At what point would the Chinese leadership capitulate under
global economic sanctions if not military blockade; at what point
would the Taiwanese populace simply give up and accept Beijing
suzerainty; at what point would the international community
support a Thatcherite reclamation of the illegally seized Island or a
Bushesque coalition to liberate the benighted Taiwanese people?
The PLA’s lessons from the Korean War promise that a swift
surprise attack would yield initial success in occupying the Island
and enduring the protracted pain of the invasion’s aftermath
would eventually yield a grudging, East Timor-like international
acquiescence in their occupation and eventual acceptance of the new
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status quo. Of course, Indonesia was eventually obliged to give up
East Timor--but that is not a lesson the Chinese are likely to take
away from the Korean War.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCENTRATING FORCES AND AUDACIOUS ACTION:
PLA LESSONS FROM THE SINO-INDIAN WAR
Larry M. Wortzel
The Sino-Indian War of 1962 is a source of great pride for
China’s Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). It followed on the heels
of an embarrassing Korean War campaign where China sustained
heavy losses and suffered a strategic geopolitical defeat. During the
Sino-Indian War, however, the PLA inflicted more damage than it
suffered. According to PLA records, more than 8,000 Indian soldiers
were killed, wounded, or captured, while Chinese casualties barely
exceeded 2,000. More importantly, China’s aggressive defense of its
borders established the paramount importance of sovereignty to its
national identity.
The recipe for war was familiar: a territorial dispute aggravated
by excess nationalism. The partition of Kashmir, which followed the
Indo-Pakistan War of 1947, resulted in a vaguely defined border
between China and India. While India recognized the so-called
“McMahon line,” China never formally accepted it, opting instead
for the “borders of habit” that had existed between adjoining
peoples for decades previous. India eventually amassed its troops
along its border and orchestrated several gradual incursions that
followed a “forward policy” that China characterized as a policy
of “nibbling.” After failed diplomatic overtures, China pursued
“audacious action,” engaging in a war of two phases. It first repelled
Indian forces from the border and then penetrated deep into Indian
territory to destroy India’s fighting capacity.
China’s overwhelming victory can be attributed to strong political
leadership and proper use of military strategy, or campaign art
(zhanyi zhudong quan). PLA records show that some 160 small
unit leaders were cited for heroism while the much-maligned
commissar system did not seem to adversely affect leadership
hierarchy or overall morale. Furthermore, in what it characterizes
as the “Counterattack in Self Defense on the China-India Border,”
the PLA exhibited brilliant strategic and tactical decision-making.
The PLA deployed a strong force decisively, concentrating strength
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at critical points with the ultimate objective of encirclement. They
also utilized the element of surprise whenever possible and took
better advantage of the weather and terrain, establishing better
lines of transport and communication.

The maintenance and defense of definable borders is one of the
most important missions of the PLA.1 Indeed, the sovereignty of
borders is a matter of the utmost national importance to China. And
to demonstrate just how important sovereignty is to China, in the
Sino-Indian War in 1962, Beijing used the PLA and “border defense
troops” to demonstrate to the Indian Army that China insisted on
observing the borders defined in 1959,2 and further, did not want
to see military exercises, military patrolling, or the firing of rifles or
artillery in close proximity to the border.3
The PLA took a number of important lessons from its experience
in the war against India in 1962. In what it characterizes for itself as
the “Counterattack in Self Defense on the China-India Border,”4 the
PLA destroyed the fighting strength and captured personnel of three
brigades of the Indian Army. The Indian 7th Brigade, including its
commander Brigadier Dalvi, the 62nd Brigade, and the 4th Artillery
Brigade were all rendered ineffective. In addition, the PLA seriously
mauled five other Indian brigades (the 11th, 48th, 65th, 67th, and
114th).5
The PLA is quite proud of its record in the war, especially since
it suffered such heavy losses in combat in the Korean War. China’s
military historians have attributed this success to a combination
of audacious action on the battlefield, good leadership, taking
advantage of the terrain, good logistics, and strong ideological
preparation.6 By “audacious action” PLA leaders mean the use of
initiative and a vigorous offense. On the whole, China’s victory was
characterized as an example of good strategy and strong initiative in
campaign art (zhanyi zhudong quan).7 PLA theorists and historians
point to Mao Zedong’s discussion of the need to “create local
superiority in the campaign” by concentrating strength at decisive
points as the inspiration for the conduct of the campaign against
India.8
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THE BACKGROUND OF THE SINO-INDIAN WAR9
After India gained independence from Britain, it was split with
the formation of a Muslim-majority Pakistan in 1947. A dispute
between the two new nations broke out almost immediately over the
states of Jammu and Kashmir (hereafter, Kashmir), located along the
northernmost part of the border with China.10 Although Kashmir
was predominantly Muslim, at the time of the partition of India and
Pakistan the region was ruled by a Hindu who opted to join India
when offered the choice to align with either of the two new nations.11
The first India-Pakistan War of 1947 gave India control of about twothirds of Kashmir, resulting in a shared border with China of about
600 kilometers within an already disputed piece of terrain in the
western sector of the Sino-Indian border.
The Sino-Indian boundary, although not continuous, is about
2,000 kilometers long, and may be subdivided into three sectors: the
east, middle, and west. The eastern sector, about 650 kilometers long,
runs from the juncture of the borders of China, India, and Bhutan to
the juncture of the borders of China, India, and Burma (Myanmar),
with southeastern Tibet on the Chinese side and Arunachal Pradesh
province on the Indian side. The middle sector extends about 450
kilometers, with the Ali administrative area of western Tibet on the
Chinese side and Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh provinces
on the Indian side. The 600-kilometer western sector overlaps areas
of Xinjiang and western Tibet on the Chinese side, and the Ladakh
Range region of Kashmir on the Indian side.
Although these three sectors of the Sino-Indian boundary have
never been formally stipulated in treaty, the traditional borders took
shape and were accepted by the peoples of the adjoining countries
who maintained generally friendly trade relations across the borders
for a long time. The eastern sector of the traditional “borders of habit”
(i.e., the traditionally accepted border) was disrupted by Britain
and India from time to time during the 19th century. After India’s
establishment as a sovereign state in 1947, the Indian Government
declared that its boundary with China, as delineated by New Delhi,
had been fixed according to international treaty law, but the Chinese
government disputed this.
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THE SECTORS OF THE BORDER
Beginning in about 1950, the Indian Government maintained that
the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary was along a partially
surveyed feature, “the McMahon Line.” British Foreign Secretary
Henry McMahon had drawn this line during the Simla Conference
held in northern India from October 13, 1913, through July 3, 1914.
Representatives from British India, the new but weak Republic of
China, and Tibet attended the Simla conference, which, among
other goals, sought a “common understanding of the political and
geographical meaning of the term Tibet.”12 The government of
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has never recognized either
the resulting treaty or the McMahon Line. Beijing maintains that
the Nationalist (Republic of China) plenipotentiary at Simla, Chen
Yifan, did not sign the treaty.13 One British goal in 1914, the time of
the Simla Conference, was to undermine both Chinese sovereignty
over Tibet and the authority of its officials within Tibet.
Notwithstanding Chen Yifan’s refusal to sign the Simla Treaty,
representatives of the pre-1911 Qing dynasty government and the
successor Republic of China (Nationalist) government had signed
a series of trade agreements and treaties concerning Tibet and the
Sino-Indian border area during the period between 1865 (the AngloBhutanese Treaty of Sinchula, November 11, 1865) and the 1914
Simla Conference.14
From the time of the establishment of the PRC in October
1949 and throughout the 1950s, India adhered to a policy that
emphasized friendly relations with the PRC. Moreover, until 1950,
the middle sector of the Sino-Indian boundary had been marked as
“not stipulated” on official maps of India. Indeed, as late as March
1959 Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru admitted in a letter to
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai that no treaty had stipulated that sector
of the boundary.15 With respect to the western sector of the border,
the Indian government likewise admitted in 1959 that the specifics
of the boundary had not been stipulated in an exchange of notes
between local Tibetan and Kashmir authorities in 1842.16
Nonetheless, despite maintaining generally friendly relations
and the Indian admissions regarding the ambiguity of the border,
India maintained its inherited territorial claims along the disputed
border, maintained military border outposts, and involved
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itself in the continuing problems China had in reestablishing its
traditional control over Tibet.17 From early 1951 on, Indian troops
took advantage of the fact that the PLA had not yet reached and
consolidated all parts of its borders, and advanced north, occupying
the Tawang Tract in the eastern sector of the border, but not crossing
the McMahon Line. Authorities in Tibet vigorously protested but
the Indian government ignored them.18 Then in 1953, Indian troops
pushed forward from their positions, which then were called the
“line of actual control,” to the McMahon Line. In doing so, they
occupied about 90,000 square kilometers of territory that, although
south of the McMahon Line, was claimed by Tibet.
THE OUTBREAK OF CONFLICT
On August 25, 1959 a squad of Indian troops crossed into the
Longju area north of the McMahon Line and opened fire on a team of
Chinese frontier guards in a village called Migyitun.19 The Chinese
forces responded to the small arms fire, fighting back in self-defense,
in the first armed clash between the two countries. The village of
Migyitun was important as a place along a pilgrimage route for
Tibetans. According to Neville Maxwell, McMahon had drawn his
line in 1914 for the area of Migyitun in a way that did not follow the
high points of topography on the map. To facilitate the pilgrimage
of Tibetan Buddhists from India and maintain good relations with
the Tibetans, McMahon left Migyitun inside Tibet.20
In the western sector of the border, on October 21, 1959, a team
of Indian troops crossed the traditional border at Kongka Pass,
entering Chinese territory. Another firefight developed, during
which the Indians again reportedly opened fire first, at least
according to Chinese sources, wounding a Chinese frontier soldier.
Although Maxwell is unsure of which side actually fired first in
these incidents, he notes that the Indian Army suffered one soldier
killed and one wounded at Longju.21
It is also important to note that the Indian forces in these two
incidents were most probably in conflict with Chinese frontier forces
(or border defense units), not the PLA main force infantry divisions
that were thrown against the Indian Army in 1962. This fact becomes
obscured in many of the statements from China, which consistently
refer to China’s frontier or border forces.22 The PLA at that time
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(as it does today) maintained border defense units with military
and public security functions that were more or less permanently
assigned to patrol and outpost duties along frontiers. These were
light infantry units often supported by artillery or mortars, but they
did not have the same training in combat, fire support, maneuver,
and communications as the main force divisions of the Chinese
combat armies.
After these two clashes, the Chinese government sought a means
to relax the tension and resolve the border disputes through dialogue.
To prevent the armed conflict from extending or escalating into war,
the Chinese government in November 1959 proposed an immediate
mutual withdrawal of troops to 20 kilometers from the McMahon
Line in the eastern sector of the border, and mutual withdrawal of
20 kilometers from the line of actual control in the western sector.
However, Nehru and the Indian government did not respond, and
Indian troops remained deployed in their forward positions. The
Chinese response was a unilateral decision to withdraw its forces
twenty kilometers from the line of actual control between the two
countries.23 In his book India’s China War, Neville Maxwell says of
the incidents:
After the Longju and Kongka Pass incidents of late 1959, with
the realization that an intractable dispute might develop over
the boundary question, the expansion of the (Indian) Army
became more purposeful, and faster. In November-December
1959, 4 Division was hurriedly transferred from the Punjab to
the northeast, and a new division, the 17th created.... 4 Division’s
responsibility was the McMahon Line, from Bhutan to Burma,
about 360 miles.24

The Indian government subsequently ordered its own forces to
suspend temporarily patrols along the line of actual control. The
armed forces of the two sides therefore disengaged, but the calm
along the border was sustained for less than 2 years as India initiated
its “forward policy” in response to domestic political pressure.
THE “FORWARD POLICY” OF INDIA CHANGES THE
SITUATION
During early 1960 India formulated its “forward policy.”
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Indian forces were to keep continuous pressure along the border,
advancing its forces slowly forward to what India sought to define
as the delineation, in order to change the status quo of the ChinaIndia border. In the spring of 1961, the Nehru administration, under
severe pressure from the Parliament to act against China, considered
conditions mature enough to implement the policy. International
matters, aside from internal politics, also forced Nehru to act on the
border. Part of this pressure was a result of the successful Indian
military seizure of the territory of Goa from Portugal.
Neville Maxwell makes the point that the Indian Parliament
did not tell Nehru to invade Goa, the last colony left on the Indian
subcontinent, but that public pressure, particularly pressure from
the press, led Nehru to that decision.25 After the successful invasion
of Goa in December 1961, Nehru, Defense Minister Krishna Menon,
and the Indian press and Parliament all turned their attention to the
Aksai Chin and China.
Once attempts at a negotiated settlement to the border dispute
had broken down after the 1959 Longju and Kongka pass incidents,
the Indian government decided that its claims would have to be
reinforced by continuous patrolling along the border, including
active patrolling into disputed areas. Maxwell quotes this from an
October 1959 editorial in the Times of India:
New Delhi must assert its rights by dispatching properly equipped
patrols into the areas currently occupied by the Chinese, since
any prolonged failure to do so will imply a tacit acceptance of
Chinese occupation, and a surrender to Peking’s threat to cross
the McMahon Line in force should Indian patrols penetrate into
the disputed areas of Ladakh.26

Nehru’s other goal was to establish an Indian presence in the
Aksai Chin area, where it was clear that China had been building
roads approaching to within three miles of the border in addition to
the strategic highway that served as the main line of communication
for the PLA, linking far western Xinjiang with Tibet.27 Maxwell
believes that the forward policy foreshadowed by the Times of India
editorial began almost without discussion (he terms it a “virgin
birth”) in response to the failure of talks between Nehru and Premier
Zhou Enlai in April 1960. Various political actors in India, including
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Prime Minister Nehru, Defense Minister Menon, and chief of the
General Staff of India, Lieutenant General B.M. Kaul, have all taken
early credit and later disavowed responsibility for the policy.28
Whatever its origins, the forward policy of India rankled Beijing.
China’s press referred to it as a policy of can shi, that is, roughly
translated as a policy of “nibbling” at another country’s territory.
And this is the term used by China’s negotiators in talks with India.
(The ideograph for silkworm, can, is used for this image of “nibbling
away;” the literal translation of can shi is food or forage for the silk
worm, which would destroy a leaf or whole plant by gradually
consuming it.29)
The Chinese government position was still to seek resolution
of the border disputes through peaceful means, but sovereignty
increasingly became a critical issue for Beijing. During the 1960s, the
American Cold War containment strategy against Communism was
in full swing. China had fought the United States in Korea and faced
the U.S. Navy in the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-55 and 1958. By the
early 1960s, China was faced with what was seen as a “crescent” or
half-moon encirclement by the United States based on its military
alliances stretching from South Korea and Japan through Okinawa
and the Ryukyus to Taiwan and the Philippines. China’s strategic
focus, therefore, was to the east and the Western Pacific, and China
could ill-afford to make an enemy of India.
Serious concerns remained for Beijing, however. The United
States had modified its South Asia policy, attaching more importance
to India in the Cold War. The 1959 border incidents enabled the
Nehru government to approach the United States for more aid, and
economic assistance grew substantially between 1959 and 1963.
India also received about $60 million worth of military assistance
from the United States, including aircraft and radar.30
THE GUERILLA WAR BY THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA’S
SUPPORT
If the border dispute between India and China was not enough
to create conditions leading to war, a continuing clandestine effort
to insert guerillas into Tibet by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
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(CIA) added to the pressures on China. The CIA had worked to
develop a guerilla effort in Tibet from the time of the Korean War,
and India tacitly, and later between 1959 and 1962 more actively,
supported this effort.31
The CIA not only sought to have guerillas attack Chinese supply
lines through Tibet, but as soon as it became clear that a military
confrontation on the border between India and China was likely,
guerilla forces were directed to attack Chinese supply lines. Many
of the guerillas were inserted by parachute from Nepal, Eastern
Pakistan, or Thailand, and few missions were successful.32 Many of
the guerillas were quickly captured or killed, but certainly Beijing
had increasing evidence of U.S.-Indian cooperation in the war.
A FALSE WAR OF “NIBBLING” AWAY AT CHINESECLAIMED TERRITORY: APRIL 1961 TO SEPTEMBER 1962
From April 1961 onward, as they implemented the “forward
policy,” Indian troops regularly dispatched patrols into what China
viewed as its territory and established a number of fortified points
along the border. After February 1962, Indian patrolling intensified,
and intrusions into areas claimed by China became more frequent.
On the western sector of the boundary, Indian troops established
positions on and forward of some of the strategic border passes,
further penetrating into Chinese-claimed territory.
It looked to Beijing like New Delhi had embarked upon a slow
process of occupation of the entire Aksai Chin. This was a region
where China could least afford any compromise. As early as 1956,
China had begun to build the road from Xinjiang to Tibet through
the Aksai Chin, improving the existing Xinjiang-Tibet link. The
road was all within Chinese territory on Chinese maps, but some
112 miles of the 750 mile-long road cut through territory claimed
by India.33 India had been aware of this activity throughout the
1950s, and it was a factor prompting the forward policy. For Beijing,
however, this was a vital strategic link consolidating PRC control
over both Xinjiang and Tibet. The road was the main, indeed the
only, developed road link along China’s western border between the
two provinces.
India’s forward policy, creeping in to the proximity of the road
as it did, seriously threatened the security of China’s highway and
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flanked PLA border outposts, aggravating the tension on the ChinaIndia border. China’s political leaders sought to exercise restraint.
Orders from the PLA’s General Staff Department to Chinese forces
were that they should not open fire first and should try to avert any
armed conflict with Indian troops.34 At the same time, the Chinese
government repeated its appeals to the Indian government to resolve
the border dispute through negotiations. In April 1960, Zhou Enlai
made a week-long visit to India and concentrated considerable
effort on resolution of the territorial disputes. The proposals put
forward by the Chinese side included settling the boundary question
between the two countries through discussion, while both sides
refrained from patrolling along all sectors of the boundary. More
meetings were held between June and December 1960, without
results. From December 1961 to April 1962, the Chinese government
again appealed several times to the Indian government for peaceful
resolution of the border disputes, but the Indian government
refused. After the diplomatic efforts failed, Chinese troops resumed
the patrols within 20 kilometers inside China’s side of the line of
actual control that had been suspended in November 1959.35
BEIJING’S “ANTI-NIBBLING” OPERATIONS: CHINA ISSUES
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
In July 1962 Chairman Mao Zedong instructed the PLA on the
guiding principles to counter India’s can shi zheng ce, or “nibbling
policy.” Briefly stated, China’s “anti-nibbling” rules told PLA
troops: “Never make a concession, but try your best to avert
bleeding; form a jagged, interlocking pattern to secure the border;
and prepare for long-time armed co-existence.”36 The PLA General
Staff Department headquarters told Chinese troops to implement the
rules of engagement strictly, and explained the guiding principles in
greater detail:
• If Indian troops do not open fire, Chinese frontier guards
should not open fire.
• If Indian troops press on toward a Chinese sentry post from
one direction, Chinese frontier guards should press on towards
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the Indian stronghold from another direction.
• If Indian troops encircle Chinese frontier guards, another
Chinese force should encircle the Indian troops.
• If Indian troops cut off a retreat route for Chinese forces,
Chinese frontier guards should cut off the Indian troops’
retreat.
• Chinese forces should keep a distance away from Indian
troops, leaving them some leeway, and withdraw if Indian
forces permit withdrawal.37
On the western sector of the border, Chinese frontier sentry
posts formed the jagged, interlocking defense pattern designed to
neutralize Indian strongholds that was suggested by Mao Zedong.
On several occasions, Indian troops opened fire at Chinese forces,
but the Chinese frontier guards maintained restraint. Meanwhile,
the PLA implemented its own “anti-nibbling measures and special
tactics.” The PLA increased both its forces and its security positions
on the border, increased the size and frequency of its patrols, and
established control of forward strategic positions. When PLA forces
encountered Indian forces, they first fired warning shots if they
believed that Indian troops were guilty of intentional provocations.
Finally, they returned fire or attacked in self-defense if fighting
broke out.38 During this “anti-nibbling” phase of hostilities, the PLA
focused on the western sector of the China-India border, because
the Indian forward policy was primarily intended to secure Indian
claims to the Aksai Chin area.
On the eastern sector of the border, on September 9, 1962, the
Indian Army gave an urgent order to some of its best troops, the
Seventh Brigade of the Fourth Division, to cross the McMahon
Line. The brigade occupied Kejielang (Khinzemane is the Indian
name for the position), north of the McMahon Line. The Indian
action was taken despite the fact that the area was marked on many
Indian Army maps of the time as China’s territory. This helped lead
China’s leaders to a final decision to launch a counterattack.
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THE COURSE OF THE BORDER WAR
The course of what Beijing defined as a “self-defensive counterattack”
can be divided into two phases. The initial reaction by China’s
Central Military Commission (CMC) in September 1962 was to react
rather passively to Indian incursions and any Indian presence on
the Chinese side of what Beijing saw as the line of control and the
disputed border. Beijing first sought only to drive invading troops
back across the border. Then, later in this phase, when faced with a
strong Indian military reaction, it sought to wipe them out. In the
second phase, beginning in late October, Beijing sought to penetrate
deeply into Indian territory to punish the Indian Army and to
destroy its fighting capacity.
The First Phase.
By September 8, 1962, the headquarters of Indian Army had
ordered the Seventh Brigade of its Fourth Division, commanded
by Brigadier John S. Dalvi, to cross the Thag La Ridge and establish
forward posts. The brigade was stationed in Kejielang, and on
that day a Chinese patrol advanced toward and surrounded an
Indian outpost at Dhola, which was inside Chinese territory.39 The
Chinese force in this affair was about 60 soldiers, but the Indian post
commander reported to his headquarters that he was facing a force
of 600 from the PLA.40 The Indian Army reacted by sending more
troops into the Thag La Ridge area to relieve the Dhola outpost and
push back what it mistakenly believed to be a battalion-sized force
of PLA. By September 14, the inaccurate report of the size of the
Chinese force had been corrected, but New Delhi still went forward
with its plan to evict the Chinese, since the Indian Army had already
dispatched a strong reaction force and it felt assured of success.
Meanwhile, Beijing launched a diplomatic protest against
the Indian advances on September 16, seeking to avoid combat.
For some time, both sides engaged in a tense dance, building up
their forces, occupying better positions, storing ammunition, and
preparing for combat, while letters of protest and demarche were
exchanged between the two capitals.
On October 10, 1962, the Indian Brigade moved against PLA
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troops garrisoned about one kilometer east of Che Dong, on the
Thag La Ridge. In a particularly well-coordinated and effective
attack, Indian forces killed five Chinese soldiers and injured five
others.41 Then, on October 12, Indian Prime Minister Nehru issued
the order to launch an all-out attack against Chinese frontier guards
on the border.
At this juncture, having been stung, China seems to have
reached a decision that the provocations were no longer tolerable,
especially given New Delhi’s arrogance and imperviousness to
Chinese diplomatic protests. On October 16, 1962, the Chinese CMC
decided on a counterattack designed to destroy Indian forces that
had crossed the McMahon Line. In the western sector, according
to the same order, Chinese troops were to play a supporting and
coordinating role. On October 17, the CMC issued its operations
order, and the General Staff Department of the PLA sought in its
plans to muster and concentrate its forces for a quick, decisive battle
against the Indian Army, seeking first to encircle the invading Indian
troops, and then to wipe them out.42
The major operational orientation of the Chinese offensive was
on the eastern sector of the border, along India’s North-East Frontier
Agency (NEFA) and the McMahon Line. The PLA chose to focus on
the eastern sector since this was where Indian troops had launched
their own large-scale attacks starting in September 1962. Another
decisive factor drove tactical orientation in the campaign toward the
eastern sector: the terrain and geographical features there were more
advantageous for the PLA, permitting it to attack and defeat major
units of the Indian Army.
By October India had deployed the Fourth Division, three other
brigades under the command of the Fourth Army, and some garrison
forces on the eastern sector of the boundary—a total of about 16,000
troops. Among them, the Seventh Brigade commanded by Brigadier
Dalvi had about 3,000 troops, including four infantry battalions and
some supporting artillery units. Dalvi’s Seventh Brigade contained
the decisive combat strength of the Fourth Division and had
compiled a solid combat record in North Africa and the Middle East
during the Second World War.
The Chinese assembled a smaller force of about 10,000 troops on
the eastern sector, under the command of the Tibetan Military Region
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and consisting of five infantry regiments and some artillery units. In
contrast to the Indian forces, however, PLA troops were acclimated
to the terrain and had better roads and supply lines approaching
the border. On October 20 the PLA began its counterattack against
the Indian troops, focusing on Kejielang north of the McMahon
Line. At 7:30 am, Chinese artillery began 15 minutes of preparatory
shelling, destroying Indian artillery positions and parts of Indian
fortifications. Chinese infantry then broke through the Indian
fortifications. Within 1 day, the PLA wiped out the Indian Seventh
Brigade and captured its commander Brigadier Dalvi. One day later,
the PLA forces again crossed the McMahon Line, recovering the area
around Zimithang.43
Chinese troops counterattacked simultaneously on the western
sector of the border, where by October the Indian Army had
deployed about 6,000 troops, including the 114th Brigade with six
battalions. Of these forces, about 1,300 Indian troops had been
stationed in some 40 strongholds or outposts placed in what China
viewed as its own territory. In response, China had deployed about
6,300 troops, including two infantry regiments, some independent
battalions, and supporting artillery units, forces that operated
under the command of the Kangxiwa Headquarters of the Xinjiang
Military Region. At 8:25 a.m. on October 20, Chinese troops initiated
a general artillery barrage assault and followed with an infantry
assault on the Indian positions. The first Indian stronghold was
captured in only eighty minutes, according to Chinese archives.44
The PLA then followed up with a series of actions against each of the
Indian garrisons, surrounding them and eliminating them one after
another. By October 29, Chinese troops had mopped up all of the
Indian strongholds around the banks of Pangong Lake, eliminated
parts of the four Indian battalions that made up the 114th Brigade,
and recovered 1,900 square kilometers of Chinese territory. The
Indian Army was beaten by a force that left itself free to maneuver,
even in that difficult terrain, while the Indians had tied themselves
down to fixed, dispersed outposts, much as the Nationalist Army
had done in the Chinese Civil War.45
The Second Phase.
While Chinese forces were engaged in combat in both the eastern
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and western sectors of the border, Beijing still sought a negotiated
solution. On October 24 the Chinese Foreign Ministry proposed
three measures to resolve the border dispute and end the combat.46
The Nehru administration, however, prodded to war by the Indian
press and encouraged by American and Russian support, refused
the proposals. The result was that by November 6, 1962, despite
a vigorous counteroffensive called Operation LEGHORN, the PLA
prevailed over the Indian Army.47
In mid-November 1962, the Indian government declared a state
of national emergency throughout the country.48 After intensive
activity involving the movement of major Indian military forces,
about 50,000 Indian troops had been sent as reinforcements to the
China-Indian border, including a corps headquarters for command
and control, the headquarters of three divisions, and 14 maneuver
brigades subordinate to the respective division headquarters. The
focus was still on the eastern sector where the Indian Army deployed
about 22,000 troops, commanded by the corps headquarters; they
made up three divisions, with a total of eight brigades. In all, India
deployed 28 battalions to the border. Among them, the Fourth
Division with its five brigades (including 15 battalions), which had a
total strength of about 15,000 soldiers, was deployed in the area from
the southern bank of Tawang River to Tezpur.49
To counter the Indian deployments, the PLA General Staff
Department (GSD) sent two more divisions into Tibet. According
to the noted historian of the PLA, William Whitson, both of these
divisions came from the 46th Corps (or Army, since a PLA army at
that time was equivalent to an Indian corps).50 The GSD-directed
deployment increased Chinese troop strength on the eastern sector
of the border to five somewhat understrength divisions — in total,
about 25,000 soldiers. With these deployments complete, the CMC
on November 12, 1962, ratified the PLA second phase plan of
operation. Chinese troops were to begin an offensive designed to
wipe out three to four Indian brigades, including the brigades in the
Tawang Tract and the single brigade in Walong, also in the eastern
sector near Burma. In the western sector, the operations plan called
for the PLA to eliminate the invading Indian troops in strongholds
in the area of Pangong Lake.51
On the morning of November 16, 1962, Chinese troops began a
general counterattack against eastern sector Indian troops, starting
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in Walong. By that evening, Chinese troops had seized Walong and
wiped out more than 1,200 Indian troops. Then on November 18 the
PLA launched a second successful eastern sector counteroffensive
in the Se La-Bomdi La area. This effectively eliminated the strength
and combat capability of most of three Indian brigades and
recovered a great deal of Chinese territory south of the McMahon
Line. Chinese troops reached a point about 30 kilometers from
Tezpur, an important town in the eastern sector, and were faced by
only an Indian battalion deployed north of Tezpur.
India had increased its troop strength to 15,000 on its western
sector after its losses in the first phase of the war. The PLA launched
its second phase western sector offensive on the morning of
November 18, and by the morning of November 20, Chinese troops
had wiped out all six Indian strongholds west of Spangur Lake.52
CHINA ANNOUNCES A UNILATERAL CEASE-FIRE
Under the circumstances, China had full capacity to realize
the boundary it claimed, but Beijing exercised restraint. Zhou
Enlai called the Indian charge d’affaires in Beijing to his residence
on November 19 and informed him that, effective November 21,
Chinese forces would cease fire; on December 1, Zhou said, Chinese
forces would withdraw 20 kilometers from the line of actual control
all along the disputed border.53 For some reason, as reported by
Maxwell based on his review of Indian archives, the charge d’affaires
seems to have delayed a full day reporting this matter to New Delhi.
As a consequence, India first learned of the Chinese cease-fire from an
announcement made in Beijing before midnight on November 20.54
Chinese troops ended the hostilities on November 21 and began an
orderly withdrawal as promised along the entire border to positions
20 kilometers behind the line of actual control as determined in
November 1959. These actions, in the Chinese view, reflected efforts
to resolve the dispute peacefully and restore friendly relations.
The disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides and the
formation of a de facto 20 kilometer-wide demilitarized zone proved
a positive step that has helped to maintain a peaceful border to this
day. Moreover, Beijing’s actions laid a foundation for the eventual
improvement of relations during the late 1980s to mid 1990s.

342

LESSONS OF COMBAT LEADERSHIP AND COMMUNIST
PARTY ACTIVITIES
Senior Chinese leaders argue that a major lesson of the Sino-Indian
War is that the strong political leadership of the Communist Party
contributed significantly to China’s victory. In Western military
literature, one of the main critiques of the PLA’s political commissar
system, and the function of the political commissar in a PLA unit,
is that the political commissar system interferes with or usurps the
duties of the commander. If this is true, the political commissar
system, and the General Political Department (GPD) of the PLA that
runs it, can be a hindrance in combat, preventing decisive action and
costing lives. Senior PLA leaders deny that this is the case. Instead,
they argue that the GPD and the political commissar system is a
source of inspiration and esprit d’corps that helps the commander
under the most difficult combat conditions.
One way to understand leadership style in the PLA and to gain
some understanding of the role of the party member or political
commissar is to look at the results of combat. Are PLA commanders
leading? Are political commissars out doing the job of the
commander leading troops in combat? Casualty rates and awards
for heroism give some hint of the answer to these questions. An
examination of one case study from the Sino-Indian War provides
empirical evidence that supports the claims of senior PLA officers.55
The PLA showed great acumen in carefully executing the
campaign according to the guidelines formulated by Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) Central Military Commission: 1) “to
beat Indian troops soundly,” and 2) “to wipe out the invading
Indian forces totally and rapidly.”56 According to PLA records
from archives, Indian casualties during the war were 4,897 killed
or wounded and 3,968 captured.57 The Indian Defense Ministry,
in 1965, showed 1,383 Indian soldiers killed, 1,696 missing in
action, 3,968 soldiers captured, and 1,047 soldiers wounded.58 In
comparison, PLA casualties in the war were quite small, with 722
Chinese soldiers killed and 1,697 wounded.59 In addition, no soldier
of the PLA was captured during the war, a rarity in the history of
warfare.60 The PLA did all of this damage to the Indian Army with
the equivalent of a reinforced corps (army), deployed and massed at
the critical points along the border.61
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In that war, according to an appendix of the PLA history of the
“self-defensive counterattack,” some 327 soldiers and officers of the
Chinese force were given awards for heroism. Over half of these
awards were given to members of the Chinese Communist Party or,
in the case of younger soldiers, the Communist Youth League. This
is a small case from which to extrapolate the data, but it seems clear
that, unless party affiliation was a criterion for being considered
a hero, the PLA’s claims that CCP membership and the existence
of the political commissar system may help build esprit d’corps.
Moreover, it is clear that Chinese military leaders lead from the front
and Communist Party members seem to follow them and emerge as
leaders. That is, a substantial number of small unit leaders, whether
squad leaders or platoon and company grade-officers, were given
awards for heroism in combat. In fact, some 160 small unit leaders
were cited for heroism, of which 114 were CCP members. Among
basic soldiers, 158 “fighters” and medics were given awards, of
which 54 were party members. Only three political commissars or
political directors got awards.
These data are limited, and it is generally not a good idea to
generalize from one case. But this may be the best case from which
to work, since the PLA has not published all of its combat records
and records of decorations for bravery in the public domain. That
said, the examination of the combat decorations given for bravery in
the Sino-Indian War suggests that PLA leaders lead from the front.
Party membership seems to result in leadership behaviors in other
situations, and the responsibility that seems to flow from being
part of an elite organization like the communist party appears to
make soldiers and leaders take greater risk. The work of the GPD in
promoting unit lineage and history probably also contributes to the
willingness of ordinary soldiers and leaders to take extraordinary
risks. The award data seem to imply that political commissars,
directors and instructors, if one can extrapolate from this single case,
stay out of the way of the commander in combat. They may not
have been a hindrance, but the data don’t decisively prove they help.
The GPD is changing its role, however. It is studying the ways that
Western militaries build morale and esprit as well as the personnel,
retirement, and legal systems of other armed forces.
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LESSONS FROM COMBAT
One of the fundamental precepts in PLA literature on the
Sino-Indian War is that troops should execute sudden attacks or
counterattacks to catch the enemy unprepared (Turan faqi fanji shi
Yinjun cuo shou bu ji).62 That is, the PLA values surprise. Second,
PLA tactics emphasized the rapid concentration of force at decisive
points to surround enemy forces and defeat them in detail (Jizhong
youshi bingli).63
PLA histories also emphasize that the superior knowledge of
the terrain and the region by Chinese border troops and reinforcing
main forces gave them the ability to take advantage of difficult
terrain. For example, the PLA was able to operate more effectively
in deep valleys and densely forested areas, in darkness, or when
cloud or mist obscured visibility. PLA histories also take note of the
need to be flexible in applying traditional warfighting and altering
tactics and doctrine because of the complexity of the terrain and the
weather.64 One way that the PLA adapted quickly to the challenges
posed by the terrain was to advance on parallel routes to one point
of attack. This was a tactic in the Sino-Japanese War, such as in the
Hundred Regiments Campaign.65
The establishment and decisive use of a relatively strong reserve
by battalion and regimental-sized units was also a significant lesson
the PLA took from the war.66 The use of reserves at the proper
time contributed to the ability to mass combat power quickly and
decisively at important points on the battlefield. As a general rule,
“PLA border forces were able to mass three and one-half to four times
the combat power of Indian forces at the decisive point of combat.”67
Massing fire effectively was also a critical factor in combat. At one
point cited in the PLA history, an Indian platoon surrendered to a
seven-man squad that concentrated its fire at the decisive place and
time. At another point, five platoons of the PLA concentrated at the
right point forced the surrender of an Indian infantry battalion.68
Throughout the first phase of the war the PLA believed that
Indian forces generally enjoyed the advantage of better lines of
transport and better communications in the rear area. They believed
that this was because during the period of executing the “forward
policy” the Indian Army had developed an effective infrastructure
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along the border. The lesson the PLA took to the second phase of
the war was to work harder at coordinating more carefully among
its own arms and support services.69
The PLA adjusted the military force employed in a particular
situation to the terrain and the Lines of Communication available.
This was especially critical in the west, which was harder to resupply. Thus the classic formula of METT (mission, enemy, terrain,
and troops) is one that the PLA values as a consideration in combat
as much as any western army.70 In the east, mobility in difficult
terrain was the most important factor. Indian forces in this area
feared most the ability of the PLA to flank them, surround them, and
take away Indian lines of communication and re-supply.71 The 11th
Infantry Division of the PLA, especially, was able to run effective
combat operations against the Indian Army through aggressive
combat reconnaissance that ultimately isolated Indian positions,
surrounded Indian forces, and caused them to collapse in such
situations,
The PLA was able to exploit the difficult terrain and the large
gaps between Indian forces through the maneuver of small units
that eventually surrounded Indian outposts and combat positions.
The PLA thus planned to divide the Indian positions into segments
and take them one at a time.72
The PLA focused on attacking both flanks of an isolated unit,
rolling it up from the flanks in a double envelopment, while pinning
down the center with automatic weapons and mortar fire. Units
then collapsed if taken by surprise in such an attack.
CONCLUSIONS
The lessons the PLA takes from the Sino-Indian War reinforce
the most enduring principles of war: surprise, mass, maneuver,
and use of terrain and weather. For the PLA, the terrain and the
weather conditions made it extremely important that its forces focus
on tactical movement, careful campaign planning, coordinated
logistics, and effective command and control.73
The political leadership of the Central Military Commission was
cited as extremely important in ensuring that the use of military
initiative created the political conditions conducive to resolving the
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conflict on Beijing’s terms in the “diplomatic struggle.”74
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CHAPTER 10
THE 1979 CHINESE CAMPAIGN IN VIETNAM:
LESSONS LEARNED
Edward C. O’Dowd
and
John F. Corbett, Jr.
Overview of the Campaign.
At 5 a.m. on the morning of February 17, 1979, Chinese troops
from at least 30 divisions raced across the Sino-Vietnamese border
and into the fire of entrenched and experienced Vietnamese soldiers.
The Chinese launched their attack as a response to a decade of
deteriorating relations with Vietnam.1 The mission of the Chinese
soldiers was to teach the Vietnamese that Vietnam could not
attack Chinese client states, in this case Cambodia, with impunity.
The operational objectives of the Chinese attack were to seize
three provincial capitals: Lao Cai, Cao Bang, and Lang Son. The
Chinese also raided or feinted at about 25 smaller towns along the
border. Although the Chinese ultimately seized the three cities, the
Vietnamese defenders, a small force of five divisions and some local
force units and militia, extracted a high price in men and materiel for
the attack. On March 5, the day after their forces finally took Lang
Son, the Chinese announced their withdrawal. After another 10 days
of fighting, the Chinese completed their withdrawal on March 16.
The Chinese probably lost about 63,000 dead and wounded soldiers
in the attack.2
What lessons did the Chinese learn from the short, bitter campaign
against the Vietnamese in 1979?3 This chapter will examine the lessons
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) learned from its incursion into
Vietnam and look for evidence that the lessons of the 1979 Campaign
shaped the PLA modernization program. To accomplish this task,
we will explore, first, the lessons the Guangzhou Military Region
Infantry School reported in 1979;4 and, second, the lessons derived
from an Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) study conducted in
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1997.5 Since the lessons the PLA published in 1997 vary in some
significant ways from the lessons that were reported in 1979, it is
likely that the Chinese continue to analyze the historical record and
the lessons are having an impact on their current modernization
program. It is interesting to note that there are problems the PLA did
not highlight in their studies. These problems may be as important
as the lessons they did. Therefore, we will examine areas we
anticipated would have been deemed important by the PLA but were
not highlighted in their analysis. We will seek to determine why the
PLA did not bring these areas out in their lessons-learned analysis. If
there were, in fact, significant lessons, we will try to determine what
the PLA has done about them. Finally, we point out that there have
been important changes in military affairs since the 1990s, and these
changes are a significant intervening variable in our understanding
of the lessons the Chinese learned from the 1979 Campaign.
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Lessons Learned: The 1979 Assessment.
The faculty and students of the Guangzhou Military Region
Infantry School (Guangzhou Junqu Bubing Xuexiao) had a unique
perspective on the events of the 1979 Campaign.6 At the direction
of the Military Region headquarters, the school assigned its faculty
and students to the Chinese armies that deployed to Vietnam from
Guangxi province. Cadre and troops from the school served with
the 41st Army and the 42nd Army during the attack on Cao Bang,
and they served with the 43rd and 55th Armies during the attacks
on Lang Son. The temporarily assigned schoolmen knew the way
the PLA was trained to fight, and they saw the way the PLA actually
fought. Therefore, the record of their observations is extremely
helpful in developing an understanding of the lessons the PLA
drew from their experience in Vietnam. The problems the cadre and
students from the infantry school found in the four armies were very
basic. In fact, the skills needed to solve these problems are frequently
taught in basic training in other armies.
The faculty and students of the Infantry School thought that the
Chinese troops used very poor basic infantry tactics. Although the
Chinese infantry were fit and capable of making enormous sacrifices,
the massed infantry attacks, favored by the Chinese, frequently
failed.7 Student Han Changyuan, who replaced a platoon leader
during attacks on a Hill 480 (unlocated), observed the problem and
experimented with a new tactical scheme to solve it. After failing
to take the hill, Han broke his platoon down into small groups and
returned to the attack. This time, however, Han ordered one small
group to advance while the other groups fired on the enemy. As a
result, Han’s troops managed to get very close to the Vietnamese
defenses without suffering a large number of losses. When it was
time to destroy the defenders, the Chinese had a greater number
of attackers in the right place to do the job. Switching from massed
attacks to small fire and maneuver attacks changed the equation at
the decisive point of the infantry attack.8
Chinese artillery was ineffective. Chinese gunners did not
understand how to measure distances and calculate firing data. As
a result, the Chinese artillery could not provide effective indirect
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fire. The Chinese artillery was limited to large-scale barrage firings
on prominent terrain features or inaccurate fire on smaller targets.
The Chinese apparently did not have a “call for fire” procedure.
Therefore, the Chinese artillery was no more effective than the
artillery of the Napoleonic era or the early American Civil War. This
situation appalled a pair of artillery instructors from the Infantry
School. Zhang Shulin and Shi Ling held classes for the artillerymen
and taught them how to improve the accuracy of their fire.9
Chinese combat engineering was crude. Although the Vietnamese
were heavily outnumbered, they made up for their disadvantage, at
least in part, by constructing strong bunker systems and surrounding
the bunkers with mines. During the Campaign, the students from the
Infantry School discovered that the PLA soldiers, at least those from
the 43rd Army, could not detect and clear mine fields. While the
43rd Army was attempting to seize Hill 627, about five kilometers
west of Lang Son, students Zhang Qingwu and Chen Dongsheng
discovered that the soldiers they were accompanying did not know
how to detect and clear the Vietnamese mines that blocked the route
to the Vietnamese positions. Zhang and Chen solved the problem.
After removing 23 Vietnamese mines, the Chinese resumed their
successful advance on the hill.10 In another part of the battlefield, the
instructors and students had to help the attacking units build hasty
bridges to ford rivers.11
Land navigation was another problem for the PLA. According to
the report of the Infantry School, an instructor, Niu Chengju, from
the school found that a regiment was unable to perform its mission
because its leaders had a poor understanding of topography and map
reading. The report does not say how Niu remedied this situation.
Did he teach the leaders or simply do the navigation himself? Either
way, it is very difficult to understand how a PLA unit that could
not navigate its way to the objective could be considered ready for
combat.12
The Chinese logistics system failed. The instructors and students
of the Infantry School discovered that the hardships of war included
wearing one pair of shoes and one set of clothes for over 10 days.
Although this may not sound like a sacrifice too far beyond the call
of duty for most soldiers with field experience, it struck the men of
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the Infantry School as worth noting. 13 The men of the Infantry School
do not record, either because they were spared the discomfort or
because they chose to ignore it, the lack of food and water that some
Chinese units reported. The Vietnamese had unexpected help in
their defense against the Chinese attacks. Less that a week into the
campaign when the fighting was most fierce, Chinese units began
to report shortages of food and water. Unit 53514, a 55th Army unit
engaged in the attack on a vital hill near Lang Son, reported that its
higher unit had not sent food for several days, and the troops had
not eaten in 2 days.14 Unit 53515, another 55th Army unit, reported
a food and water shortage.15 Cadres acted “heroically” to insure that
the troops and the wounded got the last scraps of food and the few
drops of water that remained. The Chinese logistics system, although
its lines of support extended a mere four or five kilometers into
Vietnam and less than 30 kilometers from its railhead at Pingxiang
(VN: Bang Tuong), apparently failed. These incidents happened near
Lang Son, but the PLA’s weak logistics created similar incidents in
the other theaters of the war (e.g., Lao Cai, Cao Bang).
The Infantry School had a long list of “lessons learned” but it
also had a list of prescriptive advice on the things the PLA needed
to do to become an effective fighting force. The PLA, according to
the Infantry School, needed to conduct practical and realistic tactical
training. The PLA needed to emphasize technical and military
subjects because these subjects were the basis of military tactics.
Additionally, training had to be demanding and strenuous and
suited to the geographical conditions in which the PLA had to be
prepared to fight. The PLA needed to use “live fire” in its training. In
summary, the Infantry School’s response was to jettison the heavily
politicized military program of the Maoists. The Infantry School
recommended a return to “military basics”; tough training on basic
skills was the key to success.16
The Guangzhou Military Region Infantry School identified
problems in the PLA’s performance that, at least in part, shaped
important areas of the Chinese military modernization program that
expanded after the 1979 Campaign and Deng Xiaoping’s return to
supreme power in 1981. The following portions of this chapter will
provide an overview of the reforms that can be traced to the “muddy
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boots” analysis of the Infantry School.17 Many articles and books that
shaped this field during the last 20 years have covered this material.
The works of Ellis Joffe, Harlan Jencks, Lonnie Henley, June Dreyer,
and Dennis Blasko are familiar to all students of Chinese military
affairs. Therefore, there is no need to reiterate all the developments
that occurred in the PLA in the years immediately after the 1979
Campaign. Instead, we will take a quick look at the areas the
Guangzhou Military Region Infantry School criticized.
The Infantry School identified tactics, artillery skills, combat
engineering (e.g., mine clearance and hasty river crossings), land
navigation, logistics, and “live fire” field training as the flaws in the
PLA’s performance. What did the PLA do to correct these flaws?
After the 1979 Campaign, the PLA renewed its program for the
tactical training of its infantrymen. The PLA did this by emphasizing
“infantry technical training” (bubing jishu xunlian). In a fashion
similar to other armies, the PLA broke down the key battlefield tasks
of the infantryman and trained the skills that led to the successful
accomplishment of these tasks. To be successful on the battlefield the
PLA infantryman had to be able to accomplish five tasks. The soldier
had to be able to shoot, throw a hand grenade, employ demolitions,
construct earthworks, and use the bayonet.18 Each of these tasks was
further broken down. To shoot effectively the infantryman had to
know about infantry weapons, the theory of shooting, the observation
and surveying of the battlefield and the effects of weather conditions,
terrain, and time of day on marksmanship.19 These simple skills were
a return to the soldier skills of the older PLA. They were a refutation
of the “politics is everything” model of soldiering that dominated
the PLA during the Lin Biao years, particularly during the height of
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and had hampered the
PLA in the 1979 Campaign.20
By the end of the 1980s, however, the PLA may not have
completed a tactical renaissance. In Harlan Jencks’ early 1980s study
of the PLA, From Muskets to Missiles, he correctly criticizes the PLA
for its tactic of pushing its infantrymen into close massed combat
with their opponents.21 Jencks terms this tactic “hugging” the
enemy positions, and he criticizes the PLA because this tactic limits
the ability of the PLA to use modern combined arms attacks with
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artillery and aircraft. The same passion for close combat (jinzhan)
appears in Song Shilun’s “Basic Tactical Principles” at a time when
the chief of the PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences should have
been advocating more modern tactical procedures.22 The tactical
reformers still had some work to do.
The performance of Chinese artillery did not meet the standards
of the writers from the Infantry School. Chinese artillerymen did
not provide flexible, “on call” artillery support for the maneuver
forces. Artillerymen lacked the ability to perform accurate surveys,
make firing calculations, and communicate with the maneuver
forces. The PLA approached these problems in a way that was
similar to the way it corrected the infantry’s problems. The PLA
broke down the artilleryman’s mission into the essential battlefield
tasks and prescribed training in each task. Among other areas to
be studied, the Chinese artilleryman was to develop a mastery of
artillery equipment, firing procedures, reconnaissance, artillery
emplacements, and communications. If the Chinese gunners
mastered all these areas, then the PLA had accomplished a major
improvement in the combat effectiveness of its ground forces.23
It is impossible to determine the degree to which the PLA
improved its effectiveness in combat engineering and land
navigation and the extent to which it adopted “live fire” training to
reinforce its’ new training programs. The PLA infantrymen studied
mines and the PLA artillerymen studied reconnaissance and survey.
But did they know enough to improve the PLA’s performance on
the battlefield? There were endless conferences and numerous news
articles like the following one:
Comrades attending the [Guangzhou Political Work] Conference
conscientiously studied such problems as how to improve military
training on the basis of actual combat and how to most effectively
raise the level of tactical skills. Everyone said we must compare
ourselves with the actual combat of the war. . . . study each and
every military training subject and train effectively . . .24

If the PLA did raise the level of its “tactical skills” as the comrades
in the Work Conference set out to do, they took another major step in
the development of effective ground forces.25
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The PLA’s logistics problems were, at first glance, a matter of
numbers. The Chinese force of 30 divisions required 500 tons of
supplies every day for each division (15,000 tons).26 To move the
15,000 tons of supplies, the force needed trucks. The largest Chinese
trucks (Zil-151, Zil-157, Ca-30) carried 9,900 lbs. (4,500 kg.) or 4.95
tons. Therefore, the PLA invasion force needed 3,030 trucks to carry
the supplies necessary to keep operating for 1 day. The Chinese
divisions had trucks, but the trucks were the prime movers for
artillery and other heavy equipment. They were not supply trucks;
further, the tactical formations did not have organic transportation
regiments or battalions. An army that used prime mover trucks to
move food, fuel, supplies and ammunition had no way to move its
artillery, engineering materiel, or bridging equipment.
The PLA logistics troops had access to a few independent
transportation regiments (702 transportation trucks each27),
commune trucks, packhorses, and coolies to make up the difference
between the requirement and the transportation capacity of their
units, essentially zero. But managing four modes of transportation
had to be a nightmare. As a result, food, water, and ammunition
frequently failed to get to the right place at the right time. These
management problems were symptomatic of a failed logistics
system. It is curious that the faculty and students did not raise
the issue in a more powerful way than to simply comment on the
shortage of replacement clothing.
One of the less glamorous yet significant reforms that took place
in the 1980s and 1990s was the comprehensive upgrade of organic
transportation assets for PLA combat units. Most infantry units are
now “motorized,” meaning they have sufficient trucks assigned to
the units to provide their own transportation. Motor transport units,
usually regiments, with logistics responsibilities have also had their
assigned trucks upgraded and the numbers of vehicles increased.28
The PLA reforms of its logistics system were slow and halting
during the decade of the 1980s. The reforms started with the
reopening of several logistics schools in the years right after the 1979
Campaign. The PLA Logistics Academy opened its doors on July 9,
1979, and the Logistics Engineering College, Transportation School,
and Transportation Technical School opened their doors in 1980 and
1981.29 The remainder of the Chinese attempt to reform the logistics
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system appeared to be equal parts high level spin and low-level
vagueness. For example, in 1982 Defense Minister Zhang Aiping
said, “The mobilization of the armed forces in the event of war is
not only a matter of mobilization of personnel. A more important
and complicated job is the mobilization of logistics support.30 In
January of 1983, the Liberation Army Daily stated that since the 1979
Campaign the PLA had made significant progress in “regularization
and logistics support.”31 But training lagged behind the press
releases. By 1985, only about 50 percent of the PLA’s logistics officers
were graduates of specialized logistics courses.32
While these changes made the PLA logistics system slightly more
responsive to the requirements of the soldiers, the single change
that had the greatest impact on the logistics situation after the
1979 Campaign was the advent of the combined arms group army
(jituanjun). In 1985 and 1986 the PLA changed the organization of the
“army/corps” (jun). As noted above, the old army/corps had little or
no organic logistic and transportation capability. The unit required
support from independent transportation regiments, commune
trucks, packhorses, and coolies. Support from these elements
presented a management nightmare for the combat commander.33
The new group armies solved some of the problems when they were
established as the first PLA units with organic logistical units.34
Lessons Learned: The 1997 Assessment.
In recent years PLA analysts and historians have continued to
think about the problems of the 1979 Campaign.35 In some cases,
however, they have come to different conclusions than the Chinese
writers of the late 1970s. In 1997 the Military History Section of
the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences published a thoughtful
analysis of the problems of the 1979 Campaign as part of a volume
commemorating the 70-year history of the PLA (1927-97).36 Of course
the PLA historians treated the war as an enormous success. The
national policy that shaped the campaign was “strong” or correct
(xingqiang). The PLA penetrated deeply into Vietnam, as far as 20-40
kilometers in some places. They captured the provincial capitals of
Lang Son, Cao Bang, and Lao Cai. The PLA succeeded in attacking
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and occupying 21 counties or towns in four Vietnamese provinces
(Lai Chau, Lao Cai, Cao Bang, and Lang Son).37 According to the
AMS historians, everything went according to plan.
After deposing the “politically correct” facts, the historians turned
to the problems of the campaign. The historians noted that few
soldiers in the PLA had recent combat experience and, therefore, the
PLA’s preparations for the campaign were inadequate. Furthermore,
the PLA had done very little field training and the small unit leaders
did not have adequate military skills. The quality of troops was
judged to be very low, Chinese tactics were not effective, and the
level of coordination was inadequate.38
On a slightly higher level of military analysis the AMS historians
noted that the PLA’s “establishment (tables of organization) was
not rational” (bianzhi bu heli) and that the PLA needed weapons
and equipment suitable for modern warfare. Although the Chinese
weapons were essentially the same as the weapons used by the
Vietnamese, the AMS claimed the weapons the Chinese used in
the campaign were not “up to the job” (wuqi zhuangbei bu peitao).
Without elaborating, the historians noted that the PLA also learned
lessons in the areas of security and militia.39
The source of all these problems was obvious. According to
the AMS historians, the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao, and the
Gang of Four had undermined the PLA’s fine traditions, and, as a
result, the PLA was not an effective fighting force during the 1979
Campaign.40
The PLA took the first halting steps toward correcting the
problems of the 1979 Campaign during the 1980s, but it was in the
1990s that the PLA really turned to solving its problems as an army. In
the 1990s the PLA made important changes in every one of the areas
the AMS historians identified as problematic, including reforms of
its personnel, training, tactical, organizational, and logistics systems.
This portion of the chapter will explore some of the changes that
originated in the lessons learned from the 1979 Campaign.
Before going on to trace the evolution of these changes, however,
it is important to note that the Chinese faced a dramatically different
strategic and military situation in the 1990s. The Soviet Union had
dissolved at the end of the 1980s and the long-term “local war” with
Vietnam ended in November 1991. China perceived new threats,
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the most important of which was the United States. Furthermore,
the PLA began to realize the enormity of the shift from the era of
attrition and maneuver warfare to one of “effects based warfare.”41
After the Gulf War of 1991, the tectonic plates of warfare shifted
and the Chinese, like everyone else, reevaluated their priorities and
capabilities.
It is difficult to say if the PLA of the 1990s had better troops in
its ranks than did the PLA of 1979. In 1979 the PLA was a route of
social mobility for peasants to escape the poverty of the countryside
or, at least, to improve their situation if they returned to their
home commune after demobilization. Most of the Chinese people
respected the PLA in 1979, and they were happy to send their sons
off to service. There were few economic alternatives for peasant men
in the Maoist economy and men with PLA service frequently had
leadership opportunities, which led to higher living standards when
they returned to the commune. Additionally, many had the chance
to join the Communist Party, the real door to upward social mobility
at the time.
The new economic policies of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin
changed the situation during the 1980s and 1990s. And, at roughly
the same time, the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident dealt a severe
blow to the PLA’s prestige. In the China of Jiang Zemin, there was
very little incentive to join the army. For those with the levels of
education that the PLA wanted to recruit, better jobs were available
in the civilian sector of the economy, and service in the ranks of a
tarnished institution did not improve a young man’s prestige at
home.
As a result of these factors, the PLA has not always achieved
its goals of recruiting youngsters with middle school educations.
Therefore, it will be difficult for the PLA to enter the world of
high technology warfare with a corps of soldiers with very limited
academic skills. Additionally, since service in the ranks is not
attractive, it is reasonable to assume that it will be more difficult to
motivate soldiers for whom service is an unattractive alternative.42
If it is not clear that the quality of the troops is any better
today than it was in 1979, then what about the quality of the PLA
officer corps? James C. Mulvenon, a political scientist at the Rand
Corporation, examined the characteristics of the rising PLA officer
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corps in very important study on Professionalization of the Senior
Chinese Officer Corps: Trends and Implications.43 By carefully tracking
the careers of over 400 senior officers, Mulvenon concluded that the
PLA officer corps that emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s was better
educated, more specialized, and younger than the PLA leaders at the
time of the 1979 Campaign. Mulvenon also found that very few of the
rising Chinese generals had combat experience. Table 1 depicts the
national-level PLA leadership44 and the front commanders during
the 1979 Campaign;45 they did have extensive combat experience
during the Liberation War, the Civil War, and, in some cases, the
Korean War. Table 2 lists officers who were at the regimental and
division level during the Campaign and later rose to senior ranks
and, thus, were in a position to influence reforms during the 1990’s
and today.46 Those now at the Military Commission level generally
had prior combat experience in the Korean War; officers below that
level likely experienced their first combat in 1979, and subsequent
Vietnam border operations.
Hua Guofeng, Chairman of the Military Commission (MC)
Ye Jianying, Vice Chairman, and MC Standing Committee Executive
Xu Xiangqian, Minister of National Defense and MC Standing Committee Member
Deng Xiaoping, Chief of the General Staff Department and Vice Chairman of the MC
Wei Guoqing, Director of the General Political Department
Zhang Zhen, Director of the General Logistics Department
Xu Shiyou, Commander, Guangzhou Military Region; Front Commander
Yang Dezhi, Commander, Kunming Military Region, Deputy Front Commander
Zhang Tingfa, Commander, PLA Air Force, Front Chief of Staff

Table 1. Key National-level Chinese Leaders
during the 1979 Campaign.
According to Mulvenon’s study, 79 percent of the PLA leaders of
1994 had some form of advanced education.47 In contrast, the officers
of 1979, who entered the PLA in the 1950s and 1960s, rarely had educational levels beyond junior-high school.48
PLA officers followed more specialized career patterns in the
1990s than during earlier years, and the younger officers were more
specialized than the older officers.49
As a result of an improved retirement system, the average age
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of officers at every level of the PLA has declined. Mulvenon found
that the average age of members of the Central Military Commission
(CMC) declined by 13 years between the end of the 1980s and the
middle of the 1990s. By 1994, according to Mulvenon’s study, the
holders of the senior positions in the PLA were at least 6 years
younger than the maximum age for individuals eligible to hold these
jobs.50

(division chief of staff)

Table 2. Officers from 1979 Campaign Who Later Rose to Senior
Ranks (1979 position in parenthesis).
Fewer PLA officers have combat experience in today’s PLA.
According to the Professionalization study, only 46 percent of the PLA
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officer corps in the study had combat experience.
If the AMS Historians were looking for a modern PLA with
high quality troops, competent officers, and a cadre of combat
experienced leaders, then the result is mixed. There is no evidence
that today’s PLA soldier is any better than his father was in 1979.
There is very compelling evidence that the officer corps is better at
least by the standards of education, age, and training. There still is
no cadre of combat veterans to prod the PLA into preparations for
“the real thing.”
The AMS analysts identified the PLA’s training program as
one of the weaknesses of the force that invaded Vietnam in 1979.
In the decade of the 1990s training reform was a high priority for
the PLA. In contrast, the PLA of the late 1970s did very little real
training. A writer in the Liberation Army Daily noted in 1978 that,
”military training was not strict, or at times . . . no training at all
was given. Some soldiers had been in the armed forces for several
years without ever touching a rifle and some cadres could not lead
troops. The combat capabilities of the whole armed forces declined
markedly.”51
To reverse the evidence of decline that they saw on the battlefields
of Lang Son, Cao Bang, and Lao Cai, the leaders of the PLA began a
series of new training programs for the PLA. These programs grew
from a modest size in the 1980s to much greater size in the 1990s. In
the 1980s, analysts as perceptive as Ellis Joffe were discussing single
exercises and, perhaps, one significant exercise in 2 or 3 years. By
the mid-1990s analysts identified ten to twenty exercises per year
in the years from 1991 to 1995.52 At the same time, the complexity
of the training exercises grew. The PLA abandoned the single
service, relatively static exercise for the large-scale multi-service
and combined arms exercise. To make the training of these exercises
even more challenging, the PLA frequently conducted the exercises
in the area that the PLA expected to contest in the event of war.
The training within the exercises also changed. The PLA renewed
its training in tactics, small unit leadership, and military skills. If
the PLA had a better corps of officers in the 1990s, the revitalized
training program was the perfect way to stretch them to the degree
that the errors of the 1979 Campaign would never be repeated.
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The 1979 PLA did not have the noncommissioned officers that
are the critical catalyst of small unit tactics. Noncommissioned
officers are the leaders that motivate and direct the troops during
the critical time when the unit is within a few meters of the enemy.
Therefore, any real tactical change had to begin with the creation of
a noncommissioned officer corps. In recent years there is evidence
of soldiers staying in the enlisted ranks after their mandatory
enlistment years have ended. Although we do not know the level of
competency of these soldiers or the level of authority they exercise,
the recognition of their existence is probably a step forward in the
tactical area.
The basic tactical lesson of the 1979 Campaign was that PLA
tactics more closely resembled the massed infantry attacks of the past
than the fire and movement/fire and maneuver tactics of a modern
army. Did the AMS researchers recognize this problem? Did the PLA
solve the problem? Very little is known about the PLA’s tactics in the
1990s. Some scholars have attempted to update our understanding
of Chinese tactics but such explanations usually are little more than
discussion about the latest terms the Chinese are using to describe
an action that could easily fit at the tactical or operational level of
war.53 Therefore, it is not clear whether the Chinese have corrected
the problems and learned the lessons of the 1979 Campaign or not.
The “establishment was not rational” is a simple statement by
the AMS researchers that conveys a big idea. Military organizations
are not for parades. They must make sense on the battlefield because
the organization of a military unit, when combined with other
factors, makes a unit an effective fighting force or a “circular firing
squad.” The PLA did not have a rational establishment for the 1979
Campaign because it was saddled with an establishment that grew
up during the long, almost unbroken, lack of foreign hostilities from
1953 to 1979.54
The PLA took several steps to rationalize its establishment in
the years after the 1979 Campaign. In 1985-86 the PLA transformed
its 36 “army/corps” (jun) organizations into 24 “group armies”
(jituanjun).55 This change forced the diverse maneuver, fire support,
combat support, and combat service support elements to coordinate
closely. Because group armies had one commander and one staff
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and their units could train and deploy together, the advent of the
group army was a significant step towards rationalizing the PLA’s
establishment and solving some of the coordination problems that
had plagued the PLA in 1979.
The next step the PLA took to rationalize its establishment was
to reorganize several divisions as brigades.56 Although there are
obvious cost-cutting benefits available to the PLA from reducing the
size of these units from divisions (about 13,000 men)57 to brigades
(about 5,000 men), there is a more important tactical reason for this
transformation. A brigade is a compact and maneuverable fighting
force. It can be deployed with a minimum of transportation support,
and, since it is a combined arms organization, it brings a lot of power
to the fight very quickly. The brigade structure also reduces the span
of control of the unit commander and his staff and that change
should translate into increased efficiency.
Finally, the PLA rationalized its establishment by introducing
new arms to support the traditional combat arms: infantry, armor,
and artillery. For example, during the late 1990s, the PLA began to
deploy helicopter and special operations regiments and brigades.
These units, which were key parts of the PLA’s rapid reaction forces,
deployed to provide a strong complement to the group armies and
brigades. These new units gave the PLA a centralized set of assets
that enhanced the regular combat arms forces. After the deployment
of these types of forces,58 the PLA had the building blocks needed to
create tailored response forces for future contingencies.
The AMS analysts did not express strong criticisms of the PLA
logistics system during the 1979 Campaign; nonetheless, in the
late 1990s the PLA began to make a series of significant changes in
the way it handled logistics at every level.59 In 1979, five of the ten
armies that invaded Vietnam were not assigned to the two military
regions that bordered Vietnam (Kunming and Guangzhou), and,
since the PLA supports its units from a system of fixed-depots, it
was a significant problem to supply large units that were fighting a
long distance from their home bases. The recent reforms that relate
directly to the problems of the 1979 Campaign deal with mobile
logistics, the standardization of supply procedures, skip echelon
logistics, and transportation improvements. All these reforms, if
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executed with thoroughness and imagination, will significantly
change the problems the PLA encountered in “retail logistics,” the
supply system on the battlefield.
In 1979 the PLA needed a mobile logistics system to support large
units operating as much as a thousand kilometers from their regular
depot system. Recent experiments by the PLA have attempted to
create a mobile logistics structure based on fixed depots, “emergency
depots,” and “emergency support brigades.” This new system will
allow the PLA to repair equipment at forward positions and to
meet the supply requirements of deployed units. Although the new
system is designed for the new Chinese rapid reaction units, the
“fist” units, it also could be the solution to the problem the deployed
units faced in 1979.60
The PLA is standardizing its equipment parts, supply procedures,
and requisition system. The PLA of 1979 had a hodgepodge of
equipment and procedures because, under Maoist military theory,
every unit and every region had to be as self-sufficient as possible.
As a result, small, local factories made a great deal of the PLA’s
equipment. Local manufacturers meant local standards, procedures
and tolerances. A mortar tripod from Wuhan Military Region
did not necessarily fit a Kunming Military Region mortar tube. A
standardized system will rectify this situation.61
In addition to mobile or emergency logistics plans and
standardization, the PLA of 1979 needed a faster system for delivering
supplies to combat units. To solve this problem, if it should appear
during the deployment of the “fist” units, the PLA is experimenting
with “skip-echelon logistics” and faster throughput of shipped
supplies. Skip-echelon logistics allows the logistics managers at
the military region to maintain direct links to the lower level units
operating at the front. This means a unit can request and receive
supplies or equipment without channeling its requests through the
various command layers of the organization. The military region
depot sends the mortar tripod or the radio batteries directly to the
brigade in contact that made the request.62 Faster throughput means
the PLA is trying to eliminate the long lags that plague supplies
when they are sent to depots that dole them out to units and depots
at lower levels. Like skip echelon logistics, improved throughput
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rates increase the chances of getting materiel to the requestor in the
shortest possible time.63
The key measure of effectiveness of any logistics system is: Does
it get the right “stuff” to the right soldier at the right time? Measured
by this standard, the PLA had a flawed logistics system in 1979. The
millennium PLA has attempted to fix many of the problems because
the types of logistics problems the “fist” units face today are very
similar to the ones that the deployed units faced in 1979. Only time
will tell if they have been successful.
Lessons Not Assessed.
Any effort to understand the lessons the PLA learned from the
1979 Campaign cannot avoid the feeling that the PLA is not being
fully honest with itself. All the problems the various authors discuss
were problems in areas that the PLA has attempted to reform in the
last 2 decades. But, there were many other problems in the 1979
Campaign that the PLA has not discussed. These problems need
correction. For example:
• The PLA authors do not mention air superiority or close air
support. Even though the Vietnamese conducted several
dozen-parachute resupply missions to support their forces
in their defense against the Chinese forces, the Chinese do
not comment on the desirability of an aerial supply line or air
superiority to deny such supply line to the enemy.64
• Although the Chinese forces were drained by Vietnamese
sapper attacks, the Chinese never mention their own lack
of a similar capability. If there had been a Chinese sapper
command, similar to the Vietnamese Sapper Command (Binh
Chung Dac Cong), would the Chinese have been able to cut
off the Vietnamese forces in Lang Son and bring that battle to
a more favorable conclusion?
• In 1979, the PLA did not have ranks and insignia. This simple
fact led to confusion on the battlefield. It was not until 1988
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that this problem was rectified with the reinstitution of
ranks.
The PLA has made so many changes in the years since the 1979
Campaign that it is hard to link specific reforms to specific problems.
The impetus to reform the PLA’s organizations almost certainly
came from its experience in 1979. But during the intervening years,
there have been other wars, and the Chinese have studied them
all, including the British experience in the Falklands and the U.S.
experiences in the Gulf War, Kosovo, Bosnia, and today in Iraq. As
a result, it is difficult to distinguish the extent to which the PLA
learned lessons from the 1979 Campaign or more recent campaigns.
After looking at the problems and reforms it may be the case that
while the 1979 Campaign was the impetus to reform, the reforms, as
a whole, were the result of the PLA seeking solutions from a wide
variety of sources.
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CHAPTER 11
THE LESSONS OF THE 1995-1996 MILITARY TAIWAN STRAIT
CRISIS: DEVELOPING A NEW STRATEGY TOWARD
THE UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN1
Arthur S. Ding
China’s independence, security, integration, and being a world
class power are of the utmost importance, while the Taiwan issue
is not the top and overwhelming priority.2
Facing the wave of globalization in the world, China must put
priority on, and handle the Taiwan issue well.3

In July 1995/March 1996, China launched a series of large scale
of military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. China’s military exercises
were made as responses to former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s
private visit to the United States in 1995 and the perceived U.S.
attempt to heighten the U.S.-Taiwan relationship as well as the
perceived trend of seeking independence in Taiwan. In addition
to mobilizing conventional forces, China fired several surface-tosurface missiles to the water area close to Taiwan.4
The U.S. response had been low profile before January 1996.5
However, when the decision was made to launch another round of
military exercises by China in late 1995,6 and Chinese force was being
mobilized, the United States started to make a firm response. The
United States eventually demonstrated its firmness in maintaining
stability and peace in the west Pacific region by deploying two
aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait to
stabilize the situation. The scale of the deployment was said to be the
largest one in East Asia since the United States had withdrawn from
the Vietnamese War in the mid-1970s.
After China’s military exercises had been concluded, the United
States and China started negotiations to resume relations. The
Clinton administration adopted an “engagement policy” toward,
and established “constructive strategic partnership relations” with
China. Presidents Clinton and Jiang Zemin made mutual visits to
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each other in 1997 and 1998. Both sides also accomplished several
cooperation programs in some areas. It seemed that the looming
Sino-U.S. crisis had been largely reversed.
What lessons has China learned from the crisis? Did China think
the military exercises accomplished the goals it had set? If this type
of coercive diplomacy worked in 1995-96, what show of force might
the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) think it would take to
be successful next time? Has China learned that the United States
will intervene again in case of another crisis? This chapter tries to
address these questions.
There is a caveat at the beginning: a single event may not be
enough to draw sufficient lessons. The other side of the coin is that
people tend to learn more lessons after experiencing similar events.
In other words, people learn lessons incrementally in the course
of experiencing similar events. In that case, China did not learn
sufficient lessons until 2000.
Goals of the Military Exercises.
There is a wide consensus on China’s goals in launching largescale military exercises, and the goals were two-fold.7 The first one
was to deter former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui from pursuing a
course of perceived further independence.
China’s skepticism about Lee Teng-hui’s policy direction toward
reunification with mainland China began very early. China suspected
that the National Re-Unification Guideline, proposed by Lee Tenghui in early 1991, and relevant remarks were but a camouflage for
the real intention of pursuing independence. Nevertheless, Beijing
had been restrained from making the accusation. The skepticism
later developed into distrust when he called the Republic of China
(ROC) the “Republic of China on Taiwan,” severely denounced
China’s mishandling of the “Thousand Lake” incident, and showing
more signs of identifying himself with Japan when interviewed by a
Japanese journalist in 1994.
After Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 visit to the United States, China
formally started to make the accusation.
. . . Lee Teng-hui, who insists on Taiwan independence, ignores
the strong desire of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait
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for re-unification and continues to take every opportunity to
challenge the one-China principle. He says that he is the only
person with courage to confront China. Lee Teng-hui’s statements
have severely poisoned the atmosphere for both sides. His action
on Taiwan independence is the biggest danger, and is the source
for the tension of both sides.8

China also pointed out potential problems brought by Lee
Teng-hui’s visit to the United States.
Lee Teng-hui’s remarks and actions not only have damaged
cross-strait relations, they have also bolstered the influence of
those advocating Taiwan independence on the island. This has
created a turbulent political situation, low morale, and a massive
outflow of immigration in Taiwan . . . As long as the separation
actions are not stopped, we will not stop our struggle against the
separation actions. If Taiwan continues to follow the course taken
by Lee Teng-hui’s dangerous road, Taiwan’s economy will have
no future as a result of small market size and lack of raw materials
and the Taiwan people will suffer.”9

China’s emotion exploded after Lee Teng-hui’s visit to his alma
mater, Cornell University. China’s accusation was made after
carefully examining Lee’s speech at Cornell, which contained no
word on China’s expected reunification. Chinese leaders judged that
Lee intentionally did it that way. Hence, China also judged that Lee
Teng-hui was pursuing independence.10
It could be conceived that China might have anticipated a
“decapitation effect.”11 China might wish that, through the military
exercise, a psychological paranoia would be created in Taiwan,
along with a declining stock market, depreciation of Taiwan
money, outflow of capital, and fighting among political elites.12
Chinese leaders might expect that the decapitation effect would
bring pressure toward the Lee Teng-hui government, forcing Lee to
change his policy of pursuing independence.
Another target was the United States. There was a widespread
conspiracy theory among many Chinese analysts13 called
“containment” or “soft containment” theory: the United States
intended to contain China.14 The theory started from the end of the
Cold War when many U.S. strategic analysts started to downgrade
the importance of China, arguing that China did not have value any
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more because the Soviet Union’s empire had collapsed.15 If China
was not important any more, then there was no need for the United
States to care about China.
On the other hand, it was argued by the containment advocates,
there was also a need for the United States to reorient its strategic
focus.16 With this reorientation, relations with some former friends,
allies, and adversaries might be switched and turned upside down.
In the early 1990s, China had survived the sanctions imposed by
western countries for the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen suppression and
kept its comprehensive national power growing. It was natural that
China had become the next target for a reoriented U.S. policy.
China also felt a hostile attitude from U.S. society. Some
religious groups accused China of violating religious freedom;
labor organizations charged China with exporting slave labor-made
products and undertaking unfair competition; human rights groups
denounced the Chinese government’s forced abortion policy;
the media reported the “China threat” theory. The U.S. Olympic
Committee, under the perceived influence of the United States
Government, opposed China’s bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games
and voted against China’s bid for the world game sponsorship.17
Against these circumstances, U.S. issuance of a visa to Lee
Teng-hui was perceived by many Chinese analysts as a test against
China by the United States. They, particularly those with a military
background, argued that the United States had attempted to
challenge established U.S.-China agreements since the early 1990s,
including the sale of F-16 fighters to Taiwan and the upgrading of
the Taiwan representative’s office’s status in Washington DC, in
1994. They perceived that Lee’s visit was a coordinated plot between
Taipei and Washington.18 The United States, they believed, had
attempted to drift away from its established one China policy, and
took Lee Teng-hui’s visit as a test.
Beijing was particularly concerned with the ramifications of
Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States. If Lee Teng-hui made a
successful visit to his alma mater in the United States, Japan might
follow suit and issue Lee Teng-hui a visa, allowing Lee Teng-hui to
visit his alma mater in Japan, Kyoto University. Taiwan’s attempt
to reenter the international community would be materialized, it
would be more difficult for China to isolate Taiwan internationally,
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and the sacred task of reunification would be remote.
In brief, the second goal for China in launching the military
exercises was to deter the United States from the perceived
modification of its established one China policy. Through the
forceful posture of the military exercises, China also wanted to show
the United States that it would pay a heavy cost if the United States
altered its China policy.19
Gains and Losses of the Military Exercises.
The evaluation of the crisis engineered by China has to be made
against the two goals stated above. China has accomplished its goals,
although the crisis created serious backlashes, and, on balance, the
end results were mixed.
Chinese analysts argued that the military exercises cast a blow
for those advocating Taiwan independence in Taiwan and helped
deter Lee Teng-hui from seeking independence.20 First, as Xue
Litai pointed out, after the presidential election, the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) split. Some radical Taiwan independence
subgroups who denounced the DPP, claiming it had not placed
Taiwan independence as its top priority, left the party and organized
a Taiwan Independence Party, thus further making Taiwan
independence a minority group in Taiwan. This was a serious
blow for those radical elements. The consequence was that the DPP
changed its tone over the Taiwan independence issue.
Other Chinese analysts echo Xue’s observation. Dr. Wang
Shaoguang, a U.S. trained political scientist, argued that China’s
missile test aimed at containing the further proliferation of the
force of Taiwan independence by increasing the cost of Taiwan
independence. “If China occasionally announces the information
about missile tests, Taiwan’s strength will be gradually exhausted
because an outflow of capital and manpower will be caused.” Wang
made an analog between this strategy, and China’s bombardment of
Kinmen and Matsu every other day.21
As a corollary effect, a debate later emerged within the DPP
in 1997-98. The debate, centering on policy toward China, was
conducted between two schools. One, represented by former party
chairman Xu Xin-liang (the head of the Formosa faction), argued
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that the DPP has to adopt a “Dadan xijin” [bold move of western
bound]. The other, represented by Qiu Yiren of the “New Trend”
faction, advocated a “Jieji yongren” [more cautious measure]. In
the end, a compromise was reached, and a slogan was proposed,
“strengthening self and west bound” [qiangben xijin]. Although no
specific definition was given, this reflected the serious thoughts of
the DPP regarding its policy toward China.22
Secondly, the military exercises have accomplished the goal of
reducing DPP’s votes on the presidential election. Xue’s argument
was that, if China did nothing before the voting day, Peng Mingmin, the DPP candidate, would have more votes than expected,
while Lee Teng-hui still could win the election. This was unfavorable
to China, demonstrating that DPP support went higher and higher.
The military exercise forced most Taiwanese to vote for Lee Tenghui, who, at that time, superficially did not rule out the possibility of
reunification, forcing the DPP to obtain only 21 percent of the total
vote.23
Other Chinese analysts made a similar point. Li Jiaquan, a senior
research staffer at the Institute for Taiwan Research of the Chinese
Academy of Social Science, pointed out that the DPP’s presidential
candidate obtained many fewer votes than previous elections of
around 30 percent. This implied that a total of one million votes
switched from the DPP candidate to the Kuomintang (KMT)
candidate, although the possibility of a backlash to protest China’s
military exercises could not be ruled out.24
Li Jiaquan pointed out two other signs of declining support
for candidate’s advocating independence. He says that it should
be noted that two other independent presidential candidates, Lin
Yangkang and Chen Lian, obtained 24 percent of the total vote,
slightly higher than the DPP candidate’s support of 21 percent.
Another candidate, Lee Teng-hui, promised to stabilize cross-strait
relations after the election.25
Secondly, the United States was aware of China’s position on the
Taiwan issue. Xue Litai pointed out that the United States should
have received a clear signal of China’s bottom line through the
military exercises. That is, if the United States were to breach the one
China policy, supporting Taiwan independence, or two Chinas, and
offering Taiwan the opportunity to expand Taiwan’s international
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status, China definitely would not sit idly by and would definitely
take action against the United States. Therefore, the United States
would not commit the same mistake after the strong and intense
military exercises26.
Thirdly, the military exercise opened the door for establishing
dialogue between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Xue pointed
out that, when China was escalating the intensity of the military
exercises, the United States started to pressure Taipei, requesting
Taiwan to resume dialogue with Beijing in order to defuse the crisis
and avoid direct conflict between the United States and China. This
indicated that the exercises had accomplished the goal of forcing
the United States to oppose Taiwan independence, and opening a
window of opportunity for dialogue between Taiwan and China.27
In fact, Beijing’s strategy was to gain a favorable position to
pave the way for later cross-strait dialogue. China’s calculation was
that, after the relationship between China and the United States
had improved, Taiwan would feel strong pressure from the United
States to stabilize the cross-strait relations and would be forced
to undertake dialogue with China. If the United States endorsed
China’s position on the Taiwan issue, it would strengthen Beijing’s
position and impact Taiwan’s morale.28
Chinese analysts also observed negative impacts brought by the
military exercises, although they reportedly had been in China’s
calculation. The first was the Taiwan people’s further negative
sentiment against reunification. Li Jiaquan vividly points out this
problem. He says that the significance of anti-independence of the
military exercises was seriously distorted, a new sentiment against
reunification emerged accordingly, and it would become a new
problem.29
Secondly, the military exercises heightened regional countries’
security concerns. On the one hand, the “China threat,” demonstrated
by China’s use of military force to address political issues, has
become a concern for neighboring countries and the United States.
On the other hand, China’s military exercises encouraged the United
States and Japan to conclude an agreement on security cooperation,
concluding negotiations that had taken place since early the 1990s,
and it is possible that the security cooperation included the Taiwan
issue in their considerations. Further, China’s test launch of surface-
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to-surface missiles might open the door for U.S.-Japan cooperation
on the joint collaborative development of the theater missile defense
(TMD) system. Xue’s observation points to this negative impact,
arguing that the military balance in East Asia would be changed
accordingly.30
Thirdly, the U.S.-Taiwan military-to-military relationship was
upgraded across-the-board after the military exercises. Strategically,
the United States and Taiwan started to undertake regular strategic
dialogue to review how each will react in case of military conflict
in the Taiwan Strait, the participants being composed of ranking
civilian and military staff. In terms of personnel exchange, Taiwan’s
defense minister and other high level defense officials visited the
United States more frequently. In terms of defense modernization,
Washington has sent uniformed people to help Taiwan make an
assessment of Taiwan’s defense needs. Arms transfer was also
strengthened: the United States approved more arms sales items to
Taiwan, some items having offensive capabilities, the best instance
being the approval of submarine sales. Taiwan was assisted in its
efforts to integrate command, control, communications, computers
and intelligence (C4I) systems among different services. Doctrinal
development was also on the agenda for U.S. assistance: to have the
United States send military experts to observe Taiwan’s military
exercises and provide expertise to assist Taiwan in this regard,
particularly in the field of joint operations.
U.S. Factors.
What has Beijing learned? Several questions should be asked to
provide a basis for drawing conclusions as to what lessons China has
learned. The first one has to do with U.S. factors. Has China learned
that the United States will intervene in the next crisis?
The answer is positive. The U.S. decision to intervene by sending
two aircraft carrier battle groups has sent strong signals to Beijing,
showing U.S. resolve in upholding the established principle that the
Taiwan issue has to be handled in a peaceful way.
Some observers argue that Beijing might attempt to test the U.S.
bottom line, or misperceive the meaning of peaceful settlement of
the cross-strait issue.31 China might have perceived that coercive
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action does not transgress peaceful settlement, the principle set by
the United States. However, Beijing’s perception was proven wrong,
and the United States responded firmly by sending the two battle
groups, and a possible gray area perceived by China was sealed off
quickly, decisively, and completely.
Further, the U.S. decision to intervene by sending the two aircraft
carrier battle groups was a surprise to China.32 As John W. Garver’s
research indicates, most Chinese had been misled by the low-profile
action adopted earlier by the United States,33 the U.S. decision to
intervene was a shock, and the two battle groups could demonstrate
enough U.S. resolve for the position of peaceful settlement of the
Taiwan issue.34
In addition to the erroneous impression given by the low
profile action taken by the United States earlier, Beijing might have
miscalculated U.S. interest toward Taiwan. Some Chinese analysts,
including Xue Litai, who have lived in the United States for a period
of time, emphatically pointed out the unbalanced value of Taiwan
for the United States and China. They argued that, for the United
States, Taiwan was not a core interest although the United States is
a global power. China, although only a regional power, had a core
interest in the Taiwan issue. This perceived unbalanced value led
them to conclude that the United States would seek a compromise
with China, or even accommodate China’s need in the end.35
The Chinese analysts’ calculation was not correct. To some
extent, they were correct to point out that Taiwan was not a core
interest for the United States. However, their calculation isolated
consideration for Taiwan from the issue of U.S. overall credibility
as the prominent leader in this region. Ross’s analysis points out
the mistake that China made: “the United States used force not to
defend its Taiwan policy, but to defend its strategic reputation by
influencing perceptions of U.S. resolve.”36
If the U.S. action adopted in March 1996 was not enough to
show U.S. resolve to uphold the established principle of peaceful
settlement of the Taiwan issue, what happened in the summer of
1999 should serve as another strong signal to Beijing.
In July 1999, Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui was interviewed and
said that the China-Taiwan status should be defined as special stateto-state relations. China made a coercive action again by sending
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sorties of jet fighters flying over the virtual middle line of the Taiwan
Strait. The United States, aware of the serious consequence, sent
strong words directly to China.
The 7th Fleet Commander warned China to ponder any
action taken. He was interviewed and said that China had to think
very carefully about any intimidation action taken beforehand. He
further pointed out that the U.S. capability was stronger than that of
the PLA. U.S. forces were well-trained, the United States had better
readiness, and China should know it. If China launched another
missile test like that of 1996, the United States would take resolute
action.37
China’s military program adopted in the aftermath of the
1996 crisis also reflected that they have learned of U.S. resolve.
Chinese military has started to make various scenario assessments
that the United States may intervene militarily and has worked out
responding contingency plans for those scenarios.
One PLA magazine article revealed their preparation in this
direction. The PLA Navy published Dangdai Haijun [Contemporary
Navy] which analyzed possible modes of U.S. navy involvement in
conflict in the Taiwan Strait in the future. The article takes the view
that once a conflict breaks out in the strait, the U.S. Navy is likely to
get involved. The modes of involvement range from the monitoring
of PLA forces, the dispatching of U.S. forces to Taiwan to deter
China from escalating the crisis, adopting limited military action
to prevent China’s military action against Taiwan, and undertaking
confrontation actions such as launching forces against China’s
invading units and logistics units. In their mind, the last scenario
is less likely, because an all-out war would subsequently break out
between the United States and China. However, the possibility
cannot be ruled out.38
Backlash in Taiwan.
To some extent, the military exercises did cast a blow at the
Taiwan independence movement. The DPP was split, while the
remaining DPP started to seriously rethink their China policy.
Further, the DPP’s decision to amend its Taiwan independence
platform in 1999 to appeal to the moderate voters to prepare for the
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presidential election in the year 2000 reflected the impact brought by
the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis.39
However, the military exercises also created a serious backlash
in Taiwan. To be more specific, the stronger Beijing’s intimidating
actions and words, the stronger the backfire would be. This could
be exemplified by the end result that those advocating a stronger
position against China during the election won power, while those
advocating better relations with China lost. In other words, Beijing
did not comprehend the complex linkage between its intimidation
and Taiwan’s domestic politics.
The end result of the 1996 presidential election vividly testified
to the above observation. Lee Teng-hui, who claimed that he was
the only person daring to confront China, won a landslide victory:
54 percent of the total votes. Next to him was Peng Ming-min,
obtaining 21 percent. The other two candidates, Chen Lian and
Lin Yangkang, who denounced Lee Teng-hui’s provocative action,
only obtained 10 percent and 15 percent respectively. Despite the
reiterated clarification by Chinese analysts that Lee’s re-election had
been in their expectation and the missile test was not aimed at Lee
Teng-hui, Lee Teng-hui’s landslide victory was still a little surprise
to them. Li Jiaquan admitted that Lee’s 54 percent of support was
higher than he had expected.40
Two contrasting instances could explain the outcome. One
Taiwanese military official said that he was forced by China to switch
his vote to Lee Teng-hui, although such a decision contravened his
own choice. The reason given was that, if Lee Teng-hui lost the
election, Beijing would be justified in having conducted the exercise,
and Taiwan would suffer more pressure in the future.41 The military
official decision conforms to the theory that incumbent leaders tend
to win sympathy, and voters tend to rally behind them in the wake
of an externally caused crisis. In fact, the Lin Yangkang camp had
a similar complaint; one of his aides complained afterward that if
there was no intimidation from Beijing, Lin would have gotten more
votes.42
However, China did not comprehend the complexity at that
time until the year 2000 presidential election. There were three
candidates—KMT’s Lian Chan, DPP’s Chen Shui-bian, and
independent James Soong. Lian Chan was regarded as Lee Tenghui’s protégé. James Soong earlier had had serious odds with Lee
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Teng-hui and left the KMT.
In July 9, 1999, Lee Teng-hui, when interviewed by German
media, described the cross-strait relations as “at least special stateto-state relations.” One week later, candidate Chen Shui-bian
praised Lee Teng-hui’s statement, and suggested Lee Teng-hui take
further action by dropping the National Reunification Guideline and
amending the constitution in accordance with the special state-tostate theory.
However, James Soong criticized Lee Teng-hui’s remark. He said
that the special state-to-state theory was an irresponsible statement,
and Taiwan would be labeled as troublemaker internationally,
although he emphasized that Taiwan is not a province of China.
James Soong paid for criticizing the special state-to-state
statement. According to an opinion poll made by the DPP on July
15 and 16, 1999, his popularity declined by 5 percent. Another poll
made by Chinatimes on August 3-5, 1999, similarly concluded that
James Soong’s popularity fell by 4 percent from July 7-9 of the same
year.43
China finally comprehended the complex linkage in March 2000.
Three days before voting day, China’s Premier Zhu Rongji, at a
press conference of the annual National People Congress, warned
that whoever pushes for Taiwan independence in Taiwan will go
to hell. Zhu also warned that the growing support for Taiwan’s
independence will provoke war in the Taiwan Strait “. . . Chinese
people will sacrifice blood and life to defend the reunification with
the motherland, and dignity . . . Taiwan compatriots, you have to be
aware of this.”44
In the end, Chen Shui-bian won 39.3 percent of total votes, while
Lian Chan obtained 23 percent and James Soong, 37 percent. Some
said that Zhu Rongji’s remark might have helped candidate Chen
Shui-bian win the election with a margin of 2.4 percent in total votes.45
The Chen Shui-bian camp had estimated that he had expected to win
only 36 percent before the voting day. There might be some relation
between Zhu’s threatening words and Chen Shui-bian’e victory. In
fact, after the election, China’s response has been described by CIA
Director George Tenet and DoD spokesman Kenneth Bacon as selfrestrained.46
China finally learned something in the past several years. China
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started to realize that it had better be careful when meddling in
Taiwan’s domestic politics. Beijing now knows that to make any
comment, positive or negative, on Taiwan’s domestic politics only
generates an opposite effect that they do not want to see. That was
why Beijing was relatively quiet when Taiwan had parliamentary
elections in late 2001, even after President Chen Shui-bian made the
remark on August 3, 2002 of “one country on each side of the Taiwan
Strait” at a telecommunication speech to a Taiwanese group living
in Japan.47
Related to the above is the realization that, the more Beijing
employs pressure and coercive action, the stronger Taiwan will
resist and the more remote reunification will be as a viable option
will be in Taiwan. In other words, Beijing at least has to alter its
tactics and methods for dealing with Taiwan, switching to the
incentive-oriented approach and seeking ways to establish closer
ties with Taiwan.
Internal Debate.
China faced a critical choice on the political use of military
exercises in the future. If the theory advocating coercive action to
deter Taiwan from seeking independence works, as many Chinese
analysts believe, China should launch frequent and large scale
military exercises. Moreover, the stronger military exercises are, the
more likely Taiwan would be to bow to China’s pressure.
However, this approach has not been proved successful. On the
one hand, Lee Teng-hui continued to advocate his ideas. On the
other hand, any military exercise to deter Lee Teng-hui from airing
“independence” ideas would invite the United States to intervene in
the Taiwan Strait and internationalize the cross-strait issue.48
Moreover, small scale and occasional military exercises will not
achieve the goal of conveying strong warning messages against
Taiwan. For one, small scale exercises will not shock the Taiwanese,
forcing them to think over their future. Secondly, small scale
exercises will not only enable the Taiwanese to get used gradually to
the intimidation, but will force the Taiwanese to be sympathetic to
and supportive of the Taiwan government in the long term.49
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This catch-22 situation, in fact, reflected a dilemma, that is,
Beijing felt that they were somewhat constrained. On the one hand,
they were constrained by the realization of the complex linkage, and
no alternative had been found. On the other hand, this constraint
would give further opportunity to, at least, the independence
fundamentalists to advocate whatever type of Taiwan independence
they wished, while Beijing was left with no solution for immediate
countermeasures.50
An internal debate arose in this context. In general, two schools
can be discerned. The focus of the debate was what should China do
in this context? How should China calculate its costs and benefits?
It seemed that those moderates advocating modernization as the top
priority prevailed.
There are several rationales behind the priority of modernization.51
The first one is the possible U.S. involvement and the aftermath of
large-scale confrontation between the United States and China.
Moderate analysts have confidence that in an all out war with
Taiwan, the United States can neither send large numbers of troops
to the Taiwan Strait, nor bear high casualties if choosing to fighting
with China. Meanwhile, the format for U.S. involvement may vary,
depending upon conditions, but the United States may lack sustained
will and determination comparable to those of China.
However, moderates argue that China should watch how the
United States will react after the military confrontation. They are
concerned that, if China reunifies Taiwan by force, a strong antiChina atmosphere will emerge in the United States, forcing it to
launch a long-term cold war against China. This is particularly the
case if China launches an attack without the prior provocation of
Taiwan’s announcing its independence.
What will happen for China in that case? Moderates argue that
that will be the worst scenario for China, because China, which is still
a developing country, will be forced to divert most of its resources
to military buildup and political confrontation, and opportunity
for further economic and political development will be lost. The
consequence would be that China definitely will not become the
most powerful country in the world, although a basic level of
security can be maintained.52
The Taiwan Strait may further complicate China’s military
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calculation.53 The average 90-mile distance of the strait makes offense
difficult, and 50 years of separation has witnessed this difficulty. The
other side of the coin is that the strait has easily enabled Taiwan to
defend against China’s potential attack with relative low cost.
Also, China is not well-prepared for launching an attack.
Constrained by technological, economic, and political factors in
the past decades, China has not built up a force able to carry out
three dimensional offensive operations under high tech conditions.
In contrast to China’s lack of preparation, Taiwan, assisted by the
United States, has been better prepared to defend an against attack
from China.54
Secondly, closer military ties between the United States and
Taiwan will make it difficult for China to launch low intensity war
to deter Taiwan from separation and to force Taiwan to undertake
reunification negotiations. Under this situation, Taiwan, assisted
by the United States, is being prepared militarily for this kind of
politically-oriented coercive action. China is not confident that it
can achieve the original goal without creating the opposite result of
making Taiwan announce independence.55
Further, China is not sure if the scale of the military conflict can be
confined to low intensity war. There are many unforeseeable factors
during the whole course of war, and these unexpected factors will
inevitably escalate the scale of war. The escalation will make the war
lose political direction, and consequences will be very serious.
For this school, the best alternative is to place priority on
modernization. They argue that the solution of the Taiwan issue
should be placed in a broader scope: China’s overall development
will influence the final solution of Taiwan. If China can persist in
reforming the economic system and the political institutions, as well
as developing military capabilities, this will project a good image
of China to the Taiwanese, hence helping facilitate the eventual
reunification.
In this sense, final accomplishment of reunification is a side
product of China’s overall modernization. China’s independence,
security, integration, and being a world-class power is of utmost
importance, while the Taiwan issue is not the top and overwhelming
priority. The overall modernization, if accomplished, should bring
wealth and strength to China. By doing so, China can avoid the trap
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of paying an extremely high cost for reunification.
For the modernization school, there is an implicit assumption.
That is, both mainland Chinese and Taiwanese are of Han Chinese
descent. Taiwan’s reluctance to accept reunification has to do with
China’s lack of democracy and less-developed economic system.
If China can accomplish modernization in both fields, it will be
attractive enough for the Taiwanese, and the Taiwanese will drop
separation, either keeping the status quo or changing the name of
the government, and opt for reunification.
The opposite end from the moderates was the hawkish school.56
The hawkish school argues that Lee Teng-hui’s formula defining
the cross-strait relations as special state-to state relations was not
merely a passive strategy aiming at maintaining the status quo of
two divided entities. The current temporary division, advocated
by the former ruling KMT party, does not rule out the recognition
that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are Chinese, and the
possibility of eventual reunification is not ruled out by both sides.
Instead, these hawkish critics saw Lee Teng-hui’s formula as
an offensive strategy. They saw a conspiracy behind the strategy
with the final goal of transforming and dismembering China and
eventually ruining Chinese nationalism completely. It was a grand
strategy based on a horrible conspiracy.
They reached this conclusion based on many of Lee Tenghui’s remarks. Lee said in his book, Taiwan de zhuzhang [Taiwan’s
Position], published in May 1999, that China should be divided into
seven parts, including Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia,
and Manchuria. In their mind, Lee Teng-hui’s real intention was to
negate China and Chinese nationalism to pave the way for Taiwan
independence, dismember China so as to solve the geopolitical
obstacle for Taiwan’s survival and development, as well as to
dismember Chinese nationalism to reduce the political barrier for
Taiwan’s survival and development.
They pointed out that Lee Teng-hui attempted to market his idea
to the United States and Japan. Lee advocated, they accused, that
dividing China into seven parts was in the interest of the world,
because once China is divided, there will be no Chinese hegemon
and pax-Chinese nationalism, and the threat posed to this region
will be reduced accordingly.
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They particularly resent that Lee Teng-hui attempted to prop up
Japan’s militarism. They charged that Japan’s wei xin lun [idealism],
advocated by Lee Teng-hui in his book, is tantamount to Japan’s
Bushido idea, which was the source for Japan’s pre-war militarism.
Therefore, in their mind, Lee Teng-hui was promoting Japan’s
militarism.
In this context, the Taiwan issue was not an isolated one. The
source of this issue could be dated back to the end of the Cold War.
After the Soviet Union had collapsed, the United States and its
allied states launched a containment policy toward China which
has reached its pre-final stage. It heralded that the strategic security
of China’s coastal area would further worsen and a political storm
would approach soon.
The hawkish school emphasized that, if timing is ripe, the
United States and its allied states will not forgo any opportunity to
dismember China. The new U.S.-Japan security guideline and the
signing of the Visiting Force agreement between the United States
and the Philippines could serve as a witness for the conspiracy of the
United States and its allied states. Hence, the security environment
of China’s coastal area has approached a level next to war in this
context.
Facing the above stated situation, this school proposed to take
forceful measures. First, they voted to change the perception and
modify the proposition of net assessment toward the world. They
argued that peace and development, a conclusion reached earlier to
describe the future trend, was an illusive vision that has not existed
and China should wake up from it. If China did not wake up, it
would encounter a dangerous future.
Secondly, they proposed to take military action. They emphasized
that a military force should be mobilized to solve the Taiwan issue
to assure that the objective of national development could be
accomplished, because the Taiwan issue is the key to the objective,
and, if the Taiwan issue can be solved, China will be able to break
U.S. hegemonism and containment.
Judging from the most recent developments in cross-strait and
U.S.-China relations, it seems that the moderate school prevailed.
That partially can explain why Beijing’s response has been mild
toward President Chen Shui-bian’s August 3, 2002, remark. There

395

is no doubt that Beijing did not like this statement and regarded
it as consistent with Lee Teng-hui’s special state-to-state theory of
1999. Vice Premier Qian Qichen, when hosting overseas Chinese
from Africa, said that President Chen’s remark was consistent with
Lee Teng-hui’s 1999 remark, setting up new obstacles to cross-strait
relations, bringing new problems for Taiwan society, and acting as a
troublemaker for international society.57
However, interestingly enough, Beijing did not make threatening
words in their comments. Qian Qichen only said that Chinese in the
world and international media should condemn President Chen’s
statement. China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Director, Chen Yun-lin,
had a similar response. Chen said that the three links continued to
be China’s policy.58 Also, there was no PLA jet fighter flying over
the virtual center line of the Taiwan Strait as that in August 1999
in response to Lee Teng-hui’s remark, let alone the mobilization of
military exercise targeting Taiwan.59
Conclusion: Lessons Learned.
What lessons has China learned? The foremost and core lesson
is that the United States is the No. 1 obstacle for China’s goal of
reunifying Taiwan. Normalization of relations with the United
States has not precluded it from giving up its concern for Taiwan at
all, because its credibility is at stake.
As a consequence, the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis and subsequent
events enabled China to learn that the United States will not sit
idly by in any future crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The United States
will intervene in one way or another. China has also realized its
existing capability gap with the United States. China has modified
its strategy, placing priority on developing its economy and defense
modernization.
However, the switched strategy and priority does not rule out
the possibility of taking coercive action in the future. Many analysts
pointed out that interaction between domestic and external factors
led China to launch coercive diplomacy in the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait
crisis.60 This implies that, if a similar condition happens, China may
take risks to launch coercive action in the future, while measures of
risk management will be employed.
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China has to find ways to handle possible U.S. intervention.
Militarily, it has to build up its capability in order to reunify Taiwan
and simultaneously deter the United States from intervening in the
Taiwan Strait. In Chinese leaders’ minds, an ideal military capability
is able to paralyze Taiwan’s military capability in a very short time,
leaving the United States no time to response, and, at the same time,
the PLA can, at least, hold U.S. forces. However, before that capability
is achieved, China probably has to be jieji yongren, be patient.
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PART IV:
DOMESTIC DEPLOYMENTS AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

CHAPTER 12
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
AND THE TIANANMEN MASSACRE
June Teufel Dreyer
Epistomological Questions.
The experiences of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) during
the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76 and its part in quelling the
demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in 1989 were undoubtedly
searing and left a deep impression on both those who witnessed
them and on future generations. Before coming to a judgment on
the lessons learned from these painful experiences, however, a few
broader questions should be contemplated.
• Were any lessons learned?
• If so, were they the correct lessons?
• Even if the lessons learned were correct, are they appropriate as a guide
for the PLA under current circumstances?
• Is there consensus on what these lessons were, or have different groups
assessed the experiences differently?

It is possible for a society to learn nothing from past experience,
as George Santayana lamented in his famous observation that those
who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. In this
scenario, a compressed version of traditional China’s dynastic cycle,
the same mistakes will be made over and over again. It is also
possible to learn the wrong lessons, as the French did after their
defeat at the Battle of Crecy in 1346. French knights on horseback
were defeated by British knights who fought on foot, supported by
commoners armed with longbows. The French reasoned that their
knights, like those of the British forces, should not ride into battle.
Hence, at a rematch in Agincourt in 1417, French knights also fought
on foot. The French were defeated again. It took a second battle
for the correct lesson to be learned--that longbows will penetrate
most armor, whether or not the wearer of the armor is mounted.
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The vulnerability of knights rather than that of their horses was the
problem.
In the case of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA),
public writings tend toward views that are, first, established by
fiat at the highest levels rather than emerging from open debate,
and second, ignore or give short shrift to factors that may not suit
the heroic imagery that the leadership wants to inspire the troops
with. Both may lead to simplistic explanations that mislead rather
than provide guides for success in the future. Political correctness
precludes probing analysis that could provide better explanations
for what happened. Even assuming that the lessons learned were
correct--for example, that luring the enemy deep into one’s territory
until his troops can be cut off from behind was responsible for major
Chinese Communist victories against the party’s adversaries--what
worked in the 1940s might not be workable in 2010. And, of course,
it is possible--outside China, at least--to challenge the lessons learned
from that period. Perhaps, for example, what enabled the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) to win the war was not the brilliance of
Mao Zedong’s theory of People’s War. The party’s victory can also
be attributed to a combination of two other factors: first, that the
Japanese occupation fatally weakened the opposition Kuomintang
by forcing it from the urban areas that constituted its power base
and, second, that Kuomintang (KMT) leader Chiang Kai-shek
employed a foolish military strategy.
The Cultural Revolution.
During the prelude to the Cultural Revolution,1 the PLA was
lionized. It had not always been such. An “officers to the ranks”
program carried out at the time of the Great Leap Forward indicates
the leadership’s concern that the military was becoming dangerously
elitist. The abolition of ranks in mid-1965, a decade after they had
been instituted, also spoke to this concern. The official media
explained that the rank system introduced in 1955 had proved
not in conformity with “our army’s glorious tradition, with the
close relations between officers and men, between the higher and
lower levels, and between the army and the people.” Eliminating
ranks would remove factors conducive to concern with wealth and
fame; help officers to put themselves in the position of rank-and-file
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soldiers, workers, and peasants; enable them to remold themselves
ideologically; and solidify the ideal of whole-hearted service to party
and people. A re-education effort was prescribed for the military.
The press began to praise “five good” soldiers,2 of whom there were
a great many, and Lei Feng, the model soldier so good and true
to Chairman Mao and his ideals that he was unique. Evidently,
the leadership had chosen the PLA as a test case for techniques
of ideological indoctrination before attempting to apply them to
society as a whole.
If so, they must have deemed these techniques to be successful.
By the mid-1960s, the PLA was being held up as the model for the
rest of society to emulate. A “Learn From The PLA” campaign was
launched, and the military was praised as a “great red school”
in learning and implementing the thoughts of Mao Zedong.
Additionally, Defense Minister and, until ranks were abolished,
Marshal, Lin Biao compiled the little red book of selected quotations
from Chairman Mao that became practically the only reading matter
during the Cultural Revolution. These indicated to the population
at large that the military’s influence had been enhanced. When the
Cultural Revolution was formally launched in 1966, however, it was
not the military but a new force, the Red Guards, that Chairman Mao
anointed as the vanguard of change. Speaking from the rostrum of
Tiananmen, the chairman called upon these young people, many of
them barely teenagers, to destroy the “bourgeois headquarters,” by
which he appeared to mean any organization with a hierarchy.
At least in theory, the PLA remained a respected institution and
was called upon to assist the young guards. But this did not prevent
its command structure from being purged repeatedly. Factionalism
existed within the Red Guards, with each group describing itself as
the true defenders of Mao and Marxism. Peasants and workers also
organized, sometimes to protect themselves and their workplaces
from the radicals’ depredations. Stories of battles among factions
became daily fare in the media. Since all sides claimed to be the real
revolutionaries, it was difficult for PLA leaders to decide whom
to assist, how, and to what degree. PLA units were themselves
attacked, as the attackers acted on radical exhortations to “drag out
the small handful [of counterrevolutionaries] in the military.” Army
weapons fell into civilian hands, sometimes because they had been
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stolen or looted. Sometimes those who guarded the weapons feared
that those who wanted them might, if refused, accuse the guards of
counterrevolutionary sentiments and launch a struggle against them.
Moreover, the PLA received conflicting signals: told to support the
left, it was also at one point ordered not to intervene.3 An October
1966 joint directive from the party’s Central Military Commission
(CMC) and the PLA’s General Political Department called for more
radical methods of “blooming and contending” within the PLA, but
also instructed military schools and their students to stay out of
local Cultural Revolution activities and confine their “exchange of
revolutionary experiences” to visits to other military schools.4 By late
February 1967, fearing that widespread chaos might cause a sharp
drop in the spring harvest, Mao ordered the PLA to stabilize the
situation. Radicals bitterly opposed what they called “the February
Adverse Current”; Mao as well became convinced that local military
units were backing not revolutionaries but local leaders with whom
they had been associated. Additional restraints on the military were
issued.
The PLA was not itself immune from factionalism, with
commissars somewhat more likely to be sympathetic to radicals
than commanders. Although the rhetoric of the disputes focused on
ideology, the reality was more likely to reflect personality differences
and the quest for power of those involved. As a case in point, Unit
8341, the Party Central Committee’s (PCC) Regiment of the Guards
under the command of the Beijing garrison, was controlled by
Wang Dongxing. Wang was known for his close relationship with
Chairman Mao and was sympathetic to the radicals. However,
he was also an opponent of Lin Biao,5 who had taken the lead in
publicizing the Cultural Revolution and whom the media typically
referred to as “Chairman Mao’s closest comrade-in-arms.”
These personal relationships and loyalty networks played
important parts in factionalism within the PLA. Through “special
arrangements” (teshu guanxi), the children of top leaders could enter
the military--considered far preferable than being sent “down to the
countryside” to become one with the peasants--where they received
special treatment. Lin Biao’s son, for example, was a high-ranking
officer in the air force; Mao’s nephew was an officer in a missile unit
in the northeast. Ambitious but less well-connected officers were
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eager to associate with them and thereby promote their careers
because of the opportunities that this could open up for them as
confreres of the favored few.6 Lin and others appeared to be using
the Cultural Revolution as a way to diminish and even destroy their
rivals within the military. These personal relationships and loyalty
networks played into and magnified the rivalries among them.
In general, however, the PLA tended to intervene on the side
of order and stability, meaning against the radicals. With icons
of the revolution such as Marshal He Long being purged on such
charges as “conspiracy,” it must have seemed that no one was safe.
It is known that after Deng Xiaoping was publicly humiliated and
purged, he was sheltered by military officers;7 it is likely that others
were as well. Even in the Cultural Revolution’s atmosphere of
feverish suspension of disbelief, charges that old soldiers who had
made huge personal sacrifices on behalf of the party were secret
traitors must have rung hollow.
Another charge that brought down many officers was that
of having a “narrowly military” point of view. Chairman Mao’s
actual words were that men equipped with correct political ideas
were more important in war than weapons; this theme had been
expounded on by Lin Biao as well.8 However, in the grotesquely
cartoon-like simplification of the era, one’s enemies could construe
any support for modern weapons or training as evidence of a
narrowly military point of view. Hence, officers opted to have their
troops engage in massive and repeated political study sessions.
Another of Santayana’s observations comes to mind: fanaticism
consists in redoubling one’s efforts after one has forgotten his aim.
A particularly bitter experience occurred in July 1967, when
Chen Caidao, commander of the Wuhan Military Region, arrested
central government radicals who had come to the city to arrange
a truce between two factions. The central government quickly
reasserted control, arresting Chen and his subordinates. But with
the threat of anarchy increasing, Mao appears to have decided that
order had to be restored, and in September 1967, gave the order to
do so. Andrew Scobell’s research indicates that even Mao’s wife
and leading radical Jiang Qing supported the directive.9 During the
next year, revolutionary committees were established to administer
the provinces. Their composition was dominated by military men.

409

Troops also moved into university campuses to restore order. When
the CCP’s Ninth Party Congress was held in 1969, the Central
Committee elected thereat also showed heavy military influence: 44
percent of those elected were members of the PLA. A revised party
constitution adopted at the congress designated Lin Biao, by name,
as Mao’s chosen successor. PLA members associated with him, as
compared with PLA members in general, were especially favored
with high positions.
While the military, and particularly Lin’s faction thereof,
emerged well from the Cultural Revolution, the cost had been high.
The command structure was destroyed. A number of officers had
died; many more had had their reputations ruined. The PLA’s prime
reason for being, the defense of China’s territory, was adversely
affected by the depredations visited on the military. Border security
in sensitive areas such as Xinjiang, bordering a then-hostile Soviet
Union, and Tibet had badly deteriorated. In 1968, Tibet’s leader,
Ren Rong, a Han Chinese thought to be more sympathetic to the left
than to conservatives, warned that factional infighting had reduced
attention to national defense and cautioned against border incidents.
Indian, Soviet, and American reconnaissance patrols had, he said,
been detected along the border and “traitors and bandits” within
Tibet were “itching for action” there.10
Lessons Learned.
Different entities must have learned different lessons from the
Cultural Revolution. Mao Zedong presumably learned that the
PLA played a critical role in maintaining the stability of the People’s
Republic, and that, once having unleashed the Red Guards in the
name of social reform, neither he nor the society he had created
could function without it. He also learned that a military called
in to restore order might be reluctant to abandon the positions of
authority its commanding officers had assumed. Radicals learned
that they could not trust the military, since it proved fundamentally
opposed to the kind of reform they were trying to bring about. They
concluded that they would have to create a force that could serve as
a counterweight to it.
Military leaders, though they did not publicly say so, surely felt
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betrayed and embittered. It must have been difficult to descend from
the favored position of “great red school” role model for society to
being humiliated and attacked by radical factions. While continuing
to profess unswerving loyalty to Chairman Mao, military men must
have harbored profound private doubts. Rather than giving clear
directions, the Chairman appeared to have been playing factions
against one another, to the detriment of both the corporate interests
of the military and to social welfare as a whole. PLA leaders may
also have questioned the wisdom of intervention on the side of one
faction or another to further Mao’s schemes. Memoirs written years
later profess joy at receiving Mao’s command to intervene. But
these were written after Mao’s death and a time when it was safe
to criticize the Cultural Revolution. They do not necessarily reflect
what the parties involved thought at the time the action took place.
As a case in point, Marshal Xu Shiyou, over a decade later, expressed
relief at receiving the September 1967 order to intervene.11 But he
could not have known when he received the order that it would
not prove ephemeral, as had the February 1967 order, and that the
military’s actions would not again be castigated as an “adverse
current” at some later date. This should have taught the military
that intervention should occur only on clear and unequivocal
orders from the party. At this point in time, few doubted that the
Chairman spoke for the party and, in the mystic aura created by
the cult of Mao, that he embodied the party. But, particularly after
the disastrous experience of the Great Leap Forward, many officers
must have known that the Chairman was not infallible, and that he
could be persuaded to change his policies on the basis of advice from
different people around him.
A second, and less equivocal, lesson that both the PLA and Mao
learned is that it is dangerous to allow the military’s role in society
to overwhelm its functional role of defending the nation against
external enemies.
Lessons, Loyalties, and Policy Choices.
The policy choices conditioned by the different lessons learned
by these major actors played themselves out over the next decade.
It seems clear that the lesson Mao had learned about the pivotal
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role of the military convinced him that the PLA’s recently enhanced
powers would have to be diminished. Fittingly, his first target was
the PLA figure to have most profited by the Cultural Revolution, Lin
Biao. In the normal course of events, the 1969 Party congress should
have been followed by a National People’s Congress, which would
adopt a new state constitution that, like the 1969 Party constitution,
would name Lin as Mao’s chosen successor. No congress, and no
constitution, appeared. At a conference held in Lushan in 1970, Mao
criticized Lin and his faction; in the following year he accused them
of plotting an “unaccomplished coup.”12 Mao’s drastic reassessment
of Lin was almost certainly influenced by another faction of radicals,
the Gang of Four, that included his wife, Jiang Qing.
Extensive archival research and interviews conducted by Jin
Qiu, the daughter of a member of Lin’s faction indicate that Lin was
loath to challenge Mao, even on this matter. Like other revolutionary
veterans, he felt that to oppose Mao was to oppose the party, and to
oppose the party was to negate the cause for which he and they had
spent most of their lives fighting. Also, knowing that Mao cared
intensely about the legacy of the Cultural Revolution, Lin doubted
that Mao would wish to discredit him, as the chief cheerleader for
the Revolution, too sharply. Lin’s son, however, had learned a
different lesson from the Cultural Revolution: that personal survival
was more important than any cause, and that Mao was not a benign,
god-like figure. Hence, he reasoned, he should remove his family
to safety before Mao could destroy all of their careers, including his
own.13 Feeling that this would be a mistake, Lin’s daughter made a
mistake of her own: informing Unit 8341 of the planned escape. This
enabled the 8341 commander, Wang Dongxing, to use the escape
attempt as proof that a coup was being plotted and hence that
his long-term rival, Lin Biao, was a traitor to his country.14 While
the broad outlines of this analysis can be corroborated by other
materials, there are doubts as to the accuracy of some details. As
the daughter of a central figure in the intrigue, Jin Qiu’s ability to
objectively analyze her sources can be questioned. Moreover, the
people she interviewed had legitimate concerns for their own safety
and may not have been completely truthful. Finally, the official CCP
archives on the matter remain closed. Hence, it is not certain whether
Lin was ignorant of his son’s plans to protect him, as Jin Qiu argues,
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or whether he himself was party to the scheme.15 More importantly,
however, there is no doubt that Mao Zedong turned against his loyal
commander when it seemed that Lin and the PLA might be powerful
enough to become a potential rival to his own authority.
Mao’s efforts to reduce Lin Biao’s power while reducing the
power of the military in general was also evident in the fact that
there was no Chief of the General Staff from 1971 until early 1975.
This coincided with the efforts of the radical left to keep the central
PLA leadership from being a significant political force. Probably
inadvertently, considerable military power devolved to regional
military commanders such as Chen Xilian, Li Desheng, and Xu
Shiyou, who controlled revolutionary committees as well as holding
membership in the Politburo. At the same time, however, the Cultural
Revolution had shown that problems could arise from allowing
the PLA’s combat strength to deteriorate while it concentrated on
domestic political missions. The Chinese leadership interpreted
the Soviet Union’s incursion into Czechoslovakia in August 1968
as a warning that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was next.
Rebuilding the PLA’s combat capabilities became a high priority.
Building up the PLA’s military capabilities while simultaneously
reducing its political clout is more easily accomplished in theory than
in real life. The need to strengthen defense against an external attack
reinforced already extant pressures to rehabilitate those experienced
professional military leaders who had suffered during the Cultural
Revolution. This process began in 1973, with Deng Xiaoping being
one of the first to be restored to a position of honor. Men such as
Luo Ruiqing, Wang Enmao, Yang Chengwu, and Xiao Hua were
brought back and given positions in the regional and/or central
military hierarchies, sometimes the same posts from which they had
been purged a few years before. Doing so, however, simultaneously
disadvantaged the inexperienced “helicopter people” who had
risen rapidly during the Cultural Revolution. Not surprisingly,
the return of the veterans was resented by the newcomers, and
the veterans in turn were contemptuous of the newcomers. The
interaction between the men who were recently rehabilitated and
those who had persecuted them did little to enhance military
efficiency. In the judgment of a U.S. Government analyst, when
this uneasy combination was added to the factional tensions among
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senior military leaders that had been exacerbated by the Cultural
Revolution, the result was a serious problem of polarization within
the military leadership.16
Initially, however, Mao Zedong felt that the preeminence of the
military in the power structure that had resulted from the Cultural
Revolution needed to be dealt with, as opposed to factions within
the PLA. In December 1973, he announced the rotation of eight of the
eleven commanders of the PRC’s military regions. The chairman’s
statement that he “wanted to mix in some sand,” accompanied by
warnings against the creation of “independent kingdoms” and
“warlord mentalities” indicates that he felt the commanders had
become too entrenched in regional power structures--indeed, several
held not only military command but top positions in the party and
government as well.17
Radicals, having learned from the Cultural Revolution that
they could not trust the military, sought to build a counterforce
of their own: the urban militia. Efforts to do so began in 1973; 2
years later a change in the state constitution elevated the militia to
parity with the PLA and reaffirmed the authority of the party over
both.18 At basic levels of society, the militia was used to support
radical ideological goals: suspects were apprehended without
warrants, detained without indictments, and convicted on the basis
of forced “confessions.” The militia was also used to support radical
goals at the highest levels of power. It suppressed the Tiananmen
demonstrations of April 1976 that led to Deng Xiaoping’s redismissal
from power. Radicals also planned to use the militia to ensure that
their views would prevail after the death of the ailing Mao Zedong.
Factories in Shanghai manufactured not only large quantities of
rifles for militia use, but also heavy-duty weapons such as rockets,
howitzers, and tank-like vehicles not normally used by militia
units.
Wang Dongxing of the aforementioned 8341 guards unit,
although regarded as a leftist, nonetheless arrested the Gang of
Four soon after Mao’s death, and military units took over media
outlets and other areas where the Gang’s influence was considered
strong. Only in Shanghai, the bastion of the Gang of Four’s power,
was strong resistance encountered. Although Nanjing Military
Region units obeyed CMC leader Ye Jianying’s orders to surround
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the city, commander Ding Sheng did not execute orders to disarm
the militia. Xu Shiyou, who had been Nanjing Military Region
commander before Mao’s troop rotation of 1973 and who had been
well connected with the power structure there--perhaps too well
connected from Mao’s point of view--was sent in to replace Ding
and accomplished the task with little difficulty.19 A salient lesson
from this episode is that, although one might learn from the Cultural
Revolution that a military too entrenched in the power structure was
bad, such military people could be useful in specific situations such
as putting down the militia revolt in Shanghai.
With the help of military leaders, Deng Xiaoping was rerehabilitated. Although it might have seemed that Deng would
rule China through, or perhaps on the sufferance of, this group, he
was soon to move against most of those who had helped him. The
8341 unit was either disbanded or incorporated into the units of the
Beijing Garrison and Beijing Military Region by the end of 1978,20
and Wang Dongxing lost his position on the Politburo Standing
Committee in 1980. Within months after his restoration to power,
Deng differed with Ye Jianying on the issue of professionalism,21
and with another of his erstwhile supporters, head of the PLA’s
General Political Department Wei Guoqing, on the liberalization of
censorship over literature and art. Xu Shiyou was removed from his
position in 1980, and Wei Guoqing in 1982. The lesson high-ranking
PLA leaders should have learned from this is the same one that Lin
Biao might have reflected upon had he lived to do so: loyalty to the
paramount leader will not necessarily be reciprocated.
As chair of the party’s CMC, Deng continued the process of
removing military leaders from provincial Party committees, and in
1982 initiated a plan to separate and more clearly differentiate the
functions of party, government, and military. While advantageous
to efficiency, the plan had disadvantages as well. One can argue
that at the time of the Cultural Revolution, the fusion of party,
government, and military personnel at the highest levels made
a military coup definitionally impossible, since the same people
headed all three. Conversely, to separate those functions would
create the preconditions under which a coup could occur. The
process was resisted by some who felt that revolutionary traditions
were being betrayed. A state military commission, created in 1982,
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never gained a genuinely separate existence, much less absorbing
the functions of the party CMC. The leadership personnel of the two
commissions, for example, are identical. Deng had another setback
when the military refused to agree that his chosen successor, Hu
Yaobang, should become CMC chair in addition to head of the party.
When Hu was ousted from his position as party head after student
demonstrations in 1987, the military was believed to have played an
important part in his political demise. The military also reportedly
refused to accept the man who succeeded Hu as party head, Zhao
Ziyang, as CMC chair.
But some progress was made in other areas.
Military
representation on the PCC declined, for example, and more officers
were being trained in military academies, giving them a sense of
rapport with each other as well as some distance from the civilian
system. Military salons appeared in which questions of strategy were
debated, apparently quite freely. Some questioned the wisdom of
the battle plans of revolutionary war heroes, and even the question
of whether the army should be a party army (dangjun) or a state
army (guojun) was considered an acceptable topic. Whether this
kind of discussion was acceptable to Deng at the time is unknown; it
certainly became taboo later.
Tiananmen and the Lessons of the Cultural Revolution.
In the spring of 1989, accumulated grievances burst into student
demonstrations in Beijing and scores of other Chinese cities.22 They
gained momentum after the death of Hu Yaobang, who was said to
have been arguing in favor of a larger education budget when he
succumbed to a fatal heart attack, and student demonstrators were
soon joined by other segments of society. The leadership showed
that it had learned several lessons from the Cultural Revolution.
One was to avoid having the army become involved with the
demonstrators. As a case in point, an April 28 directive from the
Shenyang Military District stated that
Any person sent out on business or a mission must be educated
well and strictly instructed not to become a looker-on, not to join
any debates, and not to participate in any trouble. No officers or
soldiers are permitted to go among the students to network, and
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still less should they ever allow students to come among them to
network.23

Three weeks later, CMC vice-chair Yang Shangkun promised
Deng Xiaoping that “These protests are not going to spread to
officers or soldiers in the military.”24 In late May, the country’s
organizational machinery was mobilized to ensure that military
officials, their staffs, and their families refrained from supporting
the demonstrations.25
A second lesson of the Cultural Revolution that the leadership
tried to apply to the demonstrations was to avoid factionalism. The
need for officers to be “unified in their thinking” and to observe
discipline was a constant theme. Military regions were expected to
announce their support for the martial law order. Units from many
parts of the country were brought in to quell the demonstrations
in the capital city, presumably as a sign that the PLA was indeed
unified and to avoid placing the responsibility for the suppression
on any one army or commander.
A third lesson from the Cultural Revolution that the leadership
tried to apply was to ensure support for the PLA among the
population. Troops were mobilized to do good deeds for local
people, and their activities in doing so were well-publicized.26 Again
and again, top leaders assured the population that the army would
not use force.27
As previously mentioned, learning lessons from the past does
not necessarily mean that the lessons can be successfully applied in
new situations. And so it was in the spring of 1989. The attempt to
create an appearance of unity within the PLA was far from perfect:
there, as elsewhere in Chinese society, the declaration of martial law
was controversial. Different military regions cabled their support for
martial law at different times during the following weeks, leading to
speculation that there was considerable disagreement within them
on the wisdom of the leadership’s decision. To the horror of senior
leaders, one general, the commander of the 38th Army, refused to
enforce the order and checked into a hospital.28 Eight others signed
a letter requesting that troops not enter Beijing and that martial law
not be enforced there.29 The PLA’s General Political Department
detailed four different kinds of “wrong thinking” that had gained
some influence in the military:
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• some officer and troops did not take seriously the student movement’s
threat to stability;
• some thought the movement might help to combat the rampant corruption
in Chinese society;
• some were afraid that, if the troops got too actively involved in resolving
civil disorders, they might be drawn into factional disputes among the
masses, as had happened in the Cultural Revolution [emphasis added];
• some felt that stemming domestic social disorder was the job of civilian
leaders, not the military.30

A report from the PLA navy revealed that doubts existed within
its ranks as well. Some naval personnel continued to esteem Zhao
Ziyang and did not wish to condemn him. Others worried about
instability in the Party’s leadership group, which had expelled Hu
Yaobang only 2 years before Zhao. There was also reluctance to
believe that a tiny minority of conspirators could have aroused
such widespread popular support. Many navy men argued that
the party leadership should examine why the turmoil had occurred
and learn from it: they should take a strong stand against bourgeois
liberalization, corruption, rising disparities in income levels, and the
worsening crime rate.31
If the commander of the 38th had been sympathetic to the
demonstrators, the commander of the 27th was perceived as
much more hostile, thereby undercutting the leadership’s aim of
demonstrating that the PLA was united in support of the declaration
of martial law. The 27th was commanded by a nephew of Chinese
president and principal CMC vice-chair Yang Shangkun. As is clear
from the Tiananmen Papers, Yang, with Premier Li Peng and Deng
Xiaoping himself, were instrumental in decisionmaking regarding
the demonstrations. A recently declassified June 6, 1989, cable from
the American Embassy describes the 27th as guarding an overpass
as if poised for attack by other PLA units.32 The Secretary of State’s
briefing for the morning of the same day reported clashes between
military units with more considered possible, especially if troops
were ordered into other cities. It added that soldiers had been heard
telling students that had they not been issued ammunition they
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would have fired on other army units. In addition to confirming
dissension among military units, this reinforces a large number
of eyewitness accounts of fraternization between soldiers and
demonstrators. The briefing goes on to mention that “the large
number of armored vehicles and military trucks destroyed by
protesters suggest collusion by troops in at least some cases.”33
The briefing for June 7 reports “widespread rumors and leaks to
Hong Kong media suggest[ing] that at least some leaders may have
envisioned an outcome that would blame most atrocities on the
27th Army, relieve its top commanders, and remove senior officials
who ordered armed action against civilians.”34 A note of skepticism
must be introduced here: American military and other government
analysts who were in Beijing at the time have questioned the validity
of several State Department cables, feeling that they exaggerate the
degree of dissension among PLA units.35 Clearly, the leadership had
difficulty in applying its Cultural Revolution lesson that factionalism
must be avoided.
Observers, noting the types of heavy weaponry present in the
Tiananmen Square, opined that these were far in excess of what
was needed to quell unarmed civilian demonstrators and surmised
that a power struggle must be in progress. If so, the outcome had
one clear loser: Deng’s second chosen successor, Zhao Ziyang.
Like his predecessor, Hu Yaobang, Zhao lacked support from the
military. A heavily-excised Central Intelligence Agency document
dated February 9, 1989--i.e., well before the demonstrations began-predicted
. . . we suspect that Zhao could become increasingly vulnerable
and even fall within the next twelve to eighteen months if China’s
economic and social problems persist or worsen . . . were some of
Zhao’s more powerful critics among party elders . . . join forces
with senior military and security officials against Zhao in a crisis,
as they did against Hu Yaobang, we doubt that Deng would be
able or even willing to save him.36

This, of course, is precisely what happened. A new successor,
Jiang Zemin, was promptly named. Although he had no military
experience, the military, somewhat surprisingly, agreed to accept
him as CMC chair, freeing Deng Xiaoping to resign that position
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in November 1989. Speculations that Yang Shangkun and his halfbrother, Yang Baibing, would actually be in charge of the day-to-day
running of the military were initially reinforced when Jiang candidly
admitted the obvious: he had no military experience, and his abilities
fell far short of the demands of the position.37 He asked for the help
of seasoned veterans on the CMC. Yang Baibing did, in fact, do
many troop inspections and “the Yang family village” remained
powerful in the military--until 1992, when Deng Xiaoping removed
them from office, presumably to clear the way for Jiang to establish
his authority over the PLA and to reduce factionalism. Once again,
PLA leaders should have reflected on the lack of rewards for loyalty.
Thereafter, Jiang moved quickly to bolster his military support. He
spent considerable time on well-publicized visits to military units,
even those stationed in distant areas, and created new billets for full
generals. Pay raises were enacted. Military region commanders and
commissars were reshuffled and retirement ages lowered, allowing
Jiang to more easily create an officer cadre that would be likely to
back him. It is clear that Jiang had learned the lesson that the top
leader of the party must have the support of the PLA.
The army emerged from the confrontation with its popular
image badly scarred. In using force against mostly unarmed
demonstrators, particularly after top leaders had repeatedly assured
the population that this would not happen, it had ceased to become
the People’s Liberation Army--precisely as a number of commanders
had argued would happen at the time the declaration of martial law
was issued. The people’s army had moved against the people. The
leadership praised the PLA for its heroic efforts in smashing the
subversive plots of a small number of “black hand” conspirators,
though most civilians appeared to view these efforts to praise the
military with great disdain. Despite the public manifestations of
praise, the leadership was plainly worried about dissension within
the military: troops and officers endured lengthy study sessions
designed to internalize the idea that the army owed its allegiance
exclusively to the party, whose orders it must obey unswervingly
and unquestioningly. Officers and enlistees took loyalty oaths.
Those who had refused to enforce martial law were punished,
though with minimal publicity. This contrasted sharply with the
leadership’s willingness to vilify student leaders and put them on
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trial.38 The leaders may have been concerned that overt chastisement
of military figures would draw unwanted attention to factional rifts
within the PLA that it had taken considerable pains to deny. They
may also have reasoned that, the more quietly conducted the purges,
the less likely they were to elicit a defensive backlash from officers
who feared that they might become the next target.
Predictions that PLA recruitment would suffer as a result of the
military’s actions at Tiananmen were not borne out: the economic
contraction that occurred the next year encouraged many young
men who might otherwise have sought to avoid military service to
sign up. The military may have learned lessons from this as well:
first, that the state of the economy has a more important effect on
recruitment than the PLA’s image. And second, that in China as
elsewhere, memories tend to be short-term.
Conclusions.
The experiences of the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen
Square demonstrations show that, in time of crisis, the leadership
must rely on the military. Unfortunately, they also show that the
leadership should not rely too heavily on the military, lest the
rewards that the military demands be too high. In theory, a balance
must be struck between reliance and over-reliance. A leader must
have the support of the military, but must never allow the military,
or any faction thereof, to become too dominant. In time of crisis,
however, it is likely to be very difficult for the leader to decide
precisely where this delicate balancing point lies. When his survival
depends on immediate action, the leader’s bargaining power may be
severely constricted.
From the PLA’s vantage point, the lessons must be that loyalty
to the commander-in-chief has too often not resulted in reciprocal
loyalty to the military, or to the factions within the military that
supported him. Some commanders at both the time of the Cultural
Revolution and Tiananmen were acutely aware of the pitfalls of
intervention; those who spoke out suffered for doing so, even as the
PLA as a whole suffered for obeying orders.
Some lessons do not need to be learned, since party leaders have
always known them. But they are very difficult to operationalize
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because they stem from fundamental contradictions in ideology.
These relate, first, to the concept of a “people’s” army and, second,
to a people’s army which is commanded by “the party.” With regard
to the first, if the army is the people’s army but the military is told
to suppress the expressed desires of the people, how will it react?
During the Cultural Revolution, the PLA was unable to determine
which factions were the true Maoists, and confusion resulted.
During the Tiananmen demonstrations, it was told that, although
the students’ demands had some merit, a few “black hands” were
manipulating the demonstrations. Yet in the end the PLA was
ordered to move indiscriminately against all the demonstrators
rather than a few black hands. Evidence presented above indicates
that significant numbers of military men questioned the validity of
such orders.
As for the second, a dilemma that emerges from the experiences
of both the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen demonstrations
is, if the PLA owes loyalty to the party, who speaks for the party?
During the Cultural Revolution, it was unequivocally Mao Zedong
--but even then, there were conflicting factional pressures on Mao
that resulted in conflicting policies, causing confusion within the
PLA. Deng Xiaoping, though not quite the commanding figure
that Mao had been, could still claim to speak for the party, and was
able to bring most reluctant commanders into line. In the Cultural
Revolution, the party did not split to any meaningful degree
between Mao and, for example, Liu Shaoqi. During the Tiananmen
demonstrations, the Party in the person of Deng was able to give
clear orders dismissing Zhao Ziyang--even though Zhao held the
highest formal position in the party and Deng did not--and have the
PLA back those orders. But no subsequent leader appears likely to
possess the authority of Mao or Deng. Jiang Zemin has attempted
to forestall any confusion on this issue by popularizing a mantra
wherein everyone must pledge loyalty to the party leadership with
himself as “the core.” But should a future crisis arise with different
leaders expressing different opinions on how to solve it, the PLA
may not so readily fall into line. It could choose which leader to
support, or split, with different segments of the PLA choosing to
support different claimants to power. And an army ordered to
suppress the popular will might, on the basis of experiences derived
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from the Cultural Revolution and Tiananmen, opt not to do so.
To return to the questions posed at the beginning of this
chapter, lessons were learned from both the Cultural Revolution and
Tiananmen experiences, and in general they were: first, the correct
lessons, and second, had application beyond the specific scenarios
that brought them forth. Party and government learned somewhat
different lessons than the PLA. Important lessons for future Chinese
leaderships are, then, not to put the PLA in the position of having
to decide who speaks for the party and not to put it in a position of
having to challenge the popular will. Reciprocally, the military has
learned that it should act only on the basis of unequivocally phrased
and legally issued orders. It has also learned that loyalty in doing
so does not necessarily guarantee the survival of individual PLA
leaders, and that the higher the profile of the loyal military leader,
the more likely he is to be removed. Whether these are lessons that,
once learned, can actually be applied in future scenarios remains to
be seen.
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CHAPTER 13
SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS:
LESSONS LEARNED
Andrew Scobell
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officially celebrated its 75th
anniversary in 2002. The date of the Nanchang Uprising--August
1, 1927--is taken as the birth date of the PLA. This anniversary also
marked the passing of 75 years of civil-military relations in the
Chinese communist era. This chapter examines the lessons the PLA
and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have learned over the
past 75 years, with a focus on the critical episodes in civil-military
relations.
Of course, it is not just the PLA but also the CCP that survived
these trials. The two entities have had been intimately linked over
the past three-quarters of a century, and it sometimes has been hard
to identify where one ended and the other one began. But this
does not mean that the lessons of the history of communist civilmilitary relations in China are simply synonymous with party-army
relations.1 Certainly, the relationship between the CCP and the PLA
has been the most important one in civil-military relations. Also
important, however, are two other relationships: those between
the armed forces and Chinese society and between the armed
forces and the Chinese state. The former relationship tends to be
under-appreciated, while the latter relationship is often ignored.
Although these links obviously have not supplanted the PLA-CCP
tie, I contend that these two relationships are becoming increasingly
important. Moreover, soldiers are drawing lessons from the armysociety and army-state relationships.
This chapter examines five critical episodes to consider what
lessons the PLA and CCP have gleaned from each: the Long March
(1934-35), the PLA intervention in the Cultural Revolution (1967),
the Lin Biao incident (1971), the Tiananmen incident (1989), and
what I call “creeping Guojiahua” (1980s to present). I contend that
these are the five episodes that have had (and continue to have) the
most significant impact on civil-military relations during the past
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three-quarters of a century. I focus in particular on the fifth episode
because it not only continues to unfold but also because it holds the
most important ramifications for the future of civil-military relations
in 21st century China. In each of the five cases, I present what I judge
to be the official and unofficial lessons learned by the CCP and the
PLA. Lastly, I assess what overall lesson(s) have been gleaned from
these five episodes combined.
EPISODE ONE: THE LONG MARCH (1934-35)
The Long March is the most celebrated episode in Chinese
Communist history and is legitimately considered to be a watershed
event in 20th century China. While arguably marking the lowest
point in the fortunes of the fledgling movement, it was certainly
a turning point. The Long March was a strategic retreat begun
in October 1934 by tens of thousands of communist fighters and
supporters from the communist base area in Jiangxi Province in
south central China to escape destruction at the hands of the military
forces of the Kuomintang (KMT) government of Chiang Kai-shek.
The trek ended a year and some 6,000 miles later in Shaanxi Province
in northwest China when a ragtag band of survivors arrived and
established a new base area. This move allowed the communist
movement to survive, regroup, and launch its ultimately successful
bid to seize power in Beijing.
Recent research suggests that some of the conventional
assumptions about the Long March are questionable. For example,
it now seems evident that Mao did not assume full control of the
party and army until after the Long March.2 Nevertheless, the
Long March constitutes a seminal event in Mao’s ascendancy to
paramount leader of the Chinese communist movement.
Lessons of the Long March for the Party.
According to the official Party version of events, the primary
lesson of the Long March was that Mao Zedong’s accession to top
leader of the Chinese Communist movement saved the day. Party
history dates Mao’s assumption of leadership of the CCP and PLA
from the Zunyi Conference reportedly held in January 1935. The
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“Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since
the Founding of the People’s Republic of China” proclaims:
This [Mao taking the reins of power] saved the Red Army and the
Central Committee of the Party which were then in critical danger
and subsequently made it possible to defeat Zhang Guotao’s
splittism, bring the Long March to a triumphant conclusion and
open up new vistas for the Chinese revolution.3

Lessons of the Long March for Army.
According to the official PLA interpretation, the Long March
is today seen as the model of successful civil-military relations for
decades in post-1949 China in at least two respects: (1) the close
interrelationships between the Army and the Party, and between the
Army the people; (2) and the Party commanding the gun.
The communist movement only survived the Long March
because of the close cooperation between party and military leaders.
In fact there was considerable leadership overlap between the
Party and Army leaders. Dubbed “dual role elites,” these people
essentially doubled as both civilian and military leaders, were
typified by individuals like Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.4 “Under
the leadership of the Party Center with Mao Zedong as the core, the
entire Party, entire Army, and entire people together achieved great
revolutionary unity on the Long March.”5 Overlapping party-army
elites tended to translate into close civil-military coordination.6 The
second lesson was the necessity of the Army’s subordination to Party
control. According to the official 70-year anniversary history of the
PLA produced by the Academy of Military Sciences: “The People’s
Army is loyal to the Party; the gun always listens to the orders of the
Party--this is the most important historical lesson [zui zhongyao de
lishi jingyan] of the Long March.”7
The trek also highlighted the importance of cultivating popular
support. The lesson for the PLA (and CCP) is that it would have
to rely on close ties to the masses and strong popular support to
survive. While people in most locales were friendly or at least not
actively hostile to the Chinese communist forces, there were many
groups who literally did battle with the Long Marchers. In the saga
recounted by Edgar Snow in Red Star Over China, even though his
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informants claimed the Reds were “welcomed everywhere by the
mass of the peasantry,” official statistics reveal that the Marchers
fought “an average of almost a skirmish a day.”8 If the communist
movement was going to wage a successful “People’s War,” then
very careful attention would have to be paid to public relations, and
particularly to the reputation of the movement’s soldiers. The “three
rules and eight points for attention” first formulated in 1928, were
reemphasized in the aftermath of the Long March.
To sum up, the Long March was quite literally a near-death
experience for the Party and the Army--one from which some
sobering lessons were drawn.
EPISODE TWO: PLA INTERVENTION IN THE CULTURAL
REVOLUTION (1967)
According to some interpretations, the Cultural Revolution has
its origins in civil-military tensions. Certainly PLA propaganda
and cultural entities were “center stage” in the preliminary phases.9
Mao Zedong appeared to interpret the historical play “Hai Rui
Dismissed from Office” as an allegorical attack on Mao’s 1959 purge
of Marshal Peng Dehuai. The most prominent critique of the play by
Yao Wenyuan first appeared in the PLA’s newspaper, the Liberation
Army Daily, in November 1965--one day before it was published in
the CCP’s mouthpiece, the People’s Daily. Then, in early 1966, Mao’s
wife Jiang Qing, used the “Seminar on Military Arts and Literature
Work” for what turned out to be the prelude to the Cultural
Revolution.
Nevertheless, the PLA proper remained on the periphery of
the Cultural Revolution--with the notable exception of turmoil in
military educational institutions--until early 1967 when Mao ordered
the military to “support the left.” Until quite recently, the PLA’s
intervention in the Cultural Revolution tended to be overlooked by
both Chinese and overseas analysts. In China the most authoritative
book about the Cultural Revolution, published in the mid-1980s by
Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, had virtually nothing to say on the subject.10
This changed with the publication of Liberation Army in the Cultural
Revolution published in 1989 by the Chinese Communist Party
Affairs Materials Publishing House.11 The majority of the torrent
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of military memoirs published in the Post-Mao era tends to gloss
over the period although some, such as those by Chen Zaidao and
Zhang Yunsheng, do address the experiences of soldiers during the
Cultural Revolution in some detail.12 Studies published outside
China focusing on this as a case study then emerged in the 1990s,
building on the work of earlier analyses of the Cultural Revolution
and providing a richer, more nuanced understanding of this
tumultuous event.13
In early January 1967 Mao and the Central Cultural Revolutionary
Group (CCRG) ordered radicals to make “seizures of power” but the
effort enjoyed little success. As a result, on January 23, 1967, the PLA
was instructed to “support the masses of the revolutionary left.”
This, too, did not have the desired effect, so on March 19, the CMC
ordered the PLA to intervene and restore public order. Officially
the armed forces were directed to “support the Left, the workers,
the peasants, and institute military control and military training.”14
In effect this meant that the PLA was ordered to intervene with one
arm tied behind its back. Most units were not armed and had severe
restrictions placed on the conditions in which they were permitted
to use force.15 It was not until early autumn that the military was
permitted to take the kid gloves off. Finally, on September 5, 1967,
the Central Committee, State Council, CMC and the CCRG, reflecting
a remarkable degree of unity, jointly gave the PLA sweeping latitude
to use any means necessary to reestablish law and order in the
country.16 By October 1968, every province and autonomous region
in China was under military control (jun guan), formally governed
by a “Revolutionary Committee” that was dominated by the PLA.17
Lessons of the Cultural Revolution for Party.
The Army was both the most energetic agent of the paramount
party leader and his critical last line of defense. When the Cultural
Revolution seemed to be faltering, Mao directed the PLA to “support
the left.” And when the Cultural Revolution was careening out of
control and threatening to throw China into total chaos, Mao again
turned to the PLA for rescue. Just as the critical role of the military
in restoring order is officially recognized, so, too, is the destructive
impact this effort had on the PLA. According to the “Resolution
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on Certain Questions of Party History”: “The chaos [of the Cultural
Revolution] was such that it was necessary to send in the People’s
Liberation Army . . . [and] it played a positive role in stabilizing the
situation but it also produced some negative consequences.”18
Lessons of the Cultural Revolution for Army.
Mao declared that, for the “Three Supports and Two Militaries”
policy to be successful, “[t]here must be no chaos in the army.”19 In
other words, the PLA must avoid getting infected by the elite strife
in the party-state and mass conflict rampant in Chinese society
and every other institution. The overriding unofficial lesson of the
Cultural Revolution was not to let political upheaval in the Party spill
over into the Army. Because of the PLA’s intimate relationship with
the CCP, the military almost inevitably got embroiled in intense party
elite power struggles. Senior generals were adamant that radicals
should not be allowed to attack and destroy the PLA. This was the
essence of views emotionally expressed by senior military leaders
in verbal skirmishes with party radicals at a series of high level
meetings in February 1967. These confrontations were collectively
dubbed the “February Adverse Current” by Cultural Revolution
radicals who sought to depict the military response as a negative
reactionary effort aimed at sabotaging the Cultural Revolution.20 At
a February 13, 1967 meeting in Zhongnanhai, Marshal Xu Xiangqian
stated emotionally: “We’ve devoted our whole lives to this army. Do
you think the soldiers of the People’s Army will simply let a few of
you [radicals] destroy it?”21 At a meeting of the CMC, also in early
February 1967, Marshal Ye Jianying erupted in anger: “You [radicals]
have made a mess of the party, government, and industry. But even
that doesn’t satisfy you, so now you want to wreck the army!”22
The PLA’s relationship with the people also suffered as soldiers
were forced to intervene in internal disturbances and attempt the
virtually impossible task of distinguishing the good elements from
the bad. There was tremendous frustration by soldiers at their
inability to determine who were the good guys and who were
the bad guys. Lin Biao’s secretary, Zhang Yunsheng, recounts a
telephone call his office received in early 1967 from a staff officer of
the Jilin Military Region Commander:
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Chairman Mao advocates supporting the broad revolutionary
masses of the left. We will follow this firmly. But, who are
the rightists? In the Changchun area there are many mass
organizations with different viewpoints. Who should we support?
Because of this issue the provincial military commander has asked
me to telephone you and ask for your instructions . . . .

Zhang recalls: “This telephone call troubled me. They didn’t
know ‘who the leftists were,’ and I didn’t know either . . . .”23
To conclude, the PLA’s wholesale intervention in the Cultural
Revolution in the late 1960s and years of defacto military rule that
followed at the provincial and local levels had a profound impact on
civil-military relations in China. The negative consequences of this
extensive and prolonged military involvement were only reinforced
by the so-called “Lin Biao incident.”
EPISODE THREE: LIN BIAO INCIDENT (1971)
In the official account of the incident, Lin Biao was guilty of
launching a coup d’etat. After the alleged coup--code named “Project
571”--was discovered, Lin and his immediate entourage, including
his wife and son, all conveniently perished in a mysterious airplane
crash while trying to escape from China. According to the Resolution
on Party history of 1981: “In 1970-71 the counter-revolutionary Lin
Biao Clique plotted to capture supreme power and attempted an
armed counter-revolutionary coup d’etat.”24
The official account has been significantly called into question
in recent years. Indeed the party line version seems implausible for
a variety of reasons.25 Carefully documented studies suggest that
Lin Biao played little, if any, role in a coup effort. Indeed, Lin Biao
seems to be an unjustly maligned figure.26 In these accounts Lin Biao
“comes across as reclusive, shy, eccentric, with a host of ailments
both real and imagined.”27 This evidence makes it implausible to
view Lin as much more than a virtual bystander to a coup d’etat
attempt. It seems more likely that Lin Biao’s son, Lin Liguo, and
perhaps Lin Biao’s wife, Ye Qun, were the prime instigators of an
ill-conceived plot to engineer a family power seizure without the full
knowledge of Lin.28
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Lessons of the Lin Biao Incident for the Party.
The official Party lesson of the Lin Biao Affair is that it is essential
to keep the Army loyal to the Party. Unofficially, the lesson of this
episode was that a military revolt or coup d’etat cannot be completely
ruled out.29 Therefore it is critical to ensure that the paramount leader
commands the gun because in reality it is he who controls the Army on
behalf of the party via the CMC.30
Lessons of the Lin Biao Incident for the Army:
Keeping the Army outside of intra-party conflict is important
(but Party conflict inevitably drags in the PLA). While it is difficult
for the PLA to avoid getting drawn into elite conflict, this should
be avoided if at all possible. Strengthening the party-army link,
of course, is the official solution. But decades later for many in
the Army, the answer is to loosen significantly the intimate links
between the Party and the Army (see below).
EPISODE FOUR: TIANANMEN (1989)
The June 4 Incident, or “liu si shijian” (literally “six-four incident”)
as it is referred to in China, has probably attracted more international
attention than any other event in post-1949 history.31 While it is
certainly recognized as a seminal event by security analysts within
China, it has not been the focus of such study inside the country as
it has outside. This, however, does not mean it has been ignored
or that lessons for the PLA have not been drawn. Indeed, it is the
subject of considerable attention. The official 70th year history of the
PLA calls the episode a “serious trial” (yansu de kaoyan).32
While the PLA was reluctant to intervene in 1989, it eventually
did so when given clear-cut orders that came from paramount leader
Deng Xiaoping. The exchange between a Western journalist and a
PLA officer shortly after martial law had been declared in Beijing is
instructive. A reporter for the German news magazine Der Spiegel
asked the soldier why the troops did not force their way through the
human barrier of Beijing citizens blocking the column’s way forward
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to Tiananmen Square. The officer answered: “We have not received
an order [to do so] yet.”33 By the time they did receive orders to use
all means necessary to march to the Square, the crowds had turned
ugly, and China’s leaders appeared united in their desire to end the
unrest. The soldiers became convinced that Beijing (and hence all
of China) was hovering on the brink of chaos, and the PLA had no
choice but to suppress the uprising in the capital.34 Nevertheless,
what is perhaps most striking to this writer after reading The
Tiananmen Papers is “how marginalized or acquiescent almost all
uniformed and retired military leaders appear to have been during
the deliberations on how to respond to the demonstrations of
1989.”35
Lessons of June 4 for Party.
The PLA is the critical last line of defense for the CCP. Therefore
the Party must do everything it can to ensure the PLA remains
loyal and capable. As Deng Xiaoping observed a few days after
the massacre, the PLA is the Party’s “great wall of steel.” The late
paramount leader also said on June 9 that the event was “a trial and
that the Army had successfully passed the test [yi ge kaoyan, kaoshi shi
hegede].”36 The related lesson that the Party took from this experience
was that the PLA continues to have a “dual mission”: in addition
to external defense, the Army bears ultimate responsibility for
internal security. This lesson is very evident in the way the Army’s
dual mission has been stressed since 1989.37 At the same time an
unofficial lesson is that the Party must try to avoid putting the PLA
is a similar situation. The development of an effective nonlethal
internal security force capable of dealing decisively with domestic
unrest is the answer, and, as a result, the paramilitary People’s Army
Police (PAP) has been expanded and beefed up.
The ultimate unofficial lesson of June 4 for the CCP is that the
Army is all that stands between communism and post-communism
in China. While officially the Army is lauded as the staunch defender
of the CCP, the pause that gives cause for concern is PLA hesitation
in the spring of 1989. Certainly this is far different from disobedience
or revolt: while there were some instances of insubordination, they
were few and scattered.38 Of course, the prime reason for the
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military’s hesitation in 1989 was a very public split within the CCP
leadership at the time. Deng Xiaoping’s remarks days after the
crackdown about the pivotal role of “veteran comrades” of the Long
March generation in suppressing the “turmoil” serves to underscore
what is left unsaid: what would have been outcome without these
staunch Long Marchers?39 When the events of 1989 in China-including the unrest in Tibet--are viewed as part of the turbulence of
a larger “international macroclimate [guoji daqihou]” which swept the
communist world, Beijing rode out the storm remarkably well.40 In
another sense though, the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union only underscores for Beijing the frailty
of party-army relations.41
Lessons of June 4 for Army.
The first official lesson of June 4 for the military was that the PLA
must avoid getting dragged into confronting mass unrest, and the
Party must try harder in future to ensure this by beefing up PAP,
for example. In the Academy of Military Sciences’ official 70-year
anniversary history of the PLA ,the establishment of the PAP gets
due attention.42 The second official lesson of June 4 is that the PLA
must continue to work hard at Army-Society relations. In the Army’s
official account of the June 4 incident, firsthand accounts of soldiers
involved in the operation abound, and in many cases a sense of
anger and outrage at the violence and indignities inflicted on them
by the people of Beijing. As one soldier said, “Later, some people
said those people surrounding military vehicles were relatively
‘friendly.’ Their symbols of friendship were bricks, stones, liquor
bottles, and even things that couldn’t be thrown.43
In the years since 1989, there has been a noticeable trend in
official propaganda pronouncements to stress the PLA’s loyalty
to “the people.” In the same breath that the Army’s loyalty to the
Party is mentioned, loyalty to the people, country, and socialism is
included.44 Moreover, it is no accident that Deng Xiaoping in postJune 4 pep talk to Army brass called the CCP’s soldiers: “the most
beloved people [zui ke’ai de ren].”45 This harks back to the reportage
literature [baogao wenxue] of the Chinese People’s Volunteers in
Korea that originally appeared in the People’s Daily on April 11,
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1951.46 This is one of the most well-known and reprinted pieces
of writing in post-1949 China--it has been read by generations of
middle school students.
In the aftermath of June 4, there was a clear need to rebuild the
PLA’s reputation in the eyes of the masses. Many soldiers seem to
believe that the people’s army must maintain contact with people-and be seen to make contributions to economic construction and
flood relief, for example. The contribution of the PLA to combating
the serious floods of the late 1990s received widespread media
attention. According to the October 2000 Chinese Defense White
Paper, “more than 300,000 officers and men participated” in flood
relief efforts around the country in 1998 alone.47 The PLA takes
seriously a commitment to continue its legacy of dedicated service
to the Chinese people. The soldiers who marched in the military
parade commemorating the 50th anniversary of the PRC in October
1999 chanted “serve the people.”48
Implicitly there is a sense in the PLA that Party incompetence
is to blame in permitting the protests of 1989 to get out of control.
As a result, the Army was caught in the middle and forced to
confront the people. The June 4 incident not only resulted in death
and destruction in the PLA, but also severely damaged the PLA’s
prestige in the eyes of Beijing residents and many other Chinese.49
EPISODE FIVE: GUOJIAHUA: AN IDEA THAT WON’T DIE
(1980s)
Since even before the incapacitation and death of Deng Xiaoping
in the mid-1990s, civil-military relations in China have been in a
state of flux. The party-army dual role elite configuration--also
known as “interlocking directorates”--has gone the way of the
dinosaurs.50 The official mantra remains that the Army must obey
the Party, especially the core of the so-called third generation of
party leaders, and most in the Army do not vehemently oppose a
continued link. Nevertheless, discussion of guojiahua (“statification”
or “nationalization” and sometimes dubbed “feizhengzhihua”
[depoliticization]) continues unabated.51 What guojiahua refers to is
the process of transforming the PLA from a purely party army into
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more of a state military. Ideally, this would mean an armed forces
bound to uphold a law-based state grounded in constitutionalism.52
As Shiping Zheng underscores, there has been a natural ongoing
tension between the party and the state in post-1949 China.53
Moreover, the PLA officially is supposed to owe its loyalty to
the Party, State, Chinese people, and socialism. While the most
important of these allegiances is clearly to the CCP, the others
are also viewed as important, at least for propaganda purposes.
However, there is no acknowledgement that there might be tensions
or conflict between these loyalties.54
Of course the most important relationship for the PLA after that
with the Party, is its link to the people; after all, it is the “People’s
Army.” At least one U.S. analyst argues that the Army’s links to
society are becoming increasingly significant.55 Indeed, the PLA
claims to have a sacred bond with the people of China. According to
the late Marshal He Long, the PLA was “the first army in history that
. . . really belongs to the people.”56 It is supposed to serve the people,
and work on their behalf for the betterment of the country. What
distinguishes the PLA from other so-called “professional” militaries
is that it is not merely a fighting force but a productive force that
contributes to national construction.57 This bond with the people
requires the PLA to be out living and working among the civilian
populace.58 It also requires reaffirmation through regular wellpublicized actions on the part of Chinese soldiers, such as the efforts
of PLA personnel to combat floods in the late 1990s noted earlier.
The official Party line is that the PLA is NOT a professional
army. Indeed, it is foreign-based analysts of Chinese civil-military
relations (this author included!) who continually seek to impose this
conceptual framework on the PLA.59 In many cases--including the
Army’s performance in the spring of 1989--analysts might need to
acknowledge that “professionalism” may have little or even nothing
“to do with it.”60 The PLA prefers to evaluate itself in terms of
modernization, revolutionization, and regularization, and this is
the metric that at least one U.S. scholar of civil-military relations has
used.61
What advocates of guojiahua hope is that the PLA is becoming
more of a national or state army and less of a party one. It is hard
to say with a high degree of certainty whether this is primarily a
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military or civilian idea. What is clear is the topic has considerable
appeal both among the officer corps and civilian elites.62 Many
soldiers find the idea appealing because they hope it will keep the
PLA out of political turmoil while ensuring adequate funding and
support. This will make the Chinese armed forces operate in a more
stable and predictable environment more like the situation they
believe their counterparts have in Western countries.63 Younger
civilian leaders probably find it appealing because without strong
military ties or experience, they are concerned about how to ensure
Army loyalty and maintain Party control. Guojiahua offers the
promise of an effective institutionalized mechanism and model of
civilian control which has been lacking in modern China.64
In fact, the PLA has been undergoing an evolution from a
strictly party army to a party-state army for at least 20 years now.
At least legally the state bureaucracy has strengthened its power
of appointment and power of the purse over the military, although
there are ambiguities and potential tensions evident.65
The Power of Appointment.
The key organ for controlling the PLA is the CCP’s Central
Military Commission (CMC), and the top position in this body
is that of chairman. It is the Party CMC that makes all senior
PLA personnel promotion and appointment decisions. But who
decides the membership of this body? According to article 22 of
the CCP constitution, “Members of the CMC are decided by the
Central Committee.”66 Nevertheless, according to the current
PRC constitution (adopted in 1982), the executive and legislative
branches of the state have jurisdiction over the selection and then
overall supervision of senior military leaders. This constitution also
provides for a State CMC in addition to the Party one (of course, these
two CMCs are in reality one and the same).67 Hence, in September
1989, when Deng Xiaoping submitted his formal letter of resignation
as chair of the Party CMC, he also had to submit a separate letter of
resignation because he would also officially be stepping down from
his post as chair of the State CMC.68 According to article 62 of the
PRC Constitution, the National People’s Congress (NPC) “elects the
Chairman of the CMC and, upon nomination by the Chairman, [the
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power] to decide the choice of all other members of the CMC.” In
addition, technically (according to PRC Constitution article 94) the
Chairman of the CMC is “responsible to” the NPC and its Standing
Committee. Moreover, the Standing Committee is charged with
“supervising the work of the CMC” (article 67). Finally, it is China’s
State Council that is constitutionally charged with “direct[ing] and
administer[ing] the building of national defense” (article 89).
The Power of the Purse.
The defense budget must be approved by the NPC that is
officially, according to the PRC Constitution (article 57), the “highest
organ of state power.” And constitutionally, it is the NPC that has
the power of the purse over national defense. According to Article
62, the NPC has the power “to examine and approve the state budget
and report on its implementation.”
Moreover, the PLA is becoming more dependent on state
funding as extra-budgetary sources of income become fewer and
fewer. The PLA tradition of self-sufficiency, while still important
rhetorically, reflects reality less and less. By the 1980s this comprised
two dimensions: internal efforts either PLA-wide or by specific units
to supply food and equipment to soldiers, and business operations
for profit sanctioned by the CCP leadership to allow the military
to supplement its modest defense budget. Military operation of
its own farms, factories, etc., has a long history in China, and this
tradition of producing significant amounts of its own food and
supplies continues.69 But by 1998, the business interests of the PLA
were no longer considered desirable and the military was directed to
divest its commercial concerns.
The ultimate goal of divestiture (yet to be realized) is to make
the PLA totally dependent on state funds and as such this promotes
guojiahua. According to article 35 of the 1997 National Defense
Law: “The state shall ensure the necessary spending for national
defense.” Divestiture then is best conceived of not as the outcome
of a civil-military struggle but rather as simply another chapter in
a larger drama witnessing the evolution of the PLA from a strictly
party army to a party-state army. The decision to divest the PLA of
its commercial operations appears to have been a consensus party-
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army decision--each agreed it was detrimental to its interests.70
For the Party, the lesson of the PLA’s commercial activities was
that the corruption it fostered undermined party supremacy. The
corruption threatened to weaken the military’s loyalty/ obedience
to the CCP. Ironically, one result of divestiture was to make the PLA
more a national army--to make it more dependent on state coffers.
The lesson of the PLA’s commercial ventures for the military itself
was that it bred corruption that undermined morale, lessened
combat readiness, and soiled the PLA’s public reputation.71
Lessons of Guojiahua for the Party.
Officially, there is no contradiction or conflict between the PLA’s
loyalty to Party, its loyalty to the state, its loyalty to the people, and
its loyalty to socialism. Nevertheless, unofficially some tensions are
recognized to exist at least between the PLA’s loyalty to the Party
and its allegiance to the state. Because of this, it is important to hold
the line on the primacy of the Army’s link to the Party. Evidence
of this lesson is the regular and vocal condemnations of guojiahua
and continued political indoctrination in the PLA. Current political
work is instrumentalist--stressing obedience to the CCP rather
than inculcating the substance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong
Thought.72
Lessons of Guojiahua for the Army.
The central official lesson for the Army is that the Party remains
key but a quasi-official lesson for the PLA is that the state and
people are of growing importance. Moreover, inherent tensions
exist between the Army’s multiple allegiances to Party and State,
and Party and people. However, for the time being these are not
considered to be contradictory in the eyes of Chinese soldiers.73
All this growing attention to codification and constitutionalism
results in an evolving and complex set of relationships between
the Army, the Party, and the state. And one of the unintended
consequences of this process is to highlight the state as an alternate
focal point for the PLA’s allegiance.
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CONCLUSION
The larger lessons drawn from these five episodes in civil-military
relations are not terribly surprising for they tend to be consistent
with the lessons drawn from specific critical episodes. The Party’s
lessons from 75 years of civil-military relations focus on ensuring
continued Army loyalty, while PLA lessons focus on protecting the
military’s corporate interests, that are seen as increasingly distinct—
but certainly not divorced—from those of the CCP. Significantly,
the tensions are not between the official and unofficial lessons of the
Party but between the official and unofficial lessons of the Army.
Lessons for the Party.
The official lesson for the CCP is that it must ensure the PLA’s
unquestioned loyalty. To this end, it is essential to justify continuously
the logic of CCP control of the gun. Moreover, unofficially there is a
recognition that the Party takes the Army for granted at its own risk.
Ellis Joffe’s concept of “conditional [PLA] compliance,” co-opted
by James Mulvenon, seems most appropriate here: the Party must
buy or otherwise continually win the Army’s loyalty. The results
are increases (or at least no decreases) in defense spending and top
Party leaders cultivating senior PLA officials. Another important
unofficial lesson is that the intra-Party conflict becomes intra-army
conflict. In late 1989, Deng Xiaoping reportedly remarked: “Turmoil
in China will be unlike that in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. If
it happens in China, one faction will control part of the army and the
other another part. A civil war could then erupt.”74
Lessons for the Army.
The official arguments made by Chinese military propagandists
are that one cannot take the Army out of politics or the Party, or
take the people out of the Army. A recent extremely authoritative
articulation of the first tenet was published in the flagship academic
journal of the PLA’s premier research institute for strategic and
military affairs. The Academy of Military Sciences’ (AMS) journal,
Chinese Military Science, published an article titled “Consistently
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uphold the Party’s absolute leadership over the Army and faithfully
carry out the brilliant concept of the ‘three represents’.” While
the title suggests nothing new, the article did contain at least one
surprise. Wang Zongren, the Political Commissar of the AMS, in
support of his point that there can be no such thing as a military
without politics, went so far as to cite American military sociologist
Morris Janowitz!75 Party leadership of the Army is essential. Further,
close, positive, ties to the people are extremely important. Moreover,
soldiers are like fish and the People are like the water—one cannot
survive without the other.76
However, the official lessons for the PLA tend to contradict
directly the unofficial lessons. One unofficial admonition is to keep
the PLA out of Party infighting and above societal conflict. Yet,
as Cheng Hsiao-shih observes under the party control model: “...
conflicts between civilian and military elites are intra-Party elite
conflicts first and civilian-military conflicts second.”77 Meanwhile,
layoffs from state owned enterprises and disgruntled unemployed
or underemployed workers in urban and rural areas threaten to put
the PLA squarely in the midst of social upheaval again. Since the
1980s, a possible solution has emerged--what promises to be a “final
solution” to these seemingly unresolvable problems: guojiahua. It
is up to the Party to determine what the PLA does, but if the CCP
botches it in the eyes of soldiers, then the Army may bolt. The shift
from dual role elites to functional differentiated elites means this is
possible even if it is not highly likely. It is not necessary for PartyArmy ties to be severed, but it is certainly one extreme option.
So, why does the PLA stay a party army? The answer is
because the PLA pretty much gets what it wants out of the existing
relationship and the Party so far has skillfully conflated the party,
state, and people. Thus, as Jeremy Paltiel notes: “The elaborate
ambiguity of China’s legal and political institutions has shielded the
Chinese armed forces from a choice between loyalty to the Party and
obedience to the state.”78 Moreover, the people have only emerged
as an obvious object of Army allegiance separate and distinct from
the Party once in the past 75 years: for a few chaotic weeks in the
spring of 1989.
The civil-military lessons of the Long March fade into the
PLA’s institutional historical memory, and younger generations of
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Chinese soldiers recall the more recent and vivid firsthand lessons
of the Cultural Revolution (including the Lin Biao incident), June
4, and/or creeping guojiahua. The result may be a Party leadership
that is becoming more paranoid about Army loyalty, and a military
leadership that increasingly views the PLA’s relationship to the CCP
as sacrosanct no longer.
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